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ABSTRACTS
This thesis is concerned with the problems of negation 
as they appear in the logical writings of India* In the first 
chapter, after discussing the paradox of negative judgment, - 
how can a negative judgment be descriptive of a positive 
reality, - we have tried to present the problems discussed 
mainly in the early writings of the realist systems, namely, 
the Nyaya, the Vai£e§ika, and the Purva Mimamsa of the Bhatta 
school. The realists advocated the acceptance of a real Non­
existence as a corresponding object of a negative judgment.
I have suggested that in advancing this theory they also relied 
upon their doctrines of negative emancipation and their princip] 
of causality - ,fthe not-pre-existent-effect*tf
The second chapter is devoted to the theories of the 
Buddhist and the Prabhakara logicians. According to these 
logicians the paradox can be solved by explaining negation in 
terms of the positive factors involved in it.
In the third chapter I have tried to show that the principl 
of double negation appears to be first applied in India by the 
Buddhist logicians and that the use of double negation is at 
least as old as the theory of logical discrimination or Apoha* 
That is that the affirmation of A implies the denial of not~A.
I have also investigated the problem of ’mutual-absence1 
versus 1constant-absence1 and have discussed complex types of
negation which are unique to the later (neo-Nyaya) writings of 
India.
The fourth chapter is concerned with the epistemological 
problem: How do we know the absence of a thing?
wl have presented Kumarila Bha$faf s realistic solution 
that the absence being real must be known by an independent 
negative means of its own called "Negation11 (abhava), After 
having investigated the Buddhist theory that the knowledge of 
absence is only an inferential judgment I have pointed out that 
the inferential principle of ! anupalabdhi * or Non-perception is 
originally a Buddhist one and that the view, upheld by some 
modern scholars, that it was originated by Kumarila, is wrong. 
Lastly I have tried to describe the later Nyaya-Vaisegika 
theory according to which all negative cognitions are perceived 
through a unique relation between the absence and the locus 
which is in direct contact with the sense organs.
The first part of the fifth chapter forms a short intro­
duction to the Buddhist theory of Apoha. In the second part 
a complete English translation of the Apohasiddhi of Ratnakirti 
is provided.
In the pages under the heading of ’conclusion1 I have 
surveyed the problem of negative judgment and have tried to 
compare some Indian and Western theories of negation.
DEDICATED
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5.
P R E S A G E
In this work various Indian theories of negation are 
discussed. Therefore, its title should read "Theories of 
Negation in Indian Logic", rather than "The Theory of Negation 
in Indian Logic."
They comprise, especially, the views developed by the 
philosophers of the Nyaya and Vai$e§ika, the Purva-Mimaqisa and 
the later Buddhist logical schools. Apart from a few incident 
references, the Saijikhya, Vedinta and Jaina theories concerning 
negation have been left out of the present study. Jaina logic 
in particular' fs interesting, containing,in its later philosoph­
ical treatises many original elements. However, owing to 
limitations of time and space we were -unable to investigate 
this vast subject at the present stage of our research, and 
include it in these theories.
No independent work on Indian negation has yet come to 
light. Dr. J.F. Staal informed me that a few years ago a 
thesis on Negation (abhava) was submitted to the Hindu Universi 
of Benares. However, no further information could be obtained 
about its exact title, contents, and specific nature. Generali; 
speaking, in most of the modern works on Indian logic and 
philosophy we find a partial treatment of the subject. I 
said the treatment is ’partial1 for two reasons. (l). Neg­
ation is not studied in all its aspects, especially the aspect
of its importance for some cardinal, principles of the different 
systems of Indian philosophy. (2). When discussing the 
theories of non-Buddhist schools such as the Bhat t a-MImams a 
and the Nyaya-Vais^sika, the Buddhist view of negation is not 
taken into consideration whereas in fact the latter influenced 
the former immensely. This partial treatment, I believe, has
been the main cause of many illfoucied theories concerning
f(P
negation in£modem publications on Indian philosophy and its 
history. Here, I have in mind three well-known theories which 
are upheld by prominent scholars of our time: (a). The theory
rl‘b-X ^  ^
thati non-existence (abhava) as a category (padirtha) was not 
originally propounded in the Nyaya and Vaisefika systems and 
that it was a later addition; (b). She theory that Kumarila 
Bhaffa did not postulate ’abhava’ as an objective entity
V)
(vastibor prameya); (c). iiie theory that "non-perception"
(anupalabdhi) as the reason (hetu) of negative cognition was 
posited by Kumarila Bhatfa, himself. Hather, it was under 
Buddhist influence, incorporated by his followers. In the 
present work I have tried to show that the three theories, 
mentioned above, are not correct.
In advancing my theories I have adopted two methods:
(l). The discovery and application of new facts; (2). the 
interpretation of these facts in the context of other relevant 
cardinal principles of the systems. This was necessary because 
it seems that the logical and ontological status of ’abhava1
is not clearly expressed in the early Nyaya^Vai^epika and 
"^Mlmagisa texts. For instance, the realist view of negation is
analysed here in the light of the causal *asatkarya1 theory,
A:
i.e. the theory of the ”noj|F*pre~existent effect” , as well as 
with regard to the doctrine of negative emancipation (mok^a).
For the latter is defined as ”dutLka^ty ant abhava” , the absolute 
absence of pain. The Buddhist view of negation is studied 
with reference to the Buddhist theories of Inference (anumana) 
and logical Discrimination or Opposition (appha). Moreover, 
in order to avoid misinterpretation of the distinct views of 
negation, a special attempt has been made to compare each of 
them with the opposing theories of the other systems. For 
instance, the realist Bha£ta, Ryaya and Vaise^ika theories are 
mutually compared, as well as with reference to the Buddhist 
theories.
In general, on the question of negation, the Indian 
philosophical systems are divided into two main groups, viz., 
-^Realist and ^ Idealist. The first group consists of the systems 
in which absence is conceived as a real non-existence (abhava) 
and as such as a real object (prameya) of its corresponding 
negative cognition (abhavadhi). In spite of their mutual 
differences, the N yay a ,^v a i s e g i ka and^  Bha'f t a-Mimagisa systems 
belong to this group.
The second group comprises the later Buddhist logicians 
and the Prabhakara-Mimagiskas who reject the objectivity ascribed
to negation by the realists. According to the idealists a 
negation is based on an inferential judgment and the cognition 
of absence of a thing is only a logical synthesis (vikalpa). 
Absence of a perceptible (d^sya) thing is inferred from its 
non-perception (anupa'-labdhi) and from the perception of 
something else, viz., the bare locus (bhutalamatra). The 
suggestion of the perception of the thing negated remains as 
an imposed mental situation (dpsyatvabuddhau^samiropat).
In the present work I have utilized some of the most 
important works on Indian logic available to us to-day. Thank 
to modern explorers and investigators such as Sylvain L^vi,
G. Tucci, Rahula Sankrtyayana, and others, several fundamental 
Buddhist Sanskrit texts, supposed to be lost, were discovered 
in Nepal and Tibet. For the study of Buddhist logic the 
most important texfs were the ones by Dharmakirti (c.700 A.D.) 
and its commentaries, re-discovered by Rahula Sankrtyayana in 
Tibet. They include the ”Pramagava^ttika” and the commentarie 
by Kar^takagmin on the first chapter, and by Prajnakaragupta 
on the remaining three chapters. Dharmakirti wrote his own 
commentary called ” on the first chapter only. Only 
a few leaves of this auto-commentary were found by Rahul a 
Sankptyayana in the monastery of *Sa skya* in Tibet. However, 
he tried to restore the complete Sanskrit text from the Tibetan 
translation. This he published together with the valuable 
sub-commentary of Karpakagorain called ”syavptti-tika”. (See
Bibliography). Recently, a far more correct new 
edition of the ’’svavptti” has been published by 
Professor Raniers Gnoli (see Bibliography). This 
edition is based on MSS. discovered after Rahula 
Sahkrtyayana had published his edition. (See FVS.,
G. ed. p. XXXVII.)
These volumes are full of very interesting material 
concerning logical and philosophical problems. There 
are several quotations of Dignaga referred to by 
Dharmakirti in the svavptti and commented on by Kari^a- 
kagomin in the svavrttit$Ika. Since the original Sanskrit 
text of Dignaga1 s own work, the "Pramlnasammueaya”, has 
not yet been discovered and H.N. Randle’s ’Fragments from 
Dinnaga’ was published before the discovery of the 
svavptti. these quotations give important information 
on Dignaga*s logical theories. These Buddhist texts 
are very difficult and have not yet been translated into 
modern languages. However, especially the works of 
Th. Stcherbatslcy and F.Frauwal|ner are of immense 
importance for the understanding of these difficult 
texts. My present research is mainly based on the three 
texts mentioned above.
In addition to the analysis of the Buddhist theory 
of negation, viz., the theory of "non-perception”
(anupalabdhi) I have given a full translation of a very
difficult logical treaties, called the "Apohasiddhi”.
It. was written about 1050 A.D. by Ratnakxrti who was 
one of the last Buddhist logicians of India.- J In it 
the author refuted-the Brahmanical opponents who. , ' -
rejected this theory, of logical Discrimindtidh or ,/ -
Opposition. The text is very difficult, inasmuch, as
Ratnakirti does not clarify many issues,* taking it*for 
granted that they were well-known by the contemporary 
logicians. According; to 'Prof. Th. Stclierbalsky, it is 
"Lacking; in clearness". ( Cf • - BL. -II, p. 4Oh) : 
foreoyer, it may be "a summary*of a bigger work of' ' 
JTianasrxmitra, viz., the Ap o ha p v ak a r a nab (Vi&ef 
A. Thakur,, RM., Int. p. 13 n* 1; E. Frauwalftner, WZKM, 
vol. 38* 1932, pp. 229-234; , and the Review of HNe by 
J.W. de Jong in the lrxdo-Iranian Journal, vol. IV. i960 
£>p. 196 f.)
Prof. A. Thakur has’recently,edited twelve essays' 
of Jhanahrlmitra, under the name "Jhanasrinbandhavall" 
which he found in the collection of bansltrit MSS,® brought 
back to India by Rahula Sankrtyayana from various
monasteries in Tibet. Although.the work has been - ' "
printed it is still .awaiting its official -publication. ’ ,
On my request Prof. Thakur was kind enough*, to-forward 
to -me his proof-copy ; of the Apohapralcarana, one of the 
twelve essays of Jilanasrimxtra. I received it after 1 .
I had completed my translation of the Apohasiddhi* ^
However,- after having-compared the two texts, 1 agree 
with Thakur1 s view * that the latter work ie a summary of >
.the^former. -.We must also keep in mind that we have . A
internal evidences to'believe that Jhanasrimitra was 
the teacher (guru) of Ratnakirti. (Cf«, Thakur,
Int. pp. 19-20)o
There'are two editions of the Apohasiddhis, the 
first was edited by Haraprasad Bhastri in the ’Six 
Buddhist Nyaya Tracts’, published in the‘Bibliotheca 
Indi.cn SerieBy., Asiatic . Society of Bengal, Calcutta 1910; ; 
the second was recently edited by A. Thakur, in the
’RatnakTrtinibandhavaliT' (the twelve1 essays of r
Ratnakirti), Kashi,Prasad- Jayaswal Research Institute, 
Patna 1957® There are only a few'deviations in these; 
two ■* editions. My translation is mainly.based .'on the 
first edition which Is abbreviated by-AS. Significant 
differences in the texts have been pointed out in, foot­
notes. The second edition is abbreviated by RN.' To' 
facilitate further research,on the theory of Apoha a 
’.separate selected bibliography of this subject has 
been added. . ■ \ ‘ ^
^  - I do not. sui pose that I have said the last'word upon 
-the problems of the negative judgement in Indian logic*
However, by pointing out some of the difficulties of 
Indian philosophy and logic concerning negation, I 
hope to have given an impetus to further research on 
this topic. If this study at all succeeds in rousing 
some controversy among the academic investigators of 
Indian philosophy, I would deem my labour rewarded.
For as it is said in an Indian logical maxim: ”through
controversies we arrive at Truth" (vade vade jayate 
tattvabodha£).
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Section I. The Paradox of the Negative Judgment.
Of all philosophical problems, p erhaps, the most
complex is that of Negationfor ;,it;a.;Vjery ;charbctaf/;h^
explanation and that entails many irreconcilahld ;epibtemo-
iogica 1 and met a phys i c a I di f f ic u lties •;i If v it we re a matter ;
of pure logic, we could have evaded those problems, f or the
logician can afford to;”disregard the meaning and objective
referenceof a proposit1 on^ , but the epistemologist cannot1* \^  
li "Epistemology is int'e frne di a b e twe e n pure Tog ic a nd me t a>- 
physics^ Whereas logic deals with the formal aspects of 
. knov/ledge and metaphysics wi^ the nature of reality, epis 
V-v./' emology is coneer nedwi t H t  ^ of reality• ■ .The
> / ; logIqlan; may /diev:CgardAVhe Atieani^
;; of a proposition, but :;the' ‘AvL.^WoodV
-; 1 The Paradox of Negative Judgment, PR., Vol. ^ XLII^^b.: 4'f 
v;^ o n  the relation of pramana and 
'A'’5 prameyd ,y ^  , Vol.I, p. -:;A5&^ S^RadhakrIshhAn, 1
IP., Vol. II, pp. 43345.
The Paradox of the Negatived Judgment.implies the .
following question: How can a negative judgment be
descriptive of a reality that is admittedly, positive?
All judgments refer to some reality and the negative,
judgment is no exception to this rule* The difficulty
arises .from the fact that a reference is made to an object
in the negative judgment, while reality is understood as
* 2exclusively positive*, In the assertion ’the book is on. 
the table1 we can perceive the presence of the book on 
the table as a positive fact. But in the judgment ’the book 
is not on the table’ we certainly do not perceive any negative 
object on the table as the absence of the book per se* . The 
question is: What is the object pf this negative judgment?
Is it the (positive) book or the (negative) absence of the 
book?’ The paradox lies in the negative judgment and. its 
pbjective. Since a,reference is'made to a reality in the 
judgment, that which corresponds to it is either a negative 
or a positive fact. A negative entity does:provide an 
appropriate, object for the negative judgment but the very 
notion of/such an entity, seems almost a contradiction in
■Z „ .
ter^ ms* And if we ' do not accept a-negative.entity, we
1. M. iliriyanna, Studies*, p. 138.
2.- In Buddhist logic the terms existence, and reality Hare
convertible and-mean ultimate reality.11 Th.Stcherbatsky, 
BL. , Vol. I, p. 69; MB.., 1.15.
3. L. Wood, loc. cit. , p., 413. ■ ,
shall have,, to conceive the negative judgment;,as an
affirmative assertion, -'A positive rendering of the
’ : ' “ ’ ; \  v/.v .• 1 • • ! ' r: ' ' -t J
negative judgment1 will be;necessary*
■ Among the Indian thinkers, the Nylaya-Vaidesikas2
T — 1 3 *'and the Bhatja 'Mxmarasakas, being-pluralistic realists, 
posited a negative entity as the,object of the negative ' 
judgment. The schools\of the Prsfohlakara MTmamsa and 
the Buddhists were inclined to render it as a 'complex of 
.affirmative judgments1 which refers to some positive
entity.; ■ . ■ *
, 1. That means .negation is "equivalent to a .complex of
affirmative judgments*11, ; Hiriyanna., Studies., p* 147; ’
, See also L. Wood, loc.citi ^
2. On the relation between the Nyaya and the Vai^(fesika 
systems, C* Kunhan Haja writes;,- "The.two systems of 
Indian Philosophy, the.Nyaya and the Vai^esika, developed 
on parallel lines until they merged into a#single system. 
The Nyaya system tried an analysis of the Universe as ‘ 
thought content,.in order to arrive at the truth of the 
Universe* It started with postulating the means of 
knowledge and fourteen,other topics that have a. bearing 
\on this. analysis. Thus .they postulated sixteen topics 
or padarthas. The Vaidesika system attempted an analysis 
of the Universe as denotations of words-and they postulated 
'seven divisions of the Universe like, substances, qualities, 
and notions,* .The synthesis came when thinkers' began, to I 
deal with.the seven divisions of the Universe/ as understoc 
.through the four means of knowledge* This stage marks the 
beginning of ’ what may be called,the Navya or- later Nyaya* 
Gange^opadhyaya1s Tattvacintamani is the, basic work in this 
new phase of the development of*the Nyaya-Vaisesika system 
in India*" Introduction to Caturdagalaksani of &ada|thara,, ■ 
pp.. V r VI. See also Qinha, HIP. ,Vol*I*,pp 277; Bhaduri,
, Metaphysics., pp3^5; Radhakrishnan, IP*a Vol.II,pp.31-32* 
3*, For the study of the relation of the Nyaya-Vaidesika and 
the B.hatta l\/flmamsakas see Faddegon, V.System* ,pptl6™17;
; Th.Stcherbatsky, BL.,Vol.I pp.22-27.
However, the position of Kumarila Bhatta is unique
inasmuch as he postulated subjective as well as objective,
1 1 * 
negation* With regard to-the means (pramapa) of its
apprehension he differed from .all other systems of Indian
philosophy* According to him negation is itself a means .
of its cognition just as-perception and the' other pramanas
are instrumental in the cognition of a positive fact.
In Indian philosophy, with an exception of Buddhist
logic, the paradox of the negative judgment is primarily
an epistemological problem*, For that reason, the problem1
of negation Is raised;by the authors ofjIndian philosophical
writings mainly together with other epistemological problems, -
3 '
concerning perception (pratyaksa) Yet it is important
to note here that the postulation of negation as an entity
by the orthodox (astika) schools, viz*, the Hyaya-Vaidesikas
and the Bhntta MTniamsakas is also obligatory for their
metaphysical doctrine of emancipation (apavarga or nihfireyasa)
and the pluralistic theory of the,1not-pre-existent-effect1
(asatkaryavada)*^ * -
1. ;Stcherbatsky, ibid., p* 389$ InfeaiyJrpp*
■2m - The question of the means of cognition of the negative/ 
entity will be discussed, in the fourth chapter and 
. Kumarila*s view concerning the negative entity in the end 
of this chapter* . , *
3* Vide, infra
4. I hav£, followed Hiriyanna’s rendering of. the term 
asatkaryavada*
Section II. The Doctrine of Negative Emancipation
Just as all other Indian philosophical writers,
Gotama and Kanada, the presumed authors*1' of the Nyaya and 
Vai^esika sutras, proclaimed Emancipation (moksa or 
apavarga) as the ultimate aim of their respective doctrines, 
^Salvation is the goal which both G-otama and Kanada promise 
the people as the ,reward of, a thorough knowledge of their 
respective;systems."
Hoy/ever, according to their views, the conception 
of emancipation is something’.negative, ,a negative situation, 
Gotama said that hindrance In accomplishment [of desire] 
is- pain (duhkha), and an absolute ■ absence' of pain is the ■
«• . ; ' * . . . , - ■ 3 „ * - -■ . • • - , -
state of emancipation* .No one is all powerful to achieve 
an, absolute fulfilment of one*s desires* So long as we 
have not acquired the knowledge of reality (tattva-jnana) 
we are led by false notions>of happiness and desires that 
are .like.a mirage. "Removal of false notions, faults,' 
activity, birth and pain in a successive order11, said
1* There, are^some^uncprtainties about Gotamafs authorship
of the Nyaya sutra and Kanada*s authorship of the VaiiSesika 
sutra* of. Radhakrishnan,ip.,Vol.II,pp.36 rx. 1,178-179# #
2. Bodas, Int. Tr. Sam*, p. XVII'. See also NS. ,1. 1*1-2;
VS* ,; I. 1*1-2.
3. !NS. , 1.1*21-2: ’badhanalaksanarn duhkhaitu tad-atyantaviraokso 
*pavargah. * See also, N. Sara., (1§22),_p.98: *atyantikT 
duhkhanivrttih purusasya moksa iti.1
' 1
Gotama/’ultimately leads to Salvation11* On this ground, 
probably, at a later,stage Udayana (984 A.D.) claimed that 
■there was no controversy about this conception of emanci-, 
pation. **In fact all;philosophers hold the same opinion 
on. this matter,that the emancipation is the,absolute
M  > P
negation of pain (atyantika-nivjttih)” *
Samkara Mifira (1600 A.D.),^ who wrote'the commentary 
Upasltara oh the Vaidesilta Sutra, explained the emancipation 
as ’the antecedent'non-existence of pain’ (duhkha- 
pr^agabhava rupam). This means that it is brought about 
by^the neutralisation of the cause, of pain*.
’ Kanada, enumerates s’ix categories which are to be 
known for the attainment of emancipation.,^ } Knowledge, 
of these, npred.icabiesn (padarthas)5 is the means of the
1* : NS.*^I*:X..2jL.«ldu^hn-3a33ma«r£r£vrtti'wdosa^raithya3nanarSm1,,i,,,.., 
uttarpttar^apaiye* tadantarapayad’apavargah1 _ .
2. /’iiih££eyasam_punar duhkhanivrttir atyaritikT* atra ca 
vadlham avivada e v a . K i r .  ,Jj?.41# There are three 
major^comrnentaries on the Bhasya of Pra^astapada, viz., 
KiranavalT of Udayana (964 A*I).), Nyayakandali of SrTdhara 
(991*A*D.) and HyayalTiavatT of Vallabha of SrTvatsacarya 
(1200 A.D.) cf. VindhyeSvarTprasUda Dvivedin, Introductioi 
to FBh. with BK. , pp. 20-22; Keith, Atomism. , pp.31-32;
, Sinha, IilP., pp. 278-9#
3* V. System., p. 17 s
.4. VS., 1.1.4. J _
5* For. further explanation, of/ the term pa&artha: see infra
'   »  ■ • .... .. .   . <
Highest Good-(nihSreyas). . The six padarthas are:
1). Substance (dravya)f
2). Attribute (guna),
3)* Action (karma), . ; , ,
4). Generality ’ (sstiimnya), - 
§). .Particularity (viSesa) and
6). Inherence (samavaya).
Kanada t does not’ include negation (abhava) as a 
seventh category in the aphorism. But Samkara Mi^ra 
commenting on the sutra refers to Gotama. (US# 1.1.2) and 
says,, that the statement (abhidhahain) of "the non-existence 
of the effect [following] from the non-existence of the 
cause, strengthens., the idea of salvation as having the 
form'of the-antecedent non-existence of,pain." . .Cessation 
of. puin does not.'necessarily mean ’annihilation*; rather’,
.it .means, ,’non-production’ , and thus apavarga is said to ' \ 
be the antecedent non-existence of pain (duhkha-pragabhava).
At this stage, we do-not^ intend to- examine’ the’ problem 
of ^emancipation fully. We’ Only wish to indicate to what" 
extent .the Hynya and VaiSesilea thinkers were confronted with
1. Upaslcara ^ on^the VS. 1^1.4.^ "GautamTya dvitTyasdtre.. ♦. 
.j^.^karanabhavsit karyyabhavabhidlianam duhkha-pragabhava- 
r'upa’m eva muktim dradhayati." Cp> Bandlal Sinha in the 
Sacred Books of'the flindus, p. 10). 1
the question 'of, negation in relation to apavarga. Whether 
it is *the antecedent non-existence1 or ‘an absolute non- 
existence* of pain can be a matter of- discussion* „ However,
one' thing' is certain and that is that this system contains
‘ - - ‘ - - ■ ' ■ 1 - . . 
the doctrine of - negative emancipation* It is important ,,
to note here that .in the-Nyaya-sUtra (1.1.2* and 21-2) the
idea of emancipation in the form'of negation,is for the
first time systematically-expressed*2 * ‘ *
It is, this doctrine of emancipation,. I.believe, which
makes it imperative for this system to posit Negation as
an entity .or category (pad’artha). However, according to
Hiriyanna, it is the conception of non-existence (abhava) , .
of the Hyaya-Vaidesika that makes it possible to put forward
such, a view, of a- negative emancipation.^ ' ,
1* of* Hiriyanna, Outlines., p* 263; (Apavarga is) “negative 
and consists.not in the attainment of happiness, but in 
the removal of pain.“ '
2* It is also a matter of discussion v/hether this system, 
being-negative in its concept, is pessimistic* Prof*
. H; Ui thinks it is not. “The Vaidesika's concept of 
emancipation seems to be negative, as in the case of other 
systems, although the system is hot at all pessimistic***
Had Sastra. , p. 74*
3* Essentials*, p* 102: “so far as the nature of the goal of 
life is concerned,, the Indian systems may be divided into 
. two classes - those which conceive of it merely as one of 
absolute freedom from misery, and those whichtake it as one 
of bliss also./ The Nyaya-Va ides ilea is of the first type: 
and its conception of non-existence (abhava) allows it to 
put,forward such a view of the goal, for, according to it, 
the absence of misery is,not the same as the presence of 
bliss.11
One of the arguments, in support of the negative 
entity or category, postulated by the followers of this 
system, is based on this conception of salvation. It is 
argued:: “If negation is not accepted as, separate; or ,
r ' ‘ , { > i , - < -
different' (from the positive entity,, then, the idea of)
" 1 r * salvation would be impossible to establish.“ Most .
probably there .would hayeL been no acceptance of negation .
' as an entity on a par with the; positive entity (bhava),
if the. emancipation, had not been defined thus* “One can,.
easily see why Naiyayikas attach so much importance to
abhava, having due regard to its close relation to the
1 p ' * " ' * *'2tfy ay a conception .of mukti.“ ..  .1,
However, Gotama, like Kapiada, wlien enumerating, the ;
categories, evidently did not mention negation. • He said:
“It is the knowledge of the real essence (or true character)
of the following sixtben categories that leads to the
attainment,of the Highest Good ' l). ‘The means of Right'
cognition; 2), The objects of Right cognition;: 3)* Doubt;;
etc.“^ Further in the Nyaya-sutra twelve things are1
1. “atiriktabhavanaipgikare mokgasyasadhyatapattesca. “
N.ICaust•, ; p.123*
2*. Kuppuswami Sastri, Primer., pp. 61-62. ' _
3. . NS.1.1 • I tpramana-prameya-samdaiya-prayo jana-dr^tanta- _ - 
!. siddhant-avayava-tarka-nirnayar-vada-jalpa-vitanda-hetyabhasi
■ cchala-jati-nigrahasthananam tattva-jftanan-nihsreyasaclhigam! 
Bodas1 comments are noteworthy. “Gotama begins, by enumera-
' ting 16 topics, which have been erroneously called padarthai 
These topics are not a. classification of all sublunary thirij
■ or categories. They look like headings, of so many chapters 
in a treatise,of logic.” Tr. Sam., p. XIV. .
’ ' Xenumerated as the objects' of cognition (prameyas) hut 
again the entity of■ negation is missing*.; Vatsyayana, the 
first commentator on the Nyaya-sutra said, here, that 
beside these twelve.there are some other objects of cognition 
(prameya) which’ are not mentioned in the aphorism and he . 
names the six categories already enumerated by Kanida in * 
the Vailesika sutra*^■*■‘■'Nearly all Nyaya-Vai^egika -authors, - 
including,Udayana, have accepted this six-fold division 
with the additional category of negation*
In the Nyaya-sutra as well as in the Vaise^ika-sutra, 
apavarga or nih^reyas is included as one of the objects of 
cognition (prameya), in spite of the fact that negation as 
such is not mentioned together with the other (positive) 
categories* In;the ’Nyaya-sutra emancipation.is-the twelfth 
prameya in the series* And-as we have seen in the preced­
ing pages, the conception of emancipation, is,negative in the 
Nyaya-Vaise^ika systems* -'Thus it may be'posited that
negation is indirectly mentioned in .the sutras.in the form
    _  - ■ — _  - ....... ....
1* NS* 1*1*9* - atma-sarir^endriy*artha-buddhi-maha]j-
p r avr111-do §a-pre t y abh a v a-ph a 1 a-duhkh% an avarga s tu prameyam
2. !asty anyad-api dravya-guna-karma-samanysPvTsesa-samavaya^
prameyam tad bhedena caparisamkhyeyam*^ NBh*, I *1*9*,
For the study of the relation*of Vatsyayana and VS* see
, Hadhakrishnan, IF*, II, p* 179^-1*
3* cf* infra, p p t h e  exception see p*r£*
of apavarga. ‘ - In the later writings of thetsyncretized 
Nyaya-Vaile§ika the' term 1 abhava1 appears, as 'padartha*
1while,1 apavarga I .disappears f rom the, li st of , categori e s .  .
An-explanation is given that since ’apavarga* is the
negation\'(,dhva^sa)-i-lvof'’p‘airiv,^if*;ev'"Qf--a’ negative form It ;
*■1 ' ' “ 2 
falls under the category of- Negation. X^l^va). / •
Introducing■the first aphorism of the Nyaya-sutra 
(which has already been mentioned above), Vatsyayana 
explains the reason why negation is not mentioned' in it.
He makes' a few remarks that ’’the means of apprehension 
that reveals existent-things, also i»eveals what is'non-existent 
For instance, by :means of a lamp at a certain place we per­
ceive some visible-objects while some -other' visible objects1 
are not perceived there. Now, if the other objects were 
.also existent they would have been perceived by us* " Thus 
absence of things is also, cognised by the same means by 
which,we cognise their presence. >’ Commenting on this
1* cf. Lak._£ p;l; SJte; Tr* Sam., sutra 2; PM., p. 36*
’QM., karika 2; SP*, ,p=* _
2. TSC., p.86. ’ ’apayargasya’duhkadhvamsarupasyabhave.1 - 
„/ Taking * anta,rbhavat *.-from page 87** „
3* fsatah prakasakam pramanam asad api prakasayati.*
NBh.,*p..2* V
section of Vatsyayana Dr* Handle writes; "The problem
is that of the negative judgment; and the reason, why it
is raised here is not apparent, seeing that ■ a section is
devoted later on to dialectical difficulties in connection /-
1 'with the apprehension of absence or non-existence*
Perhaps it was felt that the absence'of all reference to
non-existence or negation in the enumeration .of the six-
—  2 ' teen categories in the first sutra needed some' explanation.11
Randle is right that in the second chapter of the,Nyaya-
sutra the problem of the negative judgment has been dealt
with and that the "apprehension of absence or non-existence11
is one of the "dialectical' difficulties". But there are ^
two distinct problems concerning the negative judgment, ’
(a) episteraological as well as (b) ontological.^ In the
later writings of Indian Logic, as we shall' see in: other pages
of the present work, these two problems have become more-
1. Randle refers toNS., II. 2*7-12.
2* - 32. Schools*, p. ‘ T ' ‘
3* S. Mooker jee AFlux*, p. Hj.09: "There, is a wide
divergence of opinion among philosophers- regarding the 
nature and status of negative judgment and the problems 
can be. studied with profit by way of division into an ' 
epistemological and a'metaphysical aspect.""1
' explicit, ,that is the’former (a) 'is treated as a pure 
logical or dialectical and the-latter (b) as a meta- 
physical problem. It seems:, to me. that Vatsyayana had 
the metaphysical problem in "mind at the time of intro­
ducing the first sutra. He was aware of the fact that 
immediately after the1first aphorism,, Gotama used the 
term "apaya” expressing negation.
If negation were not to be, explained prior to the
first sutra, then,, the, emancipation could not possibly
be defined as ’the non-existence, of pain’ in the second
’* sutra. - - ■ : - . . - , ■ ’ •
. Similarly, Uddyotalcara C,600,,A.D.), the commentator ’'
on the commentary of Vatsyayana i.e. the' Nyayayarttika, ’
explained that .since non-existence (abhava,) is cognised
by the same instrument by which we apprehend "existence
(bhava), it is not.necessary to mention negation in the -
, aphorism separately. . By mentioning merely positive
.categories, negation, is-propounded-by implication*^
1.. Practically in all. Indian logical writings wherever
’abhava’ occurs, it is discussed .togeither with other v v 
. 1 . problems'concerning the pramapas-. (cf. infra nv—'72^ '.
• This indicates its epistemological and logical charact­
ers in Indian' philosophy.’ ‘
2. NS.1.1.2. The term 'apaya* literally means ’absence after 
. destruction. * Tims,. ’absence-of pain after its destruction’ 
i s moles a . .
Vascaspati- Misra - (8hl)A.D.), cpmmenting, oh Uddy- 
otakar a,-.observed that this explanation is necessary for 
the negative conception-of emancipation. 1 He said: "Some 
one might argue: ’negation.is useful (or necessary - upayoga) 
for the Idea of emancipation, (but since it is not mentioned 
as an object of cognition) how'should we understand it?* ;
To this he (Uddyotakara) said: ’By the -stating of positive
■ 1 categories, negation is also t a u g h t " # . *
How,: the reason why .Vatsyayana and following him 
Uddyotakara, raised the question pf negation/ at the very 
beginning of his commentary, is evidently not' the "dialect- ' 
leal.difficulties in connection with the' apprehension pf 
absence or non-existence", as supposed by Randle. I 
believe that the metaphysical difficulties in connection 
with the definition of emancipation prompted the commentators' 
to raise the problem of'negation prior to the first'sutra 
that listed'only the positive categories*.
The doctrine of negative emancipation received' 
criticism from thinkers belonging to the1 schools of the 
Prabhakara Mimaipsa, and Advaita-Vedanta* We have said
T* ^atha- nihsreyasopayogabhavah kuto ’vagantavya ityata 
aha.' bhavopadesad evabhava'upadi^^o-bhavatiti."
NVTT.,. p.3U. '■
2. cf. supra p.a^vuj,, ,
that emancipation “was defined .by the Nyaya-Vaifeika as an 
antecedent and absolute non-existence of pain, and that, 
therefore, it became necessary for them to posit negation 
as a separate category. ■ However', the Advaitin thinker 
finds, tha argument absurd. , 4 For him the Nyaya-Vai^e^ika
r^/V'* ,' i~ ■'*’v  • r - '>VV- '* '• -.v A ^ £ 7;--A " ' p  < U--< • ^ ’■ •' s ^ v ,  j- : :v ■ = -’eYJ A  p -7^ ^ v '.f/• •?  ^ ~ 'T‘ V?
" 1.writers are rather like V children* in need of reform.
Sadanandayati, in his versatile work, attacked the theory 
of salvation-put forward by the Nyaya-Vai^egika. The - 
salvation,1 according to the Advaitin,, is the state of 
being in Bliss (sukha.)- after having acquired Knowledge 
(vijnana) through realisation of the identity of,the 
self with Brahman and thus discarding nescience (avidya).
As a matter of fact mok§a is the state of Self in its real 
state, that is-Brahman i t s e l f B r a h m a n ' i s  "the Eternal 
(nitya) Bliss X^anda) and Knowledge(vijfiana) •
Moreover the view that apavarga is merely the "non-existence’ - 
of pain" but not positive Happiness is wrong. .The Advaitin ’-j
  i r"r r 1 ~ - '  T  .......       '.."r......
,1. Advaitjbrahmasiddhilj p. Ih6. For the view of Advaita
Vedanta the reader is referred to Radhakrishnan, IP., II, .
PP.*6j6 ff; Advaitabrahmasiddhilj. of Sadanandayati, pp.lhh ff
2. Radhakrishnan, op.cit., p. 639 n.h* where he refers to ■' 
sagikara. - _
3. Advaitabrahmasiddibi, p. li-jh—5 *> ■ ’nityam vijHanam anandam 
Brahma1, p. Ih5# ‘
argued that a person is free from'pain ,even when he is 
asleep. . After pne’s death or in/the end of the universe 
(pralaya) there is complete, cessation of pain. In,all 
such cases there1 is a state of non-existence of pain hut 
without turning into happiness.; let alone the Highest,
Bliss (mok§a). . ' ‘ ~ ' v
To he precise,, the Advaitin argued,' balvation must 
be posited as the state of happiness* . The very word 
’happiness* negates the existence of pain; on the other 
hand, ’non-existence of pain1/does not necessarily convey 
the idea of happiness*, To be,more explicit, in the 
attainment of\salvation there must be something which 
goes beyond-the mere destruction of pain,’ i.e/ something 
’ positive.- ,
For negation, being negative,' can be destroyed sub­
sequently by the presence of its counter-positive (pratiyogin)• 
' By the subsequent pz^esence of pain, antecedent absence of 
pain - i.e. the Nyaya-Vaise^i'ka*s salvation' (mok.§a) - may ■ 
also be destroyed. Whereas mok^a is * accepted by all
'1. ibidi p. 198; dxzhldiVabhavasya niyatatvat*
du^k^abhava-kale ca -su§upti-pralay-adau sukhasy-
‘abhavac ca. *   _ * _ t
2. ibid.,, ’kasyacid atisayasya-bhavarupasyaiva.1"
1philosophers as eternal'and something not destructahle*
L .The Prabhakara Mimaipsakas endorsed this Advaitin 
view. They rejected the Nyaya-Vai^e^ika theory, that 
negation must he a positive entity because without it the 
concept of moksa would not he valid* The Prabhakaras 
maintained tliat emancipation cannot he a mere negative
state, inasmuch as it, is the manifestation of eternal
2 ' ' ■ * 1 happiness. ,
Thus it is clear that according to early Nyaya- 
A/'ai^esika negation, is; also a metaphysical problem. In 
.order to, substantiate their doctrine of negative emanci­
pation they postulate negation in terms of ontological 
reality. On the other hand, the Advaita Vedantins and 
, the Prahhakara Mimamsakas assert that emancipation -itself - 
is positive. Hence, in their system.negation has no 
ontological value.
Section III. Meaning of the term MPadartha" or category
- J The term ’padartha1 literally means,the meaning of 
a word. Thus anything capable of being expressed’by means
1. Ibid., p p ' m o k g a s y a  ca sarvavadibhir avinasitv- 
abhyupagamat.’ p. 199* „ ‘ _
2. N. Kaust., p. 137> 'nityasuldiabhivyakter eva moksatvopagamat 
■ 1 In this passage Punatamakara presents Prabhakara’-S'--
of a word, i.e namable. -r is a- padartha. A c o m m e n t s :  
“The term is used even more loosely than the word category 
in Europe, and of ten-time implies nothing mo3?e than topics
i»lto he treated in a book*
However, the enumeration of padarthas, by Kanada 
covers the entire range of phenomena, real and unreal* 
perishable and imperishable, and even “intrinsically real11 
(svatma-sat)• Hiriyanna rightly observed: “It (VS.)
divides the si:ci>pesitive categories it postulates into 
two classes - one consisting of the first.three which are 
sat (real) because of the universal satta attaching to 
them (satta-sambandha) and the other consisting of-the 
last three which are described as svatma-sat or “intrinsic- 
ally-real". They (the latter) are neither in Time nor in 
Space and are independent of both. The former are 
characterised by box^rowed being; the latter, on the other 
hand, are in their own right.. This distinction is remark­
ably like that between subsistence and existence; and as 
samavaya is one of the last three padarthas and sainyoga, 
as a guna, is one of the first.three, the description we 
have given of them is quite in accordance with the basic
' "I
principle of Vaise^ika philosophy.“ We are, here, not 
concerned with, the (question of Samavaya. I have quoted. 
Hiriyanna only to show, the extent of Kanada’s categories.
In tact, they-Include all that can he expressed by Word* and 
hence all that can be thought of and spoken of. Dr.G-.Jha , , 
said: “The enumeisation of these categories is meant to be
a complete analysis of,the entire universal scheme."
Therefore, it may be rather surprising to a student of the 
Hyaya-Vaisesika 1 System that Gotama and Kapada did not - 
explicitly mention negation together with the other categ­
ories, whereas the later writers of the syncretist Hyaya-VaitS- 
• esika syste?n recognize-’abhava* as a category.
Section IV.. The necessity of k Negative Category for the 
Pluralistic Theory of Asatkarya.
Udayana, explaining Reality (padartha), said:
“Reality is’that*which is namable; (and) it is twofold;
. existence (bhava) and non-existence (abhava).;■ Existence 
is that object-of our cognition which is free from being the
1. Hiriyanna*s. description is not very, clear. Studies., .
p.Ill;: also Bhaduri, Metaphysics., pp. 16-7*^
2*. PBh. Translation by Jha, ■ 1.2.1. ,■ foot, note 1, p. 15*
object of a negative judgment (nafi artha)"*
The'term ’padartha* is’used here in the sense-of 
Reality. . At the same time it means category or entity. 
According to the Nyaya-Vai£e§ika whatever can be spoken 
of is,an entity or reality and that can be either negative 
or positive. . ■ Just as the object.of an affirmative 
judgment is a positive, entity, the object of a negative 
judgment is a negative entity. . Udayana cleai'ly states, 
that a positive thing cannot be the .object pf a negative 
judgment. In other words what w e *assert in the proposition 
“the pot is* on the ground" is aJ positive fact, viz. the 
presence of the pot.r ‘ This Is a perceptual experience. 
Similarly,, the negative judgment “the pot is not on the
ground" is also a perceptual' datum which refers to the
, o
factual situation, viz. .’absence of the pot on the ground1*.
,H T  ’’ . r- ’ -v * ■ ■ ;„v ^  5 ■" I- v <. i" ' , •< • •■= ■ ... ii ' • r; ,= * v-'.,W  V*/.: 1 *r.; >V: ' a  ‘A,., ■ v -A. A - f . * '  r ■
- ■ *
‘ According to.various scholars*^ Udayana in particular 
gave a new turn to Nyaya-Vai5e§ika developments by postulating
1. * abhidheya'lj padarthah. sa dvividhaJj., bhav-abhava-
bhedat.- tatra nan-arthavi§ayatva-rahita-pratyayavi§ayo 
bhavalj.’5 Lak., p.l* t „
2.. This view of negation is generally held by* all the Nyaya- 
and_Vai£e§ika writers# _cf. vastuto bhutale ghato nastiti 
maya dr§tam ity anubhavad....'.pratyak^ameva abhavasya,
. yuktanu \ N.- ICaust., p. 159; Atomism., pp.78-79* . IPP.,- 
pp. 77-78. ;
3* Among,these are C. Bulcke, Bhaduri and Ui, Bodas and 
- Satkari lookerjee whose views are■discussed below*
the (positive) ontological reality of negation. In 
contrast to the authors of the Nyaya-sutra and■Vaisegika- 
sutra he included it in the series of basic padarthas.
In this respect .Mr. C. Bulcke ,asserts: "Udayana is
■ , , . , v ’ . ■ o
the first to call NON-BEING: (abhava) a category." The 
, fact -that Gotama and Kanada did not mention negation as a 
category, led to' the view that-' negation received recognitionf - - * t - ' 4
Vv s  ? \  t rj .j ''?-t ' v . o . *V -k. \  1 r. * ■ ' ! /  - ; V ' d T *  ' * ‘" W  % ■ « ? T  ':j ‘ V ■
most probably after Udayana. Bhaduri writes:** "Kanada .and 
Pradastapada mention only these six positive categories, 
which are believed to cover the entire sphere of reality, ‘
, including’ the object and subject of thought'and even the*
- process of thought.i t s e l f A seventh- category, viz.,- 
negation-or non-being- (abhava), has been put forward by- 
. the later exponents of the school. '' Negation as an 
additional ontological, category implies the fact of the 
absence of something,, a fact believed to-be as real as a1 
-thing that exists*"^ •
Prof. H. Ui wrote: "The later Vai&esika, subsequent
to, Sivaditya,-and Udayana, acknowledged non-existence as a 
seventh category. Non-existence is affirmed in the Vai^esika-
■ 1. see supra pp. *23""^  k ,
ia2. Theism.-, p. 11*. - ^
3. Metaphysics*:, p*3* * ’ ’ * “ ’
sutra, but ,it is not a category.“ ‘ ' Arid further again he 
said; “Asat (-abhava.i non-existence), is. mentioned- in’ ' ‘ ,
Vaifiegika-sutra^ 9>1*.1—10# ’ Whether the author of the
Vaidesika-sutra regards-asat as a category or not can be* 
judged' from the ,context. . The1 first section (ahnika) of 
the .eighth chapter ..( adhyaya) explains the first ,stage of 
iaukika-pratyakga,, the second section mentions its second 
stage, then come the sutras 9,1,1-10 (as’at)y and ,the re­
maining party 11-15, explains alaukilca-pratyakga. The' ' - 
second section -of the ninth chapter expounds .-laipgika and -' 
ar§a-siddha-darsana, etc.‘ 1 It is hardly doubtful that the 
author-does not regard' asat ■ as a category, hor an entity, 
but asat Is, only a form'-or. .principle-of recognition."
- However, it is clear'that Buieke1s opinion cannot be 
accepted#’ d For, -the Dasapadartha-Sastra written by 
Maticandra,. and translated- by-Professor Hi into English 
dates from approximately 600 A.D., that is, more than 300
1 ■ Q '
years before Udayana (9&k A.D*)^ - In this work already
t * '  1 +  ^ ■ • > » 1 » t 1 * V
abhava is included as a padartha. f This fact seems to have
1. Dad 5a.,, pp. 72 and 183.
2. ibid p.l; see also pp.' 9^10• This_work' was “translated 
into Chinese by Yuan Chwang (Huen-Cwan or Hiuen Tsang) in 
6U& A*D*“ p.l* * The Sanskrit original of this work has 
not yet'been recovered. ’ Prof. ,-Ui published a critical ■ 
translation from the .Chinese into English in 1917
V been overlooked by Bulcke;/as well as:'by::Prof• :Ui himself, 
v/ho fails-'.' to point this out. . . The sequence of the ten •
■4 categories/^propoundedby- Maticahdba4-ls as follows: 4y . ,;H4 
V: ./Substance (drayya)y Quality (guna) , Action (karma), General-
V ity (samanya) ,; Partlcufarity; ( vide;§A),45:I:t^ brehe^  ^ , 
Potentiality ( sakti), non-potentiall ty ( asalcti), .Corampiuiess
: v *( saniaiiya-vise§a) y" and: noh^existehce (:abhlva)V" h  4 . 4' v,4 :
;4 44 Bpdas even; went further by saying: “Npf ■Should it be 
4 supposed?. tha/fr■■■the. %hole4 system'4-|3^ ./)4\as conceived later is ’ 
to be found in these books (NS. and VS.. ). . Many doctrines
how looked upon as cardinal principles of Vaide^ika phil- 
" osophy, are Conspicuous by their absence4in.: Ka^dats -work,
4:4such4’as,44for!'4inetahc.e> Abhdva as. a seventh" category, the 4
V vlast4 scvoh;: qualities;hncTthe doctrine of 4yise§a./^ 4 : V-/
^Satkard. Mdokerjbe . also holds a similar op 1 nion• ^
'4; - The::above quoted theory of modern scholars is accepts 
able only as far ds it means that negation is missing from r 
the sutras.where the (positive), categories are enumerated.
1. Ibid. , p . 10•, and p. ; 183 • 4. Notice;the 1 samanyarVide^a1 
v , „  v  . category \/hich ;is not found in the VS. and PBh. \ 44.'-;.'
/Sam.p..;4KIITy:/^ /..,/444/4- /'y;., .4.-
?-;s.3y'^Flbx.;y-p;A^ ' 4-';/. y4/:y;/:t  -y’ -- ' }ydAy4 ^ '/y
4 0 .
But I do not agree with them, who are of the opinion that 
: they authors; of the Nyaya and Vaise^ika sutr/as; didyhqt : -: 
regard; negation as an entity or a category, : 4. V  
• In sub sf ant ration. of this theory I wish to present . 
the following arguments.
■4Ay ;/ First of all, as mentioiied aboveGdtama .and Kanada s
: defined emancipation /as the state of negat ion. of, pain. 4;/: 
If they intended to/ give no recognition to:negation as an / 
ontological reality their conception of emancipation 
(hiljdreyasa) vShould have been / defined differently, that ■
; is in d pdaitiye.fo^ /vthc realify/of A
negation and acceptance y as /reahji/jof^negative emancipation . 
are Contradictory /propbsltipnsi/ . f or, \if negation would 4; • 
not be re,al, how then could “Moksa“, that, is, the -highest 
Nyaya^-Vaisesika goal be defined as begative.**’ ! ;;'/ -/y-
/ : / Secondly,/4ih my view, the4 auihdrs/:of 4 the Nyaya and - 
■ VaIses i ka sut i* as regarded/^ hegaiioh/: as. an entity, for they / / 4 
believed in the theory of asatkarya.^ /.. The theory of tlie 
’ no t -p r e - e xi stent -effe c t *4 .(hsatlc5fya/)>4 is /the most si g- 
nlficant. characteristic of the Nyaya^ r.eaiistic
1. cf. supra, //sectionyil, ppV'/lfe^/ay ,/4- /•■’4 4. ~'/ 4 -■ 4
,;2^4 /The: d.dctfineyis , supposedly/very/old; and id'fbuild in the 
: Up ani §ads • 4 Sinha, HIP ., I, p* 4dG and n. l*
41.
system. 4 According t67this doctfixie/ “tJie cause .always 
precedes the effect, and, f he: latter//has; no sexist ence until . ; 4
it is brought into b eing.“  ^ Z Ah effect is produced for: Zz 4/; ' 4;4.
v the first time out of the: material cause(upadana-karapa) .A
and is an entity entirely different from its cause, • y; 4,:/4 4 A 
444 /; Cause and eff ect, are ■.intimately related, but hot identical;, y;/ Zr :
4? 'Effects are non-exi stent (asat) previdus to their production.2 / 4 
4 Thus pragabhava, “the pri or non-exi stence;“ i 4^ yiz*Z .of the 4’;:;v ,4 44 
■ • effect) is an; accessdry or efficient cause (nimitta-karana).
>4.-: V./Tli’e;eff ect comes into^existenc^vafter:Zthe destruction of ’ ZZ 7
;4 fr idr, non-existence. '4 4 The very term /.! effect * indicates . 44:; 4/4
' the idea of/ its antecedent hoh^exibte3idd;Z;( asatkiirya) •:-4 4 4 ;-
Everything becomes, existent, only nfter;it:sZJcrdation.:V This. 4/4;.;..Z.:
4' implies the destfuctidn( :i.e.vdnd;)yZofZ/itS; own p ragabh ava 4 4 4
/dr^  antecedent; nonrexistence.— v^Ay/v.^ , 4^. ■-v4/4
1. Keith, Atomism., p. 2 0 2 . v,\44 44:. -; ; ' . ..-v4,
2 . cf. N • C • B . Bhattacharya, Int • to^Sapt.4XIIT to XIV. 4 4 ■ 4 4
3. Th./ S a m . , 1.29 i -Vkaryaiiivpf agabhdya^p/rhtiyogl; ■ Kuppuswami 4 
- isastri:, Primer.:,.,;pp/, 207-8;,; Bhadpri/, Metaph^
318; Hiriyanna Essentials., p.88; J .C.Chatterji,, Hindu / 
Realism, pp. 21-54; NS., IV.I.I6-I8. Against/“this 
44 obviously creationist;positidhy^4phildsdphers4cf the 
■ ySaipkhya .school hold ; the /doc'trine> of ,4 Satkafya^/Zthev theory 4:
: 4; “that theeffecf4 exists^befprehahd4in -the cause.’! cf • .4
544 Bhaduri, 4op>cit. ; ;/44 Sinha, y'HIiVy'-iy;pp;399 ff•
Thus in accordance with this theory, the Uyaya- 
Vaise§dka "was. constrained to admit:• the non-existence of iu.a-p 
the individual before its production and after its 
destruction* But along with this he was bound to ascribe 
eternal existence to the Universal.tfl ,
' Gotama described two kinds of > negation; i) Antecedent- 
non-existence (pragabhava), and 2). Posterior.-non-existence 
(pradhvaipsabhava) • The former consists of the absence of 
a thing prior to its coming into existence and,the latter ■ 
of the destruction of a thing after it lias come into being 
and now has ceased to exist. "This argument rightly conn­
ects negation with becoming; it is*impossible to conceive 
of ’becoming1 without the notion of fnot yet* (antecedent 
non-existence) and ’no longer’ (subsequent non-existence)*"^ 
On the other hand Kanada divided negation into four 
kinds which we shall discuss later on. -But here, we shall 
r ef e r: only ; t o ■; the apho r i s m o  f :■ the - Va i s e s i ka* sut r a whi ch 
describes the pragabhava. Kanada said that so long as an 
effect., is .not produced out of its causes, no action and ■
1 Gopi Natha -fcaviraj a, Sara swat i Bhawah studi es, Vol. I, , 
p.39 n.l. The realist.view of the universai is diametric 
ally opposed to the: Buddhist doctrine,of. Apoha or the - - 
Abstract Universal_which we reserve for a later chapter#
2 • US., II .11.12 * ’ pr ag-utp a 11 er abhayop ap a11 e sc a ’ cf. NBh*
there on#
3* Randle, E. Schools., p# 330.
, ■ ; ‘ *t3 ? © . ; * ctaxi be; predicated of it (effect) and therefore 
it is; non-existent (asat) prior to Its creation.’*’
:: r;;; : • Prof. Ui1 s stat ement^that Kap.ada do.es not regard
: v;:V — V; 'asat .as a category and that "it can be judged from the < •
yyfxr'x : ' / context"^seems; to -he unsatisfactory. The fact, tkht the
; I* • i;:‘ Va iIe§ ika-sutras 9.1.1-10 dealing, with negation ( asat),
'■'I7;!:.; ;/1.’'•/_ occur . after the; discussion >of the laukolKa-prat
' ordinary p ere ep t i oh does not pro vide a strong argument in  ^ -V.;,-!
. support of Ul1 s theory. We havef’ stated above ( see pp>/7-/R) ■ v l 
; ll;- I .v . thaf.negation ih!the.;pre is primarily an : ;
epistemological prolDldmi; Ahd for that re a son, nearly all .
y ; v'l;V treatises dealing ^ i'th'^indiahv/logic;. analyse : the problems y . 1;-yl 
; y of-negationy not only in terms of pure lo.^ic, but .especially
-.-.-.I vx, 1 with regard to the epistemological aspects, i,.e. the nature .
;• v of the .pramapLas . Therefore, .the matter ;of "context" ;isvC ;
v.;yy:l;’■ hardly 'relevant here • For, ; according to the ■ commentator
•, IX. 1.1, 1 kriyatguna-v;kapUdes^bhavatlprdg~esat • *
1 ’1 ;Nai^al,al^.Binhals Translatioh,publishedin .the; Sacred ,
• iBooks ? of th£ Hindus, is used in this work.; ,' ■ .' ■= r' >"-f 1' ■ ■■.v/-- 
;X 2vlxsee;:eUp^ '  ^ ;Vvxl; '1'I
3ly pf .y NS. >^II.li.2-12j : VS., IX*1.1-10; PBh.,. p.225; N.Kaust,, . 
pp . 150-163 * a b h a v a i s  discussed under ‘ 'Perception1; in ySl.
X ' Vart. y 'SVBip r and K;.Li la vat I • ,pp.5hk’"579J the Abhava chapter 
,.y;ooi)0sxyafterxarth^ ;; ;fpryBU<i(ih logic; ;:yyy.;;;
yyxitf,idy;ayyibgieai1?pfpblemv^^^
Vx^V-X631-63^-^VST..',i;ppi.^r5Z>y^5-S8jyi;y;see;'bls6y. infra Chap• IV,X Xxl;
Samkara. Misra four kinds of abhava are mentioned in 
the::VS-*4$X \l,r J-10, (see Vi p.. So) and he points out 
that they are all objects of iDerceptionw . - Professor 
Faddegon observes: "According to the Upaskara (commentary) 
Sutra IX. 1.2. refers, to Dhvamsa or posterior non-existence}: 
this Interpret at ion is. In- complete-; accordance- with the y
XX'  '  v  J ’. vv ’ X  "• ■ I s. '• x  x ,  11 ‘1 y ''"'A 1 j ' . - X ' - . x  ", 4 t X v -  ; 'aX - a ■-1 1- *!. * ’ J ‘.‘S'* i ’ x  _ / •  • 4 ’ X -.y ' /  ... v >  " y
(meaning of Sutra IX.1.1. Both formulate the asatkaryavada 
of the VaiiSe^ika. •
Faddegon also rightly, observes that "the acceptance 
of the- as a t kar y a-vida was quit e a logical result of tlie 
Vaise^ika table of categories. However r,-there 1 is some ,
controversy about the authenticity of • these sutras since • 
Prasastapada in his ;Bha§ya: did not explain themi.I XXEe 
mentioned negation only as one of the forms of inference. 
Faddegon suggested : two, possibilities: either the sutras /; 
ydid -hotxekist; in Prasastapada1 s dislike of the asatkaryavada. 
is evident from the fact. tha.t he "only accidentally mentioned 
it in the Bha^ya where it is consdldered a,; settled :tenet of 
the Vaise^ika system.®: XXY'l
1. See infra pp• X n x y y . . - - -  ,.x,X} xA':X (. \X..s.
2V ;X'Vv-System., pi 120.
3. Ibid., p.30.
ti*x; PBhr>III.,2. (32)r p. 225.
3. Faddegoii, op.cit.yp.29
I support the second suggestion for:we..know for 
certain that Prasastapada was very much inf1uehc ed by .the 
logical writings of Dignaga*^ And the latter, being a 
Buddhist y ; in; keeping; withxthe:. doctrine -of momentariness 
(k^anika) opposed the theory of asatkarya.
Kuppuswami Sasti*i,' too' states that the theory of 
yasatkaryavada-in'involveB;-thexi:deax.that the effect is in*-/
' ■ o
variably preceded by its antecedent non-existence•H vx , 
The study /of vtix is doctrine makes it clear that “the whole 
asatkaryavada-,depends on the acceptance of non-existence ■ 
as a categoryi. It is to be noted here that also the
Purvd .Mimamsakas, (Bhatta school), beljsve in the theory 
of asatkarya,-^ consequently they too posit Negation as a 
category.^ ■ ,
Moreover, the pluralistic conception of Reality 
entails negations( - Inasmuch as these three realistic 
••.schools Vaile^ika and the Bhatta,xppstulate
several categories ;(padartha) the recognitioh bf ■the x 
ontological character of abhava is the direct logical 
result. Unless it is accepted as such, the. delimitation
1. Keith, Atomism., pp. 99 ff. See Ch.IV, -with
references. : . _ ,. _ _
2.' Primer, p.200 (larySamv, 39J^ r’lcaryam-xpragab^ayarpratlyogi1 
x w p .  230, ’prdgabhutasya pa|qad*biiava-aitpada^i.1
3. :?i*p'f ♦ IBal sukh Malwa$iya:i%#AS^T:.y .
Th0xMima jisdkas * view is discussed below pp♦, «‘/g -x.' xy l
U 6 +
even of the positive categories wi 11 not b e p o s s ib 1 e •
SrTdhai?a,; explaining^^'the,-differehce-;bet«feehxmutuhl ’!>111 - x l
negat i oh X i t are t anabhava) aiidX ab solut e negat i on (atyantabhava) ; 
stated that the /f ormer, app 1 ies to finite entities only. 1 kxx
(syarupasiddhayoiv eya) whe the latter is a negation 
hoblimitbd /byxt‘imO\;and/:.;s$ab;b;\(desakalinayapch ;xll’ , x,.
prat i§edhah). . .Thus, unless theppsitiye character of ' ; 11;
absolute; negatibn/;islpo;stuiated,;; the f oriiulation of the .. /'
six basip. categories (padartha)xbecpmes ^ invalid,, because :X■■xllll/ 
beyond these six "thereyis Nothing1*1*?/ ; Furthermore, ' •
without the acceptance of mutual negation hP'"ii;stinctipn/ lyAXxyX
between these/categories is possible. This view is ; - ;/
propounded e .g. by th® Nayya^hyaya/ (Ueo-nyitya)xlbgician • , 
.Vi^vanStha/wholin: :his Siddhantamulctayali observes: v ;: /. -1 X/ : 1 1
; ^ abhavatvam drayyi^ According
to this vview, "ablSvalXhas a logical function as well as an : 
ontological character. : l^'lllylx; (xl^ ‘  ^1' : , ;lxil
The categofy/oi*^: negation,. as a factor of delimitation =
,1s'/'^ indispensable; for-theXU^ and the Bhat^a
1. Cf ._NK., - p>230:: j; ■ itaretar^hhyp: hi■^ svar^'abiddhpypr eva 1 ' / 
1  . gavasyayoh /ifa^baratmatiprati^e<^ab.;‘ . aty ant abhaye tu
v/ /;sah^athalasadbhutasyaiva buMhav-aropitasya desakaian- ixll 
1 . avacchinnah_prati sedhah : yathax satpadarthebhyo nanyat- y y
prafeyahastltiy;^xyadi *qaiyantabhavo nesyate ;§adeva .1 xy 
; padartha ity ayamniyamo durghatalj syat♦1 VX / ~ IX-1, y
;2. SM., 1.12; IP/.y Vol.II, p • 220 : Sinha HIP., Vol.I,p. 
x 3h8. - X ■/■•Ixxx/'y-il'xi.
—  —  ■ ' J 1  Mimamsaka philosophy of realistic pluralism.-
It should he noted that no scholar has suggested 
that Gotama -and Kanada- the aiithors of the Nyaya and the 
VaiSegika sutras'did not accept the theory of asatkarya.
Nor has anyone suggested that this1 theoryr should he con­
sidered as .a ’later invention1 or "addition" to.the 
system; on the1 contrary the theory is very old and has 
received recognition in the Nyaya and Vai£e§ika sutras.2 
Hence, I believe that the Xauthors of the aphorisms did not 
intend to deny the status of an entity or category to "■ ’
Negation.-
And my last argument is that both, Gotama and Kapada, 
ostensibly defended ’abhava1 as an object of knowledge 
(prameya) and as an ontological reality (padartha). Gotama 
refers to the view-that Negation is not a means of knowledge 
(pramapa)^ because no negative entity is established as its 
object. To this'he replies that,a negative entity 
(prameya), is an established fact,' just as any positive fact; 
therefore, also abhava is real, /eveh' though it is not a pramapa*.
rXilbid. pp.. 350,. i+50.. . ' r* ■
2. See, supra.; pp. 1 . 1 '
3* The question of Abhava' as a pramana, we reserve for the 
fourth chapter. _ _
!+• NS., II. 11.7-8; '’nabhava-pramanyara'pramey-assidde^jL. ’1
*lak§itesv~alpk§aha~laksitatvad alaksitanam tat-prameya- . 
-siddhip* See also sutra 10.
X / xx ; ^  these sutras states that x'x'X'X'
x ; there are numerous instancbbxpf X negative, pbamey as. X, By-
 ^ way of: example ;hbv/e±prains axpartibular/case mentioned in
Xvx;I^
■x-X XXX:XX' A number■ of ( e • g.) pieces of cloth are marked * and 
, a number are unmarked: someone is told to fetch the un- 
x, - ' marked pieces and is able, to' do so. because the unmarked 
, pieces (by way of contrast) b e e o m e X o b j b e t .co^itipn
just by not being marked• ? ' , , V * x ;t • vx ../XXXx/'- . x-j
v  X ' ’V As mentioned above2the other type of negation in- 
eludes pragabhava. and pradl'ivams’abhaVa. Thus, a twofold -xX 
. division of abhavhls Vestiabiishbti in the Nyuya Sutra#^
The early Nynyaxtheo^^ Negation is ' / * X
X,V accepted as a prameya, but not as a pramapa, it is
x inferential rather; thanimmediately pereeptual*^x/; x
 ^ x-X. However,/later"logicians; deMiiedxnegatibn in terms of 
: perception. To .them it ’ha(lvthe; character^ of being an x
object of sense-id ere ept ion. ^ v ' Bertrand: Russell analysing
1. NBh.’, oh II,11.7-8: athayam artha-bah utrad, arthaikade^a:.
X'; - xudahriyate.: (the sutra II. 11.8. ):_tasyabhavasya siddhyati ;
X ppameyam;. katham (7) lak§ite§u Vasapsu... .ubhayasahhidhaVa-; 
■ xlab^itiu^ na^ti_pra^kto\yesu. vasapsu laksapani
na bhavanti tani 1 aksapabhavena pratipadyate, pratipadya 
•: ; . canayati. X;:XlXxXx XX' ' X‘ XX.■'■X-X'X;'X/ X,, . X> / .„•/• X, A . X = .■> x X, A./,
: NS. , II.11*12 /quoted^ above r—  • xr.v..x./,;
3. NBh., (CSS.1925‘ed.).,p,359: "abhava-dvaitam khalu , .
‘ xbhavati1,;; See also NVT., thereon;. Randle,xE.Schoole. f/.X'X-
■ p*33Q n.l. / X x >>■ /■x xvxxx-- .XX'"---,-'
ii. cf.;, NjSVII.11.2; Randle., loc,pit.,f.329>X x: .' •
5*'. See Chapter IV .x x^X''?' 'v;,'x ’ ’ - X” - '■ . /X./'
a similar case of heg^tlbri^ .thaty’we•’'judged--1>he':-;,;' v ; :
absence.1 He clearly accepts.its inferential character. . 
'^ vtvvHow.eV^ ea?,i‘->1]e does:h^ the passage <pioted,;f^
/ ; - footnote 1) as a uprame3raH, which seems to be the more
• , consistent view. • 7.y7:’;
: : . The early Vaise^ika theory is. expressed as follows: „
1 An exi stent thing is an entity different. from a ■
..'7 non-existent thing, inasmuch as actions and attributes •
^77.’ : caimpt, be predicated of the latter." *7 ■ 7 -v7\ 7 77 7 .<77
Things sre limited by their beginnings and their 
*,?■ r4< 7; ends. All predicates, and actions refer to their "thing-; 7 -N 
: ; ; ness" only. They are not possible, either before the
777 •; pr oduc.t i on or after the destruction of {-the things.—
-y>.77-: 1. Cf • Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, (5th Impression 1956),
p 7 7 ' pp. ;73^ 7^ - "Suppose you are told "there is butter in the
‘77 V-“ larder,, but no: cheese." Although they seem equally based 
on’ sensible experience, the two statements "there is.
7:7 7 ‘ v but t e r a n d  "there is not . cheese" are really on a very 7 .
. • ; : ■ different level. There is a definite occurrence which
was seeing butter, and v/hlch might have put the word :
7’74v ;\:,^'7 "butter" in: your mind even If-^bnh^
V777 :7';-'7 V of blitter. ' But. there was no occurrence which could be 7/
7 v:'; "• described as "not seeing cheese" .or as "seeing the absence
. . of cheese"’. You nudged this, you did not see it;. you saw
what each thing wasy: not -what it was-hot. To) 3udge "thlsis 
not cheese", youvmust:;'hdve the word;tfcheese", 'dr some equi- 
: V, , val ent, in your mind already. There is a clash between
;.....^at^you 4be and the association of the word "cheese1", ; and. ; 
7: ; so you .Judge "th i s is hot - c h e e s e " (Underlined -words are
' 4'/." in:italics.) 77'--7?7/7 ■ ':d'7:777’' ■ ‘ 'V7l/ ' '/r--7■
2• VS;,IX. 1 i3 •: ! asat.ah kriya-guna-vyapadesabhavad arthantaraip- •> 
-.7 ^his definition; is wi th reference to the previous sutra in
, which "sat" is.>'idi^ cus^ gidi\'-:;;It'tExpresses• the pradhvar|isabhava.
■: i77/:;,’ ;;‘'‘'3*:-;':YSV>lX.l;f;*; :i^.iyp;-^^a^vy;^ad^^abhavat' prag asat*! 777-
• Thus, unless the reality of the prior and posterior : r 7
negations is accepted, the use of such words as past,
• pre sent;and future, antecedent - and sub sequent,7fb eginni ng and 7 7
v":7 end is not possible• ^ " T h e  whole view ofvatdiava: is': based;/7 7
on the metaphysical conception of the Vaise§ika. . If things . •
c 7: simply exist and/ do not become, i.e. non-exist, then all ; -:7:
things would be eternal* ; If antecedent non-existence is
. • / denied, then all thihgsrand ]their moyements should;^§ J 7 ’ 7 v / r 7
7 7 -regarded as beginhihgiess;7,7if subSegubnt^hoh^exibfence; '1V777
./>/ ■' denied, then ; things and their ;.ac tivi t ie s wiXI be ihdist iiig- ..7. 7.'
uishableand If absolute non-existence is deriied>7then : ‘7 7/ > : • I
things shbdl&ebe regarded as /existing always . and everywh ere," ^
Indeed, in the Nyaya- arid Vaide§ika-sutra s 1abhava1
is defined by the terms . "pr ameya" and " a r t h a " A l t h o u g h  7 77v
negation .is7 a;, logical-father than an ontological category
there is7;a 7b lear tendency to regardlitv as -• "sbnie thi ngv exist ent
1 • N;• Kau s t .-*, p • 1471 ; inanvevam dhvams apragabhayahaipgi kar.e ady af y a 
caramatva. vartamanatva ..bhavi^yatyatftatya^puryatvottara- 
tTOnan anugatanix^acanami :a^akyam-fA7Aptarmimamba,; verse ,10:
1 kayyyadrayyam anadi . syat pragabhavbpy4/ni^ pradhya^-; ■:
7 , . sasya ,ca7 dharmasya pracyate1 nantafam yraget1; and cp., SI* 7
Var1^;':'Ab./,;,yerss^ Notes*NASVVT * ,p*232. ■
■ 2. Radhakrishnan, IP* ,11. ,p.221. * For_,other two types of 
iiaegafipiiviz ■*,. absdluf e; V:(;aty aht abhava) 7 anfe^
/(anyonyabhav^ :Sinhsu;*HII^
ie cording^itpCSankard^rMIer'a^ Upaskara, these
sutras; contain^7fpufe types - of negation* See also:; Randle,
E*Schools, p *330, n.l.
. 3 • ; - See also Sinha, pp ♦ cl t. ,p.227•
7; ■/./ 4717Radhakrishnan, ;op.cit. y. p .220.
5 1 *  :
" Y  -v, . However, witli regard to the view, .propounded by many !;.
; scholars; viz* ihati the Nylya and yaise^ikp Sutra, did not ;Y:
7 regard negation as a padartlia, 106001186 it is not included ' ;
v : as such in the list s: of - the-positiVe categories, we may ; 7
examine the explanations given by: Sridhara and' Udayana. ;
, ; Udayanarbbserves in this respect;:. "Negation is not; mentioned
7 separately/ Although it has its own independent character:
( svarupa) ,^  simply, because, by stating; its counter-positive 1 
negation is (implicitly) mentioned. (B.uf it is not , 
mentioned) not because it is not bn entity;' since:antecedent 
and posterior negations are intended to. be explained in 
,(thd7s|ctions) dealing withv Creatipnfbnd destruction (that 
id asatkarya) ahd reciprocal and absolute negations;in the.
'-, discussiop. concerhihg; Diff erence ' (vaidharmya) ; ;.7-'
•" main ;cont ent ion is that "Negation is a cognition
which- depends upon the apprehension of:iis counter^pobitive. .
, . This meanbOlh^t, negatipn..canbe known bnlY with , reference to
v its negatumy7; Therefore,: Udhyana bhd1 ^ ridhara rejected the
7 X*7::’yidp7bbPbd P P ^  '7 '7, ..'77 7; ;-77;-7*7; ■ .. 77/: 7-.. :v''v 'YY;7
7 2# 7 Y abhayas7tii_svdfupavan api prthak npddistah pratlyogi- : >
7-■-^ ■■yina^abblnbb^S'^ pragabhava-dhvamsabhavayor^vaidharmye^ 7'Y
- ; bctaretafabhayg^yanfabhayayos tatra. tatra nidarlxsyamapatvat 
Kir.,p.38. 7 See;/aisb Naddegohy V. , System7V P* :l20 ^ oh VS:. .
7 77' i X . 1 . 1 - 2 .  "7 7- i ;:. . / /  7 Y Y ! / Y 7 _ 7 ' Y - 7 ^ V 7 / ^  '7. 7 7 _  7 ' /  -
, 3* vSiyadityd, Sapt.p. 65•, ^prati^bgiblhahadhina^nano"’bhavd^1
validity of the objections against the recognition of 
negation as a category (padartha). SrTdhara declared: , 
“Negation is not mentioned separately (in the Vaidesika. 
sutra), simply because it is dependent,(for its cognition)
upon Bhava ‘(i.e. the six positive categories), and not
' - ' ' * *’ ' 1- ’ ' ‘ * : -' 1 •" '■ "■ *' ' *because it is unreal. The same point has been expressed ,
by VatsyayansL and Uddyotakara from whose works the two
- ’ ’ * 2 1
authors derived much knowledge* However, this,explanation
does not seem satisfactory to ^“.S.Athalye. ; He .is of the
opinion that “This is more like an apology for, the non-mention
of abhava in the original sutra than ah.argument for recognis-
■ , "5 - -
ing it as a separate padartha.,fr I find.it difficult to
agree with Athalye. As we have pointed out above - in
spite of the fact that negation is not. included as such in
the list/of padarthas - it is defined as a “prameya” an object
of cognition, ,^ nd this implies its nature of a category
(padar.tha).^ Udayana and SrTdhara emphasised the fact that;
it is the specific character (SvabhavayiiSesa) of negation
itself which prevented it from being included in the list
of positive categories*: . V
1. UK* p. 7* labhavasya prthaganupadefiah bhava-p*aratantryan-
.-■■:V/\;^:matva-bhgivat *1 * 1
2. cp. NBh., (KSS.), pp* 10-12* , and XW3?. , pp. 9-10.
3* Tr* Sam., p. 102* Athalye refers to Udayan's passage which 
is quoted.above p. 51 n.2.
4. US. II* 2 *7*-8;; VS.,IX. 1.3; supra pp* h 2 sLllt' M  ,
. j//t ;-./ / With the exception of Sironiani^ ne Navyar . ;; / /.
A':>■ ..: /Naiyayikas '(Hep-Nyayh/system)/yrecdgh^ as a - :;/; ,//■
’■v ■ v; category. / So does Sivaditya Misra (13 00 A.D.) .who in . v^//- ■ -v.
/.-./y/A//t vv.vh 1 f Sdjtapadarthi f; or; the •• Account of the .y ’ /■ '■/■■;. ;,yy//:
//: seven Categories1 , specifically enlists negation as the • .
\ : / seventh’ ypategorsrinaddition ip; :& < .y./y.
•; / ; • : //' ;. %  /' In, the seventeenth eentury: Pandit a Venidatta wrote ;'.,// • /:
./,///:' an/iiiiportant ■ and ! criti6al ^ ’Befehce. .ofythe' C a t e go ri e sf or . '■ := yyA// 
1 Padartha-maiidana1 In answer to the *Padartha-Tattva- ' ^ -y-'^y" 
/, //‘.VcNxrupap.af pi* kaghupe^ . (1500 , A.X)^  )> A/ The . / y;y/ y.;/-'
/y //; ;/ .A.v:la;tt'epVfaady;yrefuted the. Vaise^ika nccountvof/the categories. /^ /;
; r,1/; -/ /At the end. of his treatise Vepldatta gavea/list of categor- 
/y■- yi.es . and’ said: ; “These are the only.,;£ourpositive’; eategori es•
A'/^A A/ .A^A ■■;;/? • ■" The use of the wqrd&!/5^ 1 in the text is ,
/ A 1 / A  : very si gnificant, for the author in  his {general I treatment of
; ^ . :/ yl«A -See infra pp• *Th 'S"£ - , ; _ ^
' ; ■ AAAA; A . V2• / Sapt ijA Su.,2._1t e_ca dr.ayya-^na-karma-samanya-vlsesa-
/ ' ■ v ;/ ! samavay9ehhavakhyah saptaiva*. r; 'See also , Annambhatta,
/ V ; . ■. ■ A y  ^r.Sam. r  1.2. # y ^ ' A y A  . A A A /y A A y A A : ' ’ ,,
AAA y; , v■■ /3*yA^^MW>_p.36>y, vastutas tu^dravya-gum^ A. ;
yyA//yyyy' -A/AP&tyaras eya ADhavapadaiAbh^
• •/' ,/y,/;// y'"y itj are intended by; the term A & a r m a 1; J'hfero^uc-tipnf /p..'$-■ .■;/' 
AA/y/y A1 Ay,, -A- V“samahya~vi£e§a;yerdharite^^ pp. -A/Ay/
; 9^10. Notice the use of the' term! ,(dharma“y instead of
/■ , \ - the^ two/ shmanyja \ahdy,vise§ay categ:pries postulated /by.; the
"/ . /l!■ early Nyaya-Vaisebikn writers.. : This■ seems ; tp me an . • {y
/" - (; influence of tlie Buddhist ’Apoha1 doctrine. , cf. infra.v .
y- .y>:; , . ■- .Chap.^V.y - \ :.v: -:; / / - r . . vacW ' ■; . i:-/-; *■ - ' r/" .
the the .categories included also" negation. The editor, 
Gopala Sastri Nene, in his introduction rightly observes , 
that this author accepted five categories, vis., Substance
(dravya), Attribute (gupa), ,Action (karma), Universality, <
■ - * ,   ' 1
and'particularity (dharma), and Negation (abhava). .
yepidatta* s‘‘treatment of the categories reflects the
manner of Gotama and Kariada. The two Subrakaras enumerated
only positive - categories but indicated by implication that
■ ’ 2 ~  ’- abhava _is a category* -Venidatta did'the same-but made1 it
more clear by saying “these are-.the only (e/va) -four
positive (bhava)1 categories.^":
:In Navy a-Ny ay a, the system of the seven categories
including negation “appears to be accepted by Gangers' and.
Mathuranatha, as it certainly is by V i s v a n a t h a . '
Baghunatha Siromapl, however, in his fPadartha-Tattva-
Nirupana1 denounced the traditional Nyaya-Vaisesika system
1. PM.j, 'Introduction p.1: “anena-granthakarta hi paflca^ _ _ 
padarthah svik^tal). - te - ca , dravya. gup.a -karma dharmabhav^h 
On page. 12. (1&-15) Venidatta rejecting the category of 
particularity .explicitly states .that he recognises only 
five padarthas and visesa is not/an independent .category^ 
Vi£esofpi ;ca na padarthahtaram,*"...dravyadipahcabhinna- 
padartha-nisedhai^.' -
2., s u p r a , p p . W / ^ % M m  ■
3* of. supra* comments .about Aristotle are
noteworthy here.- He: writes: “Aristotle do.es not 
mention Abhava-or negation as he deals'.only with Nna
1 or Being.1' Tr.. Sam. ,p.7h» ■ -
h* Ingalls,'.Materials., ‘ p.38.' See also Karikavali with - . 
SM.(l923) verse 2.
of categories, which in my opinion, includes.,negation* ' . ,
“He calls the qualities indivisible imposed properties
(aldiandopadhi): ■ to. inherence, .. absence, . and some if not
1all generic characters he gives the same name*”,
Venidatta, too, differs from the traditional system 
as well as from Raghunathq,* He ranges Samanya and 
Visesa under the term “dharma“*, instead of “akhandopadhi“, 
■However, in ;keeping with the/ traditional systera. he accepts 
“abhava'1 as a separate category# t 4
Thus, there is a tendency among some later logicians
to reject the ontological character of negation* They
- * * •- * 1 ' s 2 'rather stress its logical function# . j
i -  • j i £ . . ’ •• • , - ?"■**,<.: . i /-.• '( • -. * v  s i . •.'< r   ^ ! • • - r : • \  ^  •  *>. ^  . r *
• :>a. ->* ■ v —"'.' v. ■ •••/ _ .r j . ; ^^ ' t •« - v ^ t ‘-r,:;*:. v.--. . tN; ,-x.\ , v‘"i >r:' = * v* .
Section V . Conception of'NegationAbhava') according to the 
Nyaya-Vai sey-lka- Logici ana.
The{ Nyaya-'Vai^e^ika asserts1 that negation, is not 
apprehended as 1 non-existence1 per sje. However* • this, does 
not mean that absence is not an objective reality*. According
...to .the. Nyaya-Vaise§ika. negative/ and positive judgments..
correspond to two distinct (arthantara) entities .or “facts--
1. Ingalls., loc* cit* « ^
'2* See Chapter III,• Complex Negations, |p; -
which'themselves are negative and positive* Both these ' .
*1
“facts11 are real (Vastu) • ..» Reality is, primarily divided . 
into two categories; Pi&istence (bhava) and Non-existence 
(abhava)*^ Thus, the thing denoted by the word (pada) ’ 
is a fact (artha) or an entity which can be either 
negative or positive
-However, the perceptual as well as the logical " , _ . 
functions of these facts.are different* • The judgment . -
“the book is not on the table“ is correlated tothe 
judgment“ the book is on the table11, i*e* .the’ **absence*1 
of the expected “presence11 is perceived* Thus, the 
fact “not-book“ - is delimited’by: the different fact “book“* 
Otherwise “not-book1* may mean anything' in the cosmos* The 
very notion “it is not“ presupposes an experience of something 
“that is“(. , In Nyaya terminology this is expressed as follows:' 
“Negation depends for its cognition on-the counter-positive11 
or “negation* is that cognition which depends upon the 
cognition of the counter-positive*- ,
1* The Nominalist would not accept this view for, accord­
ing to him, reality cannot consist of two opposite 
components, cf. img.ra, chap. Vi Apoha section, '
2. Lak., p.l# supra As#!. Ji*36;yv»!U __ „ „ _ _
3* cf'. Kir., p.38; 'pratiyogi^nirupanadhinaniruijanatvat; r.
SP*, p. 65: pratiyogijhanadhinajhano*bhavah. ,
Sridhara rejecting simple sense-perception as a
means .of negative cognition says: ‘ “The grasping “by vague
1perception (i * e*/. indeterminate - nirvikalpaka), in 
consequence.:ofr a -vconnection with; the sense organs, is 
possible for pots etc*, because things/like'these do not 
depend in their innate nature (svarupa) on something else•
But the innate nature of non-existence, having'negation 
as innate character, is dependent on that whose negation 
it is* Therefore - [scil*] since there is'no other 
innate nature of non-existence, than that of Its being the 
negation of the (positive entity in question) - no deter­
mining of its is possible.without the determining of the 
innate nature of its pratiyogin (correlative object). This,
, . v . sr.‘ . ' W ' - ’ ' . ,r <,> iv: l ■■ ». • * • * "  ; '■ / ' •' v •: - v • • r** " •
namely, is the difference between existence and. non-existence 
that the grasping of the one takes place in a positive form,, 
the grasping of the other in the form of a negatipn of 1
,1* Perception (pratiyakga) is twofold, in the'Nyaya- 
Vai£e§ika system: indeterminate (nirvikalpaka) and 
determinate (savikalpaka)• ■ The latter is somewhat 
- similar to Buddhist Inference* For details see Chatter- 
jee, N. Theory of Knowledge*, pp* 207-227;; Ingalls, 
Materials*, pp. 39-i+O* For the views of the different 
. systems see Kuppuswami Shastri, Primer*, pp* 212-225* 
J.S.Jetly, “The Meaning of the word Avyapadesya in 
Nyaya-sutra, I. l*Aj.,M Journal of .the .University ofk 
Bombay, Vol* XIX, pt**2, Sept'*, 1950•-
something else*'1"1* ,
According to the Nyaya-Vaisesikas there are three
important factors for cognising negation* l)*, A
suggestion of a perceptible . counter-positive (pratiyogin);
2) ♦ Perception of the locus-: in which the absence Resides
and-thus qualifies it; 3)* ■Non-existence or negation of
2the counter-positive#
: We cannot have a cognition of a negative entity
without precedent exp eri ence and^ . the . intent ion to perceive , 
the :;'tMng'vhegate&v>:(igy^^ the perception
of the^eiirpty placeJwhere we intended to find the thing#
Then there must be definit;e;./ah^ .ence':'i of the thing (counter-
1. NK* > p.226; Yuktam ghathdinamv indMyasahhifear|ah _
Vhii^ikalp^av^grahanhBh;:^ -
\ ^ huyasya^tu ^ ratihbdhasvabh^ eva yasyayam-
eva prati§edhah__syat tadadhinam atas^tatpratisedhatam
• ant arena t adabhavasya_svarup ant arabhavat_ t at rasya 
yy p rat 1 ybgi^svaru^^nl f upanam ant arena); inirpp hn^m fasakyam* 
ayam eva hi bhavabhavayor vise $0 yad ekasya*vidhirupataya 
;'graha^ aifit;; dp a r a b y a t ^ ^ i ^ e ^ a m u ^ e h a , J / Translation 
: t>y # a d & e g o h ^ ' V * ^ ^ f > : : ^ e e ^ a l b c  >U NVT#
^ V PP i M  N S t l t r e f e r r e d
; ; to Uddyotakara ; and quote from the
■; NYT#:. sv at ant r a-p ar at ant r op al ab dhy-anup alabdhi -
; kaf anabha vac c a vi s e gah: s at t u Mi alii p ram ana sy a 1 amb anam 
svatantram a sat";, tut phrhtshtram (anyapratisOdh^
2• iiNK*, p idiMgr^ vbamyh^ta^vtsesanataya-
t ddanyatprdtf s e d h a - m i d t h ^ ; grhya^ rm
1 visesanta* means a unique re 1 atioutetween absence and 
the locus in which it resides. See Radhakrishnan; IP#, 
Vol. IIV pp* 53~5hs we shall discuss this in the fourth 
v chapter ....... ■........ 1   ■ ■  1 '*
positive) itself which is to he denied by negation. Thus • ;
in the judgment * the boojC is rot on the table*,, we have a r 
preceding awareness of the book; then, there is the factual 
absenceYpf the, book, which-is contrary to its presence,
i.e. the counter-positive* ’ Hence, we cognise real negation 
as qualifying the table (locus) connected with the book
V;'V . 1 _ 1
by negative relation (samyukta~vi£esan,ataya) •
However, there is another angle from which the 
•negative .judgment can be explained. According to this 
theory all reality is positive* only; therefore all 
cognitions are existential. Thus'even negative judgments 
refer to perception of some other-thing than the negatum.
In contrast to the previous theory the emphasis here is on 
the locus of the 'absence as a perceived entity, rather than 
‘bftjbhe perception of the absence' as such.
For instance, the negative statement ,!there is no book 
on the table11 implies the affirmative judgment 1 there is the 
table”. The assertion *The lotus is not black1 may imply,
1. The importance of perceiving the locus has been_emphasised 
in all the schools;, the Buddhists.-and the* Prabhakaras 
have even equated cognition of negation with perception, 
of the empty locus. cf. infra PP#$q~*<irY ■
2. Essentials, p. 95* v ,
*it is red1 or ‘white*. ‘ According,to this’view all
negative .judgments may he interpreted as "a complex of
1 ’ affirmative judgments”. 1
To the Nyaya-Vaise§ika* thinkers .such speculations
are'notacceptable; r In the negative ‘ judgment- * the book
is not on the table'1 the fact we cognise is in the form
of "the locus being qualified by-the absence of the
2 ' negatum". And its cognition’consists of a denial, of „
the presence of the* counter-positive. Nonetheless this
denial does not assert1 the presence of any other positive
thing*. For example,‘when we.say *it is not rainy now1, *
we do not necessarily mean 'it is snowy* or’ 'it is sunny'-.
The statement asserts only the denial of rain.at a specific
time and place. This form-of Nyaya-Vaise^ika negation
emphasises’only a particular.fact. It is hot concerned ,
with other possibilities entailed in that negation
(anyaprati§edha)• Thus,, in the statement "there is no rain",,
implications such as "the child, may play in the street"',
”it is hot”, "it snows" are not referred to. In this
connection Iiiriyanna observes that "negative facts are as
;1. Hiriyanna, Studies p., 147 (p)*_ This is thb view held’ 
by the Buddhists and the Prabhakaras. We shall discuss 
it in Chapter II. ’ _
2. NK.', p. 229, Tad-abhava-vi^i^^a-bhutala-grahanam#
much objects1 of knowledge.as positive -ones; of to state 
■the same otherwise,- knowledge of absence is not. absence • ' 
of laiowledge* That is, the present view explains, 
negative-judgments by postulating negative facts as part
/ - n ■
of objective reality.”
Section VI. ■ Neputive Category and Kumarila Bhafrfra of
Purva MimamsaSchoo 1 *
, Purva-Mimaipsa philosophy comprises two main currents .
of thought.: l) The school of Kumarila Bha^Ja and 2)
—  —  p
The school of Prabhakara* ‘ Their views on/'the problem, 
of negation are not reconcilable* In this section we 
shall limit ourselves ‘ only to Kumarila-'s standpoint.-.
The, Prabhakara theory will be presented i n ,the following • 
chapter. A point of special interest is the relation, 
of the Bha$ta-Mimamsa to the Nyaya-Vaisefika with regard 
to the problem of negation.
Kumarila Bhat1;a, as pointed out above (see p.3-)f 
differs from the Nyayd-Vaisegika with regard to the means
1. Hiriyanna, Studies, p-. 140.
2 • There-is an unsolved controversy regarding,the,priority 
in time of Kumarila^and Prabhakara. Thus it is not 
clear whether Prabhakara was.the master or/pupil of 
Kumarila. See for'this, e.g. "ihternltz, HIL., Vol. 
Ill-, p. k25> -liadhakrishnan^ IP., vol. ,11., pp. 377-378; 
Stcherbatsky, BL. vol. I. p. 51? Jha, PM Sources., 
fp. 16-17*
'-of. apprehending-negation*. 'According to-him, negation is 
the means (pramana).. for the cognition of-its own (negative)
- 1 - - ' • '* T - . ‘ . • , 1
objective reality (vdstu on padartha). Hev: adduces two,
-main .reasons for this 'theory: (a) his adherence,,to .the 
theories of asatlcarya and negative emancipation; - 
:(b) the logical necessity-of solving'the paradox:of the 
negative judgment (see p. )•
Kumarila supports the Nyaya-Vaise§ika theory concern-
- ■’ ' . x \7
ing negative 'reality#- - .He.'accepted the fourfold division.
• of negation* This1 was expressed by him as follows: "The
negation of' curd in milk is called 'Prior.Negation1 
(pragabhava); the negation of milk in’:the curd is -called " 
'-’'Posterior Negation1-.(dhvaiiisa);;the negation of the horse*etc*,
1* kumarila d?oilpws_5abara Svamin's interpretation,of 
'.Jaimini' S 'Mimamsa-Sutra. in: expounding -' abhava1. cf* 
infra Chapter IV* ' -
2/ "She conception of mok^a here’.(i*e* in /the Bhat’fa- .
Mimamsaka’system) much resembles the conception of the 
■, . same in the Nyaya-Vaisesika* / The- only' divergence bet- ■ 
ween the two shhools, wfiich may/be-noticed here, is that 
-.some among-the followers of Kumarila seem-to have main-/ • 
tained , that it was a-state not merely of absence1 of - 
suffering but also' of positive bliss.- a view which 
appears'"to be more in consonance 'with .the general spirit'
. , of hi s'' teaching#/1 p Hiriyanna,-- Essentials, p.* li+9; sse"
. ^uprarr^ p'% ' Kumarila Bha$t‘a_regards liberation "purely 
* negative in character*"- Jha., PM* Sources*, P.3&J Si* 
Vart*, Sambandhaksepapariksa, verses:101-107; Sinha-, - 
HIP., -I*,.;p*. 851. * • ,
, 3* See Chandradhhr Pharma: 1 Indian- Philosophy, pp * 309^10*
in the cow,, and, vice versa is known'as * Mutual Negation* -■ 
anyonyabhava); the lower portions of, the hare,* s head, being 
devoid, of hardness and ,a supernumery growth in the form of 
horns, is called- 'Absolute Negation*-, (atyantabhava) *fr 
After describing the four kinds of negation, Kumarila . 
refutes. nthose who hold that Negation being a non-entity 
(avastu) is-not an objective reality (tuccha)' and-is
-. „ >   p
without a self-character (nihayabhava) •u He observes 
that w e 'could not" differentiate between cause and effect 
’-if, Negation,-were not1 classifled into these ^our, different 
kinds, such as Prior ^ absence', etc* Nor again is'such 
classification possible with regard to a non-entity (avastu)#.
Therefore Negation, must be an, entity." For what is the
■ ■ * 3
negation- of an effect, other than the, absence of the cause.
In other, words all effects are hon-existent prior to their
production* If there were no pragabhava or, pradhvanisabhava
of a thing, then, it would be' always present in time and
1. *'ksire_dadhyadt yannastl ^pragabhavah ea ucyate. (-2) ■ 
•nastita payaso dadhnl pradhvaipsabhava i^yate. 
gavi yo’svady abhayas tu so^nyonyabhava ucyate* (3) 
siraso1 vayava .nimha v^ddihikathinyavar jita^* ' ‘ 
salalfmgadirupenaso * tyantabhaya ucyate » L ( k) •' _
S.Vart., Ab.ch.'J2-4,PP*U73~474^ Translation b y , Jha, - 
p*2l0*.Cp* below’,n* J?52. „
2* *ye ni^Lsyabhavam_abhavam avastusvarupam' tuccham manyante, . 
tan pratyha*. * Parthasai»athi Mi Ira. NR. commentary,’ Ibid., ■ ' 
Verses 7-8, p* klk* ’ „ ’ _ h. • -
3# \na ca syadvyavaharo’-yam^Kara^adiyibhagatali.
pragnbhavadibhedena nabhavo, bhid.yate - yadi. - - -
cavastuna ete syur bhedajs, tenajsya yastuta. 
kafyadinain abhavah ko yo*bhavah karanadinali. Ibid., verses.
contd. overleaf......
/place* ’ . if-there were. no prior, absence-of curd in milk,
then, curd would he present at' all time and sp we. should .
never be able to cognise the milk,- i.e. the cause of the,
effect (curd).’*' Kumarila thus-supports the theory, of
asatkarya*."' ' -v ' -. . - -
continued from previous page**.*1 * ■ __
* - There ;are two editions of this text:„(l) edited by Hama
Sastri . Tailapga 'in the Chowkhamba Sanskrit .Series, Benares-,
- ' 1898;' (2) edited, by S.K.Ramanatha Sastri published by the
University of Madras, 19^0. -The first edition1 giyes , in ■ f 
■ ‘ verse ’8, ...the reading “ko yo’bhavab' karanddinah!1 which 3Dr*
; ' Jha renders as follows.: “For what is the negation-rof an
effect, other than; the existence_(,continuance) of the - :
' ’'cause?1* ’He apparently reads fbhayaf in - accordance with 
,-the edition (2;* This change of Tabhavaf to_fbhayaf in;
’ the_text is very problematic. I prefer “abhava“ because 
' 'Kumarila is an “asatkaryavadin11. The term ,“abhava“ .is a 
. substitute here for “pragabhava-11*
1* The Mimamsaka does not agree with the theory,that curd is‘ 
present in the'milk._ ^Contrary to this asatkarya ; theory 
-v ■ of ’ the NV# and the Mimamsakas, the Samkhya-Yoga systems ' " 
' believe -in the, ,satkarya theory,’according to which an 
effect, exists;potentially in' its material cause. , The 
\ Samkhya-Yo.ga system, .“holds that nothing can ever come intp 
•being afresh, or. pass .away finally. When therefore, we speak 
of an effect’ as pxioduced, all that we, mean is that /what ’ was. 
'.latent merely, becomes manifest.- « The’ underlying idea is' ■ 
that the effect Is always there, though in a potential form, 
and’ that'it only becomes actual'when certain conditions ' • .
known as the, efficient causes,' _ like "the activity o f ’the- 
potter in the case of a pot,' are fulfilled.’ The material
- • ’ cause and the' effect are not; accordingly taken here to , ■
* puite-distinct as in the Nyaya-Vaiseslka; they'form, "on the, 
other hand-ah .identity in difference) as in .Jainism. This ,
' ' 1 ’ view is designated as “the doctrine of pre-existent effect1*1'
(sat-karya-vada) in contrast to- the other,_termed' “the 
doctrine of no t-pre-exist exit effect (as atkarya1vada)“* ‘ - 
Hiriyanna, Essentials., p. '109; See also J* S.inha, HIP*,
Vol. I, p,. 590*,.
Moreover, ,,111 the- absence ■ of posterior ,negation, , 
there would be - absolute- negation of all things. Fox* all' 
.effects are non-existent prior to their;production. If 
there would be no destruction: of. the prior' negation,.how 
could effects appear at all? According to' this theory 
the "prior negation is destroyed by the same .cause which 
produces its counter-entity (pratiyogin)• Thus .only 
. after’ the destruction of pragabhava--an-effect ,comes into 
being. •
■ - The mutual, negation (anyonyabhava) can be'explained 
as follows: J ' A' is- not B and vice versa. A hox*se is not 
a cow and a'cow is not a horse; there is a- class identity 
between the two inasmuch•as-both are species of the gunus 
of vertebrates. Nevertheless each’ exists,in its own form 
and at the same time does hot exist in the other1s form. - 
Thus, according'to Kumarila “all things■are positive from 
.their own standpoint, but negative-from that.of the other. 
Such judgments or usages of differentiation of things would 
not be possible if they were not-based on the.objectivity of
I. - *vinasab -pragabhavasya pratiyogyutpadana-samagritah** 
SP., p. 155*. , * 1 1
‘2. - Vide supra, pp*_W~ ^  L ' ’ _ '
3* *svarupa-para-rupabhy&m sarvam sad-asad-atmakam1-. Si*
Vart., Ab. ch., 12, p.476.
X'Mutual Absence* (nnyonyabhava) * , - .
, With regard to 'Absolute negation (atyantabava), 
Kumarila asked whether it is possible to deny the 
absolute absence of colour in the air, fire in the 
water, and horns in the hare.. If one should not accept 
the absolute absence as an objective reality (vastu), 
then, the Mmamsaka, would ask him to show and prove 1 
the existence of "hardness in the lower portion of the 
hare's head, and-colour in the ail*, taste in the fire, 
etc."^ 1 *' 1
Ihus, it is*, clear that Kumarila Bhatta, postulates 
'abhava' as an independent objective reality’or category.
Dr. Satkari Hookerjee,•however, holds a different view.
He observes:- r "Kumarila does not thing negation to be 
an independent reality, but only-an aspect ,of the - 
positive locus in which it is cognised.
—   ' ~  ^ -■■-'■■■.................. ..... -------------- :         « . . .  u ■ ■
1. For distinction between 'mutual absence' and
'separate-ness* (prth&ktva) see, lnfra,^Chapt• III,
2. \ In ascribing "vastuta"' to "abhava",. Kumarila seems to
have been Influenced by the HV. In his theory of 
"absolute negation" there may be a,trace of Madhyamika 
•and Advaita-Vedanta ideas. Paul' Masson-Oursel, in ■ 
•Esquisse d'une Histoire- de la Philosophie Indienne, 
Paris, 1923, p.202. ( / _
3. Si. Vart., Ab.Ch.,vers. 4-5: PP* 473-474:* siraso ^  vayava 
nimna'v^ddhikathinya^yarjitah. apsu gandho rasas 
cagnau vayau rupena tau' sahal (etc.).
4* Buddhist Flux.,-p. 409*
, Prof. II. Ui expresses a similar opinion.- -He writes: 
"Kumarila Bha^a mentions, Sakti, Sadrsyaj and Abhava (negatioxi) 
not as categories, but as the principles of pramana, i.e.,
.sakti for pramana in general, Sadrsya for upamana,(analogy)> 
and abhava for abhava (privation, or negation), while.in the'^
Prabhakara view1Sakti and sadysya are two categories beside
1 * ’ 1 ■ the others." 1 ,1 disagree with both scholars on the grounds
we have discussed above and the*following.,
Before further investigating whether Kumarila accepts 
the positive ( independent) reality of negation It .is necessary 
to. examine’whether his approach,to it is identical with his 
treatment of the other (positive) categories.- Kumarila gives 
an additional reason why "Negation ,should be regarded (gamyate) 
as an,entity such as a cow etc.’ For it is the-object of inclus­
ive and exclusive conceptions and- is (generally) an object of 
cognition. It. is not merely fortuitous, i.e. an (incorrect) / 
imposition or an erroneous notion., ThereforeV^t.he.*'f,act that - 
(negation is defined in terms of) the Universal and the
1. Das. Sastra., p. 125*
68*
.'-.concrete particular is not false*
( ; v ■ An (ob jectlye) ehtit y (vastu) :is tha^w&loti can be; 
affirmed and denied or. differenti ated. We /affirm a 
. particular tiling ..in its generality and differentiate it from 
all otlief'things.' To apprehend the thing (a) we cognise it 
with its class character or generality and (b) differentiate it 
, from all other things, including the members of its own class* 
The. cow isr cpigrii's-ed .first ' as ‘the / pos^ cpw-ness, but :.
1 for the, cognition of /the cow whic^beiong&rt6 .^:MrV-IA‘ we must 
. diffex*enti ate ( vyavftta) it from all other ' cowe and, in fact, 
'from! dll other■■■objectsr(-i*e>, n o ^ c p w ) M  indi^ , .
," character (anuvy^^^) 0^ dll S-Vs.;%-However, for^ the'\apprehen^--/ ■ 
. sion of the particular "S" which occurs; in thename;.
;v v : "Christopherf -itmust be" differentiated;: (yyov^tta); from all
1. .'yadvaf .nuvrt t i-vyayr11 i -buddlu -graliyo yatas tv ayam,
, >; / v tasmad: gavadivad-vastu p rameyatvac ca gamy ate. • . na
= c^upacariicatvamj vabhrdhtiryapi yadrcchaya, bhavaty-ato na 
, ysaimnya-yise^im^ * Bl.yart. ij^ (Ab., ;.9yiC>5 r See
. • also <Jha, PM’.Sourcesv p • *163•■■ rNptb;;the^correct;:trans-
latip.n;;by; Jha of;tJipAphrase "anuvrtti-vyavrtti^6uddhir
• • grahya£" as "it 1 s’-; capab 1 e oX’ IToivning the ob ject of the .
; notions;of collective affirmation and di fferent i at ion"; 
aiid the unsatisfactory rendering ty;i^/Prasaddt;np., 
p. 276: "it c an be apprehended as: applicable of non-
applicable tp:.thihgs,,>;: ; 1 a-;' . y  ^ 7^.- ■v V/:7.’V^ 7'' ’ -
other ,S* s belonging to its class.’ Kumarila believes that 
such cognition of .affirmation’ and denial, is/only possible ' 
because every entity.(vastu) has a two-fold reality, namely, 
.that of its .class arid that of,the individual.^ Kumarila* 
argues that since this two-fold character is applicable to ; 
negation, ~(abhava)•it„should1 be recognised•as an entity , 
(yastu)*^ 1 "At the time of cognition pf the- antecedent - 
non-existence of something^'this non-existence must be 
differentiated (vyav^tta) - from the-other three kinds 'of 
negatipn after it■has; been -affirmed (anuvrtta) in its 
class character. _ We also, cognise the ppsterior negation 
as’*different from the, antecedent,- mutual and the absolute 
negations. In the same way,the.last two,•that.is, the 
mutual■and the absolute-negations are cognised'as distinct
1. Whether a word denotes the 1 individuality or generality, 
or both,.,is another problem. ' According to the NS*
II. 2.64-68 the -meaning /of a..word (padartha) is not one 
but three:. Individuality (vyakti), Universality (jati)
7 , ■ and Configuration (akfti). One of the . three 1‘is/under- 
, . .stood, according to the agent* s. wish, as the-main 
.7 denotation and the othertwo as secondary. Nonetheless 
all__the tliree are the denotation of the'word . 77 But V 
* Kumarila'regards-Ikrti-and Jati as synonymous and thinks 
that the denotation*of- the wprd is the' class (akrti).
//S ee Si. Vari?,,, Ch. Akfti; Jha, PM Sources*., pp. 58-7,6•
2. , iSl. Varfc;, Ch. Akp.,',-3* p* 546 sarvavastusu buddhis ca
vyavytty anugamatmiksu Jayate dvyatmakatvena*viha ■ sa 
- .ca na siddhyat.i. ,
3* ' PM Sources, p. 163* 1 J
from each other and the rest* Kumarila-thus" that
like any other (positive) form of reality negation, too, forms
the object of cognition and also that it (negation) can be
2expressed by affirmative and-negative propositions. It 
may-also be argued that In, the proposition, e.g. .fHe 
does nothing*, or fHe eats nothing* the word 'nothing* is 
treated as the object of cognition (vastu) that takes 
the predications of * doing' and 'eating*. There is 
nothing grammatically,wrong in such constructions which , 
forbids the use of such expressions. This<affirmative 
(anuvrtti) prepositional use of negation indicates a 
class character ( anuvrtti-dliarma). Thus all negative.. 
cognitions are members of the class of Abhava.
Moreover, there are.some sources in direct support 
of the theory that the Bhatta-Kmamsakas recognised 
negation as a category from Kumarila onwards. A follower
1. 'tad ayam vastudharmah san katham avastudharmah-syad iti. 
asti hy^abhavasya pragabhavadisvarupe^La .vyavfttir 
abhavarupena car nuvrtiir iti.* Parthasarathi Mi|ra in 
N. Hatnakara^ commentai*y on Sl.Varfc> Ab.verse 9* p.475*
2. This view is diametrically opposed to the Buddhist theory 
of Apoha according, to which all propositions are 
",discriminatory" and therefore affirmative and negative, 
cf. supra Chap .V, pp. J7 7
of that - school,' called ISTarayana, wrote a treatise
* Kumari1a-mat op anyasaf- o r ,1 An Exp o s i 11on -of Kumari1a1s 
Doctrine1 in which. he enlists five categories - as . =, ’‘ 
accepted by Kumarila, Bhatta. Narayari& says: "The followers 
of Kumarila classify the. categories (of objects of know­
ledge,; prameya)into five,,-viz#: Substance '(dr'avya), 
Universal;,(jat'i), Attribute (gupta) , * Action (karma), and 
Negation (abhava)*" And “afterwards the author criticises
- - * , 1 >■ ,  > p .
Prabhakara.for. not recognising abhava as a category (vastu).
...... .................  ..■   - /£<T7‘ 1   
furthermore, Gagabha^fa, ( also called Visvesvara; ’ l~iQQA*D.),
in his versatile work 'Bhatta-cintamani * or' * the ^ Thought- ', ■/
1*" Kumarilamatopanyasa published along with Gurusammatapadarth*
^;>''^:.;/:^-!'^ ^'.ii'i<^Nniver.si'ti!y:::T.=bfl,rava2ico:rer|i'i'vdS5^l''-r:';,-t^''Used!feoni^ia'''P;a lm ^ l© a 'f 
MS*, written in Malayal’am*'* Naraya^a seems to be identical 
with the1 author of the pfameya‘part of the * Manameyodaya* 
of the IJth century*.' See. Introduction by Suranad’Kunjan 
Pillai, p*iw ^
2. Ibid. ,_jp*7* verse 5h; " abhavakhy am' oa&artham ca pancamam 
cintayamahe"; verse 571 "abhavakhyam tu vastv-eva hast! 
ty aha prabhakara^". ‘ J’ t
The emphasis on1 *tu* should "be understood with reference :
to " the ..fact that the vBhattas postulate ,* abhav aa s  vastu,. .
. /as well as pramana* Miile#the Prabhakaras do not even (tu)
. accept it as vastu or'entity* .Verses 5U‘ to 60;. , The 
terms Vprameya* a n d 1 vastu* are treated ..here, as synonyms 
of fpadartha* or' category; p.6* verse k2%, "dravyam 
jatlr gu$ah karma *pyabhavam' ceti paHcadfia* 4 prameyam; 
vibhajanty ete Kumarila-matanugah". . \ , 1
1'jewel' of Bhat$af, . . enumerates seven, categories* This
author first‘ posits three types of negation* via*, posterior
(dhvaijisa), absolute, (atyanta) and mutual (i.e. difference
(bheda)*" Subsequently he enumerates seven categories
adding Inherence (samavajra) &ud Potentiality (sakti),^
to the five 'postulated' by -Harayana.- * Now, the question *'
whether the Bhatta-MImaijisahas.. recognised five or seven
categories^remains problematic* * But this can be stated'
for certain that'Kumarila and his followers regarded abhava
as a distinct padartha.^ M. Hiriyanna,^ «X. Sinha,^
1* Bhatta-cintamanl (Ter leap ad a) of Gagabhajta; edited with 
notes and Introduction bjr Prof. Surya Narayana' Gukla, 
Chowkhamba San. Series, Benares 1933* 1 G-agabhatta was the
5 Coronation Preceptor of the great Maratha leader#,Sivajl(/^77 
p^Sy) Cf • Randle R.D., Preface to PM Sources., XI.I: Oxford-
History of India (3rd* Ed.) p. U Q 9 - U 1 5 # ___
■2* By omitting the'antecedent non-existence Gagabhajta differs 
from Kumarila who probably introduced the fourfold division 
which was subsequently adopted by the N.V. school (See 
Randle,.,33* Schools*, p#.*.*) This omission is in keeping 
with the Navya-nyaya theories propounded b y  Raghunatha ,
Siromani and Venidatta* Both these logicians rejected 10 , 
“pragabhava-1. . Cf. PM., p.28* See infra Chapt* HI, pp#
3l. , B.Cin., p* 17• 1 abhavas tridha. dlivamso* tyantabhavo 
bhedaseeti. evam, ca_drayya-guna~karma-samanya~samavay&- 
■ saktyabhavaii saptapadarthah. y
k * Maha-Meyodaya (Madras 1933 P* lU8*, “vayam tavat^prameyam. 
tu dravyajatigu^akriyali abhavas ,ceti pahcaitan padarthah 
, adriyamaheu. ‘ We, however, recognise as objects of valid 
knowledge, these-five categories-, namely, sub., genus,; 
quality, action and non-existence* See also, p.292 of the 
- same; Hiriyanna, Outlines., p*325#>
3# Essentials, pi 1^3; see also Outlines, p.323*
6. HIP., Vol.I., p* 7&5i see also p. 810*
1 2 Satish Chandra.Chattferjee, ■ S.S.Sukthankara,
Chandradhar Sharma, and qther .scholars support this
vi ew • - *
Section VII* Kumarila1s Conception of Absence*
* V :,t ' ^  ' K * 7  • v' ' •  'V.j. "-y '' ^  ; •’/ ”  ^  V 4 " ; 7 ’ X ^  V ' "  ^  v "  ■ '■* / ^ Y ^ ,  V - '' * 7  -  v / ^ v  ;•<'/?
- .From Kumarila1 s view -- as mentioned in the-previous 
section - it should not be concluded that -in the MImaijisaka’s ■ 
theory, ’abhava1, is a ’thing’ like any positive (empirical) 
entity., (it is-but negatively ;reai)• Nor is it suggested 
that negation is devoid of.reality; or without any reference 
to positive reality. ' Rather, Kumarila is of the opinion 
thay absence and presence are logically related. Yet, 
they are independent, inasmuch as they form the-objects of 
two different cognitions. This has been expressed - per­
haps not'very clearly - as follows; “Every object has a 
double character:= with regard' to its own form, it exists 
(i.e* as a jar, a jar exists);' While with regard to the 
form of another object, it does not exist (i.e., as cloth
1. , Nyaya-Theory of - Knowledge., p. 176, (University of 
Calcutta, 1950 ed.) IlY^ 3^ .fe-13:2?.
2* Introduction to Arthasamgraha of Laugak^i Bhaskara,
- p. XIII, (Bombay, 1931)#Sanskrit Text with Eng* Trans­
lation and notes by S.S.Sukthankara;
3. Studies.. ,.~*p.~~30-9* 1 i 1 .
7k<
y :':;the;;:jhr^ are eguaily;; -..rv
entities: sometimes people cognise the one! andsometlmes 
■ the .other,  ^ t . ■ v':' ^
: ; ■ .;£;;;The\c^  fact of uthe :absence of
the cloth in the.^  jar; simpl^meahs, that the cloth in its 
non-existent form inheres in another oh ject,. the; jar, and as 
OTCh,-;^rd^ces::>t'h’e;.;c„o^iti6!n ;of:iiscnon~^ the
;i;:;;Vjaar#.,f^;;:/- J tv £'*■;, , " ^  :'v •
v; ; : r |&mariih^>ih: the Sloka^Tartikasays: ^judgment . ; ;V v;^i;
; Xhirnayal, i coneei*ning^a: Ippsit^iye|;-exisfent t(htey such as 
uthis: i s: (the j ar) and hothirig; elseHi ~ possible, ,with-
out^  reld^ence^;.$9v c o g n i t i c ^ i  ;of tab s e ^  everything else•
^HohiiS;;.-;thediibwledge - (sa^ivitti) uit ■ (the; jar): does not existu 
possible, withoutttr ref erehce ; to' the negated 
vVfor , there ; can he no cognition without an ob jective ,substratum*
‘ 1 OL. , ^svarup^ararOTehhyem nityara,'sadrasada€mdie4j.vastuhi;;jhayate . 
? ha i s c i dr up ait ;;;h i me i t : had a c an a1 •; Si*. Var*, Ah. verse 12* 
t : Udayan^also describes these two parts - of reality,1 vide
2. NR.', on S.Vart.j, Ab.,' verse 12, pv.iWSjy ;Vsarvam hi : Yas,tu
. ; s, svarupatah sadrxxpamtpapainapatas Casadrupam^l^athn
gliat arupena s an patarupenasan,.pa$of py asadrupena bhayantare 
■ ;gha|adaptsafevetiOh ■tasmiii syTyasadrupaharamd}uddhim; jjahayati;
: •  ^yo’ yarn sa; patoAra; bhavaiTti.1 i ^ r anslationAby/Jha*tA%
3^f: ^ 1 -ty^rt ,_r "Ah. yverses^iS^l&r^S. h77~h7.8: :ayam eyoii^_yo 
■ '-vV:A\hy/essu hhayotbhayati hirnaya^. nai^a, vastV3L.nta^&hhava“-
,^sa|ivitty;;anhgen^dyte. ; ;jnlnain na jayateKimcid ; 
t'.'1 d-;t^h^tanA)har^ ‘
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Thus, even the positive Judgment is not possible . > 
without a reference to negation, or a' denial of everything 
else, .However> if there are' no *negative existents*, 
some kind of if reality of negative cognitive essences1-which make 
the^positive Judgment meaningful cannot be denied. Or, in 
the words of L* Wood: ■ "The reality of negative essences' is 
even more difficult-to disprove than negative existents,ft 
Kumarila, however, states that fno cognition is 
possible-without ah objective substratum1^ Being a 
realist Kumarila believes that all cognitions'correspond to 
objects; since cognitions can be eithei* negative or positive,' 
the corresponding objects must have these same characteristics#
1. Ledger Wood, op.cit., p. 417* "Essences were originally 
introduced to explain certain facts of1the existential 
order, and, if all such facts can be adequately explained 
entirely within that order, the realm of essences becomes
L superfluous. How negative essences have been postulated 
solely to explain the possibility of certain abstract, ,
i.e., non-empirical, negative Judgments; and we shall be 
■ entitled to reject them if in.the course of the subsequent
• argument-we are^able to formulate an adequate theory of 
- negative Judgment which can dispense with- them,"
2, **That cognitions are known by themselves is the position 
of .Dharmakirti, Prabhakara and the Jain logicians. This 
is opposed by the Hyaya School, Eagarjuna and also
. Kumarila Bhatta. ■ The Samkhya and the Vedante, though
• they do not believe that cognitions are sdlf-intuited, 
assert that-they never remain unperceived, being revealed 
by the. eternal .light of the self with which they are
‘connected’ from the very beginning"1# Sat# HookerJee, 
Madhyamika* s Logical Positions (Nava-Halaiida. Mahavihara 
,Research. Publication)* t Vol. I,- p# 26#*
A; negative cognition in a negative-judgment has an affinity 
with the; positiy Of cognition only; inasmuch asthe^ latter is 
also a cognition of a jud^^nt^Cfidsitive) • Just:^ 
the case of colour, tasteV and; pidtiP'ttp., in one hhd the ; 
same f ruit,: there i s dlfferen.ce:^ ht’/v'at ’* the same time ' there 
is; also ;a seeming: i d e n t i t y - of positive 
and; negative cognitions• Although both areV in facty twp;;,v.
different cbghitibno,f‘yef /they, seem;(fd 1 he7identical’ inasmuch 
i ;k; v'hs-hpth, of thhm; are; tw-paspects of the same reality. . In 
other wordsykiLekiwoj.i in the;;same ,pb ject 'and form ./ ■
two. aspects;ofthe;,same between the
two is evident by the fact -'that tvhen one, is apprehended^ih# other 
is;,hot grasped. Without; the diff’erence between, positive: and 
negative, aspects (amsa) of reality,. there cannot possibly be 
any affirmation or denial of things.,^ ." The contention is
' £ ■ k-.;; -' X#: ; Si • Var .y A b . "verse; 20 , ;• and t h e H E  commentary:,: 1 yadapyek- y;
ameva bhavabhavatmakam rvastviti krtva r •. tmanatmamsayor aik*- 
f: ’ ; ;; ; k 'vfk yam tathapikrupadty^ I na
hyasati; hhd^y^rahanagrahapa^vyavastha-sambhava iti.f- 
k; ;; :Gf L e d g e r  Woo oplcit*, p* 419> .Who,presents;a ^ somewhat 
. siraiiar^yidw; in "the;4?dllowihg;:k,: ,*'The negative, judgment * ‘
. . , ,*r * A is' i&t"is-e<piiyale^^ than B f or *A is
v ;y: ;dif f erOntf rbm ;B=*: 4k k' Di stinc t ion and;:dif f erenti at i ohkare 
rooted in,the,real, and the negative judgment gives ex--
4 passion toKthesekfeatureh;of;;realityvf? The mutual :ekclus- 
. ion of the variops, If ems^ofvodrke^eriehde^is:-as much^ :^ a 
datum as their unitykand connection* The ‘objective basis 
for the negative judgment is1 as real and, in a sense as ,
" positive,; ;asj;that'for the affirmative." .
that the two aspects are relative and can'he apprehendable 
. only with reference to each other# This view, however, 
goes1 against .the Idealist Samkara, "The view of this 
-school .(Kumarila) is that sameness (abheda) and difference- 
(bheda), so far from being incompatible, are intelligible, 
only if taken together, while Samkara maintains that, being, 
mutually^;cbht^ddictoryi they cannot he predicatedipifkQne and
■ n
the same thing;.*4; Butkthe; very fact that the two are 
"mutually contradictory" supports the Mimamsaka’s view that 
they are two different separate objects^of corresponding 
cognitions* The Advai.tin regards, the difference .and con­
tradiction as mere ignorance (ajfiana) or the absence of .
. v‘k\ ' k k; ^kkQ"> kkkkkv; ’ kkk k' k k,;
knowledge and thus illusion (maya or mithya) • But this
attitude is not•intelligible for the realists and empiricists#
For them, negation is not merely ’the absence of knowledge'
(ajnana) but rather ’the knowledge of absence’( abhavajnana)
’Nothing1 is hot ’something* that can be called an "illusion"
or "ignorance". In the cognition of' ’negation* there is
1*. Hiriyanna, Essentials, p. 154* .The'controversy between 
Kumarila and Samkara seems to be the same as that between 
the Empiricists ‘and--Idealists in general. .
2. Ibid*, py 155. ■ •
3. Si DTpika., pp. 241-2*
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knowledge of absence, that cannot be denied as a negative 
fact.-.1 Therealists; maintained; th^ is a cog­
nition of real absence. Just as affirmation is cognition 
of real presence, they thought that negation is a c ognition 
of real absence; The l,flmarasakas viewed non-existence as a ’
reality sui generis (vastvantarain)11# ;-vv
1. ^Kuniarila;?s position may be analysed in terms of the crit- ;
:::; icism of Morris Lazerowits• He writes: ’’The metaphysical 
statement 1 the nothing exists* informs us that ’nothing1 v 
is being treated as a semantic substantive in the private 
grammar book of the metaphysician* The word has not 
. actually;been changed into a thing-denoting substantive.
It has . become a name vwith ^ero xiamiaag: fuhctlbh* a name by :
. grammatical courtesy only*: -The1' statementsf the nothing  ^
exists ’ and ”we know the nothing* simply r ealize the raeta- • 
physician* s wish, not in f ac t , to use ’nothing* as the name 
v of the thing, but to use it in such a way in sentences as
to make it, look as if 1 nothing* is the name of a thing.
And he realizes his wish b y ; exaggerating a grammatical 
similarity at;the^ expense of a semantic difference*1*' (The 
underlined words are in it al ic s.) ’Hegative Terras*,
*Analysis’ , Vol•. 12. January,: 1952, p. 61* Essentially , 
Kumarila * s theories are in keeping with iiazerowits• He top 
emphasises that ’nothing* is not a ’thing’ or in Lazerowit*?! 
terminology a *’t hing-denot ing substantive”1. In fact,
: ’’nothing” and ” thing” are two eiit irely different objects of 
cognition; However, they are logibally-related and as such 
form two as pects of the; s ame reality* Kumarila certainly 
does not wish to make ”nothing” look as if ’!nothing” is the 
name of a thing. He is aware of the semantic difference.
See supra p. ■v .^'
2* BL., Vol. II, p.77 n. 4.:; ”The Mimamsakas viewed non-exist­
ence as a reality sui generis (vasty antaram). and admitted 
yogya-pratiyogj-anupalabdhi. though not as anumana. but as 
a special pramana which they called abhava. The Hyaya- 
Vai^eBika: school""viewed It as a special category (padartha), 
r a reality cognized by the^senses; owing to a special con­
tact (videsya-vIdesana^bhava-sannikarsa). The Sankhyas 
■ applied their 1dea* of pratiksana-parinama and vtewed ghata-,
abhava as a parinama-ksana of^fihutala*whichV as all •. 
j ; pa r inama-bheda. is cognized, they maintain, by sense per- 
: ; ception.” Stcherbatsky, BL•,II,;p• 77 n.4. (The under­
lined words are in italics.) , • ' • V
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Section I. A Positive Approach to Negation..
; ; Y The postulation of negative reality, as discussed
in the previous chapter, although it provides an appropriate 
: ob ject for the negative judgment, does not solve the paradox­
ical situation. nIt may^ be.difficult to refute this Y I 
(realist) position, but it should be acknowledged at.-the same 
; ; time that negative facts are nowhere revealed in experience ,
. and. that, if £hey were, they would ipso f ac to bee ome ■ -positi ve.1!
i• Hiriyanna,. Studies, pp. 145-146• Y;Y ; ;
Even accprding; to the realist theory, negation depends 
on the cognition of the positive f act, i.e. , the counter- Y. Y ,;;
■ positive, since this positive cognition is indispensable.
for the negative judgment , the paradox remains: "How can the . ' Y.-Y 
negative judgment be descriptive of a positive object?u^ .
V  Hence,; in the present chapter, we propose to in- .
v vestigate the .vi©ws of the Buddhists and the Prabhakaras#
They suggest that the so lu tion of the paradox of the neg­
ative judgment lies: in. translating the negative proposi- 
tion into a cpmp1ex of affirmative judgments. According•, , YYYy 
to this thedry, .since all negative judgments presuppose 
the idea -of‘an;affirmative judgment and the locus in .: ' 
question is directly perceived as devoid of the suggested v YY-
relation with the object negated there, negation refers Y
. to positive entities only. YNo negative entity is admitted. ;
Thus it will'be explained in the present chapter that , Y Y
negation vis only, an inferential judgment;in which on the 
basis of non-pereeption of a perceptible object (dysyanupal- . 
ab dhi), when the b are locus .(bhut al a) is perceived, the • ,Y' : :;Y 
absence of theob j ect is cognized.; In the end the neg- ,.Y.
1. Vide, supra pp• 18-19• Y Y Y
ative judgment will be explained in terms of ”a complex 
of affirmative judgments”, i.e., a negative 'judgment means 
two contradictory affirmative judgments out of which, in a^ 
given situation, either one is false and the other one is 
true. \ - •
Section II. The Prabhakara-MImamsakas and Buddhist Logic.
Whatever importance absence, (.abhava) as ah entity may 
have for the realist theories of causality (asatkarya) and 
negative emancipation, to posit a distinct negative real 
goes against the very sense of the term Reality. "This 
peculiar conception of negation discloses the of
Naiyayikas (and other realist thinkers) to invent any number 
of fictitious conventionalities, if they are convenient for 
practical purposes. . Really speaking, to; class abhava as
—  • • ' • ■ ■ ■  p
a Padartha along with the other six is an absurdity•”
1. vide, supra pp. 40-41, 62 n.2.
2. Athalye, Notes, Tr. Sam., p. 101.
Cf. also.Studies, p.117 (8;.
Prabhakara M1sra (c.700 A . D •■) of the Purya 
Mlmamsa. system criticized: the Mimamsa tradition of re- 
garding: * abhava1 as an entity and as an independent means 
(pramana) of, :judgment. By doing this he opposed not
only, the Nyaya-V aisesikas but also £ ab ar a Svamin and
■v ; - • _ - p ■ ■ ■ ’ • - ' '
Kumarila Bhatta. . In this respect Prabhakara comes
nearer to the Buddhist thinkers, than, to the Bhatta Y.
Mlmamsakas.^ On the question of,negation, Kumarila1s .
unsuccessful attempts to defend the Purva-MTmamsa system
against? Buddhist arguments ,haveiaaused: some , confusion ,i:
ab out his standpoint on negation. 11 is a controversi al
question^ not posit ’abhava’, as
category*^* Moreover, the theory of "anupal abdhi " or non-
1; It is a controversial .question whether. Prabhakara was
• :the teacherYpf Kumarila or vice versa. Vide, e.g. Y; Y
Winterni tz, HIL•,III,pp.425 ff; Stcherbatsky, BL.,i,p.51> 
Dasgupta, HIP.,1,pp.370-371; Hiriyanna, Outlines, pp.301-2;
, / S.K.Ramanatha Sastri.^v.Int. ( Sanskrit)-,• Nayaviveka, XXVIr-XXVII; 
Keith, Karma Mmamsa, pp, 9-10. However, .a comparative studj 
of the episteraological theories expounded by the two phil­
osophers, can help, indeed, in ascertaining Prabhakara’s 
posteriority. If Kumarila were posterior to Prabhakara 
■ ^ ’-one would expect him to particularly refer, to such of
Prabhakara’s views as_were different from his own,e.g. the 
. non-acc ept anc e of abh ay a a s a me ans of knowledge on the part 
of Prabhakara"; (cf.Prasad,HIE• ip • 256) while it is apparent 
.that!.^Prabhakara criticized Kumarila’s standpoint on the .
. ■ question ;pf negation. I uphold the ,view of Prabhakara’s •
:. posteriority. Dr.G.Jha has ,expressed the;;opposite view.(CF. ; 
Preface PSPM.pp.11-17).But. Jha has not taken the abhava con- 
; .troversy into consideration.
2. Vide;Das.6ast•.ip,* 125;Essentials,p.143; Sinha,HIP.,I,p.791 •
3 ♦ Buddhi st Flux, p .428., - Y-\Y.
4« Vide supra pp. 66-67# ^
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perception is wrongly ascribed to him. In fact, it
emanated from Buddhist logic . and was adoptcd, by the • ^ 7;
,: • • . ; later fo 11 owers of Kumari 1 a• ^ .Y Y Y^Y-V Y'v';
' •. ; :*• ., ; Y . Y Prabhalcaf.a, bn' t ..■
ness of ICumarilaVs arguments. ; He, therefore, unreservedly 
folIbwedYpharma ;thebrjr.? .'YYAs; we,'bhall soon see,: Y. :Y,\ Y,;
Y there is an explicit unanimity of thought as expressed 
in the phraseology and. techhicai. terminology of both ;
Y. the Prabliakaras and thb Buddhist logicians.^ Stcherbatsky 
Y; .observes "The ffimamsaka school became divided on this prob­
lem of Negati on,C just as on many others, in two subschools.
, Prabhakara; ’Ythe. friend of the Buddhists (bauddha-bandhuh Y ;Y •.
Prabhakarah)"accepted the Buddhist theory integrally. He 
. maintained' thatf: nbh-Existence ;is no separate;,reality, and : .
Negation i s not a; .s.eparate source ; of knowledge,.,... .But the 
main stock of the school, the followers of Kumari 1 abhat •£a, 
j . remained ’faithful to the .letter of tl^  old authority
' Y ■- Y;X.,:’ Cf. Chapter; IV. : Y ; Y:Y:7;y .- Y: / V yyY Y y ,. ' . V'^ Y.'Y r -v.-
2. . J ay ant a Bhatt a in N> y Man j arT,, p. 166, reprimands Prabhakara
by saying ::,fybu have . robbed BharmakTrti 1 s house". (atra 
bhavadbhlr DharmakTrti-rgrhad- ahrtam") .: See: also Malwaniya,
' ' Notes, N A S W T •., pvi68. ' y; ’ ' '
Y v Y 3* Cf. e.g. PP.,pp. 119-i20 axid NBT., p.29;. RN. > p.97; PVS. and
Y Y ; • y ;':yY"”; PVST., p .30; Bharmottarapradlpa, p . 103 • Passages quoted
' ; below in the. present, chapter. / -7 . Y ”'V-YY
Sabarasvamin, who had declared that "the non-existence 
of a means.of cogniti on is va ,proof of * the non-existence 
(of the object).\  Parthasarathi Misra, a follower.and 
commentator of a ICumar i la Bha 11 a, criticized .the Prabhakaras 
for falling in line with the Buddhist:, thinking.■ However, 
the later Bhatta IvTImamsakas, including Parthasarathi 
himself were alsoygreatly;influenced by the:Buddhist 
theories,. . y;Y*
Section III. The Positive Object of the Negative Judgment
A positive rendering of negation.
Discussing the.paradox of negative judgment Ledger 
Wood writes: "There is a way out of the difficulty inherent 
in a negative judgment, without.reconstructing reality to 
embrace negativity, y Why not reinterpret the negative 
. judgment so asYtpYreveal its fuhdamentally positive . 
character? By this; means the discord between such a judgment
1. BL•,I,pp•388-339... St cherb at sky refers to'Prabhakara as
"a real bastard son of Buddhism"♦ Ibid.p. 51 ♦. • _Y
2. NR., .on Si.VSrt*, Ab.ver. 12, p . • 476^ "yas tu madhyamikava- 
dam anusTlayan..." Note that Parthasarathi wrongly classi­
fied the Tat ei? Buddhist logic of Dharmaklrti and others,. . v 
among the. ffidhydmi.ka; trend., ' Rather, they belonged to; the 
later Vijnanavacia school. ;
3* Vide infra pp..1 oo-/c/ and chap. IV. pp.
and its object is obviated without tampering with reality.
The. transformation is WroughtYbntlreiyYbh the logical side: 
and the metaphysical situation remains; unaltered.Ifl To 
a certain extent, the Buddhist logicians'and the Prabhakaras ■ 
propose a similar solution. They explained negation "in 
terms of the positive factors involved in it" ,? rather ' 7.
than inventing ;an .ontologicai non-Ens ( abhavapadartha) • .
According to the (idealist) theory,:, truth of a negative
judgment consists of two c bghitions. ' One is that of the ; ; '
lo cus (bhut al a ) and the. other is that of the object, the ;
perception: of which, is expected. Both objects are sim- .
ultaneously perceptible (dysya) to our sense, organs' only, if
all the conditions for perception, are s.atisfied. Thus,. if
only one of the two ob jects, l i e . t h e  bare locus (bhut al a- 77
matra), is.perceived, the absence, of the expected or suggested
object, e.g;. the jar, is inferred. 7 Dharmottara explained^ Jy ;7
that :when"we actually perceive only/one of them, we (naturally) .
imagine thafYif :the, other;werb present,; we should likewise
perceive i t, be cause, the totality of the he c e; s s ary conditions
is fulfilled. Thus something fancied as perceptible is imputed.,!i
1. PR., vol.XLII, 1933, pp• 417-418.; . :-
2.7 Outlines, : p.322. . 7'• • y/7--V7 :'.7-': ,7 :-;77 • Y “-:'7
3. NBT., p •2^ ( 13-15)t "eka-jnana-samsargini drsyamane saty- 7
; ekas^ihn^barat-^
: drsyam. eva bha ved iti sambhaVi t am drsyam: aropyate". ■. 7 7 7;
Translation by Stcherbatskl, BL.il,p.63.
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‘ y . Prabhakara;;f as7 represented by ^ likamtlxb;Misra,. 
fully supported ;theYBUddhisb theory. He ; said:/Y, "By : ; 
the perceptipn of the. other ob ject (ground); where the/ YYb 
(desired): Yob ject. ( j ar ) is equally perceptible;,' theabsence 
of ■ the perceptfbl;e7(|j ar) i s apprehende ( avadharyate) * ‘: v 
Thus;; the^ (problem of )ynegation'^ (varam astu)
(by the; fprmlaYthat negation -i:e)Y;tbe; perception of that 
(locus)alone (eka)Y(where)v the perceptible counter- 
pdsitiyeisIntended^ (yi^ayn) *"^ According to this theory 
hon-perception of fal/be^beptibie object (dpsyb);is the basis 
of a negative judgment.^
Y- ,/ The following objectibhYis raised: ' How .ban.we Y 
dsbribbvpereeptibility to! ari ob ject Which is ihyfactyabsent 
from the locus,. ' "How is it possible for a ( jar) tb b b  Y 
perbeptibb©--in a placeYfromwhicb it is absent?" Dharmot tara 
e^iains:; ,fIt is saidYtp; bepbrceptible, although it is 
absent, because .its perceptibiliiyYis imagined. ; We imagine 
/this object vin the:'following, way:7V-Y" if it were presentYOh
1 • PP• p*121. 11 tulyopalambha-yogyasya carthahthrb^darsanena, 
yy drsyaniipa^l ambhof Y. y adh a ryate* ; a to dpsya-p ratiy ogi-vi '§ aya
/Y 77tad^ekopalabdhir7:^  YY' Y YVV 'YY
: 2.YY;ffiidiYPiYl2p^• Y*drsyaclarsanam YhyY^ 1
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this spot, it certainly would have been p e r c e i v e d . I n  
this case an object, although absent, is ex hypo the si 
(hamaropya) visible**! For example, the book X have 
seen on my table during the daylight, sometime before,. 
is not now perceived there after its removal* Although 
the totality of the necessary conditions of perception i*e*, 
daylight and the normal eye-sight etc., is satisfied the 
book is not seen now. v. Thus in the negative judgment "it 
is not (here),f' we reject the property of being present as 
belonging to the object for it does not appear to our 
senses., Its perceptibility we confirm (paramrsya),in 
the mind from previous experience: "If it were present it 
would have been perceived as before’"*
According to the Buddhists and the Prabhakaras it 
. is the property of exclusively positive things that they 
are apprehended in all judgments, negative and affirmative
1* NBT,p*22: atha yo yatra nasti sa katham tatra drsyah?
dysyatva' samarop.ad asaimapi. dysya ucyate. yascaivam 
sambhavyate - yady asavatra bhaved dysya eva bhaved iti. 
sa tatra.avidya*inano* pi drsyah samaropyah." Translation 
op.cit. Cf . also NASVVT* ,p.68 (22). _ *;V  —
■ 2*.'PyST. ,p*22:: "samagryam \satyain yadi s syatl'iirvakalavad _ :;
: upalabhyet ety evam upalabdhilak§anapraptatvam buddhya . 
paramysya bhavasyapratibhasanan nastlti ni§edhahi kriyate. *
88.
!alike. DharmakTrti said: "The thing is not to be
affirmed (or perceived) o n l y . I t  is also to be denied 
or not perceived (anupalabdhi).
The Prabhakaras explain that the cognition of a 
thing is of two types;: (a), sometimes a thing, is cognized
as a correlated with: some, other thing, and (b) sometimes 
as excluded from other things. : In the judgment * e.g.
"The book is on the table", we cognize the'book and the 
table correlated. But in the.judgment, "The book is not 
on the table" we cognize the table alone, andsthis cognition 
is referred to as the negative cognition of the book. Thus, 
according to this theory "absence (means) nothing (else) 
but the non-perception of positive things (bhayanam)". 
some extent this view is comparable with Bradley*'s statement 
that "every judgment, positive or negative, is in the end 
;existential".^ There^ is no negative entity.• Affirmation 
(upalabdhi) is the perception (darsanam) of the thing.
1. PVS.,p.30: f up alabdhi r eva na bhavah1. • See also PP.,p.120.
. Nayaviveka, p.l60. „ . * .
2. PP.,p.122: ’bhava eva tv ekaki sadvitTyas ceti dvaylm
7 avastham anubhavati.1 Also NASWT*.>p*p8_(2A-25:, *bhava eva 
vastv-antar-asamsrayatayopalabhyamanah purvoktam (idarn asti, 
idam nasti) jnanadvayam janayati.^ __ __
3. PVS., p.30: anupalabdhir hi bhavanain abhavah. Also
NASVYT., p .63; N . Manjarl, pp.i4.8-63; HN. ,pp.97-96•
4. Principles . of Logic, I, p. 120 (12;.
■■V-89/ :
7. ;  , Negation being; the exclusionv(niyytti)'pf. this (affirmation) 
is no thing (tuccha) ♦ It is theAne.re presence of the bare 
’7t: locus (t anmat r a), which me ans it I s d e vo i d of the relation 
; ; with the other object.1
Section 111. importance of the assertion of the bare locus 
v ’ i : (bhutalamatra) in the negative .judgment.
"The basis of. negation is really the assertion of :
.. a quality that excludes (X ). It is hot, the mere
7 assertion' of the:-quality of exclusion (Not^B.)1 . / r7 .■ ,7
77-— -Bradley*^ ."■ ^ .• '7 • . - ; V-:-: 7 77 . 77 77 . ; C-.
It has been stated in the previous section that the 
Buddhi st and the Pi’abhakar as do not admit, a non-Ens (abhava- 
padartha) as the objecf corresponding;to the negative judg- ,77 
' : ment. According to these logicians negation is not the 7 .■7.;
: cognition of a negative objects but the denial of an affirm- :
A 1.. Dharmottarapradlpa,, p.103: ; 1 darsaham np^l^dhis tasya ■ ‘ j
7'--7 7 ni vrt tir abhavas t uc charup ah s a 1 va tanmat ram vastv ant arct— " 7 s 
7 ^samsar^-vihaha^.'V: ■Durvepa7M^ called f abhava V ■ 7
' V , "tuceharupah" • The terni is^ used tp. shov/ the contrast \
with the term."vasturupah" by which the realist philosoph- j 
• 7. ers,^viz., the Bha11as and the Nyaya^Vaise§ikas defined';
* abhava *. Udayana* in Kir.., p .38,;.appears ■ to be opposing y .7 i 
• Buryeka by refuting the theory that abhava is no thing • : ; ^
(tuccha) . ;':V: • ,;^ 7';:\',7 7; 7- A' - 7 . • : 7 7'■ '7. v'.Y
2. Principles pf logic, vol..I, Book. I , Gh.Ill, (6). 7 - ' j
ation* i.e.,' in Indian terminology, the denial of perception 
of the ob j e c t (d£syanupalab dhi) •
Now,.the problem is that if the negative proposition, 
for instance "the pot is not on the floor" is true, then, 
this denial of the presence of the pot must be real. For. 
truth refers to nothing but reality#
The solution of the problem is found in the reality 
of the perception (i.e., the assertion) of the bare-ness of 
the locus, viz.;, the floor. It is this perception of a 
positively real object where the truth of the negative 
judgment lies. In other words,; the negative proposition 
"the pot is not on the floor", is true only on the basis 
that "there is the, bare floor" is true.. To the Buddhists 
and the Prabhakaras one may ask: If negation refers to the.
perception of the bare locus only, theq why do we not have 
a negative judgment where we cognize the locus with the 
object? The Bhat^as object: "It is not admissable that
this empirical usage (of negation) is due merely to the . 
cognition of the floor, because this empirical usage would 
follow, even in respect of the floor where there is a jar.
1. NBT., p.22; PP., 120, 121.
(Quoted supra p. 86 notes.)
9 2 i
‘ ■ 7 . 7 : 7.7" - *  - . - • • - ^  ' '■ ;
Indeed, the re 100,, there . is the cogni 11 on of the floor•" 7 77 7
However, the objection does not hold the ground.
The Buddhist contention is not liable to such charges.
The Buddhists maintain that negation.is not just the per- 
ception of the locus. 7 , 'Rather7lt:i:s the perception of . 
the-bare . locus.7; And it s bareness lies In the fact of its 7 
being a’ suggested'locus of the.perceptible negatum (sambhavita—- 
d:p£y va s turbhutalatvam). Only when we intend to perceive 
the - object ( jar) but cognized only the ground it is ;said: ;'
that ..we. perceive the bare locus. . For there we apprehend 7 7 
only one thing (eka-jHana) where we intended to apprehend. 7. 7 
two. 7 It is this situation where the cognition of the bare 77 77 
ground' determines7 (hi scayat i) the negation of the intended' a 
object (jar).77 The intended pebceptioh of the object in . 7 -7
the given locus is the necessary condition. Mere absence 
of an ob ject and the mere, perception of the locus itself -7 
are.not sufficient for the: valid negation.2 V For instance, 
there are -a number of things, such as a pen, an elephant,
1 . MM. ,p.29h*' na c a bhut al avedanad evayam vyavaiiara itl . ; 
7 sanrratbm• ghatavati bhutale fpi tad yyavaharaprasangat.
; asti hi tatrapi bhutalavi jnaham. _.Trans^ by IC.Ra ja &. V ; 
r Suryaiiarayana Sastri. : 7pp*;;valso^  Parthbsafathi Misra, NR.,
• on Si.V a r t A b . verse_12, p • U76 * _
2. - PVST., p. 30 5 gha.tagrahakatvasya bhutalagrahak&sya 7 : 7 
..  ^. caikajnanasamsargitvad yada bhutalagr ahakam eva tajjnanam
bhavati , tada'ghatagrahakatyabhavam nijcayayatiti .7
';v v'.'. V* '■■■' c ; \ 9 2 #  ;
and a ship etc,, which are absent from my study table#,
I would not be aware of all these: absences unless some 
one asked me if I had got them on my table, or I myself 7 -7 ' 
intended to find them there. In the particular case, 
viz, when I intend to use my pen I shall become aware of 
the fact that, the pen is missing. It is only - in this : 
case that the cognition of the bare (empty), locus (table) 
with reference to the pen would lead to the negative 
judgment: "the pen is not on the table.11 Thus it is 
said by the Buddhist that fthe •perception of the bare 7 4A 
' ' locus with reference to the perceptible j ar and the cog-
hition of this f a c t a r e  the.basis of the negation, ■77'7 7v-
kumarila Bhatta also noticed this point. He ; 
opposing the .perceptual character of the .negative judgment , 7 7 
- , ' saidr - - ; ' . . . 7 - :' ; ' ' .
: "After the ob j ect (the place where: the jar Is not) :
, has been perceived (by the Eye), and the counter-entity
( the .iar) has been remembered, . then foilpws; the notion, that;.
it (the j ar) Is not. whi ch is purely mental (and as such) ;
- • ' ,: " 7. ■ ' '■ 7 -v • 7 .' . ; o  ■ • - ' - . . •. -
7 independent .of the. SenSerOrgansi" 7; 7"'7
1* NBT., p.22 ( IS): drsyaghatarahitah pradesas tajjnanam ca.
Cf. also PP., 7 pp. 7120,122; 7PVST., * p » 31; NAS W T ., ;pp. 64-65*.
7 ;7-2.7 Sl.Vart., At. ver. 27 p,482; grhitva vastusadbhavam smrtva ca pratiyo.
; ginarcu manasam nastitajffanam jayate1ksanapeksanat.
•, 7 Jhafs translation p. 247-
9 3 *
Kumarila although rejected the positive rendering of* 
negation he evidently recognized the importance of the 
gssertion of the locus* . \
On the other hand "the amalgamated Nyaya~Vaise§ifca 
school", from a completely different point of view, recog- ;
.nized the- same: fact• The realist Nyaya-Vaise§ika logicians \. 
adhering to their naive realism insisted on the perceptual 
character of negation. And since the sense-organs can come 
into direct contact Csannikarsa) with a substance only 
whereas, negative entity (jvjjesanataj^is not^a substance, 
they postulated a unique (or simple) relationVbetween the 
negative entity and the ,locus,., Thus they maintained , 
that the reality of.non-existence (abhava) is perceived 
. as qualifying the locus (i.e., the sub stance). In fact.,; 
this, qualified perception of the locus refers to the same 
situation to which the Buddhists and the Prabhakaras refer 
by the term "hare locus"#
One may observe that as far as the theory of neg­
ation is concerned, it can be said for certain,that the 
whole realm of Indian philosophy and logic is, to a certain
1. KVT. ,P.i*U. (ltssj*p.31; N.Kaust., p.135r NK.p.195; for .
farther ■‘-detailsee Chap# - .IV^  .section VIT£ ;•
2m HK. ,p#227; abhavavisista-bhutalagrahanam. Also N.Kaust., 
p p . i59-i6i,
extent, susceptible to ;the,: Buddhist influence', \ The .
1 Px^hnkara^;apparently^ref ©rring: tov the, Nynya-Vai.sesika '
; and the Bhattas asserted that even they who postulated 
1 abhnya*.;as an ob j ect of cognition (px^ameya) must accept 
;it. as:';the c ogn.itibh. of the objecttbther. than the: intended 
one, i • e •, the locus alone • ^ ; On the other hand> the 
Samkhya-Yoga system also hold,a simi1ar view-, vi z• that  ^
the absence is the .mere presenee. of the gr ouiid*2 It is 
. noteworthy that, the Vedantins too "regard negation (abhava-) ;
simply as kaivalyarupa, that is as bhutala itself and v
:: nothing more"•  ^ " Hamariu j a . ,al so "di sp ens e s with non-existence
/. 1, ;.PP,, 120:? 1 yo*pi hi pr^ieyam^^'a^ so*pi pratiyogi^u
- drsyesu tad-eka-visayam buddhim tavad avasyam abhyupaiti1, ,
•. Sadanandayati (c v.l&OO • A • D •),; in hi s 1 Advaita-brahma-s iddhih1,
; Calcutta 1932, P • 135 * says / that negation i a,. according to 
both the. PrabhakaraS and the Bhattas,: the; .mere form of .the 
locus (Pr^hakara-bHa'ftayoh sammat adhikarana-rrupa eyabhavalj)
• . As stated above this view: is posited by Prabhakara but not
by Kumari 1 a -Bha:tt a. • On the .basis of the material .available
to-day we- can safely say . thaf ;'Sadananda, s; statement is mis- 
: '•. ;. leading. : See. B^Gin.p .k&$ pp. 293-^, where the
theory- of’ihe^^PrabhakaraO^lJ^^" has;;b^n-;explici%crltibizod.. 
. Both works belong to the school of Kumarila Bhatta.
;■ 2. S. GhattehieeivK.Th^ ;
3* Athalye, Tri: Sam., jr. 102.:^ ’ : ; i "/
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regarding it as expressible in terms of., positive entities 
much in the manner of ;:Prabhbkara";,whereas ifadhva • post­
ulates it as one of the : cat egori es • ^
SectiorivVV ;. The :Relat 1 oh: Between the Qb,iect and the Locus .
. is not Real but Mentally Constructed (vikaip.va)
; ^  To the theory, of hegati on that the so-c all ed 11re al" 
absence'isr in fact, the assertion of the bare locus some 
objections are raised: by the realists, Wh at is me ant b y 
the bare-ness (leafvalya or; ekalclbhava) ? - •' If this means: ; 
the self iiatui*e of ;the locust it is problematic* For 
even when we perceive: the ob ject.;( jar) we perceive it to­
gether with,.its locus. The floor; can be cognized in both 
forms;-; bnix^-with^-\and ^ without the; j ar> Thereforeif : ; ; . ;
absence were i'd'exitical wi th the bare locus* it would also 
be apprehended, when the ob j ect i $ •Present>^. ., \ . / , ; ^
Secondly, ■ if the bare-hess of the locus is explained; 
as its being merely separate (atirikta) from the ob ject,
1, Hi id yanha, Bssentials, p. 179,; :‘
2, ibid•,;. pp_, 190, 193 • :. ^ -'• " ;; ' ;;; - ;
3 BL• ,Kanthabharana, .p *5591. b.hutalan. tu saghatam agha$anceti 
dyirupamratas;fab''Svarupena.k^ : ;. . -
; See : al s6 BVTT-. > ( KSS ) , p ♦ 11; B , Si ddhant a-M ah j a ri, p • U2 • \
-■ v:y;, .'..v., V  ■ ■ . 96.,
negation is' in fact accepted as referring to the real 
entity ;('abhava) .in differentierms.^ For the: terms :
* separ at e \ and 1 negat i on1'' corresp ond t o , the same r e ali ty .
Thirdly, if there is no absence (as an objective 
reality) how then can there arise the cognition of that. 
ohe object (the bare locus) in that place where, there was :: 
first a relational knov/ledge (viz. of the locus and the 
j ar) ? : But thi s i s possible if we admit tlie '*■ posterior ,
absence1; (pradhvamsabhava)? We must remember that accord­
ing to the realist the ’posterior absence’ is produced sub- ; 
sequent to the destruction of the object (jar). They • 
maintain that just as we say Mthe jar is produced", so 
also; we. say "the absence of, the jar (i.e. , its destruction) 
is produced"#^ ' ■ ” \
To the Buddhists and the Prabhaicaras these object- ■ 
ions do not seem valid. By the terms ’bare-ness* o^ the 
locus (bhut alakai valya), and ■ devoid-ness* (viviktatva or
1. RN. ,p;97: (opponent s’ .view)., athatiriktah mulch ant ar ena ;
, ;abhava eva abhyupagato bhavatlti, ; Also PP•, p. 118.
atirikta = vivikta = rahita = ekakl. / •
2. PP. ,p.121 (opponents1 view),: yady abhavo nasti katham 
tarhi yatra prak samsr^tabuddhir asit^tatra tad ekavisay- 
abuddhir avir bhavativ pradhvamsabhavabhyupagame. tu sa ; 
syad.N.S.Manjari, p.U8._,
3. B.Kaust., p.151., DIdhitikara is quoted as: "jato ghato 
itivad utpanno ghatadhvamsa iti". ; B.S.Mahjari,p.k8., .
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non-ass6ciateness), what is meant is the cognition of an,
, altogether independent entity, for such; negative, attributes 
cannot be ascribed'to a locus which contains an object. 
About the floor where the jar is present you cannot say 
1 it is the bare locus1 or 1 the floor is without the Mar’.
■..And the. floor which was onee ,the/1 ocus of, the jar, after 
its (i.e> , the; jar) destruction.:or .removal*no loiiger can.' . 
, be called the locus of the j ar • *V Hence, what we perceive, 
now., is the bare floor’which1 is different in its efficiency 
( arthalcriyakar.itva) from *tthat-;’ floor: wliich- •w/as;r.t’he locus ,of y 
the jar. Ratnakirti says: "By the terms, bare-ness, •
, devoid-ness qf the ob j ect, non-associatjaness , etc ., that 
independent entity is denoted (abhidhTyate) which is pro­
duced by its own causes and altogether a different thing 
from the locus: of the j ar; (and this entity floor is such)
.; tha t i t  do e s not bear the at t r ibut e of being:the locus-of
1. . According to ythe Buddhist; .doctrine of Flux, whatever is ,
\ (real) existent ds momentary (yat sat tat ksanilcam), (RB. 
y K§an£bhahgaslddhih,:, p.77; ;B*Flux,; ppv; 2i^  ff •), and_exist- 
' ence,consists1 in the causal efficiencyI(arthakriyakartva)
. alone. - (ibid.) Bow, the question is : y if the absence 
is really created, as ; the realist maintains, then, what 
is its causal, efficiency? ;
;:y 2. ‘ If the ^ present .locus is not the, locus qf, the jar , then,
-.. the p r ob 1 em ar i s e s: .’What - then is the ' re 1 at ion b e tween ;
- ; : the locus and the . ob j ect? . Some^later Prabhakaras suggest
>. a kind of ’ temporal relatioh’ , (kalikasambandhah) ♦ B. .
. l' ■';;;Khust>V7-OT> lh5 f f ♦ ‘.-.V.V\’ \':S .y ' '. • v." vy;: ' " y
' ■' ^ ■' v ,' 98.
the jar."^ This ira pli es tha t the r e la t ion b e twe en t he 
object (i.e. , the negatum) and the locus is not real , 7 ,\vV 
but imagined. 7 RatnakTrti explains: "The object related- •
with the cogiiitibn of the one (lie., the locus) must indeed ; >
be here (in the negative judgment) mentally constructed : 
(vikalpya)."^^7 In Other -wor^, slhce ythe object is. not
7 \ present in the locus we imagine it as being present.
7;,.7 77: Thus, in order to deny its presence we mentally construct y y?
? the relation between the object and the locus. For it is
, ■ not; the reality which v/e deny but its relation - an unreal:
/; y logical construction. ‘
Parthasarathi.Mifira; in his commentary oh Sloka Vartika 
. describes negation in terms of the absence of relation 
(samyogsTbhava )•^ He argues that the object of the negative
judgment may but need not involve the perceptionaf the locus.
The locus, according to the Bhatta does not primarily form
the objept of the judgment. When an object, for instance, '
7 1. RN., p. 97: kaivalyam tadviviktatvara asahkTrnatvara ityadibh-
ih padaih pradedasya ghatampraty ariapannadharabhavasya 7; I
77-: svahetuta utpannasya ghala^radeSad anyaevatmabhidhiyate.
‘ Also PP.,; pp.ll8£l20:. ; v v7 . ';'7 - ?
2. RN., p.85J ekajnanasamsargyatra vikalpya eva. ,
; 3. HR., Sl.Vnrt; p.481 # ■■; '77 7 . 7 ; y 77 •;
a jar comes into contact with; the sense-organs the 
judgment is 11 the jar is (present) here11* Biit when the 
same jar does not come ’into contact with, the senses , it 
is c ognised to be non-present (asattaya) and. the judgment 
is 11 the jar ■ isnotV (preseiit) here^'. This means that the 
jar is denied, as being in conjunctfon (samyoga) with the 
locus* However, in this case; it is only the jar not the 
locus (i.e., the floor) which is apprehended. On the 
other hand when the locus is apprehended as being devoid 
of conjunction with the jar our proposition is "the locus 
is Without the jar*1. In this case it is the locus which 
is denied to be in conjunction with the jar. The differ­
ence between the two (forms of} the,negative, cognition 
lies in the sentences in which they are expressed. In 
the former case where the. jar is cognised as without being ; 
••in conjunction vwi.t'h. 'ttie locus: it; is expressed as the sub­
ject of the sentence and (in Sanskrit) the locus is indic­
ated, by the locative case (saptamT): ubhutale ghato nastTti1 
(the jar is not on the. floor). ;In the latter case, tech- \ 
nically speaking, the locus is expressed as the subject:
" gtiata^nyam btiutalam itiM ( t h e i s  without the jar) • 
However:, in. whicl£eyer form a 'negation is expressed, the 
truth of the negative proposition lies in the fact that there
1 0 0 .
is a denial of the conjunction of the object (jar) and 
the locus (floor).^ Vi;,
Parthas'ar at hi explains that so long as this conjunction 
has not been produced with theV jar, the: negative judgment 
(i. e. ; the antecedent denial of conjunction) refers to the 
entity * antecedent absence* (pragabhava); after having 
produced when the conjunction is destroyed, it refers to 
the 1 posterior absence* (pradhvarasabhava). But the 
denial of a hare in con,1 unction with the horn is for all the 
time, and therefore in such a case it refers to the entity; 
’constant or absolute absence* (atyntabhava). These 
three absences are not identical. The ‘antecedent absence* 
is not the posterior; the posterior is not the' antecedent.
Hor can; anyone of them be the constant absence. This ;; 
denial of the identity is called the ’mutual absence*
(itaretarabhava). For instance, the proposition "a horse \
is not a cow", means "there is no cowness in a horsei •
9
1. HR., p. 481 (ibid. {- * • •.tatra £adrupataya pratTyate asti ; 
ghata iti, yada; ya tra_asat taya p^atTyate nastaha ghata iti 
yatra (Read tatra) b hu t a la s amy oga b hSv tm a na ghata eva ^ > 
pratTyate na bhutalam^ghata^hyataya bhutalasyaf saptamya 
par av i^es hna tv's t , yada t a dev a . v iSesyate tada ghata^unyam 
bhutalam iti pfatTtih ghatasamyogilvena avidyamaham ityar-r 
thah. 0 p .^ * g hat a sam y oga b fray a* with RatnakTrti ’s ’ ghatapraty 
a n a p a h n a d h ^ r a b i i a y a * s u p r a ' ^  „• _ *
2. ibid. so * yarn ghatasamyogo yadanutannah tada pragabhavah^yada 
V utpadya yinaatah* tad*a_j? r adhvamsabhava £l • 6aSasya jbu visanat"1'
vena av i dyamana tv am sarvakalifcam ,_i ti* so * tyantabhavah. * . V  .
3 * ibid. t asminnabhavat£aye * pyanyasyanya-sambandhi tvanisedhah, 
itaretarabhava1 nyasyanyatadatmyahisedhahV gaur na bhavatyasvi|i 
; iti gavatmatvam aSvasya na vidyata* ityarthah. . '
ThisK.^xp of negation indicates
/;/?7 a'revisionist tendencyamong, the _fol7U>wu^ y
^73 Bhhttai^’^vOriginally ’fepmarila’s argument was:;that when -the 
a object c.omes into contact7with the^  ^senses ; the, judgment is J Jvr 
V;X.;v'."-V-/ 7 -perceptubl and affirmative. -Butthe judgment: "This 
( jar) is; not here^feih based oh the ab^
of the senses and the object.*^ He , was rattier concerned 
withftties validity-;of^;.v;absence^ (abtiavajvhs the means of ■
";-77\77//vifchowle<fee. as bppOsed^toVjP^ v 7. -v ; V:
77; ■ r- ■ ;-;5>l^r t tiasar a t til *' s expos iti oh>'of:; ■ f he’ ptioblem J c be /  re ~
;.y7,7:7:f-Vv garded'^as; hh; inf luence of ttie Biiddtiists anti ttie ^ Brabtiakaras*;
According to them, negation^ ia'the cognltibhdfi such a Tdcus, 
ttiht' dbes nqt bear the attribute! of being in relation with 7. 
7 the objectand the presence of the relation between,ttie ;; :
: 7;7 r 5 7ob jeci ahd7 ttie ^  mentally7cons trueted
• \ - / */- y'1 V/: ( y i ih i ip y a . - ) •; ../■ 77/ ^ " 7  , '7>77?‘7"7;'J7- fv ‘,;;7 /  77‘7.'.-.,/;7 • 7 ,-7 ’V'7 77.y;/v
7777777V,. l i ; ; :^ S l - . V a r t w V vP * 4 8 l > ;, v e ^ s e : : . ' 7 ':^ :7777'7 ,-777 * : 7
7777/-7/7:'77,^ : ’ tat sambahdhe sad-ityevam tad-i^patvam ’ pratiyate. 
77.;7.7;V77^7 7 ;/y .y777 '7  nasty :atr e;dtimitTdam tu tadasamyogaThef ukarh. . /
7:7y 7 >/\7:;7 7.7-77>ite^  ,'V;s''enae;:'.organs- A'7'7*y/
7-7. 2. Of. ' ibid., p.482, -verse’ 27>^'Sihha:,’:HiB.^ :;Yol.T,,, pp. 350,
-7-777 7 7 -7  7 - 7 ' '
£*97; PP., PP  118-120#. 7.7/-■■-// 77 7 7 7 7 ; 7; //:7./
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Section VI# legation Applies to Sellsibilia (drdya) only# ■
^ 7  It has been stated in the previous section that the 
ob ject is not really related with the locus, and that it is 
not. the reality but the relhtich/whicii^denied in < the negative 7 
7 judgment. The relation is, however, mentally constructed
(vikalpya). -7 ‘7-7 '7 7  777/-;7 - 7 :7 7,;- 7 7 7 7  -v 7' ’
To this Buddhist position the opponent argues that at
■ ■*' 0^ 7"' 7.7-7 * \ '= - ' • 7-7’ ' ■ ■ 7'-
least in thisI existence and.non-existence can be regarded
as equal. For instance, in the proposition "there is no
jar on the floor", the presence of the jar (i.e. , existence)
is not real , but imagined and subsequently denied. In the
same way we may also imagine the presence of such an entity,
for instance, the harems horn. which refers to non-existence* ;7
Thus we may be able to make a true negative proposition '
,rthere is no hare's horn". / Previously known jar as well as
a never experienced, hare's horn may both .equally be 7
-  1 7 7 - ; -  ; / 7  -7. 77  ^ ; ■ .-''7' ■ ' ■' ■ ■;7 7 i7'
negated. ■ ■ //, y- "7;' • 7777 . .
DharmakXrti enjoiiis: "legation is the process through
which either ; the absence of. something, or some practical
application of the idea of an absent thing is deduced. • 77 ; ■
1. NASVVT. , p#68, *...purvavagatasya ghatasya 3a6avisanasya - 
ca* navagatasya dvayor-api tulyani kVac 11 pr a t i s edhe#1 See;
7 ■ also HBT., p.37, 21# 7:7 ,; .. / :• / :7;.y/ 7,.* v 7
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7 Whether ; the facts he denied by way of an aff irniation of 
:homethihg ; i iic dm pat lb 1 e ,Wi t h them or / through/the/negation 7 ,; v,
V ,pf / the i r ca uses etc., everywhere /negation ,7 on analysis , 77/ 
refers to possibilities of sensatlpri(sense ^perceptlon) •"! 77 
- Ac c o r ding to B ti tidhi s t log ic the re. are eleven varieties / 77 7-- 
of negative'--; ju^inent^ iye:.:-cpgnition:ybh71' 77 7;
whicti all the negative yarieties ov negative/ f ormulae are /
/ ffounded "alwa^^refers toikehsations Actu^
;/'-/ ^ It may1 be 7 questioned7whe the/k" ^  ban be established that /- — 
y7 71 whatsoever be the facts de nied in a 11 of 7them, they are / 
a 11 s e hs i b i li a" ? / 7 Dha r mo t tar a expla i 11s : :" T he y .are'/all'- - 7 - ,\7.
/- • sensibilia (dr^ya) because in all these formulae there is 
/ •/. e i t tie r. af f irmat ion of ttie c pnt radio ting c ounter pa rt of the 7/7 
/7:^7.7dehied^f act or the denial of its cause etc. ,,f4 and here 7 
in translation Stcherbatsky ; adds :7 *rand the laws/ of Contfa- 
•7./ diction and Causat ionref er to s ensibilia, only•1 • He ;./// * 7 .
1. ,II#46 1 sarvatra casy^m abhavabhTva^vyayahara-sadhanyam
, nnupaTabdhau yesam: svabhaya-virudtiadTnam Zupalabdhya 7-7/7 
••.7. 7;: \ksjranadTn^m/ ahuP alabdLhya , ca7 prati s p .dha utit.as tespm upalab-- 
77/7 dhi-laksana-prapt?narri evo7 pa lab dtii r -aiiupa lab dhi lea : /
■..77^ yeditAvyat?;^.7 Trahsvby7BtcherbatskyV7BL.^oi.Il4p.l02. - 
- -7: .; Of# Russell Enq# Meaning,<Sb7Trutti (1956) p7106#:
7 ^ 7/
/ -,3 ; HBT# ,p#38#4i translation p#lQ2# :-7.:/v.7-77/ /7_. . 77 7;'i7/ 7/.;: ^7 
// 74 # 7 7NBT i , p . 3 8^8-9, * yasmat sy abh^va-v i ruddha a dir ye s'am te sam 
77 77-;-w.^P^i^bdtiy^/karanamadir yesam//teislitapahup^
/ 77 7 ; uktastasmad-drdyanani-*e v a prat is eclha it y a rttiah•1 Trans # y
7.7 ' /■;’7 p p # c i t v >  p . l p 3 •/ = ■-;7.7;'7‘7;777/y>7 !/*77-7 7 .7 7 7 '://7  ' 7 7 7  7 7 :: 77 77 /7 //
further observes: "It is interesting, to compare on this 
topic the view of Her b ef t Spencer ( Stuart Mill, Logic 8 .
I, p#322)7 - "the negative mode/cannot occur without ex­
cluding a correlative mode: /the antithesis of positive and 
negative being, indeed, is merely an expressiorj£>f this ex- :/ / 
pcrfence"# According to the Buddhists the concrete con­
tent of every single case of contradic 11on, a s of causality, 
is provided by experience, the causal laws have an application
to sensibilia only, but whether the laws themselves are mere -7
• " ' '7 //,.. //•.'■ ■;_// ;Vy , / ' 1 ■ v ' 7':7 '■ 7
generalizations from experience is another question#"
How the question arises: ■ Why does negation refer to / • 
sensibilia only? /• Dharmottara explains ; " In order to est­
ablish the subalternation of two facts or their causal re­
lation, and in order to know what will contradict these 7 
relations, we necessarily must have had some experience of 
them, i.e., we nrnst have had some perception of their pre- 7
sence> Objects which have been alternately perceived and
7 ■-■7 ; 7 '77 7 . 7 ■/■■'/7y ,, 77/7-.. ■ 7- ,.2^ 777 7' 7./ ■.. - 7 7  ■
not perceived are necessarily perceptible." . Thus non-
percept ion (anupalabdhl) as a middle term is acceptable 7 7
1# BL., Vol.II, p. 1Q3 n.3._ : w  w  7-
2# HBT•, p^38.11-13, *yasmad ye virodhino vyapya-vyapakabh-
utah karyakaranabhuta3ca jnatas tegamjav a gyam-evopalabdhir- 
upalabdhipurva*vanupalabdhir veditav^ya. upalabdhy- 
anupalabdhT ca dve yesam staste dr£ya eva.1. Translation
. p. 103. ■. ; 7/ 7/7. . J. 7 7;,:#7'777 ; 7' " 7//' ^7-77,/■
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only in relation .to an object perceiv e d : be f or e.,///V:;'--;-.. //•/
:7 : 7 The validity of the negatl term is also ;
; determine&7by7ttie\/tiine factors*7^v/bharmakT^ti . says: "Negative 
behdviour is:successful when;a;present or a past negativ ;7 
expef ience of ari\observer has; ha ppened, pr 6vitie ti the memory /
7/of this fact has not been obliterated."^ And Dharmottara
/expla ins/this 7in7tfe'7fpilowang7-matitie'r./7/'''^  ^
in regard of a past object, if this is clearly reraembered,
7 and in- regard of :a p^ We can cognize there was ••
: hefe no. jar, because vwe did nht/ p^ , "there is here -.7
7 no jar, because we do not perceive any". But the judgment : 7
-" there will be here no- jary b^^^ will not / perceiye any"/
7 is impossible , since a future; noh-percepti is probiematic•: 
v/Tj£e;/:t£nie7’p;f/V^ 777
7 / 7/T^ non­
existence was deducable’ from the absolute absence of valid 7
Tknowiedge (pramana).• They a&gu e d that since "cogni t i oh - '77 77
1. HB* ,11.29 , 1 airiudha-smr ti ~kamskarasy-atTt asya v a rtamsTriMya 
777:7 ca pratipatt^-pratyaksasya nivrttirrabhava^yyavahara-sadhanT 
7*77 : Translation ;p. 79; . s e e a Is o . KB # , II, 30. 7 7/' 7,7; /' V-V ^-7 7 x‘;
■ • '2./;/HBT.Jt/■p;.29.:;/18-21;,;/., atTto'.nupalambhah sptiutam smaryamanah7
77:7•/■ v^;^amanam^7:vartamand^ tatp hasTdifia jjhato' nupalabdhatvpn-
hastyanupalahh^^ jnatum. / na tii ila^
' bhavis^aty-tit ra gfcato1 nupaldp^ bakyam jnatum.
7',/// 7' ariagataya anu palabdtieh sat tv a -s amdeha d-i 11 • kalavikeso1 - ,
7 ;7 ? nupalabdher-vyakhyatab.1
777 /Transit^:by7Stcherbatsky,7opwcit. ,;’Als;6 /^Cp:^ >';'3^ TV',;/;7/--//7 
/7/v ; 7 p .30 . 12. 77/77/77// 7- 7 /7; 77/77"/7;'f'■ W '  777^ 777-7': -7777777 7 7-; /7777;777
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(pramana). p r oves the exi stenoe of the cognis ed (prameya), 
it would - be only ; natural to expect that absence of cog- '■ 
hitioh' would be a proof of the absence of the cognized?"
/ /.7 DharmakTr t i, with the emptiasis on the term 1 dr£ya! , 
a n s w e r e d : .; 7 777/7 77/7 /■ 77-; '->7/ 7/ 7- -77 7 :V 7/77/' ■ -7 7 7 '
v "VYhen there are altogether no means. of cognition * :
■ the noh^existonee^ bf the object cannot be
77777-7 established.Ui^ 7 v/ /777>77/7.r 7■ \ ■ .7 7 7 77 . 7
7/:As far as the question of an absolute non-existent 
object is concerned, the Buddtiibi logicians do hot find 
any means (pramana) of cognizing it so as to justify 
its. reality.'7/./ 77;"* 77 7  7/;- '7;-v/// -.77 ,•7'..., - ;7'7' :77"//' ..... ■
■ZL« ; / >'‘/?p7v;^i-Orri7i' Transiatibh/by Btcherbatsky^ op^cit.
7 Stchprbatsky observes:: /7 7 7 • 77//. --^ 7/ ■ 7
7/-77:7 "This7was.7th^77bpinlph'7pf" the lYaivyayikas and of 
,, European science up. to the time of Sigwart." 
p.107 n*7.
2. / KB.711^49.;> / ■ ‘ .77;777 7 / 7 / 7 . _ 7 7  - ; ''' ’
f piamanar-nivrttavapy-arthabhav-asiddher-iti1 
Translation by Stcherbatsky,,op.cit. ' :y77"'
IU | ,
BectloiiVII
7 / ..7/ s -V;Ne'jga'tioh.:'-of^ :Ntih-Sehsibi,llA/''(7k^ y^ZQ:')- A.4. . >
■ In the previous section we have .discussed;that 
,. ■. Tiiega ti on, Ac cprdiiigV to the Buddhis t and the Prabhakaras, applies 
7/v7 7tb{/&ns^ * /. Now we ..shal 1 • i nve s tigate t h e 7/ 7 •
? ' 7/ -//Buddhist /ahguriieiits7agkinst /ttie7/pcdeptdnce/7of v of the 7
/ . 7; hon-perc ep ti on (I. e>;> the negat i oh) of a non-se.hsihili a or /
■ 7 7 7 7 4 7 :  / 77./ 7 7 — /-' 7-/'.- ;3.77;. - 7.v7 . .7 7;' 7
7  ; 7777.77777'v77/7/Ac,ddr Bud^ikts':':ahd' thc/Brahliakards j'; 7773' 777''
-:7 : ■ ; hegation . or^37^ ®/ noh^perception ( ahupalahdlii) is two fold. .7../
71). Non-perception of some/ noh-per,ceptihle /( ady^ya) and 
2)*'of some perceptible, (tipsy^}3^ 33’ .Only tho/latter/type of 7/773 
noai-perceptidii i d r  egarded /hs7;ihe7 valid/ or TLpgichi negation.
7 They/ consider a 'thing \vliich can/be pe^Pclved, 3 7 /
//3 ^ ■/v//:can3bk:7$hTediV:3/7Nbn;i;per^ ,/
3; , ^perception, it must keep .our khowledge within the borders of .;; /
7 7 sensuous experience; M2 TDharmaH^ d eelared that. u since . /  7 = /
33•'//v7(the npn^perceptTort/of7ah unpercep*tihis}/7re"suits7in/uncertainty,/ 
it Aannot negate ,( determine =: vyavptti) •1J any thing/.. 3 73,/ .;
■ ’ i• Nayavivekap.l6;0/?; :pra;tiyoginyTa4?gyc7dpbye/cd;/'t aira/dp£ye3/ 
7;7777^ a :/^ah^matra-dtiih/haiva, pratiyogi^nastitvadtilh7t;; :PP.;, p.120 
7/7 77 and 121. ( quoted ah0ve p.72 n . 2); RN. 7 pp • 97 :f f • 1. NB., I I .  U8 77"/.
7:/ / . and/NBT., p ;39 thereupon; -v/ByBT. , : p . 3h, Karpegonin, 36 p. 372 7
.3 777.73and/3817/Stch^ yBIVyoi.,;ii-p. 6 37 n* 3* -7^ /’:7 'i7 / -
7 737/2/*7Stcherbatsky3 Iw/ p.382.^^  . : /// / 7/7/7/77;'’77*7/3 33  77/3 ;. • ;•
//'./-7 7:^3*- 7IY*7 277y 7/* hnlsdayaptiaia jhy—600; nalani / vyavptti-sadhane , i.; / //
'■ '333 ' See-;also:7PYP.,3P/639;/Daisukha.-Malwahiyu,/NASWT7.7-Notes3 /3 7 77 3 3 3 3 7 7 p v2 3 2 7 ':' ; 3 ,777//;; -r /77;7/:'■ 7". / 7 3 7 7 / 7 - / i /  7 7 / /7 7 / '3 3  / ; 3  / !. 3 / 3 .  ■ / - 3 3 3 /3 .  3  •
:3//3 3 3^  MybyShupalh^ caknot deteiin'ine . a negative judgment, 3 . 3 /
'■3:: . . for this only liaises doubts, . (sams1 aya he ter) .no t detexnn ination. ^
/ 771 .7;7. "The Buddhist theory, of; Negation is - a direct conse- „
; :quence; /pf/thd/lhidffi /The'^fundamental733-7/7
7 •/. •/ •. form of the" judgment", ,3* •■..i/is the3 p e r.c ep tdal judgme n t, o r - 37 
/3;: 7 3 /what/ is ihe . same. 3/ the name-giving judgment,; .of/' the -pattern 37;v : 
7:3 ; this is a jar" ^  judgment invblves two f actors: . 3 .3
737;' .:/ 3 ( i j  3 s elf- nature. or svabhaya of the thing by - which, it /-is;-- ■ ..,//; 3 / .3 /, 
;.-/ ■ / ‘/3.-3_dis-tingh'ished from/'bther^ttiJn.8.s3,Qnd/_(• 2')>‘7iis.perception* It 7 ,t • -
7 37' / //;’ 7/i s ihitties e 3iwp7 giVehlsj tda/^i
.3 33 the object of .our /judgment* *^ v .=• Bharmakirti/ says: uIt is a 
. : / thing./(itself =3 svabhiva)//whic ^/present, /is necessarily3 7
:/■ 33 7 perceived when al 1 other conditioils of perceptibility are; •/ ' 3 
/:,. 37 //3 fulfilled.i1// ''But/things/impefceptible'3^  /explained: Bhurmoitarai.3 ;
• , 3  /-'whose p l a c e t i m e  /and .essence/ are inaccessible, have no 3 
-3. 3 distinct reality for him/ (observer), although all other, con-. 3 /
' 3.7 >// ditionsof/fbrce;piibillty3;be/.fuliilieti,5^ '3333
3/3 / seIf nature/ ( s v abhava) , and are inaccessible in spatlo-tempera!
:7. •:•: relation,^ by both the senses and / thb;:reason. The Buddhist; 7/ ’ ,7 
■3 77 . maintains that the negation /of an enti ty is apprehended only .3/
3 :7  3  .:i b-7 3- 7
2. BL., I #p*384#
7/. 3 7 3/3 373; 3Balsukha /Mhlwaniy h,3NAS W f 3  • No t esy:p g l 2 3 2 ^
3 -3/^ k>3;NB;/;/ 11*3/153 1 satsy^ny^upaiambtid^ratya^^7yati7Pralyuk^a/v ?;/
■ / 37 7,:; v e Va ’ bh a vat i sa:3sVabhavabv.f/ Translation by Stchefbatsky-,/7BL*,3
7.?/■,:37;/;733 i::. /V o l.  / / I l y / u p , S h i / / / 7 / / ;3//3;%3,337--37 7/777/3, y ;':33773;7 /73v7 /  /3 / ; . /  3 / 33- ;;/7 /37-v /
,7 777/77 3* '.NBTI,^  p.2 3*9./77-'Trbnslatibn./0plcitv,,/3pwS8*3//3..;..37/37 7" 7' .'■/"33-;';>.,/3 
7 /  3 '3  6 * / V d e ^ a rk n la T S v a b h a v a 3 v ip ra k y s t^ h \*  ■ I b i t i # / /  ,37 7^'^ ^^ ^^  3 3 /377
3-\ when the entity is/ ah empixiical reality (dpsyai: no causes /
. //■ 3 ofyiis'hon-pe/rc^^ there>• and yet i t is not ’perceived. ^ :
333 / ■ 3 3/Thus nhh-perc eptiqif^ (aiiupalabdhi^ ;-: i s Jo f two ztyp e s>7 (: 1 )•/The/ non~- 33 
73/;/:'3/-3vper;eeptibn/pfy aythijng/^^ and is / -'-733/
, 3, -3 ,• accessible. in spatio-ternporal. relaticm/hut nO and here- is, - ;/ ;/ .
33' :r not perceived. . 3 It can he perceived at some, other time ahd 7 7 3 /7
/,/ - 7.;7 some other /pihcO, //for _/d;'t.v/iaB7k: perceptible ./thing ( dpsya)^ . and' /; //;v / 
7 33/737'-hus:/been perceived//before;!;// (2) / The ponvper6option /.of-.suck a 7/// : 
3 33;-'3-337 thing which has no self /nature and therefore, al though all the °
■ 3/37; //;, condi tions of perception/are'* satlsf ieti, 7is^  not perceived.7 7. 3 3
3/;3/ /7/;3 In/this;.cake3of■ non-perdeptiphj a^thihg;ib:-hot: perceived . 3/ 7f 3r3 
/7 13 3v'//hec/aybh ^ /particular /belf7hature^3;,77/7 77/733 7::337-,-'3. '7 3/;/-■/'
" ',7 .3:3-3; 7-7.3 ,77/ ;,The;/\Btia^ t.as-''.would /hhve arguedV’that 7sinc there is no 3
/ means of cognising: ;ah /labsbiute/non-existence;1/, /it must; be. 7 7
/: : •/ 7 granted the//status of a real (nega-oive) entity'.aid- is ;to. '  7/7
, 7 7 v/;/ /cbgnized^^7by; itsvOT of/.judgment7:^3;abtiaya^praiiapa3>^ 73 .3/ 3
,/7 ;Dh/armakIrti^ /r'etbr.ted;:^ I "When there are altoge ther no m eans 7
•of y ...cognition, the non-exis tehc e. of the object cannot be
3;73 .7/ 1 ♦ / PV8., (1.205) > p. 378,/ * dpsyasya darsanibhSyaTlcarapisambhave /,
,3 ■’ ;.3/3,-/3;:3Aat'i.7• Ibhayakyjfanupaik^ * pratiyatb. . ■
37/ 7 7 2 • T svabhava ;== /dpsya. /"The/hotiohs of sensible existence and 
3/ • 3 / intiividual *existence are here ;(in Bhddhist logic) charact-
37/3 /7 . 3. /eristics/ of the same /fact;.'1 /^ /-StcKerbatsky, BL., Vol. Ti. 3
•33 7 .3 7/. p. / 61]- n.I./ 73/3'../' /. 7/ 33/3/33.-;/3/; ;7 -77 yy/• -..33 •'••.\3 3..., 7; 7'' ■// 3.;-..//3
*33 73*3 Qf • /: infraChfIV33Secllb^ p . 132:/ 3 abhavakl^am 3
37 / . pramapani 7syad abhavasya avabodhakam.1 7; 3; 3 : . 37 ■
73. ; : / ? Iharmakl^ tpybb/ pbsteribr to Ehiitarila5 Bhatta. /Of ^7 7 7
■ • • , ;3 //7 / T p V S T •, dabda>^agdmay and/; apaurupeya sectibns .where he critic 
•/,/.•; 73/‘:7’‘7'’,rai.2es '• the^ .•:M|Mai^ kaica•, butydoes. not/refer to him by:,hi s name*;y. . 
7;3/; .3 . .6x1 the; other/hand, in; Bl.yVart^, Kuraari.la. Bhatta shows no.
3..' -73/ .3337.33 ■ • 7/337 /3;.337 •- -7' v' 3;3 337;/ 7 7,'-3. 7 continued on
73 . 3.73737 .by/v///!,;-;y/y - 3:-.; 3' / 3:'-Z. ' . V: \ 73-/ : next,- page
M y
established1.*-1' It. has been discuss;ed; above tliat in this -v ;
. theory the ' assertioh of the ^are-i’oeuh/ :ih the ;hhsis of the :: .
xiegative judgment.^ According to' the Buddliist view, cognition 
; of; the hare locus impliesthe; negation pf^the Here, they
stress bn the cqghition of .the ; hare, locus and the related ’ ;
. ;-object .(bka^jnana-sams Theyjudgment nHon-A!* ;■t s , : t
V, fact, the; cognition of an oppo si t e t erm, " B1 ‘ .; If there is ■ t 
■ no, *Br->':-Ue- uannotVsUyt non~A*t;tlibis bbcause bf"’H* that, w.e. bb 
, b ;: say 'non-A’.  Bharmaklrti - callbvit  ^-"negatibn Vbecause .of ( t h e b t - b
■ ;■ ;■ ■>; ? presence, of) the^other^ entity* ::: Stcherhatsky^twrites: • thatv . ;t
uthe negative judgment, or'negative deduction, in its- basic ; ; •
t foi?my t  s., not a tautology^ O f  vthb^t^ he cause , • ■
there i s none", y but i t is.. a deduc tion-of;. the f oi^ m • " there vis no ,'s
footnote; from previous page continued: : . ; i b - ; bbb;:
, b ;ofbawareness-b^ theor y ofbhega ti o n, viz.,
:the dpsyanupalahdJii,_whi1e the- Buddhist1 s argument indieates 
; his awareness of ..Kumar i 1 a * s re asoiiing. And • Pr ahhakar a is not 
. • r. . v only aware hut- literally supports the Buddhist1 s theory of neg- 
; at ion. .(Of.above ;pp.,b!ib7By l g ^ n ? # ^ ^ I t  should alsobe noted :
. - bhere that'"■■the thoor^hf-f yogyanupa-leOidhit'^very; aften a scribed to 
Kumarila Bha£ta in. the modern writings bn the Indian philosophy 
,.(Dasgupta, IilP., V. I. p . 397; %  Sinha, . HIP., V. I. p . 789; & •Had- '/b 
h a k b i s h a n a n , (19^8ebv) Vp.39^)^fvlsytLn.,thef basically ■; 
'• the Buddhist theory of■.^ Ur^yanupalbhdhi Vvb/^d;most probably 
. . under the influence: of Prabhakar a aiid the' Buddhists some latter 
t-b. Bhat$as po.site.d\;jL;t;'as Kumarila^ s theory. (We shall discuss this 
question in th#^th;bhaptarvth,nbme;::detail,0 ;V"'^ L" •
1 i c r i f m u i n r — i n n i w n i n n i — Ti wumnn i i m  ■ « ■ — ■— m ^ i mi >arm iimi <■■■! w j i  m i . ^
-V v\ II.h9, 'v•'pramaua-niv^ttayapy:.u^^habha'^|sidclherritil'1 Tira^ '
l-l;;;--', ; , nslation op.cit., p.107* : , i-. ,l, I./—, ■ A'' ■. bi.
2. Vide supra pp:.90~92 • . ■ v.; *■' ’ v - ' 'v :" b, •. :;.bt
’■ 3* vPVS,, p.31: 1 ahya-sattayaVsatta*, p.379 (1.206) and p.3bl;
'V.'--'.*: ' . '' ,NB. , 111.9. v ; ; '"V  . ‘ y  -b
v  . jar because. there is a. 'bare; piac.e11. It is^a cognition; of ah b b t -  
• *. .underlying; point-instant of; reality, and : this .makes it a true
cognition., or. judgment (ni^caya) • " v  According to' the. Buddhist . b 
: b; d°ct^ affirmation of-yan'entity involves the b
-exclusion or opposition (vyayptf 1) bf the other entity^.. ■ .' ;
This is called theprinciplebof,dichotomy tdvaibhl^khraha)''#'^' -bbb, 
b  ;. For instance, in: the> negative, judgmentt."There'■■-is/ no hare’s -bbbb 
; ; horn"-. the.; cognition of. theVbare head of a hare isy the basiss 
. - of the . judgment . :: ;The ;as sertibn o f thb bare he ad entails , the; : ’ : 
b' exclusion (apoha) of a horn. : j'b iby.b'S'. -.-;b , ’ b- b
Thus, in;the judgment "there is. no har.e._f s horn"j .what: 1 b 
, ■ y is. cognisedis the bare head, of, a hare, devoid:,of a horn. : In .
such negative, judgments "non-perception- is .due tb the paryudasa b 
type of negation" i^ lliis. Buddhist theory can be ■ compared• wiill b w  
Bradley Vs following e.kPosition:..'-'b.'b: bb.; b  ' .-b.bb - -b;:v b ' ’b b . . ;
1. BL., Vbi, II. p.. 118 n.l. ; ; ; ; b^b-'b'v^/'-V''-bb
.2. R.h,:p.53, 3rd p anagraph;; Pr. Vartika, II. 2, !apoha-cinta! b- 
section. : . v - v b b ;  : - b b.b"'.b  .‘bb b b ■* ib -V  ‘ '■■■ yb ,b
b - b j. ;Gp^ :;:Sichbrbatsky,bBIiib 'ypl.tvr.;:.p^  reserve, b*
b b our discussion for a latter ciiapter. . 'b -v .b ; .
. ;h. PyS.T .v p.’381: b i b; b  b-'b b b “ V  ' 7 ' b:yvbb.Vbybbbv.b b..bb b; 
; vi^ahadiyiviktA^^aBamastakadyupalabjdhir evanUpalabdhih b,b bb'
." ;•  ^ paryudasavrttya*; b ;.;b: b' bb ' , b- .. vbby b ■ b b bb:.b/bbbbb
b; ; ; ; apparent Vis hot ; ;b,
. y; ' the aotual sub.j ecit. Let us take "Chimaras:
b are non-existent;, |f\ ' *■ Ghiinaras" is here . ostensibly the sub ject ,
lb"b^but- ‘:is: really.thevpredicatev . It is the quality, of harbouring 
, b chimaras which is denied .of the nature, of thing s'. And we •
b deny this, because, ifbchimaras. existed, we should have to
. alter our View o f 1 he world. I n s  ome cases that view, no b
. doubt, can be -altered,; but, soylongas w e  ^hold yitt w© are . b
bb.b . bound to refuse all predicated it 'excludes*! The positive .
bb .biualifyof;;thebUltirhdte reality maybre^ be made;
bbllbbb explicit-,! notbingyelse,;^lies balw'as^
bbb/b ■ of a bde .* ;’*y, b - . ,y.;, .. ;yi;v.b- 1 ':b:bbbyy'-yb - ■ b" , ■.. by :bbb''
■, b*;‘'bb b ' ’by;y However inbthe npn-perceptlo^ a non-empirical: b; ■
,y (adr^yanupalabdhi),:re i t her, of the two principles can be applied.■' ’ 
A hpn-empirical object cannot: be. affirmed in. any locus, or bb 
spatio-temporal- ^  . . Secondly, an assertion of a non-
b empirical (adrdya) , or a super-sensuous or metaphysical. ob ject ..yj
bbbbbviprakrs^a)^^ yhot ;necessarily-inyo^ the principle of by
bb bbdichotpmy ’b Ip, the empirical situatipxi there;cdribbe ,no b
y assertion of, a; super sensuous object. And wi t liout an assert i on ; 
b yy ybthere; can be. no; dichotomy or discrimination ( apoha) . So long
1. Principles yof ; Logic , I . (19£2), p .120
as: we cannot M v e  - aff irmation of 1A 1 we cannot say about it ■ 
that it is * not-0* . ’ :>:;7;-\; :c’.\ 7; /'fb
b Often it is argued that since we have no ground to •-v.,';'b 
denyexistence of t lie metaphysical• beings or ' Super sensuous '
;ob ject s, -mere n on-pe rcept i on of such objects is not valid 
(sufficient) ground for denying their existence * ^ The results ■; 
of chhrityb(daha);bandbreligipus^prabtic himsayiraii
etc.) in the form of attainment of heaven (svarga) and saiva-j 
t ion (nihgreyasa);and a particular god (ddvaf avide§a) are . ; . 
such things that are supersensuous; (atTndriya) and therefore■ 
nonfperce^tj&id^^^ as there is no cause for their ;
opposition (virodhabhaya). m non-perceptipnyof them is not 
a strong ground for their un-acceptance, ’ Udayana maintains b 
that 1 only perceptible things are. nonrexistent, they are not- 
perceived; but God being imperceptible by natui*e, non-perception 
of him does; not. prove his non-existence. . A metaphysical ; 7, , bb;
1. PVS. , p . 575 Vtadbhaye yirodhabhavat9 atranupalabdhimatram- 
apramanam1, and see TKarpakagomin t h e r e i n . ; b ■
2.' Ib id. : N . Kusuman j al l, I. andII.; whdre - Udayana disc in
length. ;v.db’bb.V-;b'b;bybb’;;'b:'b; V ; : :y . 'b' ' //..■ 7'7 ' b.--;b 'b
b .;J.Sinhay HIP.,bVol.I. p.692•;Atma-fattVa-viveka, (Biblitheco 
Iiidica, Calcutta, 1939 ed.) , p.866. 7* dpi^yamatraniyatatvat - / :7 b  
b pratyaksabadhasya.1b Op;.;. Spino za, .1 The Chief -Works of Benedict 
7:’b' de Spinoza*, ,(Translated from the Latin, with an Introductionb 
.7 by R.H.M. Elwes, Dover Publications, New York, 1955) Vol.II, 
p.52 ^concerning ;God,:, blf*, then, no cause or reason can be . 
7 ;. given, which prevents thpExistence;of/God, dr bwhich destroys:: 
his existence , w e ' must / certainly conclude that he necessarily 
■ v does exist< b'££-Such^ abreasph or cause should be given, it
must either . be drawn' from the very nature of Cod, or be e x- " 7 
ternai to him -that is, drawn from another sxxbstance of 
7another naturalj/0jdr if ,it were7 of the . same nature, God, by ; v 
that very fact^ would be admit ted to exist. But substance of 7 
Vbb7/ . : b?\/7b7b/;: -bbb; 7;b:: •; :b ■ '.7 : - 7 bb : • /over
MH
> ■ b ; bbeihg.;- may; exist without be ing he rce ived in the empirical b 7 ;b;
: 7; bb situation; " sense: experience - is, not relevant io metaphysical
7; propositions." and here the 15*3. 1 og iclari adoptes the; course of* 77; 
bl/ bb bmany empiricists" whbb"identi with the property of
jbb 7: : heing verifiahle ( or falsifiable) by serise-experience, and to v
; conclude that no metaphysics bis possible because metaphysics 
bby ’.77. would have fo transcend sehseboxperience:. Such a: ;view "dismissed:; 
b:*b -7 metaphysical. statements not as f alse or unsupported by evidence, 
\:hut as meaningless;Ir ? bDharmakXrti re; joined: "Whatsoever is 
;; b .; . Ccalled) a supe rsensudus, for it; has ho; indicatory (logical) . 
mark is rejected as a self-existing extreme particular.."^
7 bb;',' -'b b'-:''.P.d'rb;*wherevhr/,;.bur;perCe pt ion * fhils 1 inferenceb^succeeds oh - the. 7,b ■
' 7 : ground of the logical mark (iinga). But in the case. of the .7
O' b/b ; fo o tn o te  5 from -previous ■ page bcontinued: .7, :bbb;b..,:b;,:,b.v 'bib'
.7.777:7. another nature cduld have hothing in common with God (by Prop. b ;. 
■V.; ii,) and: thereforeb; would: be uriable either* to cause or to destroy
■ bb b. his existence. 'b.b;b' ■ b b0b:b„7b ' 77-77777' _7, .7. -.. 7. 7 . . ..7 7 : yb
7bb  :;. b ; i 7; A.C b&wirig>: .Philos ophyy/1958
; b ; b b b  b b  ' : ' 7 1 h O . ; - C p . b ; ; a l s d : : p ; i 2 7 ; : r i . h O  i 3 2 - 3 ;  n 7 I ^ ;  I S h . b -  b  b b  b O y b  -
27 b p v s f ^p v 37h, y 01 pi; jnapakasy a lirigasyabhavat at indr is^ar t hah
bbl,.-b^ 7 b.bbb^y^hayavidesbb'vSbpratikSipyate.Ibb -^. -^b-' V . . b-bbbb-b  ^ * ;
77/  V; 7) in Buddhist logic the term 1 svabhava videsa V or particular >7: 
;Vb:b .7 7:77b. is-;'used^in7the:bsehsd of: reality - vastu -* s v a l a k p a n a . V 7b:
7-7;-- O ' b v b y bC f BL .  , 7Y 0I. I .  pp. 69V 81/  506 f f .  7bb0y7Vb-b7bb77 .. v b b / O
non-empirical; things no/logical .mark is established. Thus 
such object.s (afthas) which are supersenuous (atlndriya), are,, 
not cognizable entities, neither by direct nor by indirect b 
means of judgment (pramana)'. And the Buddhists accept no 
other valid means (pramana) •. of knowledge. . pharmakirti 
declared:-';"Nsgdtibri;. -;ofobjectslihaccessible-• :Cto experience) 
is the source of problematic reasoning, since its .essence is 
exclusive of.both direct and indirect knowledgevH^ The term 
1viprakrsta1 .refers t o .such things that are inaccess'sible.in 
s p a t i o - t e m p o r a l ^ a n d  thus not Cognizable.3
1. The Buddhist conceptions of .1 pratyaksa* arid f anumana1 are;
. not to be taken as similiar to the NV and the Bhattas.
Cf. B L , Vol. I. . pp. :lh7r-152, 231; J.Sinha,: HIP. , *Vol.I,
; PP* h61-h70 ; , Burgricharan: Chatter ji, 1 Sources of Knowledge .
in Bud. Logic* Indian Cultxire. Vol. I. no.2, 193d, pp#266-7.
2. NB., II. h8, ^viprakrstaivisayanupalabdliih pratyak^anumana- ; 
nivrttilaksana samdayahetuhl.1 Translation, by Stcherbatsky,
■'■op..cltw,,7pI.l67.;::V;/y bbb-b-* ' • 'f
3. viprakrsta adrdya ’ =. svabhava-videsa-rahita = atlndriya; s >b 
na; jnana-jneya-svabhava = prat yak sa-anumana-nivr11i-laksana. 
Of. NB. , II. 28, III. 71-73, 96-97 • NBT., pp.66-S7, 75; V b
PVS. ,  p.37d. . bb- : b .  ■ 7  77-b ; ' ' . b  .b; bb.
7y7y/>The : examples of uncdgnlza'bles . include the Absolute Being, the
Omniscient Buddha.. Contrary to - the Jainas . the Buddhists "have / ;:y ;7
by /maintained*" bob serye^s>Stchehbatsky,b "that p re a chirig (upade £a- . : ;
- , pranayanam) ' isba mark of non-omniscience, since conceptual 
y thought. (yikalpa) and speech can express only :liinited, .imputed.
Vbybyy knoy/1 edge.1 11 is nevertheless a tenet in Mahayana• that /.
.Buddha, the Absolute Being,' is Omniscieht, but this cannot be. : 7 
/ b  ;; 'established by 1 ogical methods. ’ Here the .terms; are arranged 
7; b..'" :,ih; every possible; combinatiohV from! a f  ormbl^ ;standpoint,f *
didaotical purposes, without, any reference to real tenets.b 
: v It has become usual among Tibetan 1 ogi c laris t o choose quite by: 
7 7/- senseless examples 'in order. better to impress the: rules; of 7/7,77/ 
7 7 formal lo gic. '//An, .inference -of 7 the form " all goats are she ep y 
v because they are cows",, is corisidered:to..,.be^ -we 117suited to y7 
777 y7 7 - exemplify an inference where all the three aspects of the . by
reason afeyv/rong." y7v ' ; yy y ■ 7b, • •' 7 7/ .77
1 7. - 7 Bharmakirti, discussing. the fallacy, of van uncertain
:7:7'.'.'7.7. treason,■,7said;.thbt when one. of the two f orms of the logical / 
y yreasoning is wrong and the other is dubious, tlie reason becomes
' 71. .N^ya^kanikay(reprint b from':the Pandit), pp. 112-113 (referred,.
. ' 7 to7by Stcherbatsky). 7 7 ■ ■ 7 : b.v.7 y/b'y,, ' 7:b;/ yb:
y 7: y/ /-py BL. , Vol.711^ p/207 n.l. /Three; aspects^ of the reason are .y
7 • . thesis (palisa, s adhya) / re as on (he tu, ling a) .and the major /
/.by. premise \nirnaya, 7 but sometime drstantajjFor fallacy of an
uncertain reason see NB., ,III.96bblfans. op.cit., p.206. ' ■
uncertain.^ And the example he gives, is:/- "someone is 
passionless or. someone:is omniscient. Because he possesses 
the faculty of speech. The contraposition (vyatiroka) is 
here wrong, the positive concomitance (ariyaya) uncertain. 7 
Since omniscience and (absolute) absence. of pass ions are 
/inaccessible to experience, it is uncertain whether the - 
faculty of speech coexists (with these at tributes) or not. " ^ y 
Thus if Buddha, preaches he cannot be.. the Absolute Being or 
Omniscient. Here; the negative judgment refers . to a false .;7.V^y 
^proposition'.;W-op-f £pm.^ /know that the reason
(hetu) ; i.e.:, the faculty of .speech is present in the dissimilar 
I ctees; .( vipaksa)^/ vilie/faculty, of speech is‘ Observed in a 
person who has passion (raga) and who is not omniscient.. Thus 
negative ;.jud^eht ; of 7a non-empirical ob ject is hot/valid. And . b 
its affirmatiye judgment is mere problematic :(saiTi^aya-hetu). ^
In the given example, the positive.form of the major premise 
will be: . 7 . 0 -by .7 -b y. 7/yb ■ 7/ b y b  y ; ;-y' '.-.‘.-by yb;
1. NB. Ill • 95 : dvayo rupayor eka sy as iddliavapar asy a - c a ; samdehe * . 
naikantikah. , Translation op^pit.;, p.206.7 :b ’ b
2. NB y III . 96-97, 1 yatlia vltaragah; kadcitsarya jno va valetgtvad- 
/ iti*-;/ ;vyatirekCf;trisiddhah* 7; bamdigdho1 rivayaji. sarva jna-
7; vitaragayor-yiprakarsad yacanades-tatra sat tvam asattvam va 
.; sanidigdham1;/. :; Translation by"Stcherbatsky, op. cit.., p. 206-7. • -V;
Stcherbatsky Bays "the gift of" 7 which we have-changed to 
■ 1 the. faculty ofT .'yb' ; 7 ' .-y, • ’ :y
3. N B T . p . 7.5. 9yll. y ;7:y:.:: ;,byb:b'-7 "
/;//'/y tfWhosoe ver posses ses the faculty of speech is omniscient."
7-/;';;/b 7And; the. - pAhtrapositiOn/of the same ijajor premise will he : 7
7 "Whosoever is;non-omniscient does not,possess; the faculty/
7 7; '■‘i Of .speech.7 ,^7 ; 7 " -7,/b ' byby//;;• b " y ■' " ■■;; ' y/\yy/: •" ■'
;y. 7/7 /by The adr d^mpalahdhi shot:: -valicl,yby:; this; what'the Buddhists 7-bb;
: mean is that/itvis rh rValid/in affirming,^ y
Vb7'- existehce .injthe mahherbhe:dpdyanupalabdhi affirms -reality ./- y-bb
;/ /  y y /of existence.? 7yDharmak^ , 7/y bb/y,'. v / y 7 b - : /by
by77- 7 7 / ^/Tho\.fbrit]Or (adrdyahupalahdhi) does -riot determine, 
b/y'-by/nqifeexi^^ ,''by///' /, - 7 y-:..;bbb/by.7/yy.- /;/— b y /
7 1. Stcherbdtsky,bBL. .- p.207 ii.l. _ •’ .; . ;'y ..,-y; y yb
:72.* Gp*7 Kunia r  i  1 a ,B h a tt‘a 1 -‘s \ ;theo fybo f; va 1 i d i  t y ; o f  negation as yyy
■77 bb7;//b‘.y7aff irkingyr'eelvnonbexisfe b 7 ;yyb;/. ' by/byy/;,-
na punah pux^vasatta-sadliarii
y . ; '  y b  7 : ;  ■ / y  y
C H A P T E R  I I I  :/ . ’: b ;
• COMPLEX HEGATIOHS, /;'/
V Xu. Divisions of 1 abhaval in the realist systems 5.
Sections: , IT* Double Begat ion (abhavabhavah-dvitTyabhavah)j
’ b -77 33J. Mutual-absence of a rautual-absence.
(anyonyab liav as ya nyonyabjxa v a h );
I$£. (A)* Prior-absence pf: a pos t er i o r-ab s e nc e
(pradbvanisabhavasya prlgabhavah); and 
7 ' • /.;• • (B). Posterior-absenee: of a priof-absence
y b y  (pragabhavasya pfadhvamsabbavah);b
•jSI* Qualified Negation (yi^ist^bhavah)
Section- Is b  Divisions of, 1 ahhava.1 in the realist - systems y '
We have seen in the previous chapter that under the .
influence of Buddhist logic philosophers of the BHatta MTraamsa
: sys/tera,; in order/to strengthen their traditional theory of
negation, felt it necessary (a) to extend the .number of types
of negation and (b ) to present it in a systematic classific-
a t i on pf t he two ma I 11 divisions, namely, the samsargabhava and
the anyonyabhava. In the early Nyaya works, including
Uddyotakara1 s Nyayavarttito, only two types of negation are y
mentioned, namely the pragabhava and the p r adhvamsabhava• ,
1 .  , O f .  s u p ra d o & i|^ ® S K E p P & i p .6 3 b n 4 . , P,1007 y /  - :■
2. See supra p.42 n2 and p. 48 n.3; IP., II , p. 220.
) P.0
fri;Kumarila: Biiatta' s Sloka-varttika we find a four-fold 
division of negation. , And. at a later date, thethe works
of Parthasafathi Midra \ i. Midra, and Srldhara
two main/classifications^o the four types posited by 
Kumarila are given. AC his development of the different , 
types of neg;ati6n. (abh^ya) may be suramarized in the follow* 
ing tables: ' ' . 7 b / / / V  .7' / ' ; ; 7 •:y - 7 y/v/y, /• ///
Table No. I*
Divis ibns of N ega tion (abhaga^according to the
■ : y  v ; u ’; ' ' 7 f ;7 ; / , r  .;7; N a i i y ; N y a y a 7 7 w r i t i n g a b ' 7 \ - /
Antecedent or prior
Non-existence
(pragabhava)
i
Posterior Non-Existence 
(pra dhvarababhav a) ;•
lb
2.
Gf.7 SI;; Vart., A b . c h . vers. 2-4, pp. 473-474 quoted 
above p. 63 n.l. : / / : / / / / • • ■ / / . ; 7 - -  ' /
Cf • s u pf a C ha p .II, P . \po; \ : J /y/y j • Si. Vart., 7' NR., 
p.481.. yacaspati Midra, may have been the first to 
postulate this twofolddivisi on, NVTT• > II, ii, 9; 
Sinha,: HIP. ;;\i; pp; 762-763* 7 77 7: ; / v , //-/ 7> ' 7/ / ; / .
Table Ho>11,
Divisions of Negation (abhava) according to Kuniarila Bbatta 
and many: subsequent writers of the Nyaya^TaiAesika. and 
Bhatta MTmams'a Schools:• •
Negation (abhava)
t .— .........   ~ t ------------- r — — ”
Antecedent Posterior^ , , Mutual or Reciprocal
(pragabhava)* (pradhvaras'abhsiva) (anyonyabhava)
V../ ' Absolute/
(atyantabliava)*
Table No* III*
Divisions of Negation according; to Vacaspati:Midra,Partha-. 
s'arathi Midra and SrTdhara and subsequent writers with the 
exception of Gagabhatthj Raghuxiatha Siromani and Venidatta:
, Negation (abhava)
k /— — | ; _ ■ //■
Privation ^ _0pposition (anyonyabhava=*
(samsargabhava) tadatmyabhava=itaretarabhava)*
1 V":V / ‘ 1 V ; /
Antecedent Posterior Absolute o r ’Constant
(pragabhava) (pradhvamsabhava) (atyantabhava)*
Cag'abhatta does not admit the antecedent abhava while
Sir omani and Venidatta appear, to have rejected the: traditional
1. vide supra p.72: n.2: and 3j B. Cin., p. 17.
7 - 7 7 ' ^ ■ ,77./>.>777 ,^ 7. 7 r 7 ; 7 7 7 / u & ■ j
view of the mutual absence as a separate individual*- "•/:
7 ; However, these two' iieo^^ya logic fans have tried to
elucidate the problems of complex negations. • , It must 1 >r
also be r emembered that Siromani does not; accept abhava ■
as an ontological entity (padartha) but only as a logical 
' concept or an imposed property (upadhi)•^ .^ 7 Venidatta 
as we shall see in the f ollowing pages, in many cases 
agrees with him* 7: ’■ '
SectionH* ; The Principle of Double Negation 
(abhavabhavah «• dvitTyabhavah) *
• Among Indian logicians the Buddhists seem to be the
first to apply the principle., of double negation (— A « A)*
In keeping with the doctrine of apoha or 1 discrimination1^
/ the Buddhist philosophers maintain that every proposition is .
the negation of its- own negation.^ According to this . 7/
theory the proposition A implies the negation of non-A
71*^ .Of. PTN*, pp. 55-56.; PM., pp 27-28i PrimelT^, pp 49-50;
" 7.\ infra pp.rr/-!^.
2. supra chap; I, /
3* See infra; chap. /V^pt* 1, p/2^r ^ ; nlso p-U 2* .
4. PVP., p. .612 PrajnakaragUpth: ’asadhya eva nastTti 
yadavaTidharanam tatsadhye nastitvam nisedhati.1
(anyapoha). In DharmakTrti’s own words:
"Affirmation is,. in de ed, the absence of negation."' \ 
However, it seems that the early Nyaya-Vai^esika arid the 
MTniamsa philos ophe r s did not use double negation as a 
logical instrument. But in the works of the neo-Nyaya 
logicians it is recognised to be of great significance. It 
ha©,, as we shall see below, even become a question of some 
controversy among the logicians*:
Among the neo-Hyaya - authors Vallabha2 is, perhaps , the 
first to apply this principle;.  ^ Criticizing the Pfabhakara 
theory that the negation of. a pbt on the floor is equal to '*.■ 
the perception of the bare locus (or floor), he says:, ; 
"Thecreiational negation of the absence of the pot i.e. when 
the pot is present, refers to the pot only, but not to the 
locus. Ihis means that there may be a locus without a pot, 
but not a pot without a related locus (atiprasakteh)."1 
In other words, since the expression, ,r^  pot = pot", the v-c 
expression "^pot"’ must be equal to the absence of the pot, 
but not to the presence of the bare locus. ^
1. PV. , IV. 223 1 nivr11j£abhavas tu vidhih1 Cy
2. According to Pt. fjh^dhiraja Sastri. Vallabhacaryya must
be a contemporary*of*Gafige|a if not prior to him.^ ^acarya 
Valiabhah'Gaftgegopadhyaya samakalTrias tatpurvakalTna eva 
yeti." Int. , NL., p.3. Prof.: Dineshchandra Bhattacharya 
supports this viev/, see History of Navya-Nyaya in 
Mithiia, pp. 55-56..r>c- VC^ c/c / V . v
3* See supra chap. II, pp.
Km HL., p.559: 1 ghate ca ghat'abh'ava-samsarganisedho ghata eva 
11a tu prakrte ,1 atiprasakte h1. prakrte '« bhutale • See
. com. Kanth’abharaha thereon.: . .;r v , \
. . . .  ~ * ■ .  .■■■; , '■ >,
However.., Raghunatha Siromani, ,f one of the most . . 
original of Indian philosophers"according to Ingalls
- ‘ ' .' . " .  '■ -- v . . ■ ' ■ 2 : ■ ' ' ■ ■' ,v-;.
is 1 the most famous opponent of11' this principle of
double negation. Raghuriatha states his argument as ^
follOWS : ; ' . ; '■ - : • . ;
; , "itov/, the absence of the absence of a pot , etc.* (is) , 
a separate (individual from the presence of the pot and ; 
from the single absence of the pot), for (in the perceptual) 
judgment11 (there) is no absence of a pot in the place (where 
there is) a pot ,m (there1 is) nothing: to remove (our \
awareness of absence-ness and indeed of double-absenceness.)
Raghuriatha rejects the objection that if a double ■ i ; 
negation is not equal to an affirmation it would lead to an 
infinite regress (anavastha)* He claims that in his 
'theory there is no infinite regress "for, since the absence 
of absence of absence of a pot (is equivalent to) the
. 1, Ingdlis, Mate rials*, p. 9. ‘V:. / •
2. Ibid., p. 68 (4o).
3. PTN., p.55. l-3:_ ■' ‘
1evam ghatadyabh^vasyapy^abhavo1tirikta eva.
Ghatn dimati tadabhavo hastTty^b'adhitabhavatva-
pratyayat.1
Translation by Potter , : pp. 67-68* See also PM., p. 27*
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single absence of a pot, ( there is) no contradict! on.
Raghuna tha' s s t afement ne e ds f urther investigation. •
It appears to me that he does not intend to deny the 
principle that a double negation is equivalent to an 
affirmation# For both he and Venidatta, who supports 
him on this point, emphatically state that the third 
negation is the same as the first. Venidatta observes: 
"There is no infinite regress, for there is no opposition 
to the view that the single negation of a.pot is the same 
as its absence. Moreoverthe absence of absence of 
absence of the pot is not different but the same as the . 
first absence.11 I his means "w p6t =>*pqt,,t and
ss How ,*-'hpWitlist'aniaing -.this it is but
natural to say that "^pot «" pot". I think that what
. i n  i — ■ ■  .  i— i . y n y . . .       — i- j — , -* J   ..................................
1. PTN.^ p#55* 3-4 na caivam anavastha ekasyaiva 
ghatabhavasya svabhavabhavarupatve virodhabbiavat.fi 
Trans. Potter, p# 68. Ingalls1 remarks are very note­
worthy. He writes: "Intuitipnistic logic * as Professor 
Quine has pointed out to me, deni es the equivalence of 
/""a and a# It admits that a implies '^“^ impliea a. f 
An interesting point of comparison with'Ravya-nyaya is 
■ that tjhe Intuitionists avoid an infinite series just as 
Raghunatha does; they admit the equivalence of ~a and 
Materials, p. 68 n. 135* The underlined~words 
‘are in italics. ■ . ; : ■ .
2* p.2?; ?na_.calvam anavastha, ghatabhavasya (ghatabhav-
.abhavab t£tpadartho1 tra bodhyah)^ta^abhava£upatve£ 
v i r o dhab haV a t^ t at ha jca gha ta £> ha v a b ha v a s y *apy abhavo 
(ghatabhav a bhav ah) ghatabhava* eva na tvatirikta iti 
nanavastlia. • ^  >
these neo-Ryaya logicians intend to say is that in other 
cases of negation, abtiava is determined by bhava or the 
counter-positive while in the case of a double negation 
abhava is limited by its own characteristic* A double 
negation is an unique or separate type (atirikta) of negation 
inasmuch as it is the only negation which negates a negation*
Section HI* Mutual-absence of a Mutual-absence
(anyonyabhavasyan.yonyabhava) *
According to Raghunatha and Venidatta a complex 
negation is such that a mutual-absence of a mutual-absence 
is equivalent to presence-ness (bhavatva)* But the texts 
in which this; formula is stated involve some logical 
difficulties and therefore, before further investigation 
of the subject, it is necessary to remind the reader that 
a simple mutual-absence is defined as that negation in 
which an essential identity. (t'ad'atmya) relation between 
two things is denied*
1* Lak. , p* 13.: * tadatmya-pratiybgiko’bhavo'nyonyabhavah1 
RL*, p. 576; SM.* ,12; . Materials , p* 68*
Raghunatha d e f i n e s  the complex negatioxi as follows:
uThe mutual-absenee of a mutual-absence (is) a presenceness
and [the single ^ absence is] a relational-absence-ness, for
on the acceptance (that) a mutual-absence (is) a separate
1
(individual) there would be an infinite regress."■ If
we leave out the added words (the single mutual absence isj|,
this statement would appear to be contradictory* It would
then assert that the mutual-absence of a mutual-absence is
equivalent to both presence-ness and absence-ness* Ingalls
2
declared that the text "Is corrupt1** And Potter in his
translation of the Pad'artha-tattva-nir'upana has omitted
the phrase "samsargabhavatvam ca"} which seemed to him "to
have been miscopied into the text from Raghudeva’s 
3
commentary"5* However, according to Venidatta, who very 
often takes sentences and phrases from the text of Raghunatha 
without acknowledging thera,^ the present case is explained 
in exactly these very words, including "samsargabhavatvam 
ca"f* Uhus, I am inclined to believe that the text is not 
"'corrupt" or "miscopied"1* However I think it does require
1* PTN*, pp* 55"56: !anyonyabhavasyanyonyabhevo bhavatvam 
samsargabhavatvam ca atirikt'anyonyabhavahglk’are *
navasthaprasahgat*1 Gf* Potter*s trans* p* 68.and n*52V 
He omits the underlined phrase in the text*
2. Materials, p. 150*
3* Potter, loc* cit*
4* Op* e.g* PM*, pp* 23, 24, 28, 29 with PIH* , pp* 48, 51*
56-57 and; 58*
•; vvv;^ ;v;v;;:iu which may hring; out-; additional .
interesting points. ./ On >the; basis of Venidatta1 s text 
' •. vhere'I'sugge st a. poss ib le interpre ta t ion of the phr a se
v •••• ■; Vsamsarg^bh'avatvaip ca* •  ^  ^  ^*\v- . ^
;Vv--V; . / Venidatta; states a m
V: \is (absolute) ^ relational:absence^
\$' x ness• ; For : ^  a separate rautual-absehce, ■‘;ij
.. (of a mutual-absezicp) would lead to infinite r e g r e s s 7.':
 ^And.^  fhe ^ pplh^ ^stated; .
;V-■■ri mutual-absence; Pf ;:;a>mdtual^ by the mutual-
•V abaenee ness. And (further) this - must also be understood ;,v’X;\-
ft# ’ ; (in. the following way)V'; (a) , the mutual-absehce of amutual- . ',
: abs e nce of a '3ur■ etc* iis the P te'sence —ness y (b )7 (while) - 
>v. the [single} mutual-absenceness of^ a jar etc* is the ; .'S/v
7-7:7- 7-7 (absolute) rpla%pnal-abs^  ^ ; :7 - ■';;^vc
. • ' . 1 * ; -  P M . P P *  2 7 - 2 8 v:  ■ , \ ^ - v ' 5-' K
%. . 7 >7 y ahyonyab hava s ya va b hay a tv am * s ams a rgab hav a tv am
y: ^riybhyabhsnmh ^  !
;-v; ; ."-w- - :'v. na v as t ha p r a s amga t •: i dam c anyonya b hav a tga v a c c hinn- ,
;v- a s ya ny onya b ha v aim • a v a lamb y okt am. g ha ta dy any o ny- ; ....^  
v‘f > ' ; *V:^;u-va.iiyQ&J^ Tb'lMy0 .^ blhiSya^ y-'am'V samsarga-
; . bhavatvam ghatadyai^yohyabhavatvam c ety api bodhyam.f -
■; ;-;: -7'V: •; ;;TIhe lunderilhed..con^unctipn:^*:vaV(':ie;;probiematici' 7 ^1-7.7 7/-; ■
v.;.; i 7 : /-:7 7 ; ..think perhapsySt; i^dica^tbsc Venidatta * S ha If -he a r t e d ; ; 77'v
; ; > support Raghunatha1 s< y r~-,
7 • • There are three -main by Vejnidatta*
7 :;777\ .'*'£• mutual^ vS-mutual^ 7. ;:-w ,
■■77 .'.7. 77 ■' presehee : (of presenbeness). Ingalls formalized
7.7\7 7 this as ' "r ;« X"v 77 The symbol - stands for ■' " '
_• , mutual-ab^ 77/ % 7r 7'■ 7;^'-v ; 77': ::C;77 ^  ' ■. 77'-
; 7 (2); The rautuai-absehce of a is limited
'777 7-,, ^vby^'bb^niutual-absenceness., . ' ■ 7' ''7^ -;7-77:
7; 7 7(3 ) ^^ The. mut is equivalent to .absolute
7'7/7;:-\ : .7 7-' rela11 oi^ 1 absenc0ness• 7 ; :-:7;;'' 7  - . 7. 777. 777; 7‘ 7-\ 7 7'7/. 
7-7 •7:/", 7 As far as the first point is concerned there is 'ho; -7-
7 difficuity*7 A ;mutual-absence is the identity negation of 7 
77.7.7'; 77771wp7ent 11ies: A 7andriB •■v7 :&'3 >.';a 11;-things'7are7.essentially' ^
7 identical with7th^ very own "essences11 [own nature] . , 7 -7'
7;7\7 ','7.:;Aocordihg;?%b/in^lle^tb.gV/^t he' mutual-absence of water '7 • v77
77777 corresponds to/the ^fragment £ C* • • •«. w a t e r 7 
it is false; that water is identical with [fire]• By this 
7 method^ the differdnces between things, are determi ned* •7-77.7 7. 
'M Accordii^^tb;--cnese.-dogicians the positi v e7 quality "separate- 7-7
.!• Materials , pv 15077 77-:--; ■ 7 7 - : 7  ^77?‘7 V 7  , 7-77',7"' - 7;77' 
.7 ;777 £♦  ^Ibid* , p* :-55V77 • • ■■•.:777777 ' 777-., :.7 ' " . .. ■ ' _ '•'7; ’• . /.'7 ' /
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ness * (prthaktva ) ref ers to the mutual-absence-nes s • 
Now/. when we s peak of; a mb tual-ab sence of the mutual- . 
absence, what/we/ashferfv ^  ixidividhal complex
negation, as siigge s ted by Raghunatha and Venidatta, in 
the case \of a double n e g a t i o n t u t  a mere denial of the
separateness of. one sr thing.
1* ' £ he separateness (prthaktva) is regarded, by the con- 
;: ■ - servative Nyaya-Vailes ikas as one of the 24 qualities
(guna). T r •; Sam., * In SM>v /. 113 and 114 the difference
between£tfe/^a^ p|vfchaktya,,and mdtual/abs^^ : ' v;V
; (a ny onyab hava)-is explaixied iri the^followihg way: •. /;/•■
. * prthbktvara syat^pythak^prat yaya^karanam* 
anyohi?abhavato nasya carl tar t ha tv am isyate.^ . ’r /
asmat-^prttiag netl>pfatXtir /hi yilaksana**: - ■ : : ■ 7
: The propositional: forms of the two are different inasmuch
as the fpfmer ; corf bsp onds to such c oiistructions; as MA is 
//V . differeht from Blf (asnia t pr t hak V. while the latte r refers
; to the: neatlye ^udgmeiits ,*e*g;*V- this is not that11 (idara 
na) or UA isi not Bt,r*. The f ormer !f should be interpreted 
,■■ as ah af f irmat iv e pr opos it ion r ef er r ing to the positive 
. ent it yealied pr t hakty a and t he lat ter . as a negative ;
. pr opqsit ion r ef err iiig ‘to the neghtiv e^categor y of reci­
procal noxi-existence called anyohyabhava*u (K.S.Sasti, 
v Primer, pf.III, p.17). In-the pr opos it i on referring to 
prthaktv a , the othe r term (B) Is express ed in the ablative 
case (paneamX) while in ahyonyabhava, generally speaking,
; both terms are expressed ih: the: nominative iprathama)*
( S M . 114. (^SS) >^>464 ? c-lyadhrthhyoge;;; pancami so1 ft ho 
nana r t hanyonyab hay a to b hi nnb gunant a ram kalpya ta it i•V)• 
See also PaninX,11,iii ,299 NL*,pp*366-372; Bhaduri, Meta- 
;: phys i c s , p p • v llSr 119 • NS • V XV• i •37-40, NBh• , arid NVT* -
. thereonl^M ,p.23G* -The Bhatta MXmamsaKas rejected the
positive coxiiceptioxi of difference. or* separateness. ,v They 
/;/ explained it in terins of mutual-negat ion* Of * /§.iilpikia, t
v p. 23 5 • ; This. lb a Is o? the position of the neo-Nyaya logic-
Ians, namely, Raghunatha and Veni da't1a• They say: /
useparateness (is)} not a distinct quality (guna), for the
’ statement (that X is) separate (fronTlfT^can be explained 
I;/?^ ^ merely thro^ its / mutual absence (with Y) •” Trahsla- 
tiori ;by ; Ppttef 9 p* 4Q*v (He/tfaxislates t he t erm *guna • :by
( c ont inue d - oy e f leaf )
M\
:  ^:f PuptK^rihb're:'^/becor dihg to the realist•/theory
of negation,'1' .cognition of an absence other than the ;
: mutual~absence;,/involves three factors, (a.) counter- 
•positlVe.^Ciie.^ the'; .negatum ‘or;:prati;yogin)x,V (b) the real ; :. 
.absence (ahhaVa-vastu), (c) the '.qualified., empty locus.
'/£ vis.i §t'a-b&u bsila’).••/;///' But in the: .case ;of . mutual-absence, . 
e. g* of a cow and a horse (non-cow), ne gation * refers to 
opposition between, two.presences. ; How, if this opposition
C'ahyonyabhava):^; \Cbfvnub-clasbes) ...is merged into/the class Z 
order of existents as such (satta), then only ''presenceness"1 
•; is/-1 left‘s -‘-Thus* the neo-Hyaya; logicians,/particularly . 
Raghunatha tand'Venidatta maintain that the mutual-absence 
of a mutual-absence corresponds to the presence•
(footnote 1 continued, from previous page) :
"trope") ,_prthaktvam api na gunantaram*,
anyonyabhavad eva prthalct va-vyavaharop ap atteh. PTN • ,;
; /. ,p • 28. It2j:; P M p  • * ip; both give the same reading*,
; . For a. lengthy discussion oh, thesubject. see PM. * -/ / /
further pp, 10-11 • ; •
2.' Gf. pray, p. 551 pm., p. 27.. . , ,/ '
1. supra p. 58 ,Zvg p .  60 n.2. :/;./;/- :
How, the question arises :-; Why; doesRaghimatha state;///
. that: "the mutual-absence/ of. a mutual-absence is presence ;
Z ; and relational /absence (samsargabhay©) - ' * ? /Here, V e n i d a t t a / /, 
.-. text seems to suggest ;/aZsolution to the. difficulty* Accord- 
ing to his second-and/third points/. ( stated. above)/a mutual*-*- 
absence of a mutual-absence is limited (avacchinna)^ by the 
• Z, mutual-absenceness,: which is - equivalent to the (constant) . Z /:
. relational absenceness*' , In order to ."understand the phrase 
* samsargabhava* In this, context,/we /must/ be familiar; with Z - //' 
the controversy among the Hynya-Vaisesika.Zwriters . concern- Z 
Z l  ing the mutual .absence versus the ab so lute; absence or? •, •’ 
constant relational absence*
; . / ZZ Z We have .already" stated above^ .the two main divisions;
/ , of negation, namely, (l) the relational absence or/privation..
/ ( sai^safgnbhuvaOZwhich .bonsistsi of three sub/ divisions,, and ;
( 2) the mutual-absence; or opposition (tadatmyabliava = anyony- Z 
/: abhava.)*z./■ The /former/refers'-.to'theZhegation of "relations :
. other than that, of identity";/While;; the latter is denial of ,Z 
identity only* . /The-.;third!sub'' division of /tbe;f irst type.:/.-: .
_____________;______________ Z...Z. . J_11_HI1H1L1— llLll UJ I . I l . . I  . ■ I 11 I............ELLUIL.-JP.W ' l l  IJ  I I. ' i.ili invn ■ I m in i '■■util ■ r r ir tT n r  r i , : --------------------  1-------r7~f ~l------------------ 1--------------------------- r~ -■— — —
1* ; Of .PTN*, pp." 55^56/luo ted-above, p*:;r^ V^ Z>(»/ ;....
r 2* The/term ^avacchimia1; .is "one of■■'the/ most, iniportant •„/1>-; ‘
technical terms in the N avy a-ny ay a" • For explanation ; 
see Ingalls, /Materials,. p* b-7 (.22) • It has "many shades 
/ of meaning, most of which are. foreign to the concepts of
.( Western logic, "z / '/• " ' z z •/ • ■ '// /.  ^/ . •. ■ 'ZZ.. // ;
Z:3*" See supra Table. No. Ill, p*/<R/ //■/'■'' Z ‘
'■ ;ifMaterials:,/ppi-54-55/•> . / ; .?/■ ■; ;/- ■- ;//-'
.z.Z/ZZ;/Zzof/iLegatipnZisztha or eonstant: absence w -' zv /■ ; ■ /Zzzz.-
/ZtZZZ" /v//(ntyahtabMya) • 11/ is; def ‘ired/Zih^ . t ^ / ; " t h b z  ebn- ^ Z/zZ;,z zZ;Z
. , ;ZZ-z-Z:toarit; absenee/;of/relatibh Z( sadaiahahZ/saitisa^
z"■>z- ;; •"-
. Z Z; ;Z /zZZZv ^ Now ;t he zob jbet ibn isZ r ais.ed that the propositions; such 
' ZZ / ZZi1-' Z;'' as " the^ pot i s not Zcloth" and 1 a/cow is/ not a /horse"5,; al- Z - b Z  
ZZ/though/ admitt edlyZref erring, to: the miitual-ab sence, corres- : 1 ./
: pond, in, fact, to the ooilstant .abspnce, of relation - v:, ;Z; / /
Z / / i( atyahtahliava) •: For the, opp osi tion; of two things>?( if . : ;Z;. /Z/
. ; Z z^ehl^must he constant, i*e;>.Zfoi all time* Moreover, Z /
/ /,, the i dentity (tadatmya)Z fOlafiorZv^^ is -denied/in?, - /Z
Zz Z Z Z ■mutual-ah senc e is it self a typ e of relation (samsarga),Z 
: Z/Z/Z^; . /; and theref ore Zit: must he regarded, as a relational absence Z .
.Z Z/z Z/Zz/Z:( Su$hargabhaya) *KZ;;. if / Z. :Z.zz Z'/yZ
/ /,;//•:zZ ;/; fbe ; conseryativb;;N^ya-Vaisesikas enjoined that '. Z,, //i
Z : / / . Z the mutual-ab sense i s dist ihct from the const ant-absepce : /
)■ - ZV .: ; //inasmuch"as the/fprmer; -is/'applica^ to the instances Z /Z: 
/^ ZZ/z;/ZZz^ehe; "the bwoiiiidiyidu^ identityzis denied reside
Z./Z ZZ;. 1 .  .h/L *, p* ,.573 *• /ipuryottaruvpdhf-rahitas,/tu^samsargab-Z'
pratiyogikq^ Ztyantsbhayb^* • Z/iPraKsa/* bommenfary/z 'ii
/;//;•/ z/;z;;Z,Z-'";"/lains;:Z:tbadatanah samsargabhavo1 tyantabhavail1 ♦ Of.;/ /ZZy;
• z-Z./ i'/z/ Z also, Udayana, La^• >.*P• . 13• / Vailablia; -inZNL*’, pi567 and Z
: Zz P *573 defines four types; of. abhava exactly in; the /same: Z\/Z 
■///Z^Z'/Z-zz;Z;Z; Z:: Z  termh£as;bda^ . : :Z;zzZ'-‘ ZZ-^ Z''''///- ^ /'z/:-'/' Z - . Z ;
■;; 2 •; z/lib •ZZ P *Z 37ft;i/^ hahu; ;g&yatmanasVabhavotpy^afyantabhava;1 Z ;;
Z Z: ; ;eva, ■. niravadhi tvat*. ; , t adap arthakam' samsargapratiyogi tvamtl; 
Kanthabharana com* : ' / Z - ' Z / ;  • - ;/f . ZZz/i '  ^ Z
■ z tadatmya^nisedhatma samsarga-nisedhatma ca eka evabhava
zzzzz; ;::;zZzz:/z:;/^-z--z.zz/z: 'Z'":-t;z
/in the /same time, and space, relation. But in the' constant. 
absence the very presence of ;all/ spaceMdmeZrblhtio^ 
things are.d e n i e d . / Z /.
Z lieep ing thi s coiit rover sy. in/mind when/we read ZEag- \ ■
hun*athaf.s text and. Venidatta.rs /explanation of it, the/ , 
phrase 1 samsargabhava * , in the text of Raghunatha does 
not. seem to be problematic as suggested by Ingnlls and , ./. ;/
Potter.2 These/heo--Nyaya logicians were,' I think, 
opposed to the conservative view of distinction between . 
the mutual-absence and; the constant relational absence. . Z>-;///.' / 
The two logicians appear to. have argued in the following 
way:/ 'Z ■ZZZ,ZZ'Z'Z Z ' / . ' . / ■ //.
(a) since the acceptance of a separate individual mutual*?. ;1:
absence would lead to regressus ad infinitum, it/is. /
/not a distinct negation; ■/ .
(b) a/vsiEple /mutualb& /Is/not different from the .. v/;Z/;
constant relational absence (samsargabhava)j .
( c ) . a ipoing-^ sence, 1 • e> , : mutual-ab sence of a , ///Z
inutua 1—absence is equivalent to. presence..^
1. Ib id., .1 ha•/,anyonyabhavasya nisedhya-s ainana de sakalatv at•
• tasya- (atyahtabhuvsya) /tu tadabhavat . 1 / / / ^ {/ .
2* Cf. Mat e;r i al s, p . 150; Pot ter Vs Translation of PTN., .
■ ■ p.: 68 n. 52. :Z z v - ;• Z ' ■' • . \Z ‘Z
/5. Cf i PTN.;,v pp./55-56; .PM. ,;pp*' 27-28.. : Z Z
Section n». (ao Prior-ab sence of a. post eri or-ab sence
, z •. . / ///. .' (pradhvamsabhayasya pragabhayah); und »>/Z ;/•
-v-vV; •/.. (.B) Posterior-abseiice of a prior -absence
■ /‘ ZV."* ' Z"z Z (prngabliavasya pradhyamsnbhayah.) • / “//■'
ZIn accoi’dance with the doctrine of * asatkarya1 , the 
early /Nyaya writerdZdescfibedZtwo /kindsZ/of absence, /namely,// ZZ ^  
/ the antecedent or prior absence (pragabhava), andZjthe ■ Z, .
y ZPostei*ibr/'Hkbsenc e ( ^ radh^ ) • lh® Zformep coh-?’ V ZZ// Z
sistsZ of the absence of a. thing prior to its coming into ; /
existence and the latter of the destruction’of a thing 
/ after ithasZcome;,into/being-/and now has; ceased to exist. ... .,.//._ 
//■■ /.Now, the neo-Nyaya, logicians/;; quest ion ‘what- will -be 
/the ante cedeht-abs enc e of .a posteri or “absence/ (before the, 
latterVs production). For1 instance, with reference to y. ■;-// 
a pot, so long asZit hasVnqtbeen destroyed:^therezis ixon- 
v production of its p o s t e r i o r-ab senc e• And this may be y /,, ’ ,.
/ termed; as * the antecedent-absence' of the posteri or- / / • / Z;
ab sence1 of the pot, ( i.e.^ the presence of the pot).
/ Z Z ZZ/;On /the -other'hand, since , the; priorZ^sence : is, Yz/ Z //
Z described^ as, that legation which is/not present/subsequent, /.
Z 1* /;SupraZTable No.; I* ;/;:p«;iio v?-Z ' Z//./
Z:/-Z ,yi^ the thing* (counterpo/sitlye), y the Z.yy-yyv
/,:Z, :, neo-Naiyayikas that the Zde sirupti bn ofZthe. prior- : ; / ;
//, ...;Z absence Zc/anY/alsq.be..- .desbribed'Yi^ terms, y / .: ;//■ /,
Yly/";■:■■ , i*e* >?asy * theypo^ prior-absence * * ; //’/•
;Z ' :Z’ .Raghunatha and Venidattn define the- two complex types of •;
;/Z/Z./y-: • negntipn in the -following way: /,/ /■//"/; •''/•/'.•'• Zy /•//; Z/-/;Z
/•////'■;•■ '•/ vyZ . y,\yM And tlie pr ior ■ absence of a ;pbsteri6r^ ''absehce,Yy''Z?Z;Z y 'Z.y'
/ZZ/Z//;///ZZ^ ;y/// y;yz (and) /the; p os t.erior . absehceyof ;/a prior; absence/ y v;'
;/z/y/./•/'//'•' , y(/are/:e^ch)y sep ar At ey;( kinds pf. individuals)/for Z z/yyyyy;/y
///•/•/ ^ ;yyyy/./• .at: the time "(when^:^ thing 'is) y ;y’.
iy/y;./. y.;. yZ ; fyyprqspnt; ■ (ihpye y ^  the cog- •'/•'• ' y Ay
/: Y; y hition of the; absence ( of • the, absehbe involved, y
•/; \ y’v' y y y,;dnythe'Zg''e$dep : judgments;:l6f *■’theZ.zpprms'j^ . / //; •
z ; ZZ Z • . v * there is no prior. ab sence /(of a pot, etc. * y Z. z
y//y/Z- -/Zy ., /.; (and)Z * there is no po st eri oi* ab seiice Z( pf a< Z:.yy-. y.y •,
/:/• / ;-/'Z-;\  ,.y Z/Yyi.ot ,/;etc. ) .1 yy yy/v;Yy.yZZ; Z y ' ZyZy/yyy " \ Z : Z //?"■/:
zy/Z/yZyZl.,y LakyiZpidSiZ/'Ahtbcedeht; absence is the 'absence limited/by its; 
i Z, Z. Z zz'Zyyendybnly; (l;>e *^ by^ ” the prpductipn’ .of/ they thing: which is its. ' 
Zy yZyv Z. counte^pbBitive): ef-T-Ymf^' * btiaraikav^^ /•■-
;yZ , y y /  Zy / abhavail* : ;  •;N L ,  p .;,567y/'bfbZyZtAhtecedent/-absence (of A); is 
Z Z y yyZ Z . the /absencez( whidhZis) ;. ^  in 'time • sub se quent (tby-its’/ -y
. ,Z y y:y/.; .Zdestrnction or- toZ the creatibnybf /itsZ counter-positive)/.Op* 
y// y Zz: -zZNK*tyvp • Z(pragabhayah):;^Zaaiadirapj^hifyah/karyotpadena//;?
. ’ ./ Z :. Z :. -: v t a sya. vi nasat * /. Tli e . prior ab Sence al though begi nningl e s s , is.
■ . Z not-eternal, fox* 1 t/ZisZdpstrbyed by^the-,.prpduction of the Z * ,
?'//, ,Z.-:V' :.Z/■ /// bff ectt CyjZA iby.itZ ZZ; Zr /Z; /Zy/ Z . /■••: ■ / . . 'y Z/ ;ZyZ ■;V:/
; ,V:/, yy Zy ; 2* PINy ■ pp . R ^y28 :Z^dhyamsap]^g^haya^^
, '•=/;/; : • kt av eva p r*agablia vadliy ams au ghatadeh sat t vakal e. t asya . b r a gab!
yZy/ / /::; ;■ Z, havadhyamsau: na ‘sta ibyyubadhitabha^
//;/y::;Zy:,zZz^PbtpF^/ rendering bf/ the:^ P^TN^  ,.;/theZuhdbriihed passage is'/; / 
" : y . wrong,; for it; reverses, the very intentioii of the passage*
;yy:Zy:ZyZ/i;;Z.renderingyisyta^;;:;gbllfe^ ,;yfor;, (there?ls')//:/;vZZ''^
-■y/y/y/ ■/'.y ;■ Z ;y //: y /. / // . z’-y- ;,■ y ;yv?/■/';yn.y: Z ;:(continued pverleaf.. .i .) /;y: Z■ y
: Now, If: it,; is argued that these two complex . ' Z ;
negations are not necessarily to he admitted as separate ' 
individuals, fox* the two-can be explained,;in terms of the 
constant absence (atyahtabhava)^‘V;-:'the neo^Naiyayika would . ft
reply, that the very term Zf constantf or atyanta in the y . , ,
definitioh of. the constkiit;. absenceZmakes " it incompatible 
with the pervasion of the other two absence's* The 1
. constant absence is defined as "that absence; of relation 
of the counterpositive;.which is free from any reference 
to time, prior or posterior",^ while the other two neg­
ations are determined by time limits. Venidatta explains ;; 
■that "the propositions: 1 there .will be posterior absence 
;( or •destruction of a pot* (/and:)---theprior,; absence of the 
pot is destroyed* etc, are the basis (sadhika) of the. 
cognition (pratiti ). of the pidbr ,absence; of/ the posterior
(continued from previous page.....)
nothing to remove , (our' awareness,/of/.Zabsenpehess in ’
,Zy the absences involved; in. the perceptual /judgments) . /.
"(there) : is no posterior absence of prior absence . ■ /;
of a pot, etc.," (and there) "is no/prior absence  ^ ;
of posterior. absence of a pot, etc.: at the time (when)
: the pot, etc. (is) in existence."! • ' v
. PTN.,'^Translation,ZpV ,69*t C^. 'PM.y/p*; Zinfra p. iM  'a  ]f/
1. . NL., p. 573 t 1 purvottarhvadkif ahitas. tu ; samsarga-pratiyogikd 
: / bhavo.* tyantabhavah*; Lak., p. 13; SM.:, 12. : :
absence and the'posterior: absence of the;-prior absence Y 4 t
( each as) being/ a., separate (kind of individual) •u. ^ \ • , ■
••••.' One, may;, observe here that contrary, to the rule //
"Determinatio est /negatio111( Spinosa) , determination of /. /
-negation itself is dependent on something as its count ex1- ,
positive (pratiyogin) i Even:, in ■cases of complex negation,; y/ v
for instance, the posterior absence of prior absence of a /
pot, it is delimited by the presenceof,/the /pot. In
.other words’* the/, hegation of /the. ;prior; absence ,(i. e I ts
destruction) is .determined, by the presence of the thing. , - ;-yyYY.
.But: in this view a-formal difficulty/arises: / //What :'will- .Y* Y/
be the negation of the negation of a prior absence? .. .
Let us explain the .problemYin the following way. If
the symbol . t ../ Stands for 1 prior ./absencef and the symbol ,
*♦//"forZnegatibn/our 5ropositihh/haxi;h e .-e^res'sed in the. : /Y
following way: : ./•••■••■ .yy’
./ /-'(.If>^r-v X:-= X,: t h e n , / 7 X/=YYr X.. ■ ./ Y/ZyV''
This means; if the negation of the .prior; ab sence is equivalent
to the presence, then, the negation of;negation of the prior
absence must be 'equivalent/ id, the/prior/absence /itself. And Y!
ly/ PM,, ,p. 2 8 : yadi canayor atyantabliavavisayatvenai vopapat ter 
Y . • na. dhyams;apragabhava-pragabhavadhvai]isayor/atiriktatve /yY' 
:-■/, ■ / sadhakam. itiyvibbnvyate, ^tada/ghatadhvamsb bhavisyati yYy:.-.' 
ghat apragabhavo nasta i ty/Jdi pr atltirYdhvamsapragabhava- 
pragabhayadlivamsayor^at lid kt at va sadhilcety^avadheyam. /;:.
//this would pbse(Ldif^ or ;theyljyaya-yaisesika' ;/y
philosoiihers who believe/that. although the pragabhava Is/-. y /
//destroyed; by.the/production’^ ^/the:hbi®ct>yafter the de- /
struction of the object it is the posterior. absence
' (pradhvamsabhava) which, is /produced,2; butrnot :the prior / /
ah sence (pragabhava). , ■ //' zy ; / >/ /: Z..Zyyz// ‘ / y // y/
zZZ ’ ^ ailabha,. .apparently,//tries to .solye this formal ■ ////
; difficulty simply by siiggesting a ^1 - c oils er vative" (i.e^ a
traditional)ysoiution.^.He stbtds:/• / / .  // : y-ZZ:'■;-■//
Zy . //y:" 11 It may be argued that in the negation of the : ; .yyZ./; y
t,y / Z :// hegktion of; the.Ffion^absence,, its re-appearance - /;,y //;
■ /■ y /is implied. This is; not the case. / For/it is , K  Z
. ;.- /; ratheiy the post.erior/;absehce,/which is in ••/•"•''//.
/ / Z : //opposition, (to/the double negation of prior / Y
/.. ■;. ■\absehce).u^  . zZy •••y;y-/.yy • y -• . .„,/Z . ■; / -Zy y.y
/ /In other words, inasmuch as the/he gat i on of the prior
■/./ absence of the pot is e quivalent with the production of . /
// the,potythq second 'negation rCfers /to/ its destruction and; y
y/1. Cf. Laic., p. 13y/ HL./,yp.. ;567r. NK.., p.^O ' . Z ' ' /
; 2 . Lakv.,. p.,13;:-Z’purvaiitavadhif abhavah* pradhvamsabhavah1; Zy
y / HL., 567, Li t ., ’Posterior absencejisZ:the absence /./*.//. Z ; y 
Zy limited;by its beginnihg/bnly/Clye.: from the moment/the /y/ 
thy/ing is destroyed) ♦. Cf. suprapiih ?V&  where 1 pragabhava1 / 
,/. is described. as that which is 1 imit edz by its destruction,/ /
;;/ / Z ;i". e.. the / creation of the thing. ..; In o ther wo rd s . ahtecedent! 
abseiice . has; no beginning:.but an/: end arid posterior absence V
• a beginning/but/^ z/ZZ/Z / ■ Z\ y/ . Zy, 'Z .> y ;y Z;///
/ 3*. Nh* > PP • 567~568: ,pragabhayahivrttinivrttau tadunmaj jan
apattir iti cet. na, dhvamsasyapi tadvii'odhitvat. * 1 zZ
VlO
nbt to: the;^re^pfodUCtion/of; the; : ■•/■ Z7 .-ZyZ/Zy
Perhaps, Raghunatha and Venidatta too. had this 
V : difficulty in mind when. they suggested that Z the posterior
absence of prior ^ ahsencef/niust/be/'regafded asy a separate ' -.
. . .. ■ .-y v- ■ Z; i ' ' ' ‘ ’ " . ' :Z
kind of individual absence# But according: to Vallabha
there is no : complex t^pe .of posterior negation* For the • /.: <
/simple posterior absence, is .equally appl-icable to both- - .' '
..existence, |^ .e,^.a po.t^and non-existence;, (i.e.* the prior
. absence of pot) ( eka eva' dhvamso bhavabhava-nisedhatma
■ na bhidyate)#2 . . ZZZ Ayy; Z/ . ^.yyy/Z Z ' •; :Z'' _ ■: ■ ■ ,
‘ Section -iVl Qua!if ied Negation (visesanabhava).
; . , V ; Z , There are . three other-typesZof negation mentioned , -Z
■ in some / of the writings of the, neo-Nyaysa bogieians>^ ;Z / /Z-
(. 1) ; Negation *of Alternation, ( anyatarabhava> = visesanabhava 
visesyabhava)^\ (2.)y' Negation; of; the Gohjoint. (ubhayabhava) ; . ; 
(3) Qualified Negation (vi^istabhava) # , Z■ ■; Zy.
The f irst type of negation may be explained as the , ’
-Abnegationof either the. substance or . the . quality of the subject*/
1. / PTN#v pp. ;;56-67f P MV ^ p . 28;.;Z / Z . ; -y -Z •••'/._ _ ^ /''Zb'rA
2* Nli# , • p# 57h and/Kanthabharanq .com.explains: ’bhavabhaveti. ' Z 
- , ghatatatpragabhava-nisedhatma* ♦; Z ,
Zv3;i, Nyaya^siddhantaYmanjaxd:Zp:Z>5?t^,^fvisesanibhavo visesyabliaya/■
. y , _/^ ubhayabhavo va tatra/yisist^havo.’Zdhiko 1 vaseyah1; #Cf • 
also Materials, pp« 61}.-65# * \ Z -
For instance, in the proposition: "A is. either nqn-B or 
noh~C",,one ox1 the other of and .’-.C’l Is'/dehied of the .
subject ’A* but. not both*.. . "Mathematical logic calls . 
this ’. joint denial’ since ~(pvq) is equivalent to ,.~p• ~q*u 
The second type of negation, viz*, the "ubhayabhava" 
or the negation of both* the substance and the quality, 
may be examplified in the proposition: v"A is/neither B 
nor C"• This means "both *Bf and ’G* are denied of the 
subject *a * .*"•'Y In mathematical logic this Is. called 
. "alternative denial"fox'1 the proposition "~(p«q)" is 
equivalent t§ "ypv*>q" *^
The third type of negation* viz*,, the. "visistabjrava"1 
refers to "the deni al of a qualified predicate in respect
15 . y ■ ■' \'V. '
of a subject*" This can be applied to three cases:
( l.) , the: negation of the substance: ( 2) or the negation of 
the quality qualifying, the . substance; (3) ox1 the negation . 
of both the substance as well. as the quality* For
1* Susil Kumar Maitra, Fundamentals, p . 155*
2 * Ingalls , op *,cit. ,, p*. 65 n* . 120*
3* Maitra, loc. cit* V Y
, k* Ingalls,/pp * cit*., p* ; 6k n.ll8*;
5* , Matira, op^cit., p. 156. Compare, .with the Buddhist view.
of a qualified cognitioh (apoha), infra Chap. V, pt.l*
V  ■ nv£lv h/tt'5V • ■/ .. . ,/
b* Fundamentals, pp. 155-156. - ., -
instance,. ill the p r oposItion: "There 1 s: ho red rose on -/A
the table", what is denied with reference to the table is 
: "Ai 'qu.alicf ibd/ sub st a'ncey/viz-, the, ;fobe ( substance) qualified V y 
/by/ the quality of yred". v This proposition will be valid 
in the cases when there be ;no red rose . on; the table but . = 
aO some other red flower; * .-.
b) a rose of some colotif other than red; or
c) a white lily instead of a red rose.^ /■A
The qualified negation or the^  ."specific Absence"'- as ; /
Ingalls calls .it- /is in "effect /the same as the negation. , /
■■ ' .■. . • -.; -;. //■ y y  ' p : , ■
/of the c onj pint > ( ubhayabhav a) *,/' . Ingal.l s formali-zes three y ■
instances of this negation /as/: / "1 >>P• q* , *p.rqf , 1 yp*-qf.- * / .
..-'.'■'Ay The treatment of these types of negation indicates
a certain tendency among the neo-Nyaya logicians to treat
1abhava1 as a propositional function, rather than an onto-
logical. f ictldn. > / However, , since discuss! oh of ./such types.' A
of negation are not -very frequent; among -the non-Buddhist .
writers, it - id ..difficult. for-'--'us at: thisystage to state as to
what.extent /the pibpositional character -of/negation is
.appreciated by these Indian/bhinkers>^ ? a  ".y . : /
1. Ibid. A . A-A '• / ' ‘ /.
2. . Ingalls, bp.,eit.‘ p.65 n*123* A y.
•3♦ Ibid,, p. 6i^ *; A .' ' / A/Ayv A"-y L . y/A/ A / ■ ■/ . //v:.
U. However , the neo-Naiynyikas used- such- types of negation, / /./
to solve some difficulties concerning their realist^theory 
of Inference. Cf. Materials, pp. 69-71,.. 93* 130-131*
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S E C T I O N S \ : ■ NBGATION:-%;$Si' A ^ M E M H  O P ; ^  (pramaija);
: ... j .  .ir;' KUHARILA BEAD'S THEORY . OP NEGATION _ -v: ■ ; ■ ?1
* , • . . . ; ( abhavaprsma:na).;; '>
'ill-? ^mH-HUDimsT';ANSviffiR!;To,
' IV.' TilH BUDDHIST THEORY OS’ NON-PERCEPTION ■ '•-,c.^O
v'' ."■■• v.-V. , A',-': ( anupalabclhi )-
■;;:^;v£vv: vir}:’\ ;N.;, j THE-NE&OTIVH^ (liAga); : •'v\
.:€':= V. NEGATION (abhava) versus NON-PERCEPTION- • s.;r;
■ ' : - V:.-- , -A ■'-A-r;^ , Vf;:-( anupalabdHi);./"'-/vY
V V ' • ■ £ ; 0 I .; THE THEORY OP 'KONi-APPREHENSION ( yogyanupalabdhi)
A ; THE THEORY OF HOK-APPREEENSION (yogyanupalabdhi)
V;. v V ; 1^ ACCORDING TO PilRTHASSR.ATHI iilSRA; .' P ■ - ';V
- V: \ I :. : ^ III^YTHE; F I & W ; W ^ E S I K ^  '"
, ; - SiU']NIKAR8A - THE PERCEPTION OP ABSENCE THROUGH
i “ - THE UNIQUE RELATION OP THE QUALIFIER AND THE
QUALIFICAND. A?/:A V: 'V'-'' ' ;;'Vf , -.P/;-
Section I . . '  — as- a‘ ineans. of. toaowledge (braman.6)m  i jbtA up m,^  y y .  in n  #  M M  *
vve come to tile;.prob 1 era of the; yalidityfo^ v 
Negation as, ,anYindbpende^ ijpiowledge .(.pnamana) .^
!• . The t errn. * pramana1 is, not very well defined. It can foe -V
: taken in,, the sense of “eithep; (a) the means of/knowledge,;
;j; or; (fo) the: f orm of coghition, o p  - ( c) the means -of proof :
and it is freely used to express any o f t  he s e. • V G. ; Jha* f.! 
Sadholjal^’lectures,;p'. 2$,: . quoted hy J. Prasad, HIE. ,p.153;
, iv■ : V'^ . ; ( continued oYerleaf • •. *;)
The. view- of negation as an* independent;; pramana.: seems to,; 
he .very old; for in the Vai s es ilea-Sutr a (IR•I * 3)> accord- •
> ing ^ to; the:VBh^sya ofe Prasastpada^ and in the Nyaya-Sutra • • :
. (IT .ii .2) '-we Bind' the reputation, of negation as a pr amana • .
Suhse.qiientXy;,••vwi thithd-'- exc'eption; ;of, the Bhatta-Mmamsa, all v 
schools of Indian logic . rejected this theory# \...
—W ITT^ !!!■ I M  II I ■ I I IT .IH II !■ I I *  11 ■!» II >■ ■ I ■  II W W  ■  Mi l  ■ ■! — I I ■! ■ l»  II MU UPI* | l HI I ■■—jP  ■ —  I— ril'l . l  I >l> !»■ II.  lU I  I <T IrfU l f  I T HinTTTIW ■  ■ m /I 1  f — I I ■ ) I ■  f  tm ■ I t l r t m  IH tlW !■ I ■! TTTTI I 1
; ( continued"from previous>page),.*♦/ • • ; i '
, see also IP., pp. Schools. ,p>335 n.2; Atomism*>■ :
p *55 Here • in--this • chap,te'rr;we.! shall uhe ihe term in, the .
: ^ fif §ttsense (,aO.. , It. should also he noted here: that we 
shallusethe term 1 Negation*to express, jEumarila 
Bhatta* s theory of pramanabhaya; the term 1 Non-apprehension1 
/ .. , for theI latter. Bhat^a-ipmaipsakas * . theory -of "yogyanupal-.
:;v i a h c i h ' i ,r and v'the*;.^e^m^^^'onr^erdepii‘onfv for the Buddhist f
. --theory;-.p.©/ ‘drsyanup:alahd% ,,anupalahdhiu which is . y. . ■ 
s : also accepted by the Prahhakara-Mlmlmsakas♦ But in
- /. the. qu^fetions . of modern writers they may occur as
isyhonyms,*■ ' ' v V:- ■ ’■' \
1. VS., IX. I • 3> : .'*■
2. ! PBh., p . 223>>:!Vahhavp^p^anumanam eya yathotpannam .
karydm karana-sadbhavji/ 1 ingam, e vam aiiutp annam karyam V.
:karanasadbhava 1 ingam*,f Negation also is (not an in^ 
dependent means hut merely•a form of) Inference; just 
: as ;thei: originated-- ;e£ifect'- is:-;a- prohans/.'.for';the existence: 
of the ■ cause,.rso is file ndtCoriginated: effect the prohans 
for the non-existence of the cause. See Paddegon, ; ; i
V. System., p. h83*  ^ ;  ^ ' '
3* NS.y ii .ii .2. ' .. ^ /'.y"'':
! U* Gf^Keith +]' Atomism*, p^n 53*^37^ ‘ - . -.vi
;‘y ■f'v.-yyy, y . The. theory of negation as a pr amana evidently belongs
to ;the; PnryarKmaiiasa: system..: , Aepprding >tpythis system there
:yv ;^;/v ,arn six, yalidVmeans, of knowledge, namely,; (i) Percept ion , yy . .yl.
■'0-’ (prat yaks a), (2) Inf er enc e ( antimana), (3) ^eipgyy(npa yy..
ii ■ y (b) . Verbal- Testimony (sabda)y;.,(3)' Presumption\;(drtliapatti)-,yy yy 
' ,-y: and (6) JNegat ion ( abhava).!^; iy The Nyaya-Vaisesika. system y
;y; • / 1 admi t s 'only the fix^ st f our: while the Br.a^  i. y,y
one of The twi>: branches;;ofythevPur*va-Mimams^;, "rbiects the  ^y
:v‘ ' last oney namely He gat ion *2. ' The Buddhist logicians; accept ; y y
 ^ . y-;y only the'first yt wo; pfaraanasv-? y .; It is evident from they , ;; ;■ y
y y y early texts, of the Purva-MImamsa that itwas. ; this school, ;
■V yy y y. .of thdught alone whi chip ropbimdedyNegat i on as a pr amana* yi-vyy-'
. y. y: abafasvamih ■hdmiBehilng . oh kthe ; Jaimini —Sutra•= 1.1.5* said
. that uNegation .stands for the non-existehce (non-operation) •
; 'y y.. of the (five) means, of Cognition; and it is what; bikings 'y 
y .about the cognition thaty Vif doesnnot exi s t *,. ih re gar d . i ■
y^ r ;;; y y i.y ,. See Sivferf^^ verse 111,"p.60 and -passim;
yy.-,yy-yy .; , Hix^iyamaa, Essentials., pp v; Ibl-lb2• '■■■■■,>.. y
y ;-y;:\'2. y Ci*iy Ibidyyppy99gl0^  •53,-3:7* :yy
• yy;3.y. See Ny aya-pi* ave s a pf Bignaga,. p . 7: . * pr atyaksam anumanam /
,;\.---y;y;y \.:;y-''-oa\dve yevaopramane^yyyPVwy''^lil;.iy'y,i :;yvyy;:;:;yy'y' - ■- yyy-yyy''
y y y ;: y • f manam dviyidham * meyadyaividhyat * ; NB. , I *3 : !pratyaksam-'
^-yyyy;. y • -y’'\y’ ahuimham -hhyyNBT.>''pp.i;5"6;ykNy,'''p.89.,:.y;i^chbrdihg- .to;"; - 
yyy' Buddhist thihkers; there axe two types;of objects of cog-
y . y ■ yy ' niiiohhi(mey^ self1-rexisting; extreme partic-
. y y y y ularReal y( syalaksana) yand,^mentally constructed;Universaiyy 
y y ' y yy ; (. s am any a 1 ak s ana = * vi kalp a).. "'The former, is the only
yy y ; y y .; efficient yreai; ( arthakriyakhx1 i). The latter isy considered; | 
y : to be "relative, and. therefore, xxnx^ eal, the human mind* s ;
; y yyy ; .• •' iraaginat;ion,f;y Howeveh, 1 ityobtains. some reality only -
‘V’y throvxgha; substratum, the p.olnt-'inst ant-particular ( ksana) •
y - 'y;.-y ': y See Stcherbatsky,hBL* ,VoljyiI jP .bCihyii.. On the othex^ hand .
, y the Jaihasy/ the furva I®mainsakas ;and Nyaya^Vaisesikas yacc- :
: *; i.i-yyy ept;y ^samahya* ;;orvtixe^  Universal as real. Of.B .Malwaniya, j
’,y" ,Vv; ,y .yyymsyvT>> Notes,; p. 2ih.^ - -yyyyy y^ y ■ ' ■ ;  ■■. . yv-,y;>-;
to, thingsynbiy-in contact with the senses1*.'1’ .ySaTparasvamihi'.-t'. yt 
In fact, endorsed the vi ew . propounded by a V r t1 i kar a mo s t : 
probably, ITpayar.sa who had postulated; six: pramapas ih the 
MImamsa systemybefore ^abara.^: \ : -;v’V-;". y ./ ■ ; yy-- y"
y; However,since. tMsle'arlir MImamsa view was upheld; 
inycohstantyoppositioh not ohly;fromythey fraterhal.realist; . — 
schools, namely the Nyaya. and:Vaisesika but also from the 
Buddhists,. Prabhakara .could not support Sahara * s. view*
Being convinced, that the opponents,.;particularly the Buddhistsy; 
were correct, he re jected the . traditional view of Negation 
and .re,cognised the y -'infliiencfe; of the new: idea,f*^  Prabhakara y : 
In his polemic al style declared .his dislike of .the viewy in , :’y 
the following ■stateiBent: : Tit: is said to be a well known . y
fact about the .MimaiiisakaS that; (they admit); this (Negation) ' ; 
indeed as .the sixth pr amana *-. (Now) the question is: What 
Is -this fweIT tobwnyfact.1-.?, >’(;X’*. say)yit is (merely) hearsay'--;.: .vys; 
just as "that ;a ■ *Yaksaf -lives; in (this) banyana tree* yy , ; 
Purther helplessly Prabhakara; argued: "Well, if. some of the 
MImamsakas do, ‘ inyyf act,, recQghisb ('Negation); as. an indepehd-" y, 
ent means,' then, ,how, cahyl:;.( as ;a true. MI mams aka) be rOspons-  ^y
•1. . Cf * -$Bh •, I.. i • 3 f (BI.) p. 10: * abhavo *pi pramanyahhavo 
; y nastTtyasyarthasyasannlkrstasy eti ^ Translation by, Jha '
yy:dp.l6V;:.h-;y-yyyviy-y hyy : / . V   ^ ' y iy-: y'h-ydy
2.; See Damodarvishnu Oarge, Citations in Sabara-BIlasya,p.11* - 
3 • , Cf * Stcherb at sky, . BL •, ; I .; 3.89; Jha y PM • S ource s , pp. ;l60-l6i.g
Vsible' for such a (logical)imfstake.i (lit* what . can I (we) y /yy.; 
y, do. about it?)Vf^ ;y f'yy.' \ y ; • ' . • y .• • . . y i"y-. ■ :V  f^ -.-y; .y"
vyiy, pn the other: hahd Kumarila Bhatta, in his conseryatiye; y
approach to the problem of Negation, attempted to reject the. 
y yyinfluenee;of ytheyopponent.’^ siiogicaly.theory; of Non-perception> ,'
; namely, the Biiddhist view of anup.aiabdhi ./ . However, the y = ;; ;
;yy followers;/' of :kuterilaVBhatta ( as.-'.we; shall see later on^ could y y ;
; not remain immune ; to . the influence of the 'new . idea. ,. They ' . 
y; ihcofpohated if into, their theory and give i t  a new name, y - ' 
i.e., Non-api?rehensiori or yo gyyTbaup a3. abdhi
Section II. i;..vKumafila-!Bhatt a*e• Theory of .Negation .(pramana) ^
( i M H H M M I W I I i n p J M H H a M M  ? JW' ^  WWW— «P*Ti i l .i * 11 HiH» J f uWn i>Wii iW T i'EHHiI Wirt*11111 l. ilH fiT'fn I T TH-—"imffl n  y *  tmrtMflOMPfllMVaami* ^ l * j l  .
,/y , .y y Kumarila Bhatta, in his vivid exposition of the y
y. y";SahararBhhs^a^ y present ing ythev cash"".of yNeg;ation y-shidi y,fi^
"" the case, of an/object..where the five (positive): means of
knowledge ( praniana ): do hdtffunctioh^towards/ "the^  ; comprehension yy 
: tof ;.the ; existence. ofythat. ob ject, we havey-Negation: as the sole yy
i l.yy Cf. Brhati, pp. 120, 123: y*'asii-jceykm'.-pr a sid&hi3i;.Mlmamsake-r •
' ; ham sasthamy kile/dam .pramanamyitl *.. f.Keyami, tariii yprasiddhih?
■ yyy ; y. prasiddhfr : atyaksa-prasiddhlvat.1 , f yadi t aval .kecin 
yyi; ; ;y.:MImamsa^^ fatasca ;vayam; kirn "■ ■ .’yy yyy1
.;y-yyy’. "kurmah.f-’f y yy v‘. i ' - — " i--. ; ■ W;., ,y' -V- ' yyy-'-yyfyiyy/
See, al so ySukhibljlS anghavih^hamana-MImamsa,: .Notes' p. 26y: : 
y.y 2i'.. C f y D a p i k a . > ;PP v 233^2h7; infrarp p v : 
y.:; 3. , See Si. Vart. Ab; . '.chapter, :pp. h73~h92f total " V J'y
' ' yy"verses .-59kf i ' ’v- - yfb--,.:yy ■ .f Vyb-ty'-.y i , : i .
/'ff|
means of cognition. And the;- determination'of A distinct .
\ ^  v . ■!■!—i «ii in m imm n mu iMhht 1 ■friinnirimirfn mu «*mi i r r mlr —r f i |— 1 1~
lojbjhect also1 depends; upon the Pvalidity of; this . (Negation) , ; ;r
v» P as a means of c o g n i t i o n . T h u s ,  according; to;. Kumarila Ppp
T . PBhatta, : since * a'bsence! is an independent objectJofPcogr; . •  ^ 1 
pP nition (prarneya or: vastti) being unique in its negative. p'P
> / : ; nature^ ^it cannot be-'apprehended by the means of Inow-  ^'-Pp
. P ; , ledge designated^toVi^ring about the jiidgmenj: of objects 
• • , of a positive natui*ev . ■ ■ ■ ; . ; . p., -:p. • ..v.-pP
; ; : :-PP Secondly, in the Mimasaha* s view, negation is -v
; conceiyed;, as:^ determinative (vasty-asanltara)!* This may be ■
PP" compared with ;some western thinkers,e.g. Spinoza who said: '
- ; ’ \ . ’hSeterminatio: negatio est .11 -.:; ■ Kumarila appeals to common- .P
: sense and;/eyeryday-ldgics.: . He argues in a realistic tone 
• of x»easoning that unless the validity of-.the negatiye ;
“m w ifim fti fcr-T*il*«iTiri~w^a**Tnff*TWrnWTW"Tnrr 1 Trri i .rfirMirn i r 1 11 •11 1 i ’
p ;,. '1 • Cp> ;;Spinp^dl -‘That 'Which-cannotP:be.'^ conceived through v .-ppp
P , any thihg el se .must be conceived .througfr’ itself *n i pp
•; / :Axioms;-Illt.c.onc'erning‘'dbN&)V The Ethics, pt. I,> The p:
' : v . Works of Shindga. Vol.I! . p.i|.6. . ; i.
;;'-':'p2.-- Ppp p p-p.p; p ■ ppr"1
'la';. . /'-.PPP pramanapancakam: yatra. vasturupe na. jay ate v. ' pp ■ .
■i- .vM • ; :vastusattayabod^^p^atr^haVapr^ , •
PP'P: .1. vastvasankarasiddhis ca tatpramianyasamasraya. "P- -P'P'j
p. '-PPpurP rendering ^ .s-vbased-vpn- Jhaf s.# translation but his trans- « 
-'V 'ppp- , 1 at ion of the'phrase^Vyastv-asankara1 .is .unsatisfactory,: V ;,1
■ PP,P,:'; i.e y, .'‘.thb; aspertainment .of the- nonr*contact of an ob ject.lf>v: ^
P V. This .ddes\not convey the sense of. the term .*• asankara1 ~ not s 
.. •. mixed. or distinef• . : ■ pi;; :• n" ■ p 1 -
py '.yv ^ 3. / Cf # ■ibld>\:;yei?ses'''ii5^ U6;->,supra-' pp ■ ' ('1st' chapter);
Ip.'-'■?+•; See Ledger .Wood, PH.,. Vol.XLII, No.i|., (1933;) P • 419• : : \
■p., ■ PS P-p/.-P, ,P--P'PP-\P J - ' P 'P-: iso ;
p~- judgment is admitted "distinction of entities would not 'P
be cognised and consequently all.selective activity, which 
makes practical life and conduct possible, would come to 
■ ;'p cessation."^-P^'PP P ' - p PP: 'V . ' - . •.
, > Pl..Now“tire-; -guest.ion arises: How do we. determine ' - P p .
the validity of a negatiye judgment and what is the ground/ ,
. of its validity?..(;';P'/Kuiu5rila:, Bha$-£af;s arguments in which'-',PV. 
he refutes, the Popp onentsp view that ; the validity- of a 
negatiye judgment pis established throughPPenception 
; (pratyakga^Pbr'^TnferCnee (anumana) etc., ...may be, summarised 
';P, as follows: :P p .P--.. .Py: "p.- .
(A). yPercep ti oh .and inference etc. are appli dable only 
in cases where d posit ivep( extant) object or fact is to be; ... 
comprehended., .Cognition of Pan entity can be of two kinds 
‘ .-••yizVt :’p'ositive;-^ instance,, cognition of
a cow is positive in relation to its own nature which is : 
of the form ^this is ,a ,cowm.. But the cognition of the 
cow in relation to a horse is a negative, one which, is of 
/ the form “this is not a .liorse.-1 ' fNot-horse*'' or' “a"negative; • 
p cognition is such a kind of-cognition which is-not derived
1. Satkari Mocker jee, B.; FluxyP p. b-11. P. P ■
, p 2. For. the Opponents.V views see infra pp. /IS*
p-^  ‘ PffbimPbhb ysd^ forpthere P:'tp.yp,y
/Is. no positive entity^ to: come into contact with the ,,yyv- : -
Ppp; 1 ‘ -r''sehses PyKumai?ila 3hntthpfargpddPthpt : cqntact yhptweeh P - .; P: p 
p PP sense. organ and absence is impossible, P "b e cause:. contactP ■ .. p. pP'
ypy ' mus t b eP ei ther conjunction {samyoga) or iihierence ( samavaya) *
p\P Oon jUnetiohp;!^ ; b eiweenP two/'^ bub stance s., a nd Pp-Pyyp. p
ppp nohr-Cxi'stdnee^ispnot-; a:stibbt:ance;;viv-Inherencepsignifies: P;P, P
P P inseparablePcoimexion^: and no one. can assert that of an’ 'PP P '
/;p.VpyppPiPprganyahdppphrT^xi:stence,; p-ihusythe Pco^itidn "it;:, is P yf;.ppP 
P: - PP ' ; ; ; ' "tPcainiot;^ ’be:;b,'r'btigh't'"^ 'about by?'the psehs e s *P' P The senses ; ;
Pp ..' pp are: capablep’ofPhayingpcontact on^  P P P
pP;p,- pof-reality.? f ■ - P' P, P:v;Pv;: pP\?Pf;P\ bp P f  ; ' ";PP P:/P:PPP. 
P '/p-y;pPpP'f:B;);jP pTbe; process' bf co^ i^ ingpd ^negation; is\purely ;,mental* -pp /
p / f■;p ThatP is ,haying pef c e i ye d the presence of. the (bare) locus ;• :P
;ppPpPp:-pPandPafter^;.remembbrihgy,the ^ counberPppsitlye . (pratiyogin or PP 
P 'PPP the tie gaturn):, w e 'arrive at pa ne gat i be pjiidgment that; P’itp f^-f
P PpP'• PP is'■ not P.♦ ♦"#. pp And pthis cognizing process is not dependent ; , P
P pp; : P P/IP . PSapnlkarsbPhr ;PtheP sensetoh jeot-conthct Pi s. a, prerepuisite:
..P P;p ; P, Pp : of P'erc ep t ion* ; Fob perceiving the absence. of an ob ject P P
':"Py/Ppp;P PP ; thC:^ laterpNyaya-VaisesikasPhaye pb^ P p '
PP-P-^:tvPtypePofpsdhhIkarsaw;P¥ide..lPPb,ppP?5w79liN*Kaustv,Pppt PP-; ; 
p; ; p PL35--136;P pp• Plo -fv ; : p Pp. . vPPy:-p;p.-pPpP-, - p. y P P-p:■
yPppp^ PPy: :;;12. :pPGf. Keitli, : Atomism;pyP78wpPv ; p-: !;p'"- pPPptpp ' Pyy; 'P;ppyy:P. pf.p^P'“:
■v-PppuP . 3• See £>1. Vart. > p ♦ U78, : versey.I7t'Pp..; y.:vP-.:'p,<p: ;y'i-ppPP-p :P; -p" , ,-p p;■
/pP/v.P; ;pP;:P: ?,•.;-‘pratyatsadyayatnrb bhayamsq;p'g^hyateP':yhda♦. .y p PyP'jPy.:-;y:yyPP
y ;:P Ppy P y p^ pPv’yaparasptad^ahutpattir-Pabhavamse.* ji^ irkslte. y P PPP P
'P P.P - P.- P For- they realists* conception of tv/o-fold PReality see ., P - y
PP'Pp.yP;P P b ® : P p  ;P;PP''/
on (the direct ) contact of the - sense , organs. V  ;.
(c)> ' -Nor cah Inference (ahumana) be valid in case of . 
a negative cognition because of the want of a logical; mark 
(linga) of a negative object./'f Since a logical mark is. . .y 
recognised only when the invariable concomitance or the 
universalprelation between the 'logical mark or the middle 
term and. the sub ject (sadhyaj has. b een established as p 
in ■ thdpbase of Psiiioke and *;flreP\p./i,h, the case Of a negative 
cognition no, logical mark of the 'universal relation is 
possible. If lt : were 'p;qdsible-%^  inferredpall-
cases of negation by cognizing one instance of absence, 
as we, can, cognize Pall Instances of smoke-fire relation p 
by :knpwing one instance of^bhat fact.2 PP ;: Pp p .
(B)p , Moreover, in the. case of . the negative cognition of 
such an entity n.egation, of which has yet hey er. been cognized,: 
eiPg.-* cognition ofy-an-antecedent absencep(prngabhava) of X, P 
. theP three characters" ofp the markcannot be estabiished.
1. Of . ibid. ..vei^ se 27 > p. b82:
pP,/grhi;tva: vastusadbhavam 'Psmrtya ,ca pratiyoglhani.: : p.
manasam nastitajhiinam jayatep ksanapeksanat. r • pp .
2. '/Ibid. verse. 3U> P*h85• p P . p :v ,t P:-f
p: kasya cid yadi bhaVasya syad abhayena kenacit.
.•pv Psambandhadarsaham^tatra / sarvamanamPprasa jyate.
And verse 33$ "P.h86. - p P P P  -' P P ' ; • ,  p • ,  P',;_
grhT te * pi c a bhavams e ha i vabhavena - hyavastunah. .
■•ppv > sarvatrp matir/ity • eyaim yyabhicarad alingata. *
"The .three character s'of the mark (• tralrupyam/.. •
: linga.sya) are Pexl stence only '( never hohyqxistance ) Pp -pP
. in the /Subject vor. thingdenoiedby the; minor term; ; -f 
existence in, things ..which .resemble the Sub ject . •
only (never in things which do/hot resemble the
v a n . i i i a m . V iB ■> ^  >.'•*, .w ' s “ . * . V ^ 4 v ■ • ’ * " I ’ - ' \ » 4 ; t L 1 v\  - •  ^ ‘
p p ■. P /P :;Sub jecti ' i.e. in v^ipsiksas* ), and only hon^exist— ^ * .. ' • V  . r 4 r w > i w ~ i  r f  !■ ’ i •
Pp ehce . (never existence),Pin things whichpdo not 
p; ; resemb 1 e the sub ject , "^P; P f p.;• ,,P.fpPt:": . ■■■P ; Pp ";pp;'
Thus, thb negatiye cognition iPe. the cognition .of1 an p
antecedent ab sence pot X mustl beP- independent of ...the inf er- .pp' 
entiai. judgment.2 .•-'-.PP.P;Pp PP"' P •. pv PP—P' '• - PP" f . p':;. P. 
(e). p p Polemically, speaking, as in cognizing a positive 
entity* hothihgpnegatiye , can, be: the means' of -Pits cognition, ;:PpPp 
(if. at all it is . tvu0s) so in the case of .cognizing a 
negative■ entlt^pp(^maf i l ap positsf ■abiiaya- as an- entity on p ;:i
a par with tbhava.t); nothing positive can be the means of' p
know 1 e dge.^  . p 'P. P ,: P-; .-p-p.Pi ■; 'P.. ppPP-;' '■ P-PPp.. •
p ilence.,: according to the .theory of Negation of p . \ P;
Kbmafila; Bhatta>and his foiPb-^ ers ."the, real absence of the .
1. Randle,; E.Schools, p.181. .P P : P . v P . P P
2. ibid. verse ifg, p .ij.88: : P Pi-- P\
; - .' t.rilaksaneha ya buddhir ' jahyate ,sanumesya;te.P , . P;: ;
pnapcahutpattirupaBya■ karapppeksitn kvacitP; ' Pp . ■ ;■ ;p-'pp.
See also NR. commentary thereon.- - : : .
3. ibid.. verse f.6, p .489?' P. ■ - p.p. P.
;p/bHlyatmakq/pt atha (fead:,Pyatha) P meyeP nabhavasyaPpramanata;:
P' •/tdthabhavapr ameyafpi ha bha va sy a p  r am ana t a.: P ; ; : PP; P--P; p '
■ See also pMMy,p • 132;: * abhayakhyam pramanam syad abhavasyava-
" ' P,, "P'P v . ' ;Pp P, P'PP. ■■ . . bodhakam.1
object becomes .cognized b.vthe real absence~ of all .
^positive) Psources’.of knowledges t It is maintained, y 
that the absence of all ..sources of knowledge' (mahuiJu), .• 
being real, ipso facto be cornea ah independent means of .. ;P-' 
knowledge* .• P • , :: • P ;P . p.-py p." , . - . ,/P-,--. _ .'
Section/Illy, :,The Buddhist Answer to Kurnari1a1• s arguments. P
p The strongest .opp'osit.ion.; to Kumarila*;S view regard- /
ing Nqgatipn (pramanabhava) . came,! from the Buddhist logicians-; ,
■' ' " ' V f  . P' ' ' 2 ' ’ y -'P ‘ ‘ --P.P'-; - y 'P .
led byyDharmakirti*; - ‘Spy. ■; / ... ,.P;.."   - ., • ... -P---
(A) .''TOp:the."; primary argument of the. :MTmaipsaica'P:that :Tthey.
determination of a distinct, object depends upon the.valid--
it i y of ,-Negation /cof responding to f eal absence by. wliich we y P
cognize things as they are; and as. they are not1 . the
’Buddhist answer isPthat .distinctness, of tilings does not P .
' depend uponPhegatlon as such but: oh the law. of; Causality ,
(karyakaranabhaya) and the law of Identity (svabhava). -
Dharmakirti argued that distinct causes (.t.adatadru^ •>.'•
fadatadibpahetxijah)..^1' ; .P - tp f , p "P
1. ,BL. ,Vol.I,p.389. P P\ ' .. y if-- y-
’ 2 •. See e • g. -PVSi ,3 ahup al.abdhi c int a,, sect I on «P pp. 2 9--57 > p_ . 
370-381; ; PyPp , pp • P23b~2lj-5, 631"6hl: ’ RN ,P pramap.antarbhaya- 
, prakaranam.• pp. 89-98. ' y ..Pf '. P:V . ' -v- V - h  P-p
3* cf . supra pp .  w y P  - p: ■ P :..p y y A -  ... 'p-pp ‘--aPP'
lU See PVP., P* 313. ; Y  ' V  Y  : tP ,y; x
P . f : -PPP(B3jP Pp P secondly* Phi stlncbnees/ofsthings^ Ih ^ governed by ;.p /
Pp P/pPp pPbhh/ihvlPhi"/Identi^ pppTliatIhp'pihepbbingsPare / P_ , P
p/-ppPPP; /identi ca 1 w i th tbe;p"Tbing^lnhtbemsbly ($ ar ve; bhavah p./
P ;P/'P P; /P ::/;..syablja^ ehaP\sya-'s.yabhhfJ^  •. For instance, Ap • v:pp p
; P P; pia Ap.and jhotpB: and 'vice versa. / PForp.in .ref ity,' no two .pp PPp 
P p-PP p : thihgsp are pi dent I cal.,P . PPpPpP Pp.: f p Pp,' , . • p. ppp:P - P P ■ 'P'ppif pP "
p Ppp P . PP/; • ••/•/ The bofinitlon b  the thing,1 according^.toPtheP :.PP;'- . PpP-’ ' 
pp-p:p-PPY PBuddhistP Ap6ba> .or biserimihaticnpp^ P
p:: pp ■ p,;; apprehehsion qfpitbPlYenti’typ dpe> ,;;what./the thing As and .
<PP' Pp pp p/whaf. it; is no t.PP/PApbprdihg theory .reality ispanpp,;/- p.p.
,. ; P; . unitary p.articular (niramsa = akhaxida) .:2 - . Therefore the I p ' 
:p;.:p,Pp; 'passertion,pofApisPinVarlably; concomitant (-ayihabhava) P/p: P .bpP 
pPPP,;- p ; with the bxclusioh -ofpali other:: things that are not A  p /-Pp, p : 
p'P p ..■ "p P 'p( any^bha: / vyav^tti ).? pppAlI Pfuhcti ons of B angitage (■sabdaip,: P.
p: P p; /Pand keasoningPCltn^Y; arePhisdrimihatory .and/deter mi native Pp
P/P' Heiice ,Pby thepAamepmeansPof vPLanguagepAnd reasoning, by V . P ./ p- ;
■Pp; p,;.p pp:pwhichpwep comf ^ iye^  bcghition,’/ a negative cog- /P'P ppp;
■ / P  p ■ bitionpis Pal sdpbo^^ PP .Pp, p-PP.; pPY/p ‘ppP;, p• PPPp v pP -'
P/ Pp. p P p P ,ltP P P y S  .tp>ipd:'earye/h^
ppp. p P pp it eh* ;svabhayaparabhayabh5^ am;:yasmad vyavrttibhaginali. , pPpP
p P P 7. (Pt., , f.b2); /Karnakagomin , thereon::,1 stabhavenahi virodho, ppP
; p. \ p;., , :nalii;.pardbhavehaf * A1 so AS *, • p. 6. (16-17) * P-. P:o.;p:’:
 ^.p pPp : 2 w ; t h e  pNyuyay7aisesikas:P.pconcep.tioh/O Reality 
- p: P tPPpp PP pp; Is pplural i stict PThey classified pseveral Ultimate' categories 
P. :;' ■ / p '; P ( p a daft ha s ) underp the / two;.main headings of bhava and abhava 
P’Pv P‘v; 'pP-PPp'/‘Pp: SeePsupraPbp^Y3^^otPtbePRuddhi;S theory of Ap oh a see . infra 
P P'P p;/':' t/PP'Y^PPPfp^^Y^^^PfY/P^P^YpP/Pft;'/ " ■ \Ppp;YJpP P.; PPp. :-JP/// 'P' p-PP/P p
;// , P p p  3 • / Cf • PV^ t P • 139 • f yyavrttasvabhavah bhay^ ab-,;p; And. sabdc
* /• /;/■ v P ■: YPp P * rthahtaf ani.yf ttiyi list anpeya Pbhayhh\uhai^Seepalso ; Abohap ;; 
PPp‘^P/v,'P'/• P^'Pp'/'' '■.bqofl'On."^ -'be'bti.bh' ■bb'iovp-J: ■ P'P,•P/tP^ PP.P/PP' -:p/YpP'! /P’P Pftp
PPP p; P, ■: Ip.; Pf f • JhP|^oliaprakarand.,p;>2M,1 apohah sabdalihgabhyam prak- 
p PP/ Pp PP p-P'P'^ asyhteiiPV• jTV.192:^ P. yyavacchedathalam,^^ vnkyamf
;:-v ./v>: 'PP':P‘/../PPvPv/'':'-/; .•/•'>"':;:p / / / : / :;- - / - / / v t / ,  -P;- v:  ^ p-/ ■ P'P' •./ /./PP/P. -  -'.p ; P ///;'. . n i l O # /
icTfrpP!
P (c) lo thd-otherpargumbnt7 of PKumarila Bhaffca thatP,7 YPPv 
Negation must he admitted as .real in itself because all .
, .other (posltlye:)\ meaaiS; of iknowiedge ..end in f ailure, ^ the 
. -Buddhistanswer/1$ ah f ollovrs: - The means of knovvledge 
. . (pramana) perception, etc., (being of) a cognitive form 
; is self-established. 7PBut7a knowable object ( jfleya), e.g.
Y  a, jar; etc. > being of a non-coguitiye form ( jadarupa) p 
depends on a. (cognitive) means for its apprehension. On 
: pthe otherPhahdy since,.Pthe, PabsenceP of knowledge ( jhaha)
P; and the absence of the knowable (jneya) arepof (neither) pp
7, form, , Absence is. not, a ne alp particular (visesa),. Now,
v ' ■' • -•fhu^tvv&b'■>;. .. , , • P • ' ; p ■ ■ \ . . p  / . ,  . V / 7.
then* theyguestion^ S :  ;How can. It be said (by the Bhattas;
/that the. absence ofPknowledge is a.self-established fact,
Ppand that pthe absence Pof the; object is determined Pbypthe p
,7 . . absehceP of P knowledge? -Furthermore, since ( all) cognitions 7
P (in themselves) :are^  not dependent oh^bfheip cognition (ive.,/
. P/the means) for 'their, apprehension;,: absence of them ( i.e., 7
Pof cognitions) cannot be of the (inferential): negative
7fppm in pwhi.ch( the..absence/of an^ob ject i sP inf.err edy from ; ;/P .
P the perceptloi^of the^  other ob j'ect (i.e.,. tlie bare locus) ...,:
Only if there is. ;a7,bognition in the internal streanipof .
7Pp7,;thought (svasahtana^) i t ( i.e. ,pthev cognition itself) is :
P I .  . C f • 7 supra p p .|^ $  V.(ovses. I - 27^  *lff3v P;" 7
Y apprehended, -but (when) It YsP hot^  apprehended, it 7isy/.indeed, p:Pp/
;■ P / absent there* Thus it xs: maintained that the-absence of
YP7 Py- - cpgnitIon/:lsv a. self ^ est^Iished. fdc'ti'^ jp7p-'vP:^ -p;. Y  - .. . YPp
: ' / 7P Y  in other words, on. thepbasisPpf;;sense*-perbeption; V PY:
we laiow intelligbly, that thePbook is on the table, , P:Y
. ;f ; , Si mi1a r l y ; wh en the book IbPnotppresbht and; therefore .v, : . P y; Y: 
Yp. . no sensepperception of the ohject is pi^ odticed in the in- P .; / :
p ... Y - tellect, the absence;.of-■;the/qp^ 1 s ■ P P
/Y7 P-7- known ,b;yp tlie , same' means : There /IbpncP Yailuhe; Qf per cep- Y  Y  Y/:
,Y. tion as such. YP- •; Pp 7/p • 'P ■ P pYP;p' "' Pr/Y/ . 7:pYY Y  Y pYp , P;P.P ;'
YY.,;; YPp,:pP /■■/; . If it were- an absence of perception: 11 would re- P'
guireP another means toestablish it and t h i s / / P: Y  p 
Y :' Y to infinite regress. : ‘Y. ‘PPpY Y Y Y y . P'P/'' '■ Y: Y  p y ■ ;P Yy'
' Section IV. The Buddhist Theory . of : Noh-perception CAnup alabdhi!
M-na a - r-  ! m m ib i« i i i i iw  V i i n i .  i iw >mi m u r i i r n . i n t  n i n i r r T w r n n —T ^ m r m f T Y r  i • •• •• i 1 i n. i —wi - iTT-t -Tr—— i— *
PI ■ Y/Yx■. • .;• YY; P as the Negative Middle .Term.; ■.. . .. p ■ .
p- ; . P'P Having discussed the pBuddhi st :refutat ion of Pthe PBhatta r 
/pPP Mi mams aka; view of Negation, swe. come; ;to .the/ Buddhist; theory •.
:p v 1 • - PVST>,p'. 30; 1 b p dh a r up am p r at yak sa d i k a m pramanam svat a. PyP 
; P■ .peva sidhyatiy ' /, jheyantu ghatadikam jadarupatyat prama^am 7 
P. apeksate. jhana jneyabhavayostu; nirun a t vena visesabhav at 
’ ; :P .; ’ katham jhanabhavasya svat alfiddhir; jneyabhavasya cajnana-P
; /  7 /Y  . bhavat /siddhirucyatey. /; / athaPgnan^hayY/naxu^na: sidhyati.
;' 7 , tnthaYhi ylhananam svasamyiditarupatyenalka jnanasamsargi:ty-7 
/ y/yppY- abhavat • 7 kevalam :ryadi Ps^  ^jhanam syad upalabhye^
Y 7 / tanualambhadasadeva tadlti svata,eva jnahabhavah siddha
p ' •' '/ iqyate.t: visesa = vastu. P P/77P-,-'Y'p Y/Yp ■ p/P_
negation* P it '’is-•.based?- bn "Non-per cep tibh" (ahup.alabdhi) /
as Yhe: iogicai/mark (llnga)/ and/Ymustybe; referred to the. 
class of inferential cognition*— . ‘:X,/.
: Bharmakirti .postulate's three varieties of the ‘ 
logical mark (linga) on/which;/all'•■■infereiitial judgments 
are baaed* They are: (f ) /Causation (karya),v (2). ,ldent~P zx ;y’,./ 
Ity ( svabhava),. : and (.3 ) Noh~p creep tion ( anup al abdhi) *
The first, .two: are. to establish;real things; (vastu-sadhanau)? 
and the third one,, namely, Non-perception is. the basis of . v PP 
all negation (pratisedhahetuhY^ . x ■ > Ppp, , : PP'r,
' ■ Among these three logical marks, Bharmakirti. .ex- .
/plains the (formula), of Non-perception as follows:
■wrtiiM~inT—*nwitTlMliinrTn*M^— rtM»— rmnfrmiT— ■—i«—i 11 Et i i^ ip p iw .»fi* i*iiIMiinMnrfiTirtMiTi—htb Tim  mTTW-TrtrTft—rnTl—m~ll 1 i> i —II"na—i------------------—
1# BL*-, VOl.i,, p.36iUYY / .Y' y . y • "_XX P . _ 7:
2. PVS., p * 20: ‘ * karyasvabhavahupalabdhi-1akaana het avastrayah* 
NB.,II *12: : * anup alabdhih . syabhavakaryam yeti•1 Stcherbat sky 
. has : translated ’/anup al abdhi * by ^Negation" BL. II .p*60) . :7 , 
but to d i s tl ngui sh ; be tween . the vi ew s of Kumar i la and the / 
Buddhists we have here .rendered' it by ’Non-perception1.
3* Notice hefe ’the- identification of reality (vastu) Twlth
affirmation (vidhi)*. In Buddhist logic the following ’ Y  
, terms-;’a-i\e-pused Pas;7s^qnymoiis;: . vastu =7 paramarthasat =?. 7 
svalaksana = ksaha7= arthakriyakari == vidhi. Cf./BL*V:
7 Vol.IlCp.68 n*3* 7 ,7 y Y  ' P-yvyX, ^  . . y;\
U* PVS.,., -''('Gnoliys .edition):*;.; p'*'2>.: ];ta . b.tap karyasvabhavaiiupal-Y' 
abdhilaksahastrayp hetavah. . yatha’gnir atra dhumat• y
• vrltso ■ yam simsapatvat. P p r a d e s a vi s e s e k v a c i n na ghat a , 
upalabdliilaksaiiapraptasyanup.alabdheh. .y yadi syadyupalabhya 
sattva eva syan nanyatha. tehopalabdhi1akganapraptasat t-
, , vasyety uktam bhavati*. tatra dvaivvastii^adhanavYekah. . y 
7. pratisedhahetuh*• .FVST . (Rahula’s edition) , pp . 20-22. In
• 7 the two, tekts> there is no potential difference in. the 
passage;Poniy a few words occur in different order. . Beey. / 
also NB•,11.19 i 7 atra dvau vastusadhanau. ekah pratisedha- .
yPy/hdtu^^yp'/' xz/'p-x -x.y . / .P.,...y p z - Y y x y -  Y  / • x  - * .7- Y  P -
; Tliesi s'; : ■ On some\p articular . place there, i s no-.3 ai* •
; '. Reason* ^Bechbsbnitis..not ■ pie.rceived, although the :VV- 
/ I conditions ( laltsana) of ^ perception are ,
In otherf.wprcLs the: Non-perception. becomes the reason of* 
negation, with. reference; ito’. the/ph j e'ct'v cap able' -oi*.; being 
perceived (^iktopalambha) * ^ . ; Kon-perception of a non- ; 
perceptible (adrsyaj'■■is onlyproblematic.? ( samsayah'etu) >. 
This defihati on:Vofthe\l hegati.yeV^M provides the
fundamental, principle governing all formulations of neg­
ative 3ndgments ^which. as w soon. see can be many-
fold* . 'V - ./'v'';"' , / ; .; , . : i ’ "V-i" . '
i- ; vVV.:B;ef6n%^go^ -the-..question of .‘the
different’ types: of negative’ ond^ents-it; isiof: interest v. '• 1 
to know;the types of inference;po si ted by.Dharmakl rt i•; ;
.:Poldowing.;.Dignaga1!:- heplassifled ^ Inference . ( anumana) as, ‘
two-foId: iriference "for one ,self ’1 ( svarthanumana), and
1* NBvVir. 13: ;1 tatranupala^ yatha*. ,na pradesavisese 
kvacid; ghatah* ; up.al'-abdlfilaksa-naprapt-asyanupalab.dher.:
iti.1 . Transiation'by Stcherbatsky, BL.II.p.6l. See
. also PVST •,Quoted above p ♦ (S'£ -y\ • H-, ’ : ..
2. PVS., (Q. ed. ) * p * 20 verse I. 29 * •; ;i 1- ; ■ C
yukt op al ambha s ya t asya c anup al ambli anam (29) < ; . .
- pratisedhahetuh. (R*: ed.. p*85, I*3l)* :
v ■ yuktopalami>ha ==■ drsya . = . laicsanaprapta, ;
-3*- Cf . supi^ a 2nd chapter :pp*ic?7"f^  where this view has already 
been, discussed in detail.;
/ I 60 ■/;
, /: inference ;"f oiv. others1". (p'ararthanumana) .. : Although V '
the difference'•-•.between the two is; quite clear.from these ■ . .
■ t very-terms, ""it Is/as.\a matter of fact "very difficult; .
_yy always,.to distinguish ./between what belongs to inference ,
'//w  / as .a .thotxght-process and what. to., its. expression in speech, . ■ ‘
: : .'/;/since we ..caimot ..deal with the-..thought'-process withouty
. . . ■ expressing ityin some ^ way.1' * ■ /. : V . / . •
v '. i ■ y: The iaaference. Hfor .othersff as explained and de-
- . . fined; by. Dharmakirfi? showb ; ah "outward similarity with ' ; , 7;
Aristotle1 s First;Figure,t!fA  and therefore should be re- : -:
■ ;v garded. as the syllogistic form of inferencev .'. There are r :
y eleven. negative,; forms; of the .syllogistic inf or ence; explain^ , \y
: the/N5^ yabindu(l|B.)*?^''But/it .is. . /
■ ‘ ;’y y noteworthy that the Bhddhist logici treats .the figures P : /
. .... of. the negative syllogism’"in the chapter /of inference ‘ ’
. i "for che self"• .' Thereason for this/ apparent inconsistency- ■
/ 1* NB,. ,11.1*2: 1 annumanam dvidha. * Cl) /-* svaf.tham parartham ’ 
ca.1 ( 2) • ,.vit;- should pe .hofed'' that; this twd-fold classi- . y'
. fication of Inf erence■ was admitted .by the Nyay a-Va i s e s i ka 
/ ;ahd by the Navya-Nyayay Buddhist ■ irif luence* :v
|Gf. BL.,V o l . I,p p .2 9 2 y 2 9 3 i,A^kunsf;?"Tha two-meinbered; /
: syllogism" , Rocznik ■Orientdiist yerny,vol.XV.pp.72-83^.
Vys*. BL.i.p.27s.> . ./ . - -yy.t/y-y/\t-v yy;-:.’ y ■■.v!:.y-y
3.; See/NB.Ill,passim^j iPVP>:,f *paksacinta* section,pp.484- -
- V ; 495 9 is very us ef ul for the/ study of the./Buddhist form 
of the syllogism as against the Nyaya; one•
4*  ^Stcherbatsky, . op.pit. , 278>: see also. pp. 275_ff • ; . :v
5. .NB.II.3li * sa ca prayogabhedad ekadas'apr a k a r a . / ./
/Vyyy \ yds -espyaiheb by him,: is: that “the"repeated/consideration■' : ; ;
'y y y y b f '  /Negation., t h r o u g h : d i f f e r e n t  /aspb y y y i
• \: :' y ydations. h^ us the essence of the Negative ;; ;y'y
; y V: yy yy^dgment V itseif.’^  : The he gative togical :mark ; : ft f ' y . i y  
•V. ' ' y ( pr at i § edhahe tu ) 'has; b een cl ass if i ed under the •three .main Pp- 
■ ■ /y he ads, namely, (1): Existent i at (or d i r ec t and simple) V Y-.
;/5V ; - y h p g a t i p h y ^  negation y -
y y ;;.(karananupalahtoi) I .and (3). Negation of a . term of a greater.
Extensichyoyy^a yysi>;y  ■ yyyicyy/yy,
y y  ; : y y  { ; y  y y ;; 'The.yuddhistiyiew of negation,;' vi z  • , • •  Non-p er cep t i on ; .
y  ;■'* ' of ;a  :Pereepty(dysya)  ^ Represent4 1be/ simple arid the first ; v; y  p
y  y ' syllogistic; fdrmula, .yyilYis'Yaiso named • "negation' or. non- , 1 '^y
y.V 1 perception/qf/identityy (syab3f^ : .;
y i t h i s  type - of hegation wha.t is : deni ed is the.; suggested :. y I i y  yi'
y iy y .. (arppi ta) p ercept i bi 1 i f y ( drsyatva) ; the perceptibility / ■> /
:ty. ;y;iyyyhich/ysyidehtiddi,wityyhd,v;natu yenpiifcbl);ibul^
y  / / yy■ y-Vibid;. ,y 45: ff ray4fe^ah§hh^hyasat ;svaya#ypyCbvam •/ . \ • - ■ 1
: , /. .vyayacehedapr.atitiiybhayat'iti; svarthe)pyfammane * syalj ;y
y,: -1 Yy v/'yv;'./•;■ . P rayoganirdesah. tyyy: y -Y.. Y y Y; :.y ;YY 'f;;y>>;'‘ft ■ Y^Y;\y Y y: Y \ -•,'.
Y.y ;yt 1 •  . vyavaccheda%ratisedha# . The renderihg of the: passage
' • , is bypStcherbatsky;in:3Ly>V61vX, Ypi278. i For: the .literal/y .
yyyy -v; :-yt-/;:.y;iyhnslatibhJ see.;^;VVqi;.:irVp;.-101 * ";‘; y y ' ;';.y./v / -yv- y ; P . . . .
;y,; v';' ' ;'v2* /; vN'B;4iix>3^ i4Qiahd::Kafpdkag^^ thereon.:, yy^
y i;yv These: will be guoted. and . explained below. - J y //■. y>:;.:yy. ;
u x
i
'i?e:*, the: hega'tum*y ; /Bharmakirti Vs texts ,provide us with ‘
YY';y, Ypnbthe nega'tiye syllogism: Y/>y;Y
Y ; ' ; . - . y Thesis., There is here no smoke.
;Y'Y ; \-yYy y'YY y  y: Reason.: Because, [althoughthe totality' Y'YY:
yy;-Y YY v\.-. : Yy ,Y Y; ,y Y Y. of'perceptual conditions is ful-
;y YY- '. ':-,Y.--y:y _ / YyyY.yYYY;:'\ filled]., we perceive no smoke'Jy. .
YY ; y The second formula of the causal negation, consists y
Yv ; of a "negation of: t &  causes,of the. denied fact. An 
y.... .example is: y '-Y'-^YY' ' • . ; y
’ ; -YY, Y yThesls.'’Yy Y y‘ih'er‘e;.Is'hereYnb- smoke. Y
y y- Y y Y • ; y ; . Reason. Because there is here no fire.11?
y There is another formula which may be. rightly‘considered', 
under this head of the causal negation. , Y Thai is the. .
^  ■ i " n r m r - — • i r“ '— — ~t~‘t~ih—i t t h i  i ■ rw irw iJW — M . i ^ r i n . n i M i .  h i i ^ t . h i i m  u rn  mi r wT>iiiriM^T.iimi n............ .........
'y-y'Y' . 1. PVST.pp.38-39: 84T86: 1 . y. Y. Y\. 'Y"Yy ; i YyY'
Yy y. ; Y ’^ vahh^vnnx^alabdhis ^ tu svayamasattaiva.
•y y y y/yy r. . yy Y hatrarthant a.rasyabhaVab ysadhyatel V, ; y ;y. y Y Y Yy Y 
YY; : Y f yukt op al ambll a s y a: fasya canup alambhanam1 . (PV., 1.31) $
. ' and garnakagomin' thereon: "jrukto .nyayya upalmbhb yasya sa yy
; Y ; Y bath a drsyasypt^arthah.^y Ytasya, betiY svabhhvasyuhup.alambhanamy 
X^ratisedhahetuh.n: . y 'yY^ Yyy-..-y. YyY ■ Y-'/:;y :Y- :Y-y; : ,;,'Y- ' YY-
, Y/2• ’PVS* Y(Gwed.).,. p.6: Yusvabhavasiddhya ■ ya-tfiayhatray dhumo1 nup'al- 
. . . abdheh.tf In R.ed. ,p .4-0: the example has Been wrongly render- 
m-y ; ;yyY Y ed by the;ybfhnslabor ‘ i .;b*7 " y i.thfumpY y anup-alambhat.,! *■ .y-v
■ Y, Yy.Yy; i.e. there is here no smoke -because there is here, no fire.!f 
y . Kaiy^akagomin. .thereon;- *••(]??• 40-), al so gives.t the Ys ame reading as ■
: YyY Y, Y ythat^of ^ he; . G.,ed. ;,Cf.;alsoYNB;. ,I1.32: ^syabhavuhupalabdhir ' Y 
YyY-:-’ ■ ;Y 1 Y yathav ;natra Ydhuma* up'alabdhi^^ asy anup al afrdher • -it i4;
; . ThisV-supppr'tsyYour r ender ing of Ythe * text ., asiddlii = antipalab-i:.
V Y- YY dlii, bee Karnakagomin, ibid. y
-:.y Y ’.- /y3V‘ PVS> , CG.ed Y), p .6:: hetvasiddhya ,yatha hatra , dhumo * naghe^.* '
YyY R. ed.y p .40-does not differ - in meaning but/reads: .*4 . *vahny Yy
: y . y •: abhavat; " : Se e al so; NB», 11.4&, 1 kar ananup al abdhi - • Iiaisn.a=hetu
-/ Yy ■YvY.,:V':' and as iddlii-anupal abdhi;. -Y'y VyYY-■ *y :
/.So
Y-YYY4.yN.ega tion ;of Y$h\Yeff ectl,?' (itaryanup al abdhi ),♦ Bharmalcifti
- describes this formula in .‘-the.NBV-i-I. 33* .-But.Yin'•••the
f;dmabayarttika-for reasons ;i o /b e discussed/below y he y 
; y.pmmittedyit*?/y//The karyanupalabdhl.isdescribed in' the/ 
yi;following statement : r :;Y:Y /.ay /-.• y. ■ Y/y. y -• //
v' "Negati on of ah effect i s as follows.,:; ,
: / (Thesis.) There are hei*e no efficient causes
•;•//: • /' Y : Y-Y' Y/ y /prodhcihg smoke,.. ; : yy Yv
yy.;/ • ; (Reason.) : •• Because there is no smoke
/'• In this/negative; fo rmu1at ion i  log!c a1 flaw is evident.
That. is that causes do not necessarily produce /Certain - Yy- yy 
y y effects'P:; -/// Pifce,/for in Stance> Ysbmetime's in.- collaborat i oh,////; 
y with a wet piece of wood may produce smoke but the pro-
due tion of .smoke does not ^ necessarily-follow from the mere .. 
presence of fire, as e.g. in a red hot. iron ball. ‘ For / /' :
*//■ thi s./reason. Bharma^ ctmdi tioned the. ;def ini t ion by the
y;r: phrase ."absenceiof suchy causes whoseyefficiehcy has not ■ y '■ y 
' been 'ihterf Ored; with**/ ( aprbtibaddhh-samarthyani karanani.) .^/;
; :7 y: /;Btormottarayih;his/commentary^ tried: to explain.
Yy;;//.. away;: * th§ &wy by. 'furthefy:4u al if yiiig' the definition.. He :
; ' /says: "(This method) of negationYcf any effect is resorted- / ;
’ 1. Cf ./PVS7Y (Gf) pp'. 5"6; R • ed.,PPj>39~40j». . Y /. _
/2. NB . ,11.331 Ykaryanup;a3Yabdhir : yatha. nehapratibaddhasamarth- 
/■ yahi:- dhuniakaranani>Ysaht’i.7 dhumabhavat ./' Translation p *88*
3* ibid.; and-Of. ifeT. ,p.31.; y ■■'"/•;■/-Y'v'/. Y . / / -y yy
4. ibid. ■■; / y; 7'7///- '■■>/;/ \ ;/ ■' .y.y. Y.7-
Y// w to/in/ cases whers tbe cause/is; iDavisiblb.,/because, /if it " -YY- Y 
/ / y :, ,; were /visible, the/, method of direct negation.first-formula)' Yy y 
1: 7/ ••;./ would have /been adopted. !,'y y., /The/ c ommehtat or /further Yin -a Y / ■"■/: 7f 
//// //. lengthy^/exbosition^exp;ialns : Y ^ hPpbsing: a man) /sYtands oh 7 
//yy the roof ofya palace wherefrom he fai 1 s to ,perceive the 
:■:■/./■ / court grounds. / . He looks at the upper yextremities /of the yy /y /y
y. walls enclosing/the court on its/four. sides, and at the / '/yY/-'
/',. sarne time he/,seesY; the; .space/ which , i s/called therange ( aloka)/ /;
: . y , of ..hie sight, f i*ee ;from smoke. / . Since: he is. sure1 that there
/ ■/ i s no smoYke; in t,h i;s /space., hey mb stY.c one lube/that;; /there/is : :
. y/y 7 ( al so) no;/f lre,y the, .ef f i ci eiiey: /pf Y/which/^  t by prodtic e/- smoke is y ;,/ 
y Y//;;yry^ ./unchecked/: in;a/pdnce wherefrb^ reach the /. /
-;Y y/ court. The. ..smoke which would; he produced by a fire situated/: y
Y //y in the: court/would beYYpresentyIn the space (visible; to him);./Y ;
Y Yy./ / Y - Therefbre /heymbb/cqnclud^ I s Yno:;f if e/ in/that: Y / /- y; /
//;■// Y 1. ibid. p.31 12-3.3: kar^nupalabdhid/ca/yatra/ Imfaham // // //y
/ // '////>, Y; :y //ad:£syamy^ Ydrsye.Y tu,rlbh?aney to
y , Y - / .•/ /-•/;///. evas gamika.' /-Trahsiation p^ 8^fi.y /y YY/Y:/,/• ,;;Y". ;  Y/‘' • /• / /YYY/--"'-/ 
y: Y /; •/ /:2v /..ibidy,pi‘3l 13^1?V/t airaY dhayalagrhoparidibito grliamganamY 
; /yy:-y.y/'/;.//>///apYasyahh^ parsyesvamgahabhittipafyantamY paeyati./ / ,
Y ; ///;7:/ V bhi 11 ip ar ybnt a dhumviviktam.
/: 77. / Y//'1 y / /Ras^at! ;. tatraydhuraabhavaniscayadY-y YvahhiYnay /Yy
/ , y;y.://:-.danyamano ydhYimastdddesahrYsyatYw-//YtasydYba vahner apr.atibadd- 
■y,./YY- / ; hdsamarthyasyabhayahY^pratip.attavyah*Y:/7 Ytadgrhamganadesena/
:. ••// ■/:'./Yy//Vahnina yi^yamano/dhumasytaddesah syat/// ;tasmattaddesasya/Y /Y
.- //Y /.r/Y' Yvahner abhavali pratipattayya]i*;Y, Translation p.. 88.^ ;y . iY///
/ t ; • How?,;. _ ±f.;/wev*.bomphre:- -the /^ sl'tuati6ri\.e^iai^e.d ..hy t> t'vtt.
'tk-  ^ Dliai^mdttara with -that; oflthe fofmUld^P^ the' vcausal- negation \
V • '?( ka r ananup a 1 ab dhi ) ^ . i t k e c pme's clear that; the second
f'>:vt;' . formula^ vi s •, the -negati on . of an effect . (1c a ryanup a 1 ab dh i)
fhf f listt itfeelf f'kased foh.dh vthbt-eff ici,ent,;.causp h  ’> ;f
•f f vV •-f i-(‘f tr ej-v^  •' 's:-Ffpik- & ts \ own example •.of bbhetmanhdio ttv'Vf.
:-;i'.f .db&db^'"'aTDsence\of'smoke. from 'tlie... definite knowledge T ■ 
v .tvvfifof tthe taksence ;,of ' fire it ^ appears til at funaclmental ly there, 
ht ;bifTcbehbey'h^ thespttwo .-tOTBS-pf-^ negattonk'^ ;' V.- ' :
t'f. :.•liowever, f pi 1 owing the general practice of an Indian : ,: v. 1
ff vv-;\ comment at or Dhaj^ mott.ak^ a . mere 1 y ■ t r I es, to defend the author tv f? ';
t.ii-h ifvuponvwhbb^ ^tsidommentihg*;;^ f- ?t vht.-' ■. ■ • • -tv- -v trtvi'
;ift \. V ■ kV'; '• .v v On the ■ 01her''vh a M ;'^ v'Bhnfniaklrti; himself in the h; - -ft . ■'
VPramanavarttikawhi.ch,:ls: evidently ' a more, mature . work- and v 
V ■; -.may:-hothMled;,:his . Vmastdrpiece V, - points, out.."the logical ; V';
; • /  .;flaw' and instead vbf! the khryamipalahdhi. propounds the!,.; - -h / h
. . khi^ananupalahdlii* v He says t. -/ ",ft v'- : :-r ; - t -
. , vk ' v: nEven when there lsvnon-^ an effect, •••.
: ; ; ittdoes'not hebehsarilyv-f ts steals9 < f • • ;:f-;
;v:;' ;'he the samet(;i ab'sentVdr^nQh^ercbiyed}.#. Therefore > ■ \^V - ;
.. the;view , that - fro 11 thereason, non-b©rception of the; effec.t > 1 ; ;
. : /v ; vt- !• CfV roupra ’ptr^bvv^/K^v-hvtv vhv;' ;k. vf:vi 1 d - v v 1 V,-'. ;
, v tv. 2 /PVS..;,' €!• ed., ip *5 •. A: ;V th; vt,:,v:'' v't-tt -tv :-t. h ; v --v
£A
.absence of:its cause is deduced, is not correct*, \
Hence,' the,.akse.nce (.of the effect) is to.he deduceahie 
only from the reason, non-p ere ep tion (i.e., absence) of
the cause (or the causal negation). (But it cannot he , ,
vi c.e -versa) •" "v • •k'/- .... kk.h* V. ' .
• ; " In other woMd,van;effect (smoke), is related to V ;f k vk
Its cause .(fife) f r y r e l a t i o n ; * ^ 'k "If v.
k smokeythen, fireif: V . But .we cannot say /"ifff ire, then,/
smoke". ; Hence> 'Dhaivnakirti asserted -that only; from ;  ^f v ;
"absence of causeu?( kar ananup al ah dhi) we; can infer the ..y k* ' v 
■ "absence^ of effect" (karyanupalahdhi); the negativein* v'v' '
;V ferential operation cannot he otherwise, v v ' r; : v 1 ’ vf
The ; third.-main formula, namely, . the negation of .
V a term of .a greater extension (vyapaka) is as follows:
' v "(Thesis), v , There is here no Asoka tree, : ; t
■ . ’y^  (Reason).  ^f Because there afe no t r e e s . v  . v
. 1.1. ifr id • ."k*aryanup al abdhavkap i navasyam kar anani t advant i:
bhayantTtiVtadabhavah/' kufah. vtasmat kar.ananupalafrdhir'' ;•;
V ; , evabhavam :gamayat11i ♦ . Karnakagomi n (PVSlyR.ed.) ,p.38-39 ’ 
.-.k explains: " ♦. .abhavaiii gamayati karyasyeti - sambandhad k;
.V. v gamyate;. " / Vv ; • k k  . - . : ; ; -t , :'--fk '•
2. . Gf.frvS.Stebfring, Modern .Intrdductioh to Logic,, (seventh 
... . ed. Reprinted 1958)_, p. 168.? .• k
3* -PVS.. ,P.kO:^etgna -yy ap akasyabhsgsl ddhifjUkt a. ; ■ yatha natra v 
■ simsa yrksafrlidvat. v d.v ed, has the. same; reading. - The. ih*-
/sertionvof ksvafrhava* only indicates that/.this type vis-:‘.:. tf 
also primarily based on, the first formuia... Alsq HB.V,II. .
V v; , : ,.3k: where :;this; term; is .inserted•; ? .. ,. V
' ,// Dharmoitara ‘exp.-lal-he:i? : e*!yfskjifr&Abufr^c/iy •■'■;■A-Ho’ A&soku"', A:fk-k
'//. -..;■. A y  IteV,;: /the absence; o f such t r e e s, i s. p r edi c at ed. } "Because :; . y 
•;;/ • ^ f there are;(.altogether) no trees-kA iye ;ykthbAtefmAbfAg^ /A v'k
' k k \afrdenty k''Thisyi^ / This .•'• A:kkk
;> ■' - A f or mul a' of. he gat ion is used /./whbir Af subordinate-, term like y . k-k
; : /f/the Asoka 'tfee i f  not hei^jpefceiye&r"^ AkAk Ak'V;F A A kk;kVk 
AA k k k 1, A -Ai; Sbff ar:'/we"\haye vdiscussed/';threefmMh; typesf of: the -A . kkk;, 
,/A . : negatiye middle texmi v( iinga) propounded by the,. Buddhist k ' . . i
A; logibidh/^^Dharmakirti. :^ /ButytKe Anupalahdhiv br the / negative v 
.;. A, inf erent; i al i judgment b an he; f ur tner blassif ied according to
.the difference in. its formulation..(prayogahhedat), Dharma- . • 
,.,A klrti explains : //M,The Hon-perception ( anupal.ahdhi) , ,w.i^ thAk. k k k
. / . . these .three ‘aforesaid, piassificatiohsy is .furthef" divided' k k k k k
v.-'1 in" t o in any vari e t i e s ( T h i s )  is. h as ed; • on the. d if f er ent ktkkkk.
.V -types of formulation of,/ the (three) y each (expressed), by ./
' A / ■ - /the* Methbd of Diff erence ;( agati), - and by- the Method of !
A A^/kk^\;-Agreemeht; ( or d^ffirmatioh);-.oft'vsomething incb^atibiekwith; kk:AA k  j 
A;yA/Athe fact /Whichkis being:denied;;;(.tadvarud^ragatik etc.--A' ..kk'J
' - A,;: /HBT-. ,pA3,2:.Ai1 atra?/dharnu, . ha Simsapeti ^imsapabliatah kAA-kk
- . . sadliyah. vjftsasya vyapakasyabhavad iti itietuhkk i'yanf apyyahu-k
> k; ■ palabdhifOvyapyasya '^imsafiatvasya drsyabhavevpfajdijyate.k :
kkAkkvglmsapa- /- Asoka., SeeVtrhhsd’atioh^ p'p-*'8®r.9G--.by vBtchei^hdtskyw*
k'’k- , A 2. ;PVS.,p.B6 (PV. ,i;32) r A ' . > Afkjk A .kk Ak / kk--.. .V.k
k kk;; :A - . itiyam trividheP50iktaitp.alabdhi:rfanekhdha.
--kkkA si ’k d ;a^^^b-vinuddhadya^tigatibhedapraybgat:ah. / kk-kk
 ^,k ./Akf / G. ed.p. 20, giyes; the ; s ame re ad i ng. /but the verse ho v ■ there y
va, ; ; k: :./. is: 30. . The , terms 1 Method; of Diff erence 'and the Method/ of
:A-'’ 1 Agreement1. we have1 borrowed .from Stchefb'a.tsky,BL.yV.o3.1,- :
■; A.-/ :'Vy-A /A-''PP*370>375*■ • ^ ■ A :k’■ k  ■ k '■ ■ ■ A:'kA/k'A; -.: :';k■ '  ^nAk \r" 'kA';/V-k k
tfEt c ♦,f v refer s*. to two. further comp lex negati ons r . > 
viz., "the method of Agreement of r an. incompatible 
eff e c t1 *1 ■ (vi ruddhh k ai^ yop al ah dh i) and of' 1 an e f f e c t of : ■
. something incomp atihle wi th the cause1 ; (Icar aiT,avirxiddhakaryo- 
palabdlii)".1 : h h . / h  ■
Thus y al thou gif Dh armaki ft i in the Nyaya-Bindu said;
that the .anupalahdhi: ‘'has: eleven ,yarieties,;Vaqeo,rding to ^ -
"■ ' ‘ : v:‘iV 2 ■ "' ■ ■ - — - h • ■ - • ■ * *difference of formulation » in the Pr amanavar 11 ika. ~
as valso rightly oh served hy; Karnakagomin^:hc admitted . . -
only eightyvarieties, -h'; . : ! ^ •
;The eight varieties are- as follows., . K ; . -
t - '    1— trrrrM .  i r f i i-MT,  r~ n -T i ~ n — n  i n  . - wi . u mmmi i i — im  i . i h p h h  i p u w n m i i i i M i  i i i i u . i i . H i i ' h i i i i i i i .  ■■urn. i r i ^  ITIIIIM . r  -num — - 1 i r- m u r .  • m t n  urn-
1. PVST. ,p.86; Karnakagomin,: "adisahdat- viruddhakaryopaI~ 
nhdhih ? kar anaviruddhakarypp al ah dhi s eeti."
. , ■ ' . S :- 'k- ' : : '• ■ \
s.a' ca pr.ayogahhedad ekadasaprakara.
Translatioxi>p.;86.; ;V;; ■ . . - ■ ^
3>K/fPVST^ , : 7' ' ./■ kv .'■■■ ‘ ■' '-‘i'
tatra^tadagaiya t i sro^nup al ah dhay ah s.amgrhT tah .
. svahhavanup al ahdhihkar ananup alahdhili vyup akanup.alahdhi sea 
.: tudviruddhagatya; 11 srd evaVy ’ . s vahhavdvix^uddhdp al ahdhih ' 
karanaviruddhppalahdliih vy ap ak a vi ruddhop a 1 ah dh i s ca. 
adi sahdatI viruddhaltaryopalahdhih karanaviruddhakaifyopal- . 
ah dhi s c e t i. ', ■..; . evam astayidliasya pragukt a syanup al amhh a s y a 
samgraho h h a v a t i *'* 'V\-„■ f h
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(1) "Tlie Affirmation; of something incompatible with ,
: the fact which is being, denied (svabhavaviruddhopal abdhi) • 
7 For example: •(Thesis) . There is here, no sensation, of
. ' 7- . V . v; .“ . cold*. • 7y 7 ;/ : v’ . v-7 . \ \ : '-7-'' - ;
■- ' .-7 ’' 3'y' - v ' ; 7^: ■. ^ '■
(Reason). Because there is fire.1,1 . ■
(2) "The Affirmation of a -f act incompatible with the 7y 
'causes of something '(karanaviruddhopalabdhi). .
For example: (Thesis). He betrays no sy&ptoixs of cold,
-.77- 7  such as shivering etc.
i 7 v (Reason)• Because there is an efficient .
'7 ' : fire near him.11 ^
(3) "The Affirmation of: something incompatibie witli a fact 
; of greater extension (vyapakaviruddhopalabdhi).7
For example: (Thesis)• There is here no sensation
produced by snpw. 7 7 - •  * -7.
(Reason). Because there is f i r e . 7
1. NB. ,11.35 : svabhavaviruddhopaiabdhir yatha. 77; : . 7 y>
natra sitasparso* gner;iti. Translation p.90 PVST.,p.39*
2. , 7NB.,II.hi: karanaviruddhdpalabdhir yatha.
nasya romaharsadivise§ah. sannihitad ahanavisesatvad ;7
iti. Translation p.-97* • .7-' * ; '
3. RB.11,39: vyapdkaviruddhopalabdh.ir yatha.
; natra tusarasparso1gner iti. Transiation p .96•
77 PVS.„p.39*. 7, 7 „ 7 • 77. - . ^ 77. T7vv;' '7>77'"7>- ' \ y7;-y,^ 7 7.
(h) "The Affirmation of an incompatible effect 
7" ( viruddhakaryop al abdhi).7 -v" ... ;: v
For example: (Thesis). There is here no sensation 7
7". 7; :”7 -7. 7.' ;7 7 '7-of. cold* '• 7
. (Reason)• Because, there .is smoke."y
(5) "The Affirmation of an effect of something.incom­
patible with the cause (karanaviruddhakaryopalabdhi). 
For example: .7(Thesis)•7 In this place nobody ex-
• . hibits symptoms of cold,.
7' . '7' , ; such as shivering etc.,
(Reason) • 7 Because there i s smoke ♦"
7 However/ the Buddhist reaffirmed^ his position 
that all objects which: are7affirmed and or denied refer 
to "possibilities of p e r c e p t i o n . • Dharmaklrti s&dLd:
"And everywhere in this Non-perception (anupalabdhi) 
which establishes negation (and negative behaviour)V the 
things whose. negation (is expressed through the method of) 
denial and (through the method of) affirmation of the
1.- NB.II .36 iviruddhakaryop al abdhi r yatha. natra 
' . ; sit asp arso , dhumad iti.7 Translation p *91 • Pys>p.39*
7 2. . NB• II.hR:: karanaviruddhakaryop alabdhir yatha. 7;
na romaharsadivisesayuktapurusavan ayam pradeso.dhumad 
777 iti. Translation p .98; 7 FVS. Jp.hl 7 7
3* Cf. supra, p. [ Tf[. 7 7 .-7: "' :y'7r.7'7... ’7 ' 77. :
h. NB. ,H.h6. Translation p .1102:. ■
V [things] ihcoippatihle/'with-4 them;(tadyir^ ;y‘-7y
be- understbod exc^ :as perceptible by y( their own)
nature (dr 3yatmanamyeva) #n 7 :/j7;-
7 :; 7 The sinii la rity of this theory w.i t h t ha t of the . ; ;7 ; 
yi>^bbSkara;7i£uri^ ;
following exposition in the Ha/a-vivelca r >^^ 7^ 7
uItyis .said that there is cognition of abs ence y y
:7 :7'‘-.y 7: 7-- 7 :7 -77 . 77; 7 -“ :v7t ' 7'77'7: y '777'' • •v7"'7/ 7- 7^
(tad-)7When the sense s a re inaet iye [i.e. when there is no^ 
sense-organ and the (expected) sehse-Object]* ; For there 7
is no invariable concomitance between the existence of a
;, y 7',.- ■ y 7 ■ ;;- y . V ■" ,.y; - 7 v ; 7:-;., • 7'
y perceptible thing and perceptionJ^and absence of the per- 7
ceptible. In. that. case the presence of. perception, itself
/becomes the absence]. Therefore, the absence of percep- 
Tbibn [functions 7as J7the7rebsbh7(ih: anVinference) w Thus 7 7 ;7
7 ‘the cognitibn of 71 hb absence of a thing is an infer ence 77:;7
7 [based on h negativeyperceptiph] 77 7y .7 . 7. yy -/y
!• PVS* , G.ed. ,p. 6/y_sarvetray^^ abhavasadhanyam 7
.777 7 anupaiabdhau dr dyntmanam eva^tesamtadviruddhanam ca y 7,7 
siddhir^asiddhid ca veditavya. *k*edy,p.40 reading is 7 
;faultyly: Bee Karhakagbmin thereonVwhich idoes not corres- 
, 7 pond with - R./but: with G.ed.y 7 Vy yy:--/. 'v''v . 7//' . ‘. ^ 'y- 77/7'. 7
7 2 .., Naya-Viveka / pp^X66-l67i ihdriyoparame : ca tadd.hrr^uleta7 - 77 
7 na ca dr3yasatta daySanena Vyapteti dav&anahivr11 i1Iftga d ■
■ 7 ,  7 dr^^bhavadhTiC^n - i -7 77/7-7,y 7 ... ' y y ' 7/-7'777: # ,7:7-77 ■ ,.7. 7
7}. ./See also S.ylffpTl^.7, p ^  7-7 77'y 7vy.;77../7 .--7; 7 •
7 7 • Thus he cor ding to this view of Non-perception,
"every judgment positive or negative is in the end 
existential"• :  And, here, we.may conclude that in this 
., ;. theory " every perception consists in a perceptioh , preceded 7 - 
by a non-perception of the same object, that is to say, 
by the absence of its own hypothetica1 vis i b i 1 i t y , not by .7
non-perception simply, not by non-perception of something
7v777v-7 7 '-7 . '7,72; / ’ 7 - -7: 7- : - .7/’: ; . .' ',7;7
absolutely invisible*" . - 7
Section V . Negation (abhava) versus Non-Perception 
7 . (anupalabdhi) ^
It has. been stated above^ that Kumarila Bhatta in 
‘ allegiance to the MTmams'aka tradition postulated Negation 
as an independent means (pramana) of cognizing an objective 7 
negative entity (vastu *= prameya). Also it has, been de­
monstrated above^ that the Buddhists and the Prabhakaras, 
contrary to the Bhatta IvlTmamsakas, admi11 ed.nega tion only 77 
as an inferential judgment based on the Non-perception of 7 
7:77;\7. a perceptible entity (drSyahupalabdhi)• • These two prominent
1. Cf • Principles of Logic , Vol. r  (1922, ed. )/, p.115. 7
• 7 7 ,7:2. ' StcherbatBky/7BL,.,Vol.l>p.382* 7 . 7 . 77;
:7 • - 7 3^  videsupra,>v-Rpw'77>^777777^^:7;7, ■'7’'7'.:7777-v' -'7-:v> ' 7 . 77;,;
7. 7-77:; 4. ■■ vide;, supra pp.?77^  ; -,.7 ■ '777;. . 777yy7- -7:7'::
theories . are diainetrically. opposed to each other•
Their;differences may be following
table* " wV.:,-7>: ;: : V'''Vx! X-:-V v^ ;V^  - ••••''.■/ ' ./.•
Negation XJon-perception
■ (abhavapramana) . , ’ ; S^' ’ ; ■ (anapalabdhif , ■ :V ■,
according 16* ‘ ‘. , ' . - • -X according to the
; Kurriarila Bhatta v . V?-V Buddhists & the
0 : ■ : - ‘ V /;>Vvyv:4 • y^v Prabhakaras’ <
,li J f^egat iohiSvnon~Ehs^( pa dart ha); ; 1* Negation « non4pe re opt ion: :
;;Vv,V;.; ‘ ; /Vv-'K-:'':'" ^ -4" " 't' ?: r :  ^^  !
2* Real absence is to be. estabr 2# A ;suggested perception .
lished (abhavapranieyasia.d^ is to be negated .
vi. J '  -"O: K ; i (drd^sarnaropanisedhah)
3. :Petermiiiatip Ihsfy-ne^ 3# Things are distinct by :
( y a sjt v as araka r a si ddi r a b hav a- ■ the "Thing-in~t hems elve s*1,
.; p r a n i a n a t a } ; 7 v 7 7 v- - (syabhaya--svalaksane--
v'  ^ A 7..-1 ^ 7 7'": /ha yyav asthiteh) j * :-
4. Since no other (positive) 4* N'on-perception is the :;7;.7
1 means can cdgiiize; real absence ^ ; reason of negation and 77: 
,: Negation is the means pf cog~ ; the negative behaviour
niaihg its ^m.cdrres ponding 7 ^anu pa lab dhi rabha vav yay ah- 
entity (abheivo1 bhavena arasadliika pratisedhah-
raryate). 7l7\l777-;; :7 7 * 7 W O  / ■ ' -v
'However, it is ah astonishing fact that some modern • 
writers;whom we. sha 11 pr esently ;quotd . here> h ave asqribed 77' ■ v' 
the theory; ofanupaiabdhi 10 Sahara dnd Kuraarila Bhatta* ,
S/f H*J>asgupta7writesf^ylh addition to the four positive ., 
pramanas, Kumarila a dmi t s ;a' fifth kind of pramana, viz *4 v; 
aiiupalabdlii for the perception of ,thd' non -e xistence of•,ac - : V ;; 
thing*1
7 :J. Sinha callshis section on the abhlfva theory 7; //
77-77/ of7the 7 ^ ^ ^^*Noh-apprehbhsion^^7(anupalabdhi)u;.J ; 7,7/777 7 /• v7 
•7. He; quotes Sabarasv'amin*1' and observes: "Savara recognizes .
7 '7 7 non-apprehension (anupalabdhi) as an independent pramana, 7; : -'77
;‘7 and7defines it as the absence of any means of valid know- 
77;-; ledge, which cognizes the non-existence of an ob ject, which ;
777 777 7is not present to a . sense-organ. V*' 7 In another sectionthe
7; '7 .same author writes: "Kumarila holds that the non>-existence 7 
7;;,:,7,7 7 of‘ a j af on the gr o und 1 s known by non-a ppr ehens i on . 7 7 7
7 7-;-;77<v' " ;■ 7.7 . - ;;7777 "7 7-7 7-7 .’77 777v7 7 ' 7 '7 V7;:. ' . /;
777%: S. Radhakrisbnan .obse rves:: "Kumarila , after the
. 77 '7 Vr11i.kara.admiis hon-apprehensidn (anupalabdhi) as an 
| 7., indepexident source of knowledge#"^ 77 7 ^ 7 77 . 7 77 :'
77-7 7 7: 7 These sc holdrs have been wrong in ascribing the yuse of
7.-7- / -the term.11 anupalabdhi" to Sahara 7and Kumar ila Bhatta , I con- : 7-. 7
sider it important to point this out here. Por, as we shall
see /below, it Vmisrepresents. the development of the Tcival ■;7 7:7 • =
7, 7 * \ theories, viz *, of the TBuddhists and Prabhakara as against -.77 
777v 7 the views of Kumar ila. M'y arguments are as follows: ,77 7/ ; 7
1. Sbh. ,1 .1 * 5 .  Quoted above p. 77/77 71-7 ,
7 - 7 7 2V ; H IP . ,V o l . I , p . 789. 7 7 - 7  \7 "/"77 /1 -7v7>  7,7 /177 77'777 7 7 -.*'-7 7-7:' ; 7
: 77 7 73. ibid. ,p*309. ■ - 7 77‘ ■ 77-' ':"7 ' 7. ■ ’ “■7;.' • ; - ■ ■ ’ 7:-'-. /.7.
4v;:- I P . ( i 9 4 6 )  , V o l ^ l i , p . 3 9 4 7 7  ;^7 : ' - 7 "  77
m(1). D'asgupt a is wrong in s. taiing that "Kumarila aclraita 
a fifth kind of :pramana, viz•, anupalabdhi"« I have hot 
come across any work of Kumarila where Negation ;is mentioned 
as the fifth pramana.■ 7 '/uhfortuxiafieiy Dasgupta gives no 77 7 
/ref'erenpe: in /support of his opinion.1 " While the available .
. texts of Kumar ila and other writers. of the system: mention 
"abhava" only as the sixth pramana7(sastham kiledara pramanara).2 
;v'^ Thpladthpf himseli1 ih7tfte; Slc^ it in 7
addition .to the five (positive)' pramanas (pramana-pahcakam) . 
yatra va sturu pe ha jayat evv vas t us a t tava b o dha r them tat rabhava- ■
. pramanata).7 . And as we see in the passage'the term 
"anupalabdhi" does not occur. : / 77 7
(2). The two terms ,7namely, . - anupalabdhi1 and - abhava1 as 
we have, already mentioned above^ ' correspond to two entirely 
different, theories of negation. At least in the early .
writings of /the. Mima^ ho mention of the
term * anupalabdhi1. G. Jha: in his 1 P'urva-M'im'ams^. in Jits/ / 77 
Sources1 , aithough he translated the term"1abh^vapramana1 by
: ;i.: 7 0f. NaSgUpth:7; pp./C;it* 7' -7 7 , ■ v7'- ..7.7 7" 777 7-,. . ',7777'....
2. Brhati^r juvimala, p.1201 S1.Vart., Ab.chapt. p.473 »verse 1;
Primer . , p.57l Atomism. , p.57. .777^7
3* Sl.Vart. , op.cit.. See also supra pp. 77;
4. Cf. supra p./K^/ L ; 7 7.'■■7 ■ 7 ^  ; 77/777-v-:‘;.7/: '7 7 .7777;
7;71777 "hon-appreh^ not use the term 1 anupalabdhi V*1 77 -
: -77 - Neither 3abara nor Kumarila used thi s t erm to exp re s s ■ /
7777 7. their theory*2 / " 7 - 7 : 7 . 777777.7 ‘ ' ///• " 7 7v-:7. -7'.'7 7 7-777 7
(3) TAh edition of the text of the Sastra-Dlpika? might 
have been the: cau s e of thi s mistake * For in thi s text .
'■.7:77' the heading on the pages of the section .concerning 7-7 ; *:7'7 77,
7 * abhava1 has been printed as 1fanuJ a 1 abdhi-mirupanam; 
which apparently seems to be an;error of the editor. .For . 
in the text itself, the section (p.233) begins with the .
/quotation of Sabarabhasya (I.i.5 ) "abhavo *pi pramanabhavalj. • •1 
and it ends (p.247) with the wprds/’Jlty^bhnvavad^" or ;
7 “here ends: the section on Negatioh"* > A .commentary thereon.
7 77: called "Yukti-snehaprapura^i7r by Pravarararaakr^a also has 7 
the same ending. ^ 7  Radhakri shnan refers to this text of 
77/7 7  ^ / / ih b /:S a s t .r a 7 ^  :7 :v;; 7-77777/ 7. 7'777r- 7-':7.'.:'■ ■■7777;- /V.: ‘/7 /  ' ■
■77.7 / (4) However, TParthasarathi Misra seems- to be the first .
; /Mimaipsaka; -author .who; introduced the term * ahupalabdhi, in 7 
hi's/ system. Defending TKumailla* s view point against /
:/ ;7/ 1. PM• Sources•, pp.163-165• / 7/ /•. / -//i-/>■:/■: 7 7/' -7-; ■ 77 :
2. . % h  . ,op.cit.2 :3i'*^rt*>7-|^',7Ghapt.'. passim. 7 
7 37 Sastra-pipika Chow.&. Series , No * 188. Benares 19.1.6 ,• ed* 7.
, by Laxman Shastri Pravid. '7 7/ 7 . /■'■■’ 7 '
,777:-;774iv lbid♦,pp * 233~247• 7/7/>/., ; >.,7;- : >7:7 , '7' ''
"‘/77‘ 7"/ 3. ibid. , p.247. '^777.;7;/7- 7' 777 '7-7' 7// . ‘ / 7 " 7/ 7 7v
■■■//:■. ■' 6. IP.,opvcit* 7 ; 7; ./:7v
the criticisms: of the Buddhists and Prabhakar a, /
Parthasarathi said: "If somewhere a thing is non­
existent, then perception and the other means, which ,
manifest ohjects of a positive character, fail to function, 
even though all the accessories for the manifestation V . / / 
(of such positive existences are present) and this non- : 
manifest at ion which mayrbe styled by the alternative names , • , 
of dysyadarsana (non-pereeived) and yogyanup alambha (non- 
cogni zed though cap able of being cogni zed ) i s t ermed 
pramanabhava in the Bha§ya ( of Sabaraswami).1,1 Later on 
.(pp.*240-242) Parasthasarathi used the term 1 yogyanupalabdhi1 
as synonymous with 1 abhavapramanLa, But ’this use of 
the term yogy ahup alabdhi by Parthasarathi, as we shall . 
investigate in the next section, should be regarded as a 
concession to the Buddhists and Prabhalcara./
(5) It seems that up. to. the time of Salikanatha/ Misra 
(.800 A.D. ,), the view of ’yogyanupalabdhi r was unknown ..
1* 7 op Veit. ,p • 234,? yatra tvasadrup ena v art ate tatra sad- /
7rup ena bodhakariam p r aty ak§adlham__ sadrup ab odhanayp tp at turn . ' 
yogyatve satyapi yo *nutpqdo dr £yadars ana~y ogyanup alambhadi- 
p aryayo bhasye pramanabhayasabdenoktah. ,Cf. the 7 '
:. translatipn-by Venkatramiah, p.112. , .
2. ; ibid., pp. 240-243* . ;7; ,
to the opponents• For {Saiikanatha, present ing Prabhakar a1 s ; 7/ 
view against//Kumari1a and his followers, does not mention
7 the terms . * anupalabdhi ’ and 1 yogyahupalabdhi when dis-
7 . 7 7 :. "77. 7-7 7- ' 7- / 7/;-7:''' 77 / -• . 5-0 o "7 7
7 cussing the [Latter1 s theory. Ratnaklrti (c .A.D♦ 1025)
■ and SrTdhara, of the same: period, criticising. the Bha$tai ;
theory of negation, do not refer to it by this ternu^
(6) On these grounds/we may conclude that the / early Purva-
/, Ml mams a. p hi lo sopher s,. namely,/Sabar as yami/: and Kumar ila Bha^ta
. did not postulate a theory of negation called • Non-p e r ceptiontl.
pr 7*Non-apprehension1 ; Canupalabdhi/. or yogyanupalabdhi ) • .. /
later;/ ,./ such as Parthasarathi Mis.ra, under the
'/influence of Buddhist logic modified and revised the original .
Bhatta theory of Negation. It is7this modified theory 7 . 7 V7
of the later Kmamsakas /which, to a certain extent , , was ' /
7 adopted by the/ Navya-Nyaya logicians^ and in modern pub-
. lications is fre quent ly described by the term.* anupalabdhi * •
,1 * PP* ,P •IIS: T^ye punar abhavaldiyam pramanam icchanti tat-/ 71 
pratibpdhanaya.. •t;./. Moreover, to explain (bodhanaya)( the 7 
7777: Prabhakara theory of ne ga t ion) to tho se schol ar s who wish
/ to posit Negation (_as an independent)means ; (we say. ♦).7/
2. RN. ,1 pramanantarbhava* section.pp*92,97~98* /
: . 3*' NK,,pp.227-228: •abhava’bhavenaiva paricchidyate iti na
'777 7; buddhyamahe (/p.227) • •; ■i-7.7- .7-- /.-/7-'7//' ,7 ’• 77/’-; - 7777.7V :7;7';
: 74. . Cf.N.Kaust.,pp.160-163 where even G-apgesa (manikpt)7 has .
been quoted as recognizing yogyanupalabdhi; with his own .77' 
7777^7/ int erp ret at i on. Thediff erencp /between the neo-logicians 7 
- and the Bha^tas lies in the fact that the former, regard it 
as only sub si di ary cause of p ere ep11on of ,non-exi stence. 
while the later insist that it/is an independent means and//
thus the primary Pause of cogni zing abhava as an entity*
See also Atomism. ,pp. 7.8-79*
Section VI .' 7/,,,,;:-' . v 7, 777/7.7: : 77- ■ /■ ,77- 7'7, :-'777-./
/ 7v : The Theory /of Non-Appreheiisi on (Yo1 gyanup a 1 abdhi) 7. : •
./ / .. In the previous section, we, tried to show. that the
theory of Non-apprehension (yo gy anup al ahdhi ) was propounded ../ '7777 
by a later Bhabta-MlinaijisakaV philosopher,, mbs t; p*1 oh ably by 
Parthhsarathi Mibrav 7 Now, we; propose to investigate this 
theory on the basis,/of the writings of the later Bhattas and. .V77 
thevneo-Naiyayikas. - .in the: preseht/section we{:shall see7(i). . 7 
the extent Of .; the;7 Buddhist ihfluencd/on the Bhattas, (2). an 
trterpretatxon76f the /tbriii 7 yogy anupalabdhif 'Suggested by . ■' -
Par tha s ar a thi In order to maintain it as/ the original theory, .. 
bf/Negation/(pramapabhava):, 7apd1/^ 3).# the7view7cf/yogyaiiupalab 
as it is accepted by the7n e o-Na iyayihas. 7' ..
;, ; /7 , The theory of ypgyantipalabdlai. of. the later Bhafta 7 7^
Mimai^ sakas/iS'/as/1 fo3tbws.777//'77 ^-7 /' ' 7.;;/. V7‘ :. 7'- 77
,(A) : Parthasarathi explains: .. "The/ basis (or reason-karapa) .7 v;
of the cognltibn of absence Is tlie non-perceptiph: of. the per- 7, •
.ceptible feet (dpgy.a)> 7,(Now, / what is- this non-perception?). ; /; /
.Non-peroeptipn /is-,/ (in , fac.t);.j/7'the, absence of. ( sense)-perCeptiprL- ^  
7howeyer, what / is inyoivbd Tln the 7 cognition of7 an absence is not
/ just! a nonr-perception* The .operation of a negative judgment , : :
1> GkBlpikay pv236i  ^dy^yadardaiiam abhavajhaha-karanam., 
7 77p,v 7'7 ; 7 .: adai*danam ca dardanabhava.h: .
Is described/by Gagabha/fcta ' tlie /following terms
■ 7 "The cognition of .the absence of a jar. etc. [ is/7
v7////brought about] by, the ab s e nce,Zof (sense/)-perdeption,; inasmuch77 : 
as the; presence/of ■7the;//couhtbr-:positiye::iis ^ Impiied\in the 7 ' /- 
negation [absence‘of perception]. . Thus, the absence of the -. .
./ jar, is cognised /in the form [of the following propbsltion]/:. 7 /77 
7 / /.; ( There is no jar here) • / If TthereVwere ajar, if would be/.7 
777.,7.7 visible.u  ^/7 ; / 7 .; -.7, ,77 /• - . 7'7,.7-; ./ .,;v/7 7/7.77. -7.-77 . 777'- .7/7/7. -
; In other words, ; CJagabhbttu ,poInfs7out; two important 7factors 7 
yconditioning a negative cogiiltiohlS (l)• /7y:The./necessiby' of -77/ 77-. 
delimi ting a Non-percept ioh by a - counter-po si tI've whose. 7 / .
;•/, 7 ; 7 pre sehce ; / i s/ a / pos sible /sub j ect. of , judgment,/ 7 ( 2) ■ the - * '7V 777*' 7.; 
7/7 7 suggest i on of/pres enc e of the counter-positive, or to use -the7 .
7 7 7,77/T^sselliah phrasedlbgyV f a .prppositional / affltude^/towar&s/ - 7 /
/, the oOounter-posif Iveyi&;./ne/c/es's- ./Thai/:.!s./ either; we/ doubt, 7</ 7; 
777 ■ the .presence of the"he gat urn 7lh;the space-time. reiqtion, ,/or we . 7 
: / • 7 desire ..it to be present/there7 ' 7b?huq,7 .1f and/Only . if fhere/is/7.7// 
a suggestion of its presence, - '’which/is/ a possibility'in the . .
7/7./’ I* B.Gin., p(.47;. gliafabhayadi jfiaham. dardanabhavena .pratiyogi-. .
.7 ; satfya^prasahjana7pfasah jitaprafiyoglkena yadi. ghatab syaf; 7/77 
7 7 .7/'^ /tpd|7dpl^tef3^7hkarakbha gha fabha vo 7 j 21 ay a t e • .Compare with 7 
Gapge^e/s . view, N.Kuust.;,' p*l6l: 7! anubalabdhyau yogyata: ca 77777 
7.. pratiyoglsattva-prasahjlta-pra.tiyogikatvarupa paribha§iki ^7 7
77.7/ 7 G-agabhaf f a 7i s/evi dent ly under the Influence of /.the'. Navya- .7 7 / 
,v7.;r Nyaya- logic . . 7 7 . .. 7 77/ 7;i7-'77 7 7-v ' '.'-."'7 , . '. ’ 7 ' py ;y
. 2•: Inquiry into; Meaning and Truth, (1956, 5th imp. ) pp. 291,294. •://
v . ' . ■ V  . V y::. y/7y.y -7 y 7;.. , •/ p • -7 yy ,,7' „ ; :y
7; case of: a jaf 7-, its Non^apprehen.slon :(yp formsy/y y.
77;''-.:77v;7the7bhsis' of/the, -bognitiqn:7pf/its a'bsencd;.‘1'/>7 77 by... ;y ..yyy - 7/7 7 ■y://y 
7; 777777 • : Now>. if comparpythis/interprefatipn^qfy yogyahupalT:; 777::
'Z/y 7yahdhi: with/ that7 of dfaya^ the Buddhists^, we-find;by z 7
v7 . ho logic al difference;/; The /Buddhi s t :theory of dpdyanup alabdhi.//" 
' : ;7/ ,means the coghi'tiph of absence of a perceptible fact deduced ; 7 
7 7 from the reason (lihga) of its Non-perception. By/ perceiving; 7 7
.the babe ground, :e. g.V7 the hypo thb tic al /perceptibility of the .7, 7 
V 7 7 7;/jar ls/negated.^;7; However, .a poinf of-difference between.the 77 .• 
7-7 7 77 7/: two ^theories-, still remains and that is that according 7 to the 
7 7: 7y7Hhddhist7view this judgmeht ip bnly? inferenflal-.whileyaccording 7
77 7-v 77bo7.thp "Bhaffa tradition I t . shduld be regarded a s/an independent . 7 
7v , 77. means of judgment '..7.-,. 7-.-, 7' ' v' 7" 77: ' 7.,/ 77 / /// 7;
7;7 77 (B) 7/ The logical weight :,of the;Buddhist theory that /y^  /y
y /./....7 ynegation is ah inferentiai judgment cannot be cbnied by the /yZ'
\7 later/Bhatfas. ,7 /Parthasarathi found it difficult to re ject / //•■’/;
7 7 the theoi^y .entirely. 7 However ,yarguing" against the Buddhists, 
v ///.• he -indie ates his . wi11ingne ss to meet the opponent half-way.
'■//'7.'. .lie proposes to admit an. inferential character of negation.
. . y /7 provided the BUddhist ;agrees; to /the/'Bhat fats point of view.;
; y ; //7that the primary cause pf . cognif ing an abhava1 is/?Ee pex*ception
77/ /7:.1»/ Cf.y_G-agabhatta, loc.Pit,, *yogyanupalabdhid ca /dardanayogy- y/ 
7 .; 7 asyadar £anarn♦ ' 77/77 zZ-y/ /; 77' •" y- - / . y . yy , ' , 7 7
y/y/7'/y2 .y-0 f; supra pp ♦ / Z./: 7 ■ .: t  77-; './/.-..V/'' ' ' . y-'
: 7^ -'7-y/7;3.. See supra pp* 7 ; 7 ‘ ' ''./-.//t ' • . /
7 777 ;4., Cf. : supra pp. /p^y/gyy/ 7 /.yf. . 77.-7->f 7...y b  ’ 7
; ; of the ^ hare/>l'p‘ciis,'.--.as.:pro-p.ounde.cl b y the. Buddhists hut the i f;‘vi.
• hoh-app3?eh^nsibn- (or non-p ercepti on)of the counter~po sitive,y ■' • 
As ;farv:-hs. theyp.bsitionof Gagahha*fta. is concerned it :
;,;p : is;^evirientithaii he' seesrioy significancein recoighizlng negation.:5
'; ’ ss ; ,8 Vs sp 83? a is iihe sns,of. :knbwlriri£e; r( px*ama^ a);* :. :^ ih/a3.1e glance ;; ;->/
:. . t o  the Bhatta.traditional;vi ew:of;Negation,he first states I :
r • . viFon-apgrphension or.yogySnupa^ dri -independent means.y f.i
.: But afterwards when descriii>ihg:its ; operation he explicitly v ;
' p • ohseryes that the logic al formula ; of hon-app rehens iori is ;
•f : :-similar . to that 0fy<lhfbrehce:y(amm^ the end: ; ; i
:; Gagahhaita expresees , his .own ^ iew an the foilbyahg Words:
i : :.. : u As a ma t ter of- fact we (i): do no t conc;eivri any (re al) \ 'iW;
 ~ i■   ■ i ib -V — — ir ii^ ii.^ — irrT<iiM;n«-nw w i  wi^'iiw ri ii11>V .pw imi i n H i  ‘m ...... i i m ii u m  i n - nr- i~ i l t ip>h p  w i i t  it~i 11 mf /
■ nupalahdhyahhavah.pratyetayya^^ pi^amite ca tasmin pascad . •
f fi ;hhavat^an^ yv’:f ■- . / \ • v i: W pV >. v / .\f •/-//■; .-Wf--
Wlhy ;: 2, B*Cin., p*ri7;f 'ylsiddhaiW; ahhayagrahahamiahnpaiahdhirupam^^ ’
W  ' nianantaramV.  ^ . ;y. . Wijy, ' . y->y/i ‘ -W-- wWf \y' 1
, . ; ; 3,; ITpid. ..Vatra pratiybgipratyak^ahhavati /karapam. anumi tiri- ;
■ ' W-W ;'vM f c a r a y ^  if f f ' i. ■ i ; . f ; i i /.: f
. v Compare this with trie-first negative;; formula of Driarmakirti,;
• , supra p, 76"? antaravyanara = logical formula or operation
• ^ ' t h e f i n t e l l e c t ' * ; ' y . ' : .  - ...y.
yfdiif er'erice ;bpf weeni Presumpti oriy (Wrtriapa11i)y y arid Non-apprphens'ion; 
. (anup a 1 ah dhf ) > , arid the difference offthe two from Ihferericef .'f ■ y
y:y',(:ariri^ariai-* fv7^w'-''7V-1 '.f'f: y-:i ; h -' fif •••'•••'•/if • f^ffyiy?
7  ;:'f ‘f .fy:ihus we'm ay :conclude that this• interpretation of the iy 
y.;fifihppry' ofynoriWfipprehensipri-:^ to • ff 7:7
; a mb re re ga tl ve . form of i inferencey which is tqui vale n t to the ■ , 
7  ^ &ddhist 'theory of yripii^perceptiorii ^  V7"■:f:;7ffi ■ f y
Section VII '
•: v" ‘ r " The - ihVorvfof' ;Nbri~drihr'eherisiori •l-vogvSriririaiahdhl)' f:77•. <1 ' 'r * - • • J lulUim.^  i^ ilm lfcrp«*n—WM^ wp»PW¥iliW>MiniN«Slt*»Mifti —ipiw i,i* mi p^ imw wurw * '■
ifffff'' Accordirig:to .Parthasarathi Ml&ra.f , f' .:7... ,,y-=7 7;y 77
7  f f i:ii.7 f;ff Parthasaratliif Mi^ra:;:hb^iains- the. term ,.yogyanupalhhdhi- ; 'fy 
y*_ in ' t er ms o f.. they’1 non-- m ani f e s tail on o f aval id. or c o nip at ih 1 e i 
fmeans1-* (yogyapramai,aahhava = yogyasya pramanasyanudaya&^ ;7 if
/; ’If'-.The. Ivlimaijisa and 'idvalt a' Vedanta systems recognize Presumption 
:,y n 7 (arthipatti^f Wh W  , separate.'means of lmpwiedge f (px*amapa). f 
y;;7yy I'^The^vstpbk'rixpmple^p^ the ,iiiferencel;yfDeyadatta, ^ though
iyf7;fhe- isf fatyVddesfnolf eatydurto^ arid'ihei*eiore must-. f fy-
/ eat at nightfThe Wyaya fprmulates the proposition as a 
r f' yfpurely riegative > inferhnce*7:.;f :Kei7h Atomism* p*1217, See 
i f ; alsh 9inhay ;HIP.f Voi;; I. pp*308-30$*7 i i 7 '7- ff 77:,ff;.
•2* l o c  *cit.; > V y a s t u t a s : i y ' a r i h a p a t t ^ a n u p a l a h ^
:y y7 ;a^ ca . hhedam nakal ayamah *f.  ^f ' if.ii"■ 1;
;-'53iy Gf .;f;snprri-:^ 7yr77Ai',;iy i y'^ff? 7 y. .i;7:i f '7;i:-.y.fy ; y y ;ff. ' yy-,
y’-vfeySh .^ 39V;5 iTsgyapramapahh^^
: i  P  r a p  a h h  a v  a m  a t r a lii ^ y o g y a s a i v a :  P r ^m ^ a s y a n u d a y a h *  • • . i
ISTV
. . ; This /interpretatloriy i's-advdhcbdy to^  ^m^ independent / 77:.
vVVy^ycharacter of/ ityae . aymepnsybifyrhgriisin^ 7 ; .
; 7 7 phswor the following, oh 3ectiohs7^^:^;/^;' y- 7 / • - y'7y- 777v: fy 7777
y; v 7( l)v .;: She theory of JNphr"apprehension: bf! dv percpptihje '77:7 
;y f '■ ecty ^ yogyahupaiahdhf.J. y c ahnot: hey valid ih .cases wliere they V yy 
/77;; y locus;iay;nof;-pb;^ oh dec t of .he gation '
; yi; ina^ i hey per ceptihle • y y :.P p  instance y; a p e r  s o n:. who w i she s .to y yy 
’' ■ 7y7as;6ertain. if his ' ring i& A b7he/;f onhdi; in a dark room■ searche svy7 
;.. y 7 hands'yall: ground ihe7 roomy andyheoriu^
' 77':('presumably} searchedythe whole, room, believes that the ring 7 - 
i .7: ft7 is^ npt.viriiere>!f;yyfer .him yiMere7is'. certainly ' a nbn“apprehehsipii;7!l: 
yfyyye^y&yperce^ :;rinjg777:;h ^ e y d ^
; yi; remainswhether: dliypartsy o 17 the room have he en se arched 'or y. Vy, 
v /;yfwhether;' any p a rt lias; heen left. unsearched. 7y7J?hus>> in ;such • . . 77 
y yy:y cases. since theyyog^rariupalahdhi^is not pbsit i vely estahlished, 
yyf 7 y ipyspite ybf -':itS;:(^ iriduhilahle) existence, .■ one: cannot conclude
that, the thing (ring) ;is not: there (present).y . y;y* 7y-1 7.y-7 y.y y. 
f - 7 ‘;'y ( ; ‘yy 5Wrthermore> isbmeiimesy heiievihg that r theysearc ; .7 y 
was thorough, even though 1 t was- not , ;one Is cbnvinced •;that 7,77  
y- there is: Non~apprehensioh of they pe rc eptih 1 e (yogyanupalahdhi) •
7 y:,7 :i;:y±hi:d■* yy p 7 y o f p g u l i y ^  Wbsdritamasap^
y: y y d hastahhyam.: saiW.atb]^  paramp§7a r^in tasya tavat sarvade^a* 
;7': 7y7.y7'P&rimarSad:,vasiutpi^bgyanimalahdhiryd ataiva, ;yatha:yc a; kirn;yy 
777y- ■... . .sarvo: de b ah parampbtrihyhim^ ha^cidydedoyhayparSmr^io * pi :77y 
y;7;fy.y, syad^iti^sandihanp. •yogyanupalahdlier ani^dayat satyam api -.yf... 
; yyyi-i napgullyakasyahhavam: ay adh ar ay at if; 5y: 7r:.y7; ,i 7 ':7: y, - ,..'yi
. >■: y. y y  y y - r  -7 7 . 7 7 7 7 7 .7 ’7 y. -7 y f -  . 7-
v ; . 7E r r o ne oti s 1 y > in ■, su c h cases,.. pne: ass.eiyts ,the. dhsence. of the ,7 . '
. ' ;.7.y thing (ring)• 7 Hence it can ;bp., argued that the yogyanupalahdhi
y • as the mb^ns;.yof; cogni!zingyiWori^existbnce,,ycan he admittedfonly
■with the cbndition that first its .own validity is established..’
,y ;, And if that he the- case we would have to postulate, another
777 ./ friega’iiv.e’-means yCoryyogysin^ the first y
: ; yogyanupalahdhi, and so, on and so forth. . This would2 lead to
7 .y7y. infinite regress.,h-! ,7- 7 7.77 ■ yy .' ■/.■' \ ' . •
7-f 7; n(A)yyy'.7 Parthasifathi Mibra retorted that what is meant by 7-y.y y 
y . thev term; yogyanupalahdhi: isy, the. 7 non-manifestation of a valid 
y. ( or . compatihle) means ofy. judgment (yogyapramapanudayah) in : y
.. y the case of cognizing an absence". *7 Since the object of y ■;
• cognition (prameyam) is a. negative one/ e.g. the absence of •
. • a jar etc•, .and there is non-manifestation of a, (positively);
; .valid'., me axis i-'NohT^Pprehehsloh; Ipso- facto becomes the' means .7 ■■■*■,7 1
. !• Ibid*, ^kadaclttu saryato1 i^ ar ampsyapi sarvatah param£§tam
7 y': V y. ;7 iti7bhrant$i7 y9Eyan u p a ^
■ 777 Tbhr tasmaj: jriatatayaiva;
.77 , >ogy|impalahdhi^hhaya,dhanakaranam .i ty^abhyupagantavyam
7 y; y y;f. 7; t a thi;. canavasthaprasapgah. ■. y yy7 y7--.-.7y— . 7 . \ ; 7 . '/7 :r
y.y .7 2. Ibid. : p. 271.' ’ yyyf, . 77 7 _ 7'"':.y J 7 - ■; . y-7' y yyy f •
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(loodhalca) of cognit i on by' its very existence v1 . . Its validity 
X x;i'S': ftbt to Jtie. established as isXthe vcaseX^itfr ; the instruments X 
X'.:Xy; X • of percept ion., e. g. the; eyes etc, ,%xi?h7 eyes;: dexn ot depend^ ^Xx 
XXx X  o n . ano t lie r i lis t miineht for the i r own a sc er t aiiBi\ent , For if\;Xxy”xX 
an;ins trument of: cognitibn were.to be dependent on some other . ; 
X.XX; X; instrument7b;rXits-1,^ownjhscertai^ehty itXwould again 'deadyxVX;- .:X. 
to, the regressus ad inf ihiturn (anayastha svat). ^  • ,
'/ Xv;x:\lt:; Ibid, : Xghdt ady^ahhavo is tlx prame.yamV yo gy apr amananuda.vasc a. XXoJ j  ■5*\ V  1 j J I , ( , , , "  * ■ I I I I>|B1 Ullr  I ill I I nw l i i l n I  a W tW H ||p M l» l | > | i t W i -s •
■ v :y X .v "V tasya sattamatrehdiva ,netradavad7°^slco ria:, j hat ay a, yatd X
; navas tha • syat•! 'XX '-.V X;y, . ..' , XX ? '' :X : xX. _ 7  X •-X.xX "tX'X-X
X-'v-xxxXX,’ Dv;Vehfcatram^ has vtrhnsfated ! y o gy an r amananudayah1J by X X - 
/■, ■ x.' .if;/ ■ noh^manifestation; of a\ pramana : in relation .to a :Visaya X:
•/ X ; xXpb ;ject )•. wtLich is capable of "being, perceived (yogya)u . '-7 X.xX-::X 
.X-X; ;;Trahslatleh3^ii8i W^0; 7isagfee^7lth;:7is;■fendering; for it: xxxX 
, / ; . mi sr ©presents ihevery intent ion o f : the pro sent argument.XX
X X X i i ; i ;-Wo;undeystandthb,;/pasbage as: ‘1 no n-manifestation of the / X X 
i ^(pddltive ):;mean^ compatihle (yogya) ; f ^
' X ' i n ;  cases of. .positive fact only and therefore in__case of ;a- •
, X’X.. . negative fact ft. is non-inanifested).n , •Q;fV^ S’,Dfplki> pp.
:'Xxx : ■ '234 j 238-Q; *7pgyapramagahhaya^cahhava3handharaham1 >X X, ^ ,■ \K': 
. X .1 yogyasyaiva pramanasyanudayab.*;; ;’;'X'LvX; ;X'.;.X ■ XX ''XX: • '
V:;.xv';; 7> It may be aslced' whether theXascertainitent ;of my, dyos> Is X , XX 
: X X X . x sel f-evi dent; :o3? i s ah ^ inf erent ial; j udgmehty. That is o f the X 
1 x ^ x form: P1®3?-8:X my. .eyes are normal and v aiid for the .opera- ; .
: Xxxx' XX: tion of .direct perception, XXXReasoiiXv^because^If see; (or can , Xx; 
XXx X; X see jXthrcnighxthem^ normai Xperceptual condi- X
;. XX::. Xx.--X- tions-,.-X X^ -.;/.:;X' ;:/.-’vX • X X ’X \ XX: ■ <;.X:,x ■ -'X■■■X' - xX^ -X;. X : ;.XX -X;
V;;:'X:X /; 3> For :a:^detailed;' study ;pf:^ X^Ldgical;XSrrors.M "by Indian. logicians X?
 ^ :.XX/:X see Kofth,AtAmismv> PP•131-157? vdn(I^ ^particuiarly for the- X ;
!,Xxx XX,r Xconceptiohv of..the;' regre.ssusXad -infinitum . ( anavastha). p* 156 / - ' 
;■ XX. off tllexsame. . .
7X'VXX‘:7;'X::\Howeveri_;‘to. repudiate the .objections; raised by the 
bpponents^. Parthasarathi !says;.that\ it is: not the Compatibility 
X  or validity (yqgyatva.) of the; yogyanupalabdhi /yhich is, to be : , xy. 
X. ascertained; but rathef ;p7, theXpositive:^means.,. Perception etc.,
. , ;for in case . of the former •yogyatya l i e s ° f  non- XlX’: 
manifestation of the positive means. X In comprehending an 
7 7 - •.-X- absence ( abhava) .-tvheih the’, compatible means of judgment: does X • • 
XX X ;not operate , its f ailure:, ipso f acto 'for&s.* theXcompatibi 11 t.v ■
. ■ 5 \  v \ : utikm)»i)'I <ijvw>iiw»mmmi rp t t W r M m w f W M w i i M H M n r a a i M e u t M M *
XX. ’ :(yogyatva) qjX Noh-aptprehensioh. ‘ .Thusythe; validityof Ncjn- 
X;;.' v apprehension J1 even while present, not Xbei ng appi»ehended some- .
. „ , • times, :f ails to esf ablish; theknowledge ; of the, non-existent;
Xx^X / and sometimes; ypgyatva eyen while • not present establishes the X.
. XknoWledge ’p^^ho- honXexistent; being: through illusion taken as
7... actually, existing. . ./The absence of •cognition (I. e X  anupalabdhi),.
Xxxb:bweverXrbecoines; the instrument of knowledge by its mere being X; 
X/; :.y . .and not1by. the ;fact of^^^bXbeing known| so. tha7 it (our . •
•XX' X; po.sition) Xis-not liable;1 to the; charge of iiifdnite regress. X /X
Tmmn—pniiin-maMiiurt n ~hp< imi immi iwii i ■■■■>! mi   nmmniin.i—— i i n f c i — » i .iwi'muAu—j_ mxi_—mMJUiiu—
'•Xpv\/'X^ --lX7i.';7upiraV.pp. -y.V ..7 \ V _ X/ XX . , : ■ Xx7-f77:" . '-X ,.
; 7 7  :Y• ^ ;. yogyanupdlambho hi karapam tafra: yogya.tva&X;
’■ .1'- • 7 X  \7X7;jflatataya;L;y ^  tatah sadeva yogyatvam
XX\;7,X'v:k^d5qid:. ujiiatam nabhaydm avadharayati ,^ kadacit, tv avidyamana-X 
X . -. J mevd;':7c>gyatva:m" bhrantyaXxii^cityabhavam avadhapayati. ; upala- X 
■.X.X.XXxX tdhy -abhavastu sanmatrataya karapam ha jnatataya tena X 
■X /; x : ninaVasthapattir , iti .sarvam ayadatam, Trahsiation by . -X ;..
XXXX X;" VenkatramaiahfXp.lSdX'Xf'X.' ■' X X7:.7X XXx'xx Xx • ‘ ;V7 ’:'
(B) ■ Thhsy.'hecbrdihg..• tol- the xthe'/; importance, of \\X
perception, In the case of Non-apprehension Is. not to. he re- 
Xxjectedaltogether^ X"'■/The’ .totality;;pf /conditidhsvof ,pe rceptibh X;7 
must he fulfilled first, and only, then. Non-apprehensiony c^nyy- *y 
yx\operate in coghising/non-existehqe.l . This. is exiDX^essed by the 
v term 1 y o gy a1 r e f e r r i ng to !-prama£a!-, The yogy at a of per”
X X’V - oeption /(pramapa). involves- the sense-contact .with'.'-the- ( empty) X .
locus/and the.cognition X of perceptihiiity of . the object, ; 
yXX;,.'; These two;’bbnditiohs are theybasis of; NbhXapprehension or
/ non-manifestatioh of perception,which, lead the cognition\ X 
yX', .of non- existence. / If the terni f ybgyahupalabdhi * were not I. .xX/x,-:
explained In these: terms ,X namely: 7he  ^ Non-apprehension o f  a . X y X
’ compatible /means"^^"(yogyapramapabhava) - but taken only as 1 the 1 ' 
y Nph-apprihensibh'ofo perceptible.oh j ec t *, then, the diffi- 
culty would; arise that a 011111 man, too ,,; would apprehend non- .... .
. .. existence of a perceptible object by mere Non-apprehension,
X Therefore, the^ totality of cohdit ibris of perception is X v.
. necessary,'1' / .X ; XyX:‘7 :7‘vvvXy. \-xXX cxi-yxb■' X ■yy -y xxy -yXX' Xy ,,.
: t* 'N.ltaust;,.,.. p,199r X*^a 2aiyamyhndhasyapl::'ghatadyanupala- 
; y bdhisatvad l^ata^ Spatti^iti vacy,am> . abhavat/ X;
X vgf aheldhikara^ he tut ky atadarthahi y
XX / XV^rad^f^apek§apat • janakasampadakatvenanyatha'siddhatavendri- /’ 
Xy : yasyabhavagrahe hetutyasambh.aya& ca, X , na ca bhutale ghat- y 7, 
abhav.am pa^yamltyadyanubhavahurodhenendriyass^abhava jhana—
; janakatyam ;itf yacyam,. ghatoXhastifiy^janamityadyakarakanthh- .,
,  X X/y ■ ayehhVtadpdanufc^ -(ya&antivTO
. , .• v- • ■ -anyathahid^a/:/== ^ accessory. c'.ausbybee:’ Atomiami y p.,199X ,/y . X .
xXXyyX/X -- ■- : ' 'y:7X-x- ;,y-;y: /X,X :yy- y;yy-.yX ; X X ■' y-Xvx-.."‘Vy' . X ; |X(0
:. However,. : si no e the /pe r c e p t i o nl 6 f the locus and y X X
Xy. perceptihility of. the object are (only) ; accessory causes , /
■'“v. ;X yX(.^ahyathasiddha)/ of. chdaiingX^hd; composing theXcognition.ofX .
; hon-exist,ence, there is ho possibility of its being appre- 
X,/ //handed throughthe sense-perception. The pi>lmary cause 
; y x 'Of negatiyey cognition, yth^XBha^ta/ would .insist , is Non- X X X y .
. apprehension of perception, /i.e.*, a negative one. A state­
ment: *■ I; see the absence of a pot on the floor", is not to be 
; v . ■ ■ regarde d a s X1 o g i c a 11 y c o rre c f .* X . / The yc orx*e c t X p r o p o s i t ion, ,
X' ; According to: the Bhattas is:’ 111 .know that there is no pot 
X . X°h the floor)u X 7x^9 ft-X ^ X  Xxx X ' 'X/ '" ’ ' X; . x
'• y XX,= From this/ it may be; concluded. thatX this intery/XXx xx
pi^eta.tion of the theory, namely, . tlie Non-apprehension of a 
X valid perception ..(yogyaprainapaupa 1 abdhi), ipso facto becomes y 
■; an independent, means,: seems ‘/merely /ahyattemptXpn /the part of
X ' 'X.,. the 1 ater Blla11as f p be. in. keeping wi th v the /y few of Kumarila 
X Bhatta, who-' said/, that XNegafion^ was absence ,pf//a (positiye) y ;./
- /•■/. means/'o f  ■. cogni tion, ^  . XX' X’hxX7v: X/xy.:,yx / /'X y;y/XX: x / y;y:;Xy yy/x -. X/ y' X
1. Of , , supra/ p
However, the main defect of this interpretation is quite 
X // evident inasmuch as;it can repudiate only perceptibility yy 'y
being ascribed to non-existence/but it cannot deny its ; y
■ y inferential; character., X /^ihce ;the/totality of conditions .
X of perception (yogyata) is admitted, it would be. quite
correct to reg^id it .as an.inferential, cognition in • ; 7 7  -
which by perceiving one term we; infer the btheiy'which, ' ' 
although invisible [or absent, can be visible. For , ; ; X
... x instance, X byxperceiving .the bare locus, yogyata of p e r -  x .
ception is ascertained, and:fiom this the.absence of a -
:,y . yXxy ■: pot; can be . inferred. y Thus, . this, interpretatibh of
;/ ■ the theory of yogyanupalahdhi also fails to\establish a • vX
re al difference' be tween Non^apprehensi on as an absehc e of; ;y y y. 
perception and Non-perception .(anupalabdhi)Xas an in-. ; X y y / Xy 
fepence•1 ' ;V ■ * . x "■ •’"‘./'•■XX. ,VX. ■■-,-”'XX,:.
■: / l. See supra’< I p p .i$ 7 7 7 .
y-'v- Section VIII -v J ' y :X //X
: ''Xx.y ;,/:..: V: y , - The Nyaya-Vaiseeitea
■/ • . ;/.-X Or the ' Percept ion of :Non~exi stence through; the' Unique/
X'XtX/vy/Relation ofXQuaflfierXandXQuallficand. ; X\ V . v
:/ :, ■ y : V X The Bha’ttu theory of Negation, namely, that * ahhava *
X:;X/y /yi,s/an^  Ihbepehddhtv-ineans (prams/pa) of negative" cognitlon, is "■;
X ; /ykx/aisb 'opposed by. the Nyay a~Valde§ ika iogic'ihhs.X : The Buddhist/ ’■ 
?""X1 /i.x- and/•the.X'Pr.abhakardry-;-we. have / already • discussed above 
: i / : . X/ They regard negation as. au .inferential - judgment.,^ Jains X’ \  /■
/'/;logiciahs alsp/y;opposed the /BhaiXta/1s /ylew^ and propounded a -/y 
X X : . //y X X t h o r y ^■■of'7oh“perceptiony(hxiupaiabdhi.) /which is somewliaty sitailar 
./■ / X07X'/:^ BUddhi s,ty.and ithe' Prabhakara/ view/ of ariupalabdhi •'?/.,/ ■' /
X ., /Here, in the present section', we propose tot Investigate: the ;,. /
X VX question /ofX;thOXmeans of; cognlaing’hoh-existence,1 ■ according - /, X 
/yy;-, to the Nyaya-Va/ihesika theory qfy perception :(sannikar^a) .Xy x/,x,,y 
y / .■ yy -Here we ,shall / see/ (1) to, wha txextent the laterVaisesika /' :X 
,/y / ’ Xthinkersydeviatedy from Pra^dstapadh, and: joined/the Nyaya X X
/ X ,/; system on. this question, (.2) the. necessity to postulate an
/. unique relation. (vide.sapata) between absence arid Its locus, ' in
1 . Q f . supraypp, %7 v;*'SXtj>y, I S 7  ^  j '7 /XXX;/Xyy;X/:;.; ./ ■ — /. "/X;
•2. :See HIE., > pp• 287,-288; pp♦ 120-125; N. Theory of Knowledge, 
X/X:; pp. 179-180;.: NA3WT. , Notes, p . 229. X/- v X ' 'X : ^  / . X 
3. O f. N A S W T ., pp. 62-73; xN. /Vini^caya. by Akalaipka,, Vol./II, 
■X ; pp. .190-195; • Pramapa^Mxmaiiisa by Hemaehandra, pp. 8-9.. /:'•:
X y X; -\X. X ..orderx ,to:' e.stabii &h/‘ the: perceptual character of //negation,
/ and (3) an exhaustive table of formulae suggested by the . y 
■ v ; y Nyaya-hXaisbqikaXlogibf dna/wi^^ all- types XX X X
■X :V‘X X/ of negative cognitions by perception. y. -xy X XX X X/y
X c yX' X . ; :-x. Th^ sync retired- NyayaXyai^e^ikaX. including the neo- 
X/X/X X ,;;/;Nyaya>:y.-mai.ni.airis /that they/cognatlonf of ./nonrexistence "Cabl^
X; XX ': vis a perceptuaiX judgment . They argue: . . : XX ; X . .
X XXy/XxX’. : •' / "SinceyweXhayeXsuch everyday /experiences :as "lyhavb ;
X X seen that the re xi s. rbaltyXndXja^ ohthe Xf Ibor/," / the ■ sense- yX 
X-’ /.perception is .invariably proved to/JbeX vdlid/ (anahyathasiddha) - 
yxx / by affirnia t i v e (.anvaya) as well as negative (vyatireka) X  X : 
/ : , X -/ ins t.ances o f per ce i ving. absence,. • The ref or e, it is ( quite)
X correct to/posit that (the;ycqgn:ition\pf7: abhavd is perceptual
;/xyyX //and pro due.ed by/ the /sense-organs" .^* XX, x; /yy X XX/y-X 
However, this sense-perception:should not be, regarded as a 
/ //• /Xx/simpib-.or indeterminate perception (nirvikalpaka pratyak§a), .
X/:X X; !• N.Kaust.,// p,159; 1 vastuto bhutale ghato nastiti may a dvdtam ,: 
XX /yX X 7 ^ ^ aPPhuvid^ipr.iyasiyahanyathasIddhanvaya-vyatireka--* . X; X, / 
/XX X X  X y / vad ab^o endr iy a j any am ; pr atyak^am/evabhavasya /yuktam. -X Notice 
.XX the use of, the terras 1 anvaya-vyatireka1 in the ordinary X/
/ sense of aff;irmation; apd/negation /(yidhi-nibedha)" but/ not X- 
XX/.X y X. in/ thCXIhferentlal sense', viz.,/s i m i l a r  aiidXdissimilar .ihXX /X; 
//-X/ y X stances of example. See also Pbh., and NK., pp.205-206, / ./
: /X y X where/ the term * vidhi 1 /. 1 s used- in the sense of 1 anvaya *. and X.• 
xX7*X/'XXx-/.yFVSV., pp.,/35y38Xwhere the termb"X*VidhilXand’ ’ni^edha* are /x;
X used in/theysense' of X!anvaya-vyatireka.7: X.For the inferential 
X ,. / yy X‘ / conceptions of the terms se.e Atomism,/ pp.118-120.X /.
For. :negaiiqh/.i/sXdepe^ '.o7fWhi;‘ch/X:i-t;-i‘S ' the / X >
negation# :• The;perception.of something posi tive, e •g. 1 pot1, 
can be. simple//for.;by its:. Very nature-, / if. does; not /depend /on/: // 
some; other .entity, x/But since /there/ is ho 1 i/nnate/ nafur*e'1 // -//; ■ / 
,( svarupa) of / absence; other than /that //of; i ts ybeing//the negation ;X 
of the/ comiter-positive (pratiyogin),/it cannot be perceived 
unless, the nature of the negn turn /has not been deter mined. ***; Xi/-X 
This view,-/ although. on a different level, may ,be. compared. XX.* . 
with Russell rs theory 'that 1 not1 does not belong to the class/ / 
of ’'bb ject-words7 buf; to upropositional ■words1'. ^ / ,/:/;// .■'/■
/;;X;;/;/ - Pra^astapada does not recognize abhava /as ..an entity/ 
/(padartha). . He denies that, it is an. independent me ahs of ,
knowledge 7ppamapa) on the ground that it is an. in inferential; 
judgment •. ; Pra^astapada, argues: . X . X  X v / /■
1. NK,. p.226: Xyuktam ghafadinam indriyasannikar§annirvikalpena, 
/,/:/ ;jgrahandmi/7edam syarupasya/ parahapeksatvat. abhivasya tu//, //
pi^atisedliasvabhavasya svafupameva yasyayameva prati§edhab 
/ sy a t _ t adadh inam, _ at as /1 at pr a t i § e dha.t am antarena tadabhavasya:
, / / s v ar up antar abha v a t it a ir a sy a/ pr a t i yo g i s v ar up a-hi rup apam ah t ar t //
, epainirupapam a^akyam '. Xx x //■-X X ;V- // '/X///' 'X,. ■ / /'////; -v/ X X// X 
/ "The gfas^h&^^'XV/aguoX^^perceptionh^n cohsequencei of a con- 
/ ; ■ /■= he c t i o n with; the / sense-organs, is possible for pots &c., y 
•■•/■ beeauseXthingSvlike/ /these,/ do no t/. dep e hd in their innate. natune 
. on some thing else. But the; innate nature of noh-existencey '•
; having /negation a/s Innate /character,/. is./dependent oh that.
‘ .///whose/ hega^qn/ it/ is# Therefore (scil#) since there is no /
X ,6/the:r/7imateXh non-estistence / than that of, its being X r
, / the hegatipia of the (positive entity■in question) no deter­
mining of it is possible without/ the determining of: the iii- 
/nafe//ha;ture/of/ i ts trailyoglnX( cor r el attvd; object ) . " x X  ;/*; 
Translatibn ,by Faddegbn, V. System> p#785w ; // /; x  X X /
2. Inquiry into Meaning and Tmth, /pp.70-7d. . ./ . ■ ;v ;
X . "Negation is merely. (a: form of) inference, just as ' x  
X originated effect is a: pro/bans for the .existence of the . y 
VX- yX; cause, so is the)not; / originated!elfect the probans for the xt X"
;■ / non-ex 1 s1 ence of" the cause. X ;..\ X  v X / _■; . .. yyy
In other words^/vdieu^Xanybffeci,y/eVgh ffi 
/ ? . ;. of the oh j ect A is produced in . the. intellec t , on the /basis .
)) XXX'9f7!?77aw'■ Of causality, ywe.i deduce from it the presence .of .
/ ;XX its cause.V. i>oi ,? the qb: j ect A which produces the corresponding. 
lyyyx Xycognif ipn^x /Thud/opytheXbame /basia/of the causal!ty,Xwhen 'they / ; 
7 /yy X/y- effecty(i. e# : the coghitipn yinXfhis, given instance) is not;X/yl ■
• T'hoduced, we invariably can deduce the absence of the corres- y
y y / ponding cause (i.e,the; bbjcct) , granting, that' the totality /)/x/ 
X y / .of tiie tauses qf/ producing/ a cognition is present.^ . ./ ; X. .,//■
/ X > H ow ever> ;/P ra^asfapad!n / v iew  t h a t  n e g a tio n  is  an XX x x 
X  i n f e r e n t i a l  judgm ent , Was ign ored ; by th e  cpm m entator S r i  dhara  . 
Who s a id : / ■ X:X.'X' - " ' -v X.-vX. X XxX'X. :X X/XXyX/  /;• ;,X-' ' x X . X X ,  V- XX
,i. / PBh., p. 225 7  * abbayo ^ py lahumaham/e^ ykaryain; / ;y
; karapa-sadbhave . 1ipgam e vain ahutpahnamX karyam karapas adbhave
Xyyyy .. lipgam.1 ■ xyx-xyy: yyxx;x-X-xx .• -X xyy;' : ..:xy X ;x;• • - x yyv/Xy/ 
:X,2, Thi s th e o ry •i s similar to the; Buddhist view of; the, negative 
X XXxy X X X e X ^ e ^ p a l a b d h i ■: or ;Non-perception)lx7eey nugra. p p X . • 
/ X i X ■ XyX .;: / yXx • /ifhip X’PPfht: ;71fbX/suppprts: t he xtheory Xof - Buddhist; in- .
vX-/: fiuehce on Pradastapada. Cp. Keith, Atomism. , pp. 101-108; '
X/;;Xx/; Sinha,. Hip., Vol. I. pp.292-293# X X X ;XX/Xx y y-yX-; XXX.yXx
y X ; "Just, as; existence,' non-existence also/ is capable 
/■X of being, apprehended by the s e n s e s " H e  argued: "There - 
Xy X; X ;X i s: alsovan;/( actudl) y sense^cpntacf with non-existence which is 
y the collocating causeyof/the perception/of the/non-existence,
(just) as it is; in the case of perception of ;the (positive)
X floor. Xy// /X. /; X'X 7:.v :XyX / '/ // ; / ••. ;. yX X- , : X ' X X
. ; ; ; / x On/this’/ppiht, seems,; toy have^/been greatly/: ; y X
influenced by the great Naiyayika Uddyotakara. For Uddyotalc- 
ur a is ; the first:Naiyayika; author w h o , as we shall see below, 
yy • propounded a systematic formula oil determining the:• se'nse- 
■////;/ contact (sannikarpa)/with/a negative fab tv. Sridhara1 s. ' X'-/ 'X 
, ; ,/y -yexpositipn of the; subject and hia table, of; many types r of; ■ X y
; • //f 'sannikar^a"y( see/below)X.appehr/tp;be based on. that of Uddy-
: ‘ otakara.^ ; Srldhara, as/a matter/of f ac t, freely quotes the :
■' ■ X-Naiyayiica/yas. //an- ’ authority^ X/:':' It seems; that. the sync re ti sm ; / /X;
■ /./hetween% the;/Yhi&ep ika -ah&ythe^^ which began at y y: 7
. ‘ least as .earljr as Vatsyayana^ (300 A.D,) with regard to the
——— TTP r ~ T T ^ ------ - ------ — r~pmr r m — i r-------- --rr— tt>tt n— ir~fiTiTJ iiium — mr inwirpp-ni in<.......................
/I. p.226:y/bhavayad ■abhavo*pi indriyagrahapayogyah.
; 2. ibid., p>229:: . ybhutalagf ahapayad: abhavendriya-sannikar$o *py 
y /'//.X y/X /; abhayagrahapasamagrivX See /also basgupta, HIP,, ; Vol. /lv p.359.
3* NVT. 9 on the IIS•, 1.1.h. (KSSo) p.31. / See infra p. XX
X . : h. :Cf. NK., pp. 115, 226 and NVT., pp.9, 30.-31, where the X
;/ '■;// X prbblems/ pfXperdepticn/ahd ;hpn-ekisteiicd:N!as^ an entity (pad- X
// '■ artha) are discussed. X XX-. /.■ • .XX/-- . y X . y
■ ■ 5 . .  CfAtomistvX/pt.21.X\yy:X '/XX; y yXX x / V :/1 ;; 'X;X /;./• / X-y XX;
'/Xy- /question, of negation, /was ^ by Sridhara• It has been;
somewhere .else that . Ira^astapada was greatly influenced,
, ; A by/tHeyBuddh logician bighaga.*^/ Srldhara, ^  . X
himself a Vaisepika,, apparently dfeviated fbom PraAastapada, V;
X the oldercommentator/ofy.-the. Vaibepika-Sutf^ incorporated
Xy : Xx . the thedryybf /the/Naiyayikas and ;as we shall/spqnysee., ^ sxlb7 yry y;.
/Xyy X. sequent tb/Ai^/tho Nyaya-Vaidepika /logicians)/Including the X 
yi:lxf;A;.iiep^  it,y'y,-Xy/Jyy/-:..yyy; X - :-, / >■._./ : • ,X X y / 'Y.XXv'/'x'
: y, X: :y y According, toy the,; Nylya-Vaile pika, X ail :s ense-ppr c apt i ons
depend,oh the contact of .the sense-organ with its/object; And'
' y ;/yy/ thi sX; contact Is /palled/ 7ahnlkarps!t. , X It is described asy x xt/ /
y'y . X/y' "the function of . the sense-organs by means/ of . which they enter X ,
• = Xxyy into a particular relation/with /their apphpprihte objects/and y 
VyyX/y bring' about the perception .of the objects. . X, X / X ; ;y X X
’ Xy XI./ Of. :Dr..Xy.:B.Pathak:yinHistory/ of; Saiva Cults-, in. Northern 
v/y; Xy ; y/,//India fhomXiqscriptions Vy(/Vaf I960), p.2h./ oh .the y -, /.:
. yy'yyy-X-basis’ of/ sorne^  Chinese t ext s, mantioils a ’Nyaya ’ school of 
'Xy-XXyy/thought;called "Naya-soma".y Its yfounder>: Somasarma, is -yy 
yXy X; y ; ysupposed,/to' be/the/ preceptor,/of Akpap^-da; COotama) the founder 
/■//y/XXX;;X’i/X of''the/'/Nyhya/i-systbmy/and KapadaXiheX originator of the Vaidep- X 
'X.;;/' .;;//;• X ;/’ika system.., Pathalc has suggested to me that. Bignaga also) 
x/; .might have been influenced by Naya-soma logic* See' also 
Xy v-y/X X B L . , I..yp.70.yX- .Xyy "-X, X-.y/Xy;;^ ./Xy/” 7  / ■ -X-//. y 7
X y >XX 2v NVT./, 17/17:/; XindriyepalAhasya sannikarpad ya dutp adya te - X 
; : / ;jhanam tatpratyakpamr; PBh., p.186; NK., p.188.., TS., 1.30.
/ lyy/•• -/ Primer., p.ihi;TSCX , p^ 35,. - yA-y-'-vX- .x -.
; .v'yX;';'X:y),.x/f:x/xX' x7XIy''/f .y/Xy/ y y X I y
X ' X; ■ . 1 : The. objects are many-fo.ld, namely, 'substances,
X; ,, y;qudIities,X;aCtiohh,Vete.7\ while In fact only a substance can 
X .come/ into. aXdirect contact with- a sense-organ. Therefore,; ;
; ; ;. quali t i e s, act Ions, . and universals are perceived through the
..//•' ) sense' contact/with hXsubstance In:.which they) inhereX.'' For 
X . y. instance, the /eye can come into. contact with a substance XX.. X 
X;/. y ; "directly"Xbut: only; ■"ihdirectly7%lthv a colour ."which inheres 
in.that substance, and still, more "indirectly" vXith the class 
XyX concept which. ihhefesXih: colour which resides in the object 
with which/the eye Is in con junction"/.^ ■/ ■ yy':X ‘ 
yX X x /X X ; The. sense-oboect contact (sannikarpa) is six-fold:^ X
1. ibid., pp.74-75* Xyy-X -/ y  : \ yy-' ;. .y-
2 • IP. ,y Vol. v II j yp. 53• See also Atomism, p*75: X y
IPP., p>77* , Note according to the Buddhist theory of x
■:^ . perceptidn is perceived "directly". ; X
3. NVT., I..1.Ip.y (KSS v)/-/p.-31X ‘isannikarpaljrpuxiati . poqha bhidyafe 
. / / saijiyogab saijiyuktasamavayab saijyuktasdmavetasamavaysamavaya^ 
-■ samavetasamavayo yidepahavidepyabhavad ceti.1 * y:
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• A:'/;:N The term sannikar§a or .sense^contact j ^thusf pervades .
. the three1 relations*ylz,/,> Conjur^
(samavaya), and the. Rei at ion o fpre di c a t e and subject (or 
. v.-^ haX:'ifd©r/and;A<^nalifi'Cahd . := vi ^ e§aha—yiSe^yhbhava) «/*^".
. The first . three modes; of i sahnikar§a, amorigst the six des- 
- , cribed in the tableare based - on the first, relation, saijiyoga;
. . i the.: foui'th' and the f ifth. modes are b ased on the second relation,
, ;samavaya; ^ahd " the sixth- mode pervades the third, relation,
: ; i i y i & e t a  i > ; Through ^thegSir'stciagde of sanhihar^a-.we,' perceive
V. substances, gualit ies, act!ohs/. etc. >; are cognized through the 
V ' ; -^second. >• The gbnus^pfi apprehended;through the
;• ; thirdhi; The ;: ;souhd 'ih^ fourth; the genus ; • "V
; of s ound through the; fifth. And the. absence is perceived through;' 
•; /the s i x t h ; ^ :' ;4;;A;a/. ••'•/ //iv/v/:/'• ■ -i . . . •/ . .-'-'1v;/- :
v;-;;. , The sixth mode of perception or the sense-contact is ;/
;:a ; ;‘;:; / / ; s p e c i d e !signed Jfo^ihe perception of ..ir^erehce and non- /aa;a/. 
\.v;.existence• ^ S i n c e  these two entitles have no "autonomous ,
a;aaa 1*. Ibid: _ f so f yara saimikar§a4abdah\ saQiyoga-samayay;a^yi^eaap.avi^e- •
■ ; ^yabhava-vyapakatvad upattah1;. • • '■'•'/ii/; V
/ / : ;HK>* p*l95- .itatra' saHiyogad:; dravyagrahap.am samyukta-samayayad
:• / ; /:;;:;guhad.ipr.atltlh! samyukta-samaveta-samavayad gupatyadi jham 
; ■ 'Va'* a - V'samayayacc^ samayetaysamavayacchabdatvagraha^am;
; sambaddha-vi £e §apa tay.g c abhavagrahapam ill • . f /
a 3. 1WT. ,a loc. cit: ! samavaye cabhave. ca viee§anavi£e§yabhavad 
; aa a. ■ iti; N.Kaust;/• p #135,a 1 samavayabhavayor grahe vi^e§ap.ata- ;
■: . sannikar§a' 1 ti; M i ; pyl95 *. SM(iCSS) *•'■ p, 193. : .:
existence” V  it i sv- maintained /•••that • they 'can be perceived only 
. as . attributes: orqualifiers;t.yileaapa) of the: objects in which 
they reside;'*' --As ; far;/ah; t ^  is' cone erne d:; .
the cone eptioh .is-” at least' simpleui.but;: the cape of non-r 
existence is, a complex one 'which raises some;/Qbvipus; diffi­
culties • ’ '.Since,aM'ny a-'\;i: s - ho t«• a. substance. (dr a vya). it, cannot 
be perceived through conjunction, or‘direct contact between /
: the Vi sual /senses' and the 'vabsenee. Nor: can it inhere in, a 
substance > for it ’/is; not /a/quality, activity/;or a,class.*' . 
Therefore,; thp perception^ of absence of a jar, for instance, 
.involves two contacts, (a) -first/between the visual.'sense-; 
organ. and-1 the (bare)/lobus;and;;(b) second a peculiar-pualifying- 
relation between the locus: and the-absence of the.jar. Thus, .
"we ; perceiy^ ■ ddaltfyihg,the floor in which the-:
negatum, jar*; is not: present According to ; this ■ view absence 
. and universals- are, perceived; by- the same sense, .organ by which 
the particular, is perceived (yenendriyepa ya vyaktiy gphyate; 
tenalvendriyepa tajJatihttadabhavo1 pi gphyatejl- Therefore 
the hyaya-yaideeika.. maintains that cognition of absence is a 
perceptual judgment. / ;• • . - " \ .v ■ , / - •
*A~r J ~~TrT^ '* <kJ~rTWTrr~l 1 i i i i i m niiii< i w p t i i i ■ f c f . n H * mi* mibhiii^  m . i ^  n m i
1. Atomism.,. p .77 v . : ,.• -"f  ^.... • ". •■ ■■■“ ••/,
2. Of. ibid; Materials,'- p.58 (29) -  ^ -ht; 'v >
3 i , N K * p > 2-29.2: 1 abhayaT"Vi^i§tsbhUtaiagrahanatf ; - See' also Chapter 
II, the section concerning the impor'tahce of perception of : 
the locus. : . , ■':/ , :-
Appai-ently, the early. Naiyaylkas, including Vat.sy ay ana did
•■ ; bi^bor std the viapa-videeyabhave' thdory ■:in the sense :
it., is used in the present context. Dignaga seems to be. the
;’/, -■ - - V ; ,-t; /../ .;;;' t ', - ",:' ‘ ;f./: /over •. ■
(F)
However, the relation ’between the absence anti, the locus,
namely , ;the. vi £e$auata i s.; consi dered • to "be a.. kind;of 11 Pecull ar; ,
. Relation ( svaruga-saijibandha)!, i. e. a relation peculiar to the
'.'pair--Jlt connectbuii'I: \ The other .two'; relations,, hkmelyy
i Conjunction (saijiyoga) and Inherence (samavaya) are not
applicable to non-exi stence.; For the former is only possible .
where <the;,; re1! at adareitwo sub stance S; While. the; absence is not
a sub s t anc e• And the 1at ter 1 s applicable to the cases where
the two terms :'ai?eIso . related that one of them inheres in the :
.. other,e•g./ as a colour and- a flower. In the instance of ’
absence and the . floorneither of the two inheres in the other.
t If they were so related they would, be perceived alv/ays to­
ft, "I ■ . : 2 • ' '  ^ . . . ' • . ■ : - ■ - -
■ gether. ■ ^ - ... V *  f'f. . ..ff.'f-
, Pootnote coritinued: pf.? 'ff if? .;■ f-.f- -
first to use this phrase;/ "yatra; vi£e§ya-vi&e;§a$abhaVatL. tatra .
: s amanendriya-goc ara tvam-1, , Pr am ana- s ammp-c gaya-.vr 11 i, . p. 5 9 • . ,
( The.v:Sanskrit text of • t hi s work. is no t avaliable in iis, original,; 
i,fofm)i■ ; ;fhiswconcepiiQnf been borrowed by
tUddyotakara fronkDignaga. Gf. llVT; 1.1.U , supra p. ;
Materlals>:,V;f^ 4d»^ -":U— ‘
'2,. Hiriyahha1 s. comment s' on the, svar upa-sambandha are very : note- :
'• iwor tliyy;,He writes: "This . seems fust the. monist* s internal , 
relation.;'TheNy ay.atVai&p$ika postulates it only to emphasize
1 the distinction between,the, relata which really does not exisl 
. ,:as e.gi .;in tlie' case .pf^the .bhufala and ghafabftava;• where" also 
; ; the vi^esapa-vi^esyabhava is only svarupa.. That is, even
where the cone ep tion is precisely that of the monist, the 
',V, f •pftyayat^^^^ refuses• • to ’recognise if and invents an; onto-;
logical: fictioii to connect things which^are not distinct. .
. . This shows its wholehearted opposition to the monist* s view 
t of Relations.11 .Studies; p;.117(8). It should also be noted .
; ■  here../;tiia.t in, the Buddhist nominalism>> too, Relations represent
..if. -i f - f  .':...if1 vf- .1 1 -f f f  i f f vf . fff", /over ; ■
f. " .i-r" ■ v v r; v^ :. ‘v ;/f f  ■ f  V ■; f
/ . . • : • . V''' ' ' • ; '""; ■ ‘' i, - \ ; ry if /i; ■'/ i,. , i . i. ,
.The postulation 'of.this/peculiaif relation;by the if-i', 
Nyaya-Vai£egika seems to have been forced upon;; them by their , 
naive realism ,that non-existence. is the yobjecf. of. a perceptuaT 
judgment* , -On, the other, handy Bhifta Mlmaijisaltas although, y- 
agreeing with;the Nyaya-Vaisegika view that it;is the objecty
of dlr'ect ;.apprehension X prameya) insist thafcany/ contact !
' : /absencebetween the sense-organ and nonfexistence/is impossible . ;
For according to the Mimaijis.akas the contact -between: the senses ,
and the objects of^perception;can;only be either conjunction; f
■ ' j A  . -.V y ■ ■ ’ ' ... • . :■ ;
or inherence.; The Miinaijisakas therefore,, posited Negation <■-/;;
as ah independent means for its., apprehension while the ,t . i
Nyiya-Vaidesikas invented 1 an, ontological, fiction to connect ,;
things which are not distinct"^ •••-.. 1: / V" •,
(a) ; - :Vy- ;
Now,, we come to the gtiestioii ofVblassification, of the f 
sixth mode; of pepoeptlpn or senses contact ,(vi^egapata) through-.; 
which the cognition of non-existenc;e is established.. . ,
It has been stated above/that senses can come into;,
Footnote 2 continued:
nothing real per; se;.beside;- the things related and this, view, 
is also accepted by Bradley. \ See BL. , Vol.I, pp.2h5~2h8, p.2^6 
n.l|: Bradley,yPrineipies/ol*;Logic,Jp.96. - ... v ..i
1., Atomism, p.78;; NK; ,J;pil95;f IPB. ,V p.78 h.2v 
2-. Gf . supra pp.fz^yy. ■ ■ : - 7 f
3• Hiriyanna, op.cit. f; . ■ : i
■ contact With’: a ' substance only and; therefore in all r inodes of f -
; i i t v; perception'•contact'with a substance is: necessarily. ndirectn ;
fy.f -or "indirectl,v^. ’ In. the sixth mode/of perception, too, the
y.'fyy- •• dense contact is primarily referred to a substance (locus)'.
. But negationvis not limited to substance only; ■.■fit may referf 7 
ff y-y- to-''• any,/pther.vent.i;ty, f qualitjr,acti.onyandvgeneric character or f,
' ■ , uni Verbal jail bsmanya)^ ^/'which are- to be establishedby ; • :
f f jf ■the other five modes of perception or contact. ; Theyidegapata,
. thus, can operate only through one,of the five?other modes. . if 
; yf y . For instance, the^ absence ofya guality / is perceived by a f-y 
,yf; variety of the cjuaiifieand relation (yideganata). .applied to 
;■ f yf the:.secqndymodefofyedhtgct^ viz. y / .the inherence in that ; ;f W  f 
f fff/. .; which is in eonjuncti on v/ith tiie senses. For that is the 
•f ; y . contact through^which we perceive a qualityof an action.2. .
'y : Ih the ;sameywayvythe:: absence of sound, is perceived by the ;
ffffff variety.of ■ vibeda^dtafappii<3d- to the fourth mode of contact,
;., vis.,: inherence . (samayaya). That is . the absence of sound is 
f yf ffy,perceived- as; quailfyiiig the' dende-organ - the ear-drum - y y. "ff 
; f f  ;f f  pervaded by aka da o r e  the r whi ch i s the substratum of sound. ^
: y . Thus, with ; regard to : i is reference to. the five - (posit ive) i mode s 
-yyy y-v of contact, the nega ti v e mo de of? contact or thetuualificand;/
■ f V-"' . ,.;Seeynupra . pVlt$ $ffff/fff ‘■-■V; fff ' f ■ f ,.f ' y'' - ■ ff.: f /
, f-d 2*fCff supra.>pffff \ 'ff-.v.. f f ; f^f'f f '! \ ;f:r . ■ yyy', v y-y- y f
y 3. IPP,. , p.78 y y 7 yf yf ';f ? : f y f  ’
X os
relational ;perpepiibn is; eiassifled ;as ".follows:1
1. Srldhara (NK., p.195) seems'; to be. the first to give a '
: four-fbld classification of vise^h^ata in:tlie;.following
'words:-"'’' ; 1 : • . '' ' .vU'.;,‘-'V
1 yatsaiiiyukta-samaveta-videpapatyena rupe rasadyabhavagrahapam 
’ yacca saipyi^cta-samavetayviieoapa-vi^e^aoatyena rupat'ye.. 
rasatvadyahhavapra11 tip, y ad ca s amavetav id e §apataya ■; 
kakare kliakarady abhavavagamb y ad c a samveta-samave ta- 
vise§apataya gat ve, khatvady, abhava s aijiv e danam tat sarvaiji ;;
. saqibadclliavi s epapabhavena. sa ipgphi tam'1 . • -  /• . , ' T  ^--Vv.
Pupatamakara (N. Kaust., pp.. 135~136) i; gives a six-fold 
/ division; hs: shown in the /table ; which" is essentially^based ■; v h 
on Sridhara * s text .but; also"• seems' to have incorporated^ - ';/■• .
1 ••'•••••'Vi'gvaiiatha.f;;s.•_yiow<- of the diyision;,. ; pie , latter is also
primarily based .on that of, 3rIdharaf s.: ;;;
P • 193 • .,We have given the table* mainly^ according to 
Pupatamakara. and Srldhara* ^ y;: ' VI'
.N. Kaust; > pp. 135-136> the' text reads: . . b ’7.
1 si ca vide^apata dvivid^^ '^at-'sambandlid-‘ -
7: vide$apata ca. (l) tatra drot re abdabhiyagr.ahe adya.7 antya 
. , ca__saipyogadipahcanyatamasapbandhabhedena bhi nna. > tatra (2; ; 
bhutaladau; ghatadyabhavagrahe sapyukta-vi sepapata * b(3)
, dukladirupe .nllatvadyabhavagrahe, • sai^ylhtta-samaveta-vi de papafa; 
(h) nllatyidav abhavagrahe ca rsaiiiyukta-samaveta-samaveta- 
-;. vi d e § apa t a;: . (5); kakar adau kii.a t vadyabhaybgr ahe s amave t a--. 
v videpapab.aV ; (6) khatvadau gatyady abhavagrahe samaveta-. 
samaveta-vide§apata iti bodhyam. *' v V . . •• ’; .
CO- M 110
• • ** 0 P
bO P P cO 
O P 0p* 
0 ; -H > 0. 
0 : . CO .0*
•* o - a 0' 
p p cb cd '0 
co o;>,bG'0p 
P. (O o CO .
I
r cd
0 s. aP,S»:0
0 >>H O
Q -p fd
P P: 0
Q?:P
P P ^H -H P £
. cd o P  0: 0 p  o 
P  0 -H P
p 0 01 ed,<H bo 
0 I p o 
Ps->0 0 . 0
p .r- p  f> .0 P 
H P, 0 0 O P  £ 0 > 0* p
bo 0 0 0 p
P P  a VQ 0-H 
0 0 0 -H p 
H 10 > 0 p 
P 0 I . I . ' d 
O 0 0 0 • O 
p p P P  , bO rH 
d 0 P 0 • O
m 0 d > 0 0
,bo 0 ,0 P *h
bO 010 P P O *HH P *H 0 
>>>H P bfl-H P 15 P 
H P  ; *H.p O P  0 O 
0 -H 0 p *H 
P rP P 0 PO ; 1? P P  £
0 0p.
0 P  VQ.
Cs?.£
P PH O  0 
P
P P P 0 bO 0 0P  -H 'H P  P • p; o P0 0 .0 ;0 p !g
p  w 0 i^ bo a 0 0P  0 -H p 0 *P 0 p
p O CQ
bO 0 p O I 10 P 0
p. p o -H , 0 0 P  O
•H - P *H P  0 P 0
>>*H P O P P P» 0 •* 0
P  ^ P 0 p. 0 O P P
H p P 0 >> CO* p
H  O P *rp~. S» 0 0 
0 *H 0 P 0 0 '0 0 rH 0
P. P P O P 0 -H p O H0Vfg P O P ^  > 0 O p
0 P:
O 'P-H 0 bO P
H 0
I b . ' •
p p w  bO 
O *H *H; >a *
H • •, p 1 0  .
P p, 0 O  0 P0, O H  P  *ip ' *rl - 
P *H -H 0 W  
0. p  p P  >10 ** :■, 
bO p: O d 0 P 0 ^  -h 0 a 0 > : :^ rp>_>0 }>p 
p  rp j5 .0 0 0
0 P . 0 W  0*p
P d P  p r. 0 p r
P' O '0 P ' **'0
0 p  P P  ^
bO - P P 0 > P 
PP-T. :«h .bo I O ■
•H : Q P, P 0 =;■>
>5 . >H ■ bo O 4*? 0 *• " 
<p 0 ): P ; 0 O 0
•H P 0 *H 0 > P > 
H d 0 .0 0 0 0 P 
0 P P P. P &  0 0  
d CO 0 0 0 0 p bO 
G? p p  p  0 .0 0P
P. p  P ,> P
0 O M
p  P o 0 d .
p  o p >. • <H: ,p p
•H 0 10 0
P 0 P P.,0 P  v 1 0. *d .:
‘H ,*H P*
. £ 0-^ 0 p
.. p ^ 0. «> o 
H  rQ O P 0 0
0 d >H O P VO p
: d CO P *H .0 -H' 0fg p  0 > *rD
IIA 
*oj.r 
a
ia
s
i
CHAPTER V;
■ P A E l  . I.
• Sections : I* THE BULffllST OPPOSITION TO THE REALIST
THEORY OF UNIQUE RELATION (svabhava = 
Svarupasambandha):
. II. NEGATION IS ROOTED IH:OPPOSITION (virodha):
III. THE THEORY OF APOHA AS CORRESPONDING- TO THE .
. LAW OF CONTRADICT ION (virodha): ;
IV. THE ‘THEORY OF APOHA VERSUS NEGATIVE STATEMENT;. 
P A R  T II.
; ■ English Translation of the Apoha«jSiddhi of
■ . Ratnalcirti. ■
Section I. The Buddhist Opposition to the-Realist Theory of 
Unique Relation (svabhava » Svarupasambandha)
It has been stated above that the Nyaya-Valuesifca 
realists, in order to maintain ,the perceptual character of 
a negative cognition, postulated an unique or simple rela­
tion (svarupa or svabtxavasambandha) between the absence 
and the locus which is in direct conjunction-with the sense- 
organ. This was possible .because they admitted the reality
of relations y i.e., relation itself (sambandha) was 
postulated; as a third unity between the two terms related •;
(sambandhin).^
■ A-- -R-~~B .
However, the, relation of this third unity, with the related 
terms is called a simple relation,, (svabh’ava sambandha)
i.e., a relation without additional relating unities. In 
this Way theIndian realists, escaped from the danger of an 
inf inite regress 11 which" , as.sicherbatsky rightly observes, 
"obliged Bradley to deny the: reality of all relations as 
well as of separate unities and to merge them all in One 
Whole .’V. , Further he explains the Buddhist view: "The
reality of relations required as a corollary the. stability 
(sthayitva) of enduring objects. The Buddhist who denied 
this stability and converted.the existence.of every object 
;into a stream of momentary events (ksanikatya) divided all . 
relations into real (veistava) - that was the relation of 
Causality between the consecutive moments ~ and logical 
(kalpita). these were the relations of the "thing with its 
attributes and,,motions superimposed (aropita) upon it by
productive imagination (kalpana » vikalpa-vasana). The 
first relations can also be called external or causal 
(tadutpatti), the ;second internal or relations of existential 
Identity (t^adatmya) • The subject-object relation was thus . 
a simple relation for the,Realist, and a causal relation for 
the Buddhist* It is clear that the Buddhist ‘ never could 
accept the perceptibility of relation through the senses.
Even causality as a relation was for him a construction of
• ' ' : 1 1 
the mind. Only its members , the foments , were real.,lf
Thus the Buddhist nominalist would not accept the reality
of relation, nor the perceptibility.of negative judgment.
Negation for him is an inferential judgment and inference
does not apply to reality (svalakaana) which is momentary
(ksanilta).• • It'applies to. Uniyersals (samanya-laksana),
which are unreal (alTka) and mere logical constructions
(vikalpa). ... These, points are'important for the study of
Apoha theory*
Section II.. Negation is Rooted in Opposition (virodha)•
For the Buddhist thinkers, negation is based on the
1. Ibid.,
2. PVP. fp.l69: £valaksana-visayam pratyaksam. s’ameinyalalcsana 
vfsayam anumanam. •
a priori opposition (virodha) of the unique particular
■' ; ;■ ■. ■ •: 1 ' 
entities* All negations, according to Dharmalcirti,
are: rooted in Opposition which.can be. divided into two
■classes: :
(1) Efficient opposition or, Incompatibility (sahabhava- 
virodha); . ; ' . .
(2) Logical opposition or Contradiction (anyonyopalabdhi- 
; , pa r i ha r a ~s t hi t ilaks ana -v i r odha) •
The former is defined in the following passage: .
MWhen (one fact) has duration (as long as) the sum- 
total of its causes remains unimpaired', and it (then) 
vanishes as soon as another, (the opposed), fact appears, 
it follows that both are incompatible, (or efficiently 
opposed), just as the sensations of heat and cold*’1^
The second type of opposition is explained as follows:
.“There is also (opposition between two terms) when .
: their, own essence consists in mutual exclusion, as.
1.PVS.,pp.35-37 (ed.G.p.5 f),
2. In translating 1 virodhaT, by Opposition we have followed 
Stcherbatslty1 s exposition of the law of contradictj.on.Cf*
• • BL. ,op.cit. p• 1.87 n*3. EB. ,III• 7Vs. ,dvividho.; hi padarthanam 
virodhah. ^ ^
3* , sahabhava=: sahanavasthalalcsana virodha^_JPVS. ,p*35:
"aparyahtakaranasya bhavato*nyabhava * bhavad virodhagatih.
= iiB. ,111,75: VevikalalSranasya. i... *.V(rest:is: the same), 
and 76: ^Ttosnaspar^avatV Translation p.187• See also 
Karnakagomin*,*pp.cit• pp. 35-36*
between.the,(terms) eternal and non-eternal•u 
Some other instances of the second opposition, include such 
pairs as: reality and unreality.,; existence: and non-existence, 
affirmation and negation, blue and non-blue* . In the first 
opposition, namely the incompatibility, two facts eafcist in-. 
dependently without opposing each other*. .Their opposition 
becomes efficient only/when they are placed together in one 
space-time relation*. While in the second: Opposition, via;.,
1. PVS.jg.36: anyonyopalabdhipar iharas thit i laksaiiatai v*a virodho
hityanityavat* . .The text reads * paritiarena * \ . But on the
- ' basis . of Ka.rnakagomih1 s commentary thereouTand G-.ed, p*5,
we read in tfie compound 1 parihara1 • This reading also 
agrees with the'reading of KB.III,77s parasparapariharasthi- , 
ta-(ti)-laksanataya va bhavabhavavat. Stcherbatsky1s 
observation*thereon is noteworthy* Translation p.192 n.2 
1 • • V. (P>193) it is clear that in these words we have a 
definition of the Law of Contradiction, so much discussed in 
; European Logic from Aristot.eles .through Leibnitz;, Kant and V:
. Sigwarf up to the modern logicians. It . is therefore of the
: highest importance to realize’ the; exact meaning, of the Indian
-.view* ■It;will‘ be noticed, first of all, that there is no ' 
difference between a contradiction of concepts and a contra- 
. diction between judgments ,^the terms bhaya/« vidhi p vastu,
. Tib. yod-pa.« sgrub-pa « dnos-pa -being syiaonymous • ’’ The. 
term 1fblue" in logic always, means the judgment-Vthis is 
blue” , it is a synthesis of “thisness1 and 1 that ness u , it 
is; oontr&btedswith t he mere ref lex of the blue (pratibh*asa), 
un unascertained reflex which has; no place in logic* Thus 
in . the quarrel;between Aristoteleh and Bigwart on the one 
side, and Kant on the other,: the Indian view will fall in 
line rather with the first party.; The contradiction is . 
virtually between the judgments 1 this is blue1 and uthis 
is not blue".
2. . PYST. , pp.36-37 Karanakagomin, passim; EBT.,pp.69-70.
contradictibn, the two opposed facts are so related that 
neither of the two can he defined or apprehended without 
excluding the other* The very ''essence11 (laksana) of 
the one consists in exclusion of the other, e*g. blue and 
iibn-blue* The first opposition seems to mean negation 
of terras or entities- as.can be seen in the eight-fold 
formulae of negative, inference explained by Dharmakirti*
The second opposition, contradiction, appears to. be designated 
to. refer to negation of propositions* For the very essence 
of 1 non-blue1, presupposes the proposition * this is blue1 , 
and vice versa* . This propositional opposition,.however, 
rposes many logical difficulties which.are discussed by 
the Buddhist philosophers under the heading of the theory 
of Apoha or determination - exclusion .= discrimination*
Table Nd.VTII The. Table of Opposition (virodha)
. j  --------------- ------------------------------------— r—  ------ ,
Incorapatibility .or Efficient Contradiction or Logical
opposition = negation of terms opposition = negation of
or entities (sahabtiava-virodha), propositions (anyonyopal- 
e*g* the opposition of the abdhi-pariheTra-sthiti-
sensations of heat and cold laksana-virodha) • e • g • the
(3Ttosnaspar£avat)• opposition of blue and non*
blue, exist.ence^and non- 
exjisjence (nTlaiiTla, 
bhavabhavaj Affirmation & . 
negation (vidhinisedha)•
1. Of* supra p. /ha\
2. Cf* Stcherbatsky, dp*cit.,pil95: n*2; infra Part II.
Section III# The Theory off Apoha as Corresponding to the 
Law of Contradiction (virodha)•
The theory of Apoha is designated by the Buddhist 
philosophers to solve the problems of the Universal (snmanya) 
aiid the Particular Brror (bhedagraha), the relation between 
substance and attribute (dharmi^dharma) and the word and its 
meaning (3abdarthasambandha)• The theory seems to be 
misunderstood as 1 a negative approach towards meaning1 •
The charge of ’negativism1, appears to have been based on the 
study of Hindu scholars like Uddyotakara, Kumarila. Bhatta, 
Bhamaha and Udayana who "vehemently. criticized1 the theory as;, 
negative* In fact, the charges of. ’negativism* have been 
constantly refuted by DharmakTrti and the subsequent Buddhist 
scholars*^ The theory therefore, needs a completely in­
dependent study of its own. Being limited by the scope of 
•the present thesis,, we shall only deal with one aspect of 
it, viz., the extent to which it is based on the. law of 
contradiction .(virodha)*
1. Of. infra pt. II; BL.,11,pp. 403-404*
2V . k.IC.Raja, The theory of Meaning According to Buddhist
Logicians,, (reprint fro#) the Adyar Library Bulletin, Vol. \ 
XVIII, part 3-4, p. 11, see also pp. 3-13*
3* ibid*
4* Of*. PVS., pp.248-263 and Karnakagomin’s commentary thereon; 
JNV,apohaprakarana, pp*201-232; RN. ,(AS),;pp.51-6l*
The .Apoha theory seems, to be directed' primarily 
against the realist conception of Reality according to which 
Uniyersals are posited as real* For the nominalist
Buddhist a Real.is the extreme point instance of reality
: ‘ - "• ■ '■ 1 (svalaksana) which is beyond propositional operation*
..Thus all verbal and logical statements express "dis- 
crimination1 (apoha). To the realist argument that it 
is really the universal which is the subject of a pro­
position, the nominalist rejoins that the universal 
itself is not real but a logical construct (vikalpa).
It,must be conceived as the idea of exclusion of a common, 
counter-correlate* . Eor instance, the common counter- 
correlative of all cows is non-horse* / Thus, the concept 
’cow* can only.be determined by all the others instances 
of reality from which it is excluded* "Universal is in 
its very, essence (laksana) exclusion of the other*"^
1* PVS^, (G-*ed.£.65) p• 262; tenanyapohavisayah proktah
samanyag^ocarah, sabdad ca buddhayad caxva vastuny esam, 
asambhavat1; also PV.,1*91-94 verses; infra pt*II,AS*, 
p*6 (14-17)r PVP* ,p*621* : Everything past, future ,
, imagined, absent, mental, notional and universal, i.e., 
all thought.constructions are unreal. Thus, the object 
of a .Judgment or. expression,i.e; the propositional 
. operation, is not. the momentary real (ksanika) which is 
in constant flux* . Of. BL*I.p.69* Erauwallnar, V72KM*, ,
vol.37,P*275> vol. *40, P*63v;i . _  ^ ; _
2* <JN* ,p*201: !apohah SabdalihgSbhyam praka^yate1 •
3* ; PV*,111,30• 1samanyam anyavyavrttilaksanam1 (PVP*,p*20Q) 
see also PVS*,p*262* V'
Furthermore, from a purely logical point of view, 
the Buddhists maintain that: every term or propositiph is- 
the negation of its own negation (anyapoha)♦ .  Even an 
affirmative proposition entails, the exclusion of its 
contradictory proposition. .Digriaga explains that a 
term, such as for instance, "the blue-lotus" not only excludes 
the,lotuses that are not blue but also excludes those blue
f“-" ■■. i
things which are not lotuses. .Thus it signifies the 
exclusion of the non-blue and the non-lotus*
Thus what is intended by the theory of Apoha is 
neither merely a positive cognition A nor merely exclusion
of others (non-A = X ) , but a positive cognition qualified
- ' 3 ' ' . " ■
by the exclusion of others* For instance, terms affirm­
ation and negation, existence and non-existence, or A and 
non-A are mutually exclusive*^ The relation between the 
two is not ultimately real (pafamarthika) but logical 
(v y av a ha r ika). ^
1 • PKM •, p • 436: 1 di gnagena^v i £ es a nav i^esyas araar t ha hart ham
"nTlotpaladi.Sabda arthantaranivrttividistan arthan ahuh11 . 
ity^uktam.-1 . (DharmakTrti and Karnakogomih too ascribed* • 
this passage to Digimga, jsee PVSv, PP•248,231)♦ See also . 
Ka r nalcogom i n p ,182: 1 yathanutpal^ad vyavrtta ut pa lab he das . 
ta eva Npunar fanyatopy, anTlad vyavr11imahtah p ratibhpant1 * 
also pp.260-261. . *,. . s
2. Raja, loc*cit.,,p*8* 3* AS . ,p.3 (6-8). PVS, f  ^  \ \
.4* Gf * Logical opposition table No* VIII, p* g) % '
5* infra AS*^p.l6 £l-15); PVST• .,Karnakagomin p."121: 1 na punar 
vastuno rupam paramarthika-dhar ma-dharma-dharmi-bhavalaks- 
anam p r a t i padya t e1 ; . PVP •, p • 3 73 : samvrtt is ad e v a dharm i - * 
dharmalaksanam1 * samvrttisad =. vyavaharika*
Here we may conclude that the theory of Apoha is not a "neg­
ative approach0 to Reality but a logical principle, grounded 
in the law of contradiction, in order to apprehend the 
real unique particular point instant of reality, (svalaksa 
na)."
Section IVY The Theory.of Apoha verses, Negative Statements#
It has been stated in the previous section that on 
the basis of the law of contradiction, Buddhist logicians, 
in their theory of Apoha, maintained that every term and 
proposition is discriminatory. Thus it is said that 
affirmation and negation are mutually exclusive arid so 
related to each: other that one involves the other. 
DharmakTrti said: "There can be no affirmation of a thing 
(A) which does not exclude the other (non~A); nor can there
■ . i
be a negation of that which cannot be affirmed*"' Hence, 
whereas affirmation implies negation, negation presupposes 
the affirmation.
1., PVS., p.253: fna hy anvayo1 vyavrttimato napjP.ananvayino 
vyavrttih* • \
2. ’Not1 belongs to the class ofpropositional words"• Gf• 
B.Russell, Inq. into Meaning & Truth, (1956), pp.70 ff• 
Strictly speaking negation :i£,always negation of a pro­
position (upalabdhilaksanapraptasyanupalabdhi) Cf. 
Buddhist view, Chapt. ti. <
In Indian logic the forms of propositions are two­
fold; (l) Positive (vidhij, and (2) Negative, (nisedha or 
pratisedha). The negative form is again divided into
two: (a) a simple negative (prusaoya-pratisedha), and (b)
- ' -■ l ,
negation by implication (paryudasa).
Table No. IX. ..
The Tab1e bf t he f o rms of prop os it i ons:
>{/ —  ! *>'
Positive (yidhi) Negative (pratisedha)
e.g. ’this is blue’- I ■; "" j
(nTlo’yam). w aV
Negative - Negative by
(prasajya) implication
; e.g. , (paryudasaje.g,.
"the jar is not here" "p implies
(iha ghato pasti). not -q". If
"snow; is* not black"': it is grey it
 ^ is not white.
If X is a 
ksatsiya he is 
not a brahman.
■ (abrahmana),.
It may be argued that if the Buddhist S. a re correct in 
asserting that the meaning of all words is (logically), both 
affirmative and negative at the same time, the different 
(propositional) forms are meaningless. , The answer to this 
problem is that the Buddhists were concerned with their 
practical importance. Kannakagomin explains: "There is a
1. It seems that these negative types, of statemeit in Indian 
Logic were originally introduced by the MTmamsakas who 
were primarily concerned with the problems of the correct 
application of the Vedic texts in the sacrificial 
ceremonies. Of. Jamini S*utra, X.VIII,! ,13i &Bh.,pp.621— 
631. . ' • - .
great difference* (l). A .sentence expressing an affirm­
ative (judgment) asserts a positive (meaning) primarily 
(and) negation of the "other" (non-A) by implication (arthat). 
(2). And (a sentence) expressing a negative (judgment) 
asserts a,negation primarily (and) affirmation, of the "other"1 
(i.e., the positive B not-A ^ b ) by implication. (3) While 
the sentence expressing 1 negation by implication1 (paryyudasa) 
by denying (p r a t i s edha p urvaka =* (not-A=B).primarily asserts 
an affirmation of the "other" . fact. (A i.e., the other . 
than the fact negation of which is iitplied). Thus, indeed, .
■' ‘ ■ ■ ■ / • ■■" ' > ■ • •••/'' 2.
is the distinction (between the three forms of statements);.!,i
1. ibid. ’ kastarhi vi dhi - p r a t i se dha - pa r y u da s a v^ kj^ a nam^b he dah ? 
mahanbhedah. vidhayakam hi vakyam vidhim p r a dha ny e nab hi dh*
- ayanya-nisedhakam arthat.^  nisedhakam ca nisedham pradhany- 
enabhi dha yar t ha d anya v idh*a nam* *a ha • pajr yu da sap rat i p*adakan 
tu valcyarn prat is e dha pu rv akam anyavidhanam pradhanyenaha ity 
asty eva videsafu iti.1 , The, MXmamsaka writers applied' the 
, terms prasajya.and paryyudasa .to tbeir religious and ritual 
■. /interpretations of negative statements. For instance, the 
statement: "One must not kill a Br a hmana"\ (Dvijamna hanyat),
'■ (cp."T:hou shalt not; kill"), defiance oi- which leads to sin 
and calamity (alreya) is to be considered as the pure neg­
ation (prasajya). Whereas if the Vedie text reads that *a 
particular; ritual should be performed in a particular cere­
mony1 it implies that the ritual may or may not be performed 
in some other ceremony but bust be performed in that partic­
ular instance. See for. details MNP. ,pp. 156 ff j Samksepa- .
. darTraka,(CSS.) ,p£.298 ff; Arthasamgraha (CSS) ,pp.l7& ff; 
Tattvabindu (Trichinopoly, 1936),pp.120 ff. However,, 
Indian grammarians stress on the point of construction; of a . 
negative sentence. According to grammarians: the prasa.jya is 
there where the negation is essential and the positive elem­
ent secondary,i.e. ,where negation applies to the verb (but 
not to the last member of the negative compound). Where the 
positive element is essential and the negation secondary is 
the paryyudasa . I t  is to be understood, that (this) negation-, 
applies .only to the last member (of the negative compound). .
continued overleaf...... '
According to this explanation, (l) the proposition, 
for instance, "snoW is white”1, is affirmative in which the 
negation of the other- ”snow, is hlack”; is implied; (2) the 
proposition for instance, 1 snow is not black”, is negative 
in which the other affirmative 1 snow is white’* is implied;
(3J in the proposition ”Mt. Everest is the highest mountain 
in the. world”, is the parryudasa type in which, we primarily ■ 
assert that Mt. Everest is the highest mountain in the 
world hut we do so-by denying the proposition that thereris 
any other mountain1 as high as this one*
However, it should he remembered that the Buddhist 
theory of negation (anup a 1 ah dhi), corresponding to the ; 
simple negation (prasajjya), also entails.the.other^ On 
the other hand, the theory, of Apoha, primarily corresponding
to the negation by implication also involves the simple .
■ .. ' Accor^ i’M ti> i f a t n »xl< Z r(K 'y ‘ ‘ . •
negation,^by implication (paryyudasa) is found rooted (niyata)
continued from previous page...**
apradhanyaln vidheryatra prati§edhe pradhanata., 
prasajjya-pratifedho'yam kriyaya saha yatra nah. 
pradhanatvam vidheryatra pratifedhe’pradhanata. 
paryudasah sa vi jheyo yatrottarapadena naru 
This is dioka*||.90 in a work called Sarasvata, edited hy 
Nava Kishora Kara Sarma, 1936 (cf. Renou, Terminologie r 
Gramm&ti cale du S anslcri t: Paris, 1937, PP * 202,230) •
, in. thh-immediate knowledge of tlie thing and thus is 
roiiMoniy applied to both affirmative and (simple) . 
negative .propositions* This means that logically 
speaking, Jthere can.be no pure affirmation, nor negation* 
For instance, if.:the negation of X isnot^implied,in. 
the affirmation of Y, hovr can we then act discrimihately 
.in everyday life*; -^One’ pightbjwell tie horses etc*
; when, asked to tie a cow”. . .
’ 1** ■'\v.AS*. ,p>Ui 6-7 ) ^ ; ‘ p.ary^d^'sar1|pebhay •'
r ; niyata^svarupa-samvedaham uMayqravisif$am*
,2*. ibid. anyatha, yadi sabdad arthapratipaftikale kalito nav 
, parapohah, kafhafo anya^ariharepa':prav^tfih. tato /gam, 
.vadhaheti codito’^ vldln api 'vatibhTyat*
.■ ■; ; ■:v C ' ^ . p a s t  i i v " . ; ' : ‘ - - b ’ ' b 1 ’ • ? ^
•; 31'TCrliISH TRANSLATION OF ,TIIE ' APCHASIEDHI (a Buddhist logical
' • .treatise by Ratnaklrti, Jnanasrimitra, (1050 A.Dw)
■ ' Refe fence s to the page and 1 ihe correspond to the!' text ; : ;  V- ;.
: pubiished in-'Tlie; Six. Buddhi st, Nyaya Tractsu , Bib lib thee a " A- •
; : Indica Sepi e s, C alcutta 1910b v . ^ X . •' ; r-' v' ‘
dV\ The translation of: the f i r  st two pages of the Sans la* i t t e x t 7'.'
is based on a Rendering b y  :Professor J .  Brough. . . ’ b
"= A ;A'A\'A • A P o H A S I D D H I A • bAA/' . . ' "
■ # b A . ; V : THE UNIVERSE, SHTIjOKANATHA;.
’ . The meaning of the term • Apoha ’ is to he def ined.
; (below).^  (The. question is) t What is meant by' the teimi 
/Av f :;p. ”Biscfiminatibn”^  three; possible; interpretations)A
AA . : If the etymological sense As taken: (l). A is discriminated 
: :. /•/ from no t-A (B ): ; or hot - A (B) from A;' or (2) . B i s .
V . ".discriminated- out in the/-:midst/ of: not-A A ’ then what is ■ '
A  \ , intended. by a term is simply A;. : /. either the, external ob Ject 
; Ah; ■ or the mental cone ept separated from ( the class, of)^ ho t-A. . ; '
AxX/Pf■■•eTs,er,f('3).v,/-;l,l)iscriminationth^ Afsddeniai. (and thus) is mere x ;:/X--: 
exclusion of,no t-A. These are the three possible views 1
■/’/ '.v’ I*^  Pro.f. , Brodgh-s/ trahsiation/isr’A’/The;; meaning, of a term” is ; v'^ ' 
X':vX:. ■ defined to be ;”Discrimihatioh” iXl-X/ . :  ^ r i
; . 2. Gf.; PVST*, Karpakagomin, p.llhlv^kalpitascakaro1 pohasrit'a- .
AX tv a d  apoha^ucyate ♦/., ' a p o h y a te 1 n e n e t i  va • 1 a n y a n iv r t t im a ir a m \ - 
; AX.--X' -tv  a rth a d , aftqlptam; ;aphhanam-*appha i t y  u c y a te .  s.valakpapam /X> 
XA;X v^ v^h^^^^^ A./X/" - X X  - . . XA-
A' ■' AA/' 1;".;'/ Contrary ' tdAhe^; Realists Ny ay a and Vaidesikas> and the/‘  ^ / i
A  ; /;Minlaiiis'akas,. the Bud dhi s t s do not admit the, universal or ,■-/ I
:■ ,/ . ciasSv:(aka.rd)l;as 'a real -c ategbfyh(,padartha^;* ; A  -Universal, A
': ; AXX. A they, say, isialogical'coiic'epii imagined or kalpita), XAx/
, f / ; / / ^ r o u n d e d '  (bashd) Adri / the b^clusipn of A  common-counter . • -':
■ horrelate.;:;d^orAhstanpe A with//feferende/:to ' a bow^ ;,;h6rse A  ' 7;ih
• A  ‘/11/1; ddg,^ "-camel, 1 iiona,/.etc-^ iihelonglto - one ^ ciasA"Anoi“co'^ , V. / •'AA/
/ : ”5.3303. Roughly speaking; to say .of two things, that; they ,A
. /are . identical- is nonsense, and to say of; one '■ thing that it 
/A ', ;; / /is identical/; withritseif; is to bay nothihgV” ! - Ludwigs
/• ;Wittgehs teihy;-A Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, /(.eight imp. ? ‘ 
X;A/A-a I960), p. 139. ■ ^
X(lv8) B u t ;  it cannoty in fact, be,; either/ the. first or the X
Xv'.-V second, -for/it isx indeed,, -an!affirmationX( positive 'thing) ;
A : ; ; i %hichv=iS; intended by^  .theAtefm /discrimination. And the last ,
( third) view is also unsatisfactory, sinceXit is- contradicted A'A;/ 
X ,, v byPore apt ion. y-and; ordinaryuhdersthndi^^^ the.. X.. uAx-XA;
,x \ X;'Xunder standi rigXdf the Apropo sit idh ”There "isifire on the' mount ain't ’ 
X . V;isXobserved as Seiineating- ..something in the affirmative form ; V;X 
1 A ::and; not as a .  ^staterrieht:X X'there is not not-fire”.
v q .  13);- And. it ? is a; well known . fact, that what 1 s contrary : to .
X; ; - perception -c&imo;tAhel/gusti'f ied /by/.r.spmb : other means ( such as X 
x. an inferential argument) .2 x : • ; "Ax •
Ax'-A A ;(l.i5)vA/( TheSRbalisfA;^: You,v>(;the ;Budclbist) .may; now; say: A X A A- 
A; "Although there is,’no. judgment of the fdritv’h^perce.iveAnegatibn
A-X ■ X;A;(hhseheb)”;, . still, Ash ImpressionAof, negation does, in fact y : x A X / 
XA occur;in the impression. of the thing-negafed, (in the locus).
X,A x , A;®dr ;thcfe is/no 'qualified/perception which does not imply the 
*: ;A. \ A-';.xperceptioii q;fXthe;; qdalifiqr A(aty least) in its conceptual fdrm.^ . *■
; . ;: .(2;.l):. Thus, although theife^ ■; isXhdXjudgm^ of the form "I ; A
X X perceive a universal", theAknowledge of a j udgme nt Xhich arises 
■ A, -^^^ Af^  impression -of.a/common cless-characteaiAis called, by A
. 1. pratiti. A; VxA ' /"AX' '. ^ /... A"'- A’A - ; A X X A ..A/•' , . -A ;A) X; - \
X X/ XX2AA infer end e’ lh 'also/. ;hasedAdn per 6eptiorly5 primarily. /A A /A/ A-A;/
• ; 3. antarbhavlta* A A/AX n AXAXA./XAx'A"A -X.,;.. A AxXX/.xAx- AA x/vA/-/
: other (phli-bso.ph'ers;  ^ of a miiverqal|^ and ,
;'v ' similarly, (the Buddhist;.vai?feues')'V; tlie -knowledge of negation
; which is /pro 3ected>;hy the perception:.ofthings -negated ,}\makes •,
: possihle^ our talking;. ahout 7;t ^  ■"Biscrimination1( .
(?) ■ (2v6)>,; But surely, ( the Realist; ohjects)if the status : 
of a .knowledge (or c onfi gur a t ion) o f a uni ver s a 1 rests . on : ' ;y , 
vthe./impre ssion. of a common olasstcKaracter^which appears in ■ 
v the!.>;shhp^'-.';of' an. affii'imatioix (a positive entity), .we:;.may well 
= I(7 yask:,;:., Whhtis it 7whi'ph"arises; ih>:the ;mind in^the naSexof the.
configuration, whidh ;!s' the perception . of negatipn;when: there’ *. 7,.
. is no impression of a class-character -of an absence? 7
(2„8-9)> Therefore, although there i.,s7no;■ class.of( judgments); /" 
of the form, ’Vi:perceive hegation,,y' if there!,were really an ; ■ f i 
fimpfessibn of a;.;cl’a.ss-chardoter ;inegntioni>no-ehe would deny 7V\.;/ 
7"- the. existence (G-esta 11 ?) of perception of ^negation, > . ' : tt"r
(2.10-11). But if, on , the other, ’hand, you (the Buddhist)
; maintain,that! even when there is iio.vinental-fm^ress.ion of X, ,.7 • 
xwe cah talk ahout;the: perception of ,X; then, (the 'Realist-' h ;
!, objects), when a elass-coneept of a cow is present" in .the mind^
77/'--7'; the resulting; judgment ^.could, well he'-that of! a;'tokev': ., i--h;7//7-7'
' 7 1*" Gp.ytDharmaklrti, Pys#7,7p^l32,; It. 3ft.77 ;7;77,. . ;• 7 ' 77 - 7 '
:\7 •  ^! 7.; 2* atanotiv 7,y 7; 77 t n ' ; ” 7 - 7,'. 77^777 7 7 * 7 ! . •  ' V.’;v •
tc 3.7 ■cetasit seems :to suggest- a passive, mental impression as. . ; ‘ ■
7-3  ^: 7; 'opposed to active tmpression . 1 bodha1. —  <!• Brough y 7 77 ... •
:! 77 / 7(2 .12-16). (the Buddhist) 7suggestion^ that the 7 7.
t/ 7 V:; perception, of negaticm;inhy he , contained (in the! perpeption/of : 
777/7 77 the. thing-negated) as a-qualifier, nonetheless,! if the . -7
7 : > v judgment is /of7 a :* formtshch! as ‘ithat which is/■discriminated " ;7 7- 
7!- ., ! ;. from not-cow." > then, we; admit that the negation comes in 7y ; 7
/ afterwards as! a qr al ifter, hut the/actual perception is the 
;7^ 7  ppaitive .( affirmation)!V’!.c‘ow•*;k"\ And , since at, that- time, ( in :,7
the perception of. a cow):, there is no awareness of it (a 
, 7' qualifier.) whdseicharacter i svhegalion—  even though such a -
qualifier . is, ih/fapt, in..existence how can we. talk of t/h: ;
/’’Gestalt1* of “the perception of negation"? '77--.
7 7 ;; (2*16-17) • /So then,;, the situation is as follows: .
7.7 '(2..17^ 19.) xi'Tha't/y^ .a positive ,entity also .
. 7;7 7 entails;the exclusion of what, is other, and this is. called ,
!; ! - 7 * . (,hy theyhuddhist) /.’ the. perception of negationV7(Discrimin- -77'
r -■ :  ^ i;Never^hele'ss_' it( is only thetpositive entity-A in 7
7 77 >- r: (of) the, discriminatloh !of! nbt-A.’(X.)' which:reflects at the 7 1 ;
77^ ; direct 7aense perception ( and thus/ the! apprehension of dis-h 7 
: crimination !i0: a7mere73?elation, 7: v.;7 ’ ?
(R.I9) • Further , it is.undeniable that - in the same sense- 7 . 7!
. ;'77t;:r 7''i7tsphuri.tam>.7-...i; 7 t ;: ::_.; \ t7;.; 7 . 7  ; 7 • 7;.'-: .7 7 ,,'7.7.7 "7 ."777 7 ' ,■ .7 ■' :
7 , 7v! (the function/of) dense-perception'1' is also discrimina^
(3,1) •,7 (TFor example) .. Whenya fthing. is pierce ive.d as. a / • •
7v 7/;, particular .,^7yfromtheybdnstrueted reasoningy(yibralpat) yy-y y 
yfchere/Arises^ : ther/.awafeness of7exclusion/of/all other things ;; •/
_7.’7 / /■rt(x)7by//the7;awarehess7of thei excluded (x>art 1 cular) one♦ /7y: 7/y../; 7 
, 7/(3• 2-ft);*': Henceindeed, the object of /( pure)/ mental/ judgmental . 
7 /7 //construct^ ih ontityyy just/as:lftihe.!/,;;!/ ;/:7
perception (it; is).'the positive;entity^ which -is to be cog- 7 ;
\7:7 ///his ed through; the perception/of ( it s’);-cl ass1- character/ ,7 ■- 7
;/ / / (akara, a; common/meiital image).7 . The ob ject ( of a’ menial ; "
7.. . construetion) is not :the exclusion of nori-A. 7 ,
.; -; (37ft)77;//(TheTRealistv dn t ^grounds.)asks): How .can the7-
. /. . • meanilig of a terra be dec 1 ared (by the /Buddhists) 7to be ;
; / ‘‘Biscriminatiph / '7- 7 -/yv./y/yyy/ ///v.y// ' 77//. ■' ■/;'■ /-:‘ 7./-.
7 7  1*7hdhyakea,:JC py/be lbw  p.6,:10:>7 where . th e , B u d d h is t re  jo in s  and :
7. 7v7 , 7 R a t n a k l r t i , u se s ;. th e  general;, term  f o r  p e r c e p t i o n -p fa ty a k § a 7 v /
/ • ■ 2 ., L i  1,T;> : p . 2 .1 9  ♦ /" F u r th e r ,  i t  i s  unden i a b le / t h a t  in  th e  same 7 7 7
7,; .7 ;/7 ; ; s e n se , [ ( o r  th e / s e n s e /p e rc e p tio n  ),^  i s  the  o b je c t  o f , ( a p h h a y ip - -
/ 7/77/7.- a y a t^ a m )".] y" ip isdrim ina-ti.qh--1.5-also b e lo n g s  to  s e n s e -p e rc e p tio n . : 
7, T h a t is  when, th ex  th in g  i  s p c r c e iy e d 7 its /  r e la t io n !  -  a  s e p a ra te  
//7 7 / 377v7/ ;''s ftt i /% /fte c p rd ih g 7id ;7ih f t  B u t* /./
y v y  r3^7 f o r  /th e /.  B u d d h is t h :/7 r e l  a t  io n ’y is  h o t -/an ,e n t i t y /b u t  a . lo g ic a l-  /:
77 7.77 // ' s y n th e s is ; (ndhyayasaya =/ v ik a lp a )  and th e r e fo r e  cannot be - ’
. { 7 perceived;by/serse^cpntaeiy/ G f. ■; below,' (6.9-10) and ( 6.11-12) . 
y >  ;/ 7 ‘3(»7 v if te e a ta .ft  yxk^amSpBsy^* " 7 7 :7 7 7 7  / • ' :- 7 y. / v 7 77 ' 7- ,y.-.7'' ■ . 7 /-y  7 / - •
7 7 7 7 7 ;ft. ; y ik a ftp a  adhyavhsaya* c f . -R N ., ■ p . 6 7 . 3 0 , yand p p 4130- 1 3 1 .7 :;;7 ■/
7 ; (3 .3) .7 (The /Buddiest) .7 , /To/tbiA our answer is as follows: . 7
• (3*6-8) By the term "Disci-imi-^ • is- intended/is.
■ not merely" n/positive entity, (A),; nor /merely! exblusiohyof 
■ : . ■ ( the -other) niof-A, "butthe ;meAhihg;^  ^of the terms is ..the posi-7
;7/iivev7thihg7 (A) qua!ified by the excXus ion: of7 thefbther (not-A).
1 -« ( t * - ' / * um m  * . ' ' v  ■ • _ ' L >' "' . * < > t - ■ - r~**-------- 1 * -
7 : . 777 (37^)7/;/And-thus>/7(>ihy'thls..'Buddhi sty definition)^
scope/for, 'criti-ci.sm'vohcihe-\/part'-v (ofal-1;'/;thosev;whb) ihdifectff 7
//./ y 7 ?y//ftoldydiffbrent. views ■ ;(.;6f / A^.oha:),.#/'/ :7y/.y 7 7y/y r'777'77/77 7 • / 7 ' ■
77 ; (3.9) « (There7are. twb; opposite/interpretations of Apoha) .7 y77/7 
7' 7 77;7 The ;positiye view is:;yft TheyphrcOption! of a cow v does not 7 77yy/y.
7/ . ilivo ly e (cognition of) ' others and Its own s elf and therefore /
7 yy; TbXsbriminaiio^ judgment 7 .!
. / based: upon the force (of the ".primary affirmative or. posi tive) .
77‘7yyyy7p.e.rceptiob7q^ -7 . ' 7/ /7'' ; 7 y/;
, 7 (3*11), And; the^  negative; view . is; "The (distinct) positive 7;
7; thing J(A; discriminated from not-A) is under stood (as the - * /: : i/
7 7/ secondary meaning) based on the force of the. perception,of
- 7 exclusion/dfxthexother/(not-rA) ’ (which Is the/ primary meaning ;
■' . . of the '
1
■7/ . ;1 #7;.i)hafmakJ-fti;/ also in This;'P V S p.231 >. quotes .Dihnaga in / :/ ;
''7/;'/7777//:/support:.bf^ this;' vf'ewv-.'7'yy 7 7-7f b/tyy/- ■ 7- /./y/. -7;v./// , .-77 ; 7
/v 7/ // / - ;" d abdo; 1 rthant;araryyayr11iAvidi$tarlevay bhavahaheti */"; A t erm
■ ’ / denotes .only positive .entities•/.qualified by the ■ exclusion of. 
1-:/737-/!/777bther'sy/vKdrhakagomin/ in his commentary on PV. p.2ft8. ex-/ :
: /■77-,v>■/.■'^/'/%/./!pllcitiy-/has7/ABcribed- this passage to -Dihnaga.; See also77 
/7-‘7/7'7-7/yy.PP*’: /■ 128^12/9/ofiVthe-'y's^  p.ft36, too ascribes .
/• '• \ / / / / thi s pass age to, Dihnaga •:;// . "7/'"'7 ; ^ y7’-^ 7; " / ' . / 1 7. 7
;■ • • i 7-/' / ■''/;///. ;W '•'/ /■
7- ;' / ( 3.12) .7 Thi s. extremism (of both views).! is not; good. /// 7 .. ,
7 ' (3* 13-lft) • In the/ former (positivists* .vibw)> we do not /find; 7.
7 7 . any successive stages of apprehension ( of affirmative.and 7.. .
negative);meaning*77 No/one apprehends; the dldcriminatofy! ' 'v;7’777 
;; ; :(ne;gative):;]iibaningy 'after/understanding, the affirmative 7
y;; /7/';7meaning,;/hy ;lbgieai’'dmpiicatioh.'^7.77 7 v 7/' - ■7/77:7_ ,v.- .. 77-
;-/) :/(3 w i'5)((Cohver seiy,y;hor\J^£2S^  ^ one ■
; 7 apprehend;the positive distinct •meaning, having /understood ■
/' y y/the /Cpriiria:ry);/^ .meaning.;A-3 7'/ 777.)'7 y7/y777 '! ■'•/ \ 7 ■ /-7-:.7
77' 7/7/7l7'7h*K.Ra ja /observes that; dathakirti; here "re jects .3‘antlrak§ita1 's'- 
view that a word conveys a positive m eaning /first, and a 7 / ;
7/  3 !:7 ^ /negative/meaning later/'by71^^ implication. "77.-r .The .Theory /;
7 of Meaning: Ac cording to :Buddliist7Logibians7 - The/Adyar Library 
. / 7; 7 Bulletin, Vol.. XVIII., part 3-4) p* 15. For Santix^ak^ita1 s 7 7.
77/:-/\/;:\//.-.7-yie-w;-. see, p.llplbidx y /; .77,7 7 )// 77.— y- ; ■ >/':/.s,:- . •'y. 77.7 3 77)..
(3.16). Hence, the proposition "understanding of (the^  meaning - 
of) the word cow" - is said (to mean) "the understanding of 
the positive distinct entity (i.e. qualified by the exclusion 
of not-cow)."
(3.17-18). And although it is . said that (in the term cow) there, 
is no occurrence of word(s) "excluded from the other (not-cow)", 
nevertheless, since the term ’cow* is indeed (already) har­
bouring the ’exclusion of non-cow1, there is no non-apprehension 
of the exclusion of the other (non-cow)' which is (in fact) the 
form of an attribute (of the cow).
(3.19-30) . For example, the awareness of the blue colour at 
the perception of a blue-lotus, is at once inevitable from the 
term ’blue-lotus* which is harbouring the blue-lotus (the. posi­
tive entity); in the same (li-,1-3) . way, the av/areness of the • 
exclusion of not-cow from the term cow, which is harbouring 
the positive entity from not-cow, is invariably simultaneous 
with the perception of the cow, for (the exclusion of not-cow) 
is being the qualifier (of the cow).
(i4.lj.-6) . Just, as the grasping of the simple absence (prasajya) ^
■ .___ ■   ' j
1. vi£e$anabhutasyanyapohasya.
3. prasahya. Read: prasajya. The author distinguishes between 
the three types,of judgment, namely, two negative - prasa,jya- 
pratigedha and paryyudasa, and one affirmative vidhi. Cf. 
JR., p.305. For a fuller exposition of the three see supra 
Chapter V. section IV.
of perception^[is (nothing) .but the force (which) generates ■ v'>S 
the negative T judgment, so, is the case, with affirmative judgments 
also (the grasping of .absence- (in this case) is ;said to be 
that, force only which, in accordance to the judgment (tadanurupaj , 
(brings about the merits which we, get from performing) rites /and t; 
(giving) charity (anusthanadana) ; ) ,
(U.7) .[VJBut the apprehension of ’negation by implication1 ® v - k'tt 
"is-based on the, immediate knowledge^ of the. thing(and 
therefore) is corpionly applied to both (affirmative and .tj,
negative judgments)* .' ; > • \ •: ' ; ';t[
(h.QilO). Otherwise,, if the-discriminatioh of the other entity J [ 
is not to be cor^eived, at the same, , instant as the meaning of _ 
the term A is apprehended, the difficulty,,would arise: How
can we" act discrirriinately between'A-'and not-A?) . Then, pne -v' 
could well tie horses etc., when asked to tie up. a cowl*5. - • . -
.l;,v[That is * anupalabdhi ’ or hohi-perception.
B . t h e  passage i^/extre^iy difficult. : The use of -[ 
.!-te'ricns" 'anusthanadana^- -or x^ ites and.charity, indicates rel- 
■ igiPus, te.hdencies of Ratnakirft and his teacher Jhanadri 
h (cfw:JH.^>^ in the. present, logical context I
to understand;the passage- clearly*
3.^paryyudasa A  negation by . implication.
;h. :;sa4ivedaha. / V - ; : / .. ,, . . ” \ r - .
.5.. :Cp. :Yacaspatimi^ra, ,.WTT.(Vizianagaram edition.).
,[pY3l|0 v 83-07; Trahslation by Stcherbatsky, BL., Vol. II.
, p)*Ul8.W' . t  -'.V
(U. 11-13) * (The Realist). Vaeaspti^ has said: ‘'Individuals 
belong to universals and they are perceived (or apprehended) 
by judgmental constructions and words. And the form of.these 
individuals which possess their own class-charactei^, is 
.excluded from the class-character of othex* things. Hence,
since the class-character'(tad) is known* from (as) the under-
*■ - 2standing (of the word), at the injunction "Tie up the cow" 
one does not tie up>' horses etc."
4 ^ Ik) w , (The-Buddhist). This view (of the Haiyayika) is 
also refuted by the same (above given) argument•
(!},.15-17). However, even if we admit the discrepancy of a 
universal as a separate entity, the form of individuals (as 
posited by the realist) is indeed the one discriminated from 
the class-charactex, of other things. ~ Therefore you cannot, 
deny (the basic argument.of the Buddhist) that an individual 
of the same form (as you. the Realist have described), and which 
Is the object of the word and judgment- (^abda-vikalpa) is the 
negation of :the other. , . . *
1. Vacaspatimidra (C.8hl), the author of the Hyaya-vartika-\ 
tatparyatika, (IWTT.) who criticized the Buddhist theory of 
Apoha.  ^Subsequently, Ratnakirti, following his teacher 
Jnanadrl's Apohaprakarapa, refuted again the Naiyayikas* • 
charges against the Buddhist theory.- Of. A. Thakur, RN., 
Introduction, p.27.
2v artha or the meanings - the ob jective thing. (i4Vl5-17) v
f- / . ,;(i4.18--20). ' Now, i f f 1 . be argued (by the:Realis;t): , *^If the ; ./
form of .on -indiyidual, or ;a thing .cognised- as an individual'1' : '
■ ;• .f>.s’is' not. -.(dis.cr fniihated from the other class-character,, then,, this 
; .;••/•'• is,, in>;.fact, the(positive); presence^ ;of its ^ Wn class; (that\
.A -is’ cognized as; excluded if rom not-Ax)u:. (otherwise without 
• - n class-character) "how; can its. (A) apprehension also from the
: (mere)^ ;uhderstandihg (of a term), be possible?,"^. (The . Buddhidt) f; 
/; " We hdve--aimostianswered;:’these; p'bjectibnsv^ -.i;; •
c ■ > . (5*1-3)• And if ,(the Realist) here argues that A is dis-
;;:criminated from hot-A only on, the force .(or duevto) 'of its own.
, . V-, class • (The Buddhist) * .Let it be due to, the .force of ..its
; ; o W n ' c l a s s .  , Or ( as we Buddhists; regard' this situation) that ; .
; A is discriminated from hot-A oh the force of the sxxccess.ion d;
of .its own; causes. In both cases, there is, in fact, (the
"V ;  ^acceptance of) the cognition lof ^,( the. act; of) discrimination;, in 
. .the cognition of the (positive) thing discriminated.,
)/■' v • 1. tathapratita. ; v'-. ; : / / . • - ■/f:’:'.
'2. p r a s a d a ; - . 1 '■ ; : - • ' . ; ', , , .
• 3 r ;Wheai a ; t h i n g ; is p r e s e n t  a n d  Is;: p o i n t e d :  o u t ; w e : c a n  c o g n i z e  ■
: 7; f ; just; an .individual things ... But; when a thing .is not present v,
; 1  ' a n d / W e ^ u p h r e ^ J t i ;  it  f r o m  t h e  .usage',: o f i b ) w o r d  o r  n a m e ,  ■ the n,
. ’ w h a t  is d e n o t e d  by. t h e  . w o r d  is, a c c o r d i n g  t o : the;’ r e a l i s t ,  ;; -
••'• 'the;;.uiiiversai; • ,entity= ;whi'eh;;.exists e v e n  trhen .the: i n d i v i d u a l  
; , t h i n g  is  n o t  p r e s e n t .  ' .:\v v'i ^
I
(3 .1 -5.)« 'And, here, :(thbvRealdst1 s)v Qb’3ec'tibii;..-lth'htthus .an7-33 
> aff irinaiive pointing7us'e7- ofthe'-Vt.eh^ s.,.-■
directly perceived) hhd>(the jtidgmeht;pf) th^;positive- cow. /p; :
77. 7 ;pexcluded;from; not~hpw would become- ;inierdep mot ;
.'77 hold ground. Fpr,. (in the Re all s t i c view too) there is scope •
7:I y. , yfohthisybb jeetlon; even wheh'pdihting,ht^  a class or: ah/ihdividt• >: 
3-7; ual ,possess ing\ ■ aclass-characteryOfprvthey exclusion:of: other yl ; - 
At I 7 iulUss-characters^  ailed;thettv? \t’y.y.77177- ' V,, iy
7 (5 -.6-7;) Since by : the term y "universal" (the . Realist) does v 
not ■ intehd' inereiy :(;a7geheral); tniversalt: • otherwise pointing7 
at a horse also would, be .possible. hy . the use..of the term .* cow'.> 
7; ahdyhvhorby;-hothy.;Seid.hgr\to'.ajgenerhl^ -or• :e0mnion■ 
class.) ;-y.vy7' f t t y ^ y  t'ty- . - t/vi.7-.-tv. yy y■ 7-.-.. ■ ...'ey., •" .
jW-' \ ( 5 •7-9 ) •• ::yy&ty;y;ihe;vRealist. too;)/ .'Intends ■ the ^ universal cow.
;..yy .-. .7 'cow-ness1 , (as the • meahing. of. the. terinfcow).;: - And thus (in y 7
7y: .7 i^ this view) plso thby'sameyphject then) 7)7-77
1 ;; withoutcogni tion of an Individual > there pan he no cogni tion . .7
.of thb/'uaiiversaiy'cbiy,y■•ycpwyheshi* and Without cognition of 17:77'
’ the universal cow,y:-cow-ness f there can he no; Imowledge of the/; ;’
. / 77' (pbsitive) indiv-idublfcoW) which71s: denoted by ythe' term . 1 cow f.
7 . ( 5 •10-12 ) i Hence the ( s07called) c 1 ass-chax^acter (or ,universal)
fy y-/• - f hiyi:hyfaet,y ay judgment construction^ It
7 yceeded hy (or. based. bh)y. theyysense perception7of■ -one (ihdividual)•
. body ( and thus.), corresponding . to ah external entity* (or 
.v,;i'h.^ pl.aoedyin- the. external, f o r m ) a s  if were.: ay.comph-charactery)''_
.; (5 ^ 11-12) to all the (external). xiartic.ular.S; (thus) in pointing 
out (:anv-‘external. indiyrdubV);y:'hbw.:y.: "this is a cow here" ; : ^ - ..
.V v " y(this!judgment)7:,dQea; not.'involve,: the discrepancy* of mutual /. A 
.;7dependence (of; a: particular and. its ■ universal).
. y(5.13)f hAndlfurther,7 inypur (Buddhist) viewiy (exclusion of) 
all other (members of the class Cow)vis. also properly* stated 
7, 7 (or covered) :by,;i the term npt-cow in the occurrence (pravptti)
. ,  of the 7 term cpw.*7 > hy ''7.:')' 7; . "7\ . - :i7 y----'y'y • •. fyVy 7 y
(5• li+f 16‘) A n d  neither is there any. contradiction (in the 
7 Buddhi s t view) y tliat the positive 7and the- negative (meanings . y 7-7 
are apprehended simultaneously), iioxv anyycohfusipn (or loss- 
7, k^atih) . about the qualified and ;th.e qualifier (position of A 
y ; and not-A): for' ;b6th7;bx’e.;!hpt ^mutually ;separated*^, because they . .
l .'t . 7 ‘ " ' ‘ *.. "-------------------n  11 I *i IIII IHI ■Illn Wi ri H^mTHiriTTKilHiBiltTHiiii—TiK uiDwi1 nn»>Til«^ w w n r w i I r~ ~ll i >i m i n i—  m  m n  nftiiMflwwnililiMniiniw i ■!■! mmni.ni ■ ■■■ mi 11 i w  mi ajwiw^tip. ji
■V. 7.771. balilradhyastah. 77 yy fv:y' ' / l\ y 7 . y . :•' 77- .777' 7;-y.y' 
.j 2. The contention seems to -be: that notwithstanding* the Realist.
7 . View, that "cow" yis.discriminated f rom "hot-:cow11 011 the basis 
777 , of its ownybpWT-nessyyWe; are7,confronted with -they problem of. * 7
7 7 1>;■7.77-i; hifferentibting betwpeh individual cows 17 el7’the7pbsse-; -7
:7■.y* ; :7; v' 7 ssdfs. of tile "*;same '• class-charaeter'v7 *v.-According -to.7‘tlie Buddhist 
7; 7 y a; .view/. the.teriii "npt-cow" -does not only 'connote lions,; horses., 
etc. but also other individual cows different from, this .
7,77 yy ;y 77 cow> ..PV.>;, IV80^8l; ; Vvyavrttah punar any a t ab t a eva,f . Karp- , ,
7 > 7^ 7.7 ’akagb.min':-7ihei?eUpdn7£VST> yypblg'O:- * artha pnyatp vyavpttirupf 7
ipab santp puharanyata^ sajatiyad.yapi'‘vyavptta bhanti 7
. 7-:73>7:’paraspara-vyavacche^^bhaVat^. , ..or7"pince7.there is nothing 7 
7 to -separate/.(the qualified arid the;'qualifier). mu tually". 7 7
' reside in the same • locus (substance.). just as the (hare)
ground and the absence of the j a r - AAAA 
. (5• 17) • The difference is due to the own (positive) na.tui>e 
(of/A) hut not;: due to the. absence of not-A^ » • Everybody ImoWs
; *•.tlii*s fact. o ; / A-A/: A- ' 'AAAAAA;Aav A ;A /.-hAA ' A\A\.' A. AvAAA’
A (5 •18-19) • (?or example). :'uThis path leads to (the town),.
. Srughna."A Even here (in anAaffirrsdatiye, proposition) .y’dis-,,/ j }-/A 
;; Primination isi indeed>tc;dgnishd: (from each - and every word) •
■ • A;AvV:(-That.;.lsv as fhllows)::; aAA ■" A A A' A A A /..AAA A .v v,A A ' . A" ■ A
, (1); The term j!this'*^ •excludes;, all -other paths;,fi?om; theone . A A 
indicated X'or...4hisV.al6ne^ ;vnb>.p:ther path which is not stated :
A” : Ahere) •’■AAAA' -' ' - AA--A AAA:A a  , A- ‘ - A . A/A ; ;,A;A'-' A y A  v:A'-,;
(2 ).. / No other undesired placet hut Aonly. tpASrughna;! : (6.1-2 )v A 
.A (3) • .’Leads to1, excludes allv^other /fdrest;. foot-patlxs.that ■ end ; /;A., 
A Ashorl (of 0ru^na)*/t Ay A; A/-;/ : A'AA. v AA, . -aAA'A- A )-A . A
1 . According to. tlieA^ddhahtVA-A^ a iar‘, in fact, refers
to the perception'of .the hare‘ground (locus): of the jar.; Of.A
NBT., p. 22. ‘ . AA^ . ; Aa;AaA A A  • ■ ■; A A A -' :A :'A A ■ .; :
, A_'.;2V Therefore. when .a ?/ord denotes a .positive ehtity it also. : ; A
: • simultaneously deaiptds all the. attributes possessed hy the A A;'
■ positive entity. ,/ 'A;'’AAA'A .A'- A- .-A -A '. V
:. • 3. ahalaprasiddham: ■ Lit.:, is .hnown hy children and adults. : A
h ., Lit •, (6.1). ” Since there is no t'A'cut (in . this) ; - as; i n a
forest ,a foot-path A-only \thi;sAleads.to* ; A A A A  A:A;
2 3 6
A y A  ‘ ' (i-)AAAiTheAterm ’pantha* excludes (the uhqof).:^ etc.
(for it is only a path (pantha) not a road). (6.3) Thus 
y separation}; #sAnatur ailyy;(^ found
■in each'and:every term; .
(•6^ 3-h)-#' ' Hence (the Buddh4et;tyie^;'.IjsApornect that) ..the 
. attributiye^ (qualifier) Aisqhiminati Acoghised"(or 
apprehended) from■■the: word inAan>;d$Aifmatiye :(posit form;
A A  ( 6.5)V-A Just as byAtheAtefm ApuP^ 9hA'^^;te"“lothsn, (we
cognigeA ra lotus which is^hot separated1 from; the-:whiteness 
(attribute).
(6.5-6)A • (The Realists1 objection). ’’Well, then, isn’t it - v 
A;- proper : to ^ fine :the;Aeaning of a termyas'Van;affirmative
yAf (positive):. alone Why do you ( Buddhiat) Iceep harping on
(giyate) ■ "Discrimination!!? : - . ■ /
: yy • y A (6.7). (The huddhibtAre jpips;)ATothtsAwe hhyeys aid, that it
- ; A • AAA is the positiveAthing ; (affirmatiye meaning) qualified by the 
exclusion of other things (not-A),;.which is ir6ahtAbv the 
.A A y  y t e r m ,,D i s c ^ i m i h a t i o n ,,;
(6.8). this means 11 the exclusion of '• ixo‘t .apprehended' v -
simultaneously with the apprehension-of tliA;positive Vthing-/A> *' 
A;, A in "iheAform, blyApualrfier (qualifying A ).1
■ 1. Lit., :(6.5-6A^. ’’If that is so,- theh,AltAisyprdphr :to: say
that the meaning of a term is‘only a positive (attirmative) 
thing.”
vA.AV?A A'^A:.GpA^ (3-7“9) * Also JN., pi2p£>AAAyA /yA
(.6.9-10). . And :thusy tlie :(Reali,stid) ylew that even sense- A 
perc epiion is discriminatory, ^ i s not correct;: for there is 
Ay .no; diif erenceyof opinion about; (the fact) that the object of -A. 
A'. . the sense—perception \ is .an, Obj.eciiveVthing*,y: just' as: the direct A ■
.*■ ■ /'meanihg-'pf ,a word is (an ^ Objective; t h i n g ) ■ •-.yy/yA -yy 7 ' A  
(6.11-12). And by the. term "affirmation”.:(or affirmative 
A meaning) , wey(BuMhists) Intend;;(two-things) :: ( a) . an e xternal: yA; 
v; , ob ject- according to /the.. 10gica 1. synthesis [negatively] .., A; 
A excluded from all other forms: . (of things) ; and (b). an • ideal A 
A y: ; imagecorresponding to the pure sensation (of the thing). Ay'7 / :
d A: : (6113) .^ . Here, an. external (partieular) ob ject is established,
/Ay A ■ (by the Buddhists) as verb ally • expr e ss .i abl e ' in terms: of: the A -A ■ A 
. =■ ■ /' logical; synthesis only.^ . ■■ A. -;A; "7//;
- ^  ----  ^  1^ -JrrirT^ _^  ..j | | |. „  p-h- M|  ^  ^Ml|| raniTmii r *iri‘i n r f  it. >g uti m Mir—.im miin Via.i i mm . i. i nm «w.ii.mnmTii wn mmum—    in Mpm i . j 11 iTi — ii^n
; A / 1 • Cp.above AS (2.20), and (3.2) .A ; / > 7
2.; sabidaAgratyaya AAhbhida/or/l; simple meaning o f ; a Word.'. But ,
.7 l* the cow” , or ”this . is, a cow” y are not simple-meanings'but ; . ■
. j udgmen t al o r de ter mi hat i ve; 11 e ani ng s and therefore entail
A , ”discrl.mihation”. /:.//'-/-• 7 Ayyy A/ . ;  , y.,:: ,yy'7y- Ay ; ,,'^A'/
■ A,-Ay/-3. ; 'bahy"&rtha!:.A:A arthaV:fn Sanskrit hasA as; many bhed AA
/ ' as the English ”meaiiing”ybut here with !bahya,! it is clearly '
A intended, to mean an objective thing. A: y yy y^ •. -A y'\
//: AA,.'; h.y iitqpAaftery/^ *.yRN;.> Af .55 • 7 -v • : - A AAA ' ' -’'71
r A 7,^ .5, Gp. JN., p .208: ”ar tho. dvivi dhah bahya antarasca # . ;..... 7
.A ■ ; / babyah adliyavasayadeva: vacy.o.; vyavasthapyate , na svalalceapa- -
■y ■;*/ parisphui*ttya.” 7 . . .  -A A; : ’AAo A-:-; .--'"/A- ' . y y
(6.14"15.)>.„ : (Bvtt), ;not because . the thlngr-in-itself, reflects:; 77-/777 
(in, tlie word);?' The 1 thing-ih^ltself’u (reality) does , not api^ear 
(in. the word)’ as, [it doesJ, In7senseupdree^ it 7 ,■- i i
"becomes. manifest^ with the fixed? time and "space (momentary)v.i; v;V>:
(6* 15-17)> (Thd fbllowing: reference of); the janthoritatiye- -’7
work7 also 7d0.es. (substantiate -‘the .^ddhisboyiew): ’ ;'-."The ;,(i*eal)'.;77- 
fhlng is called ^unexpresslhle jby^the ;wo.r&!v^  because5;byAits...,./’- i; 
name;-it is. not reflected;; ih the, miild ( in the „ same way) as Vyi.
(it does), in''the,, perception. 7 ' i-ti;.- -V7 ; ■7777‘7 ‘: ?-Vt .7-777‘7
1 <-The 7Buddhis t s' ddi.not ;:admit;i that i;the extreme-particuiarireaii- 77'
‘ . can b e.; *1 p. 11 ered1 ,•, 71 The tliing-in-i tself •,is unu t1e rable. . Cf •, i 
7-7 Stcherbatsky,1 s rendering ■ of, iWTT. y on Apohayada,; B L . I I .
P*U25 , (3U.2.6),,-h.h7 and p.;26^ (88.26). ;• V- : ^
2. pravyakta. ; . 7 ' ' 7V . 7:;-7.-, •’""'•.7. • '.
3. niyata. ‘ v - 7 . : 7 -,;. V';i :;\.b 7 ;::V • • 7:7.;777.
ip. Cp. BL., II. ip. 26ip;(,88.25;)1 ’uThus ,it; is that; what, is really ; ;
; iperceived, (by the senses) is not the, meaning. (sambandha); of . ,
a. name, and what is meant hy' a name is not what is really 
perceived (hy ihe: senses)v’hp sbetalsoTiCelthV.s, Atomism;, ; i 
;.f p. 101 n.2. - and ,NBT., p.l6 referred; to: therein; 7.- 7
5.7 According to . Prof... Anantalal' .Tliakur( HN . ,7 p . 151)' this passage
7 ref ers to a ?/.ork ) Sakarhsa^grahasutra!- ,of-dhinasri y,' the . ; , 71 ‘ 7;
‘ 7 Buadhiet;.:.:teadher. of Hatnakirti./ The workyis'.- awaiting' puh- iTA 
1 i c;ati on in the near future., along. with o ther e s s ays of 7 Jnanas-* 
7 '■, ri,y in;';-/the VOT> :.;; !7, 77i-7;;v 7'7 7 77 7 7:7 . 7 /'. ,7 7 7 - 7.;, .,, - 7-7v77;
6 • sahdenavyappta. Lit . , * not covered hy the word1.7 ■ 7. 7 77 7 7 -
7.7 Cf. below A.S., (li.i;17),' ! ha svaiak^apasya 7sahdavikalpa-- . v7
y,-- 7iiingapra'iihha;sitvam,i wi7;. 7*-7/i-/-7 ''7i:':7 7.-7 777, . 7 '>'77.;/^77-777:
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 ; ' 7 . ( ' 6 . ar gue) :  "The: d if fe r e n c e  /• 7 ; ..7
: 7 ■ y 77,f  ;pf;: r e f  le x io n ;b f7 . th e  ; same Cone;)y th in g  ' i s  due to; th e77d iffe fen ce i. t - t y t  
7 - -  o f  . th e  means?: 77 ( i . e . .  e i t h e r  ) th e  7 senses o r  t h e . word 7 ( o f  . ; 7 7 7 7
' 777y77;7v jcdgnih in g ) : re  a l i t y *1 ? 7 ? ?  7'((;Tlie’;;Buddhist) 7v.:,To7Pth,i,s77-al so,;, 77;' -.7;■ 7- ;77 -  
; • • 7; (• Bhar.maki r t i ) s a id :. 7 ( 7 . 1 - 2 );.; - o f  .a , th in g  as, a jw ho le1* th e  . o th e r u
y ;7 7 7 7 is #  in d e e d  ,e h g e n d e re (i;;^  m iiid  7on fh e  ;das.is o f  d i f f e r e n t  7
77  -7yr7 lbcus-: f o r  in s i£ n c e ,7  ihe7biue;yb^
7 77>''7 . ( q ) 0 How 7 c an 7 ( d i  f f e r e n t ); form  he o f  th e  7same . ( one ), t h in g ? ■ 7 ,
. ( kn&m).. T h a t ( d i f f e r e n c e ) ;  r e f le c t s y ( h p f  ytlle  7p o in t  :in s ta h t  7v y 77, y 
th in g  h u t )  d i f f e r e n t  im a g e a (a ) (m e n ta l ly  c o n s tru c te d ) . " 5
;,;'777;:77;7 7 'i.;;;d p a yah h ed at. ’ ( ’ .
7; A - '7 2 . svahhava. • , ■
y - ' ; '> 7 , : -3 ;S in e e > 7 A c c p rd in g -- ,tp .;th e  B u d d h is ts >7bhdy: th e  syalak^apa., is , 77 ;;
7,; ;7 .. p en ce i v e d , 7 akar.a ; yi^alpa;:;==; aiiyapoha o r  .u n iv e rs a l o r 7 7; 7:,7,; 77 '
77i777-: 77;7;7' v;d  i  f f  e ren cey is .; t h e 7 o h je c t ';of • th e  ie rm :;(w b rd ^  s i s . .■ - y.7:
'7-;;7;; 7:7;7 7;argue; .why.,-hot:;ai<htit7:d a ffe re h b ;;r^  .'•,7 p 'a r .f lc d l'a r7 t ;777
:;;/'v77y;7 ;i7 y a h d /p n iy e rs a l,v  as ifthb; two , r e a l7 p a r t s ; d f  one ob je c t  and t h e i r  
7 ;';.t'';.;77 . d i f  fe re n c e  based • on 7 th e  d l f f  erence o f 7 n iedium yof. c o g n it  i  on? . -7;
yyf7y,yy.yip.y;Tlals7,,yer^ D h a rm a k lr t i  1 7 7 "  7-;: "77y
7-7 -7 _7; 5 .7 Tlie r e a  1 i t  y • o f  th e  . extrem e p a r b ic u la r  ;p b in t$ ih s ta h t ;  cannot y7y77 
7 7 7, 7; ;7bev d iv id e d y o n  -the -g rou n d  th a t ;  ity ls 7 7 a p p re h e h ^  , 7 7 77
;; :7. 77; / ;d i f f e r e n t  .substances- and th rough  d if fe re n t ,;m e a n s . Cp. .. 7 7 ,7 ; 7;;
, \ • 7- y; f y  ;;Pra j f ia k a r a g U p ta B V P i V7£v3.9’£ f  (• •. P V V . H i ;• ' 7
7;7;.;.7';>, 7; 2 3 6 / y  ;and7;p.621t.7, anyapohs^y;^  -7 ' ' - ' 77;■
7 7 ; (7..3~5) * There, are vnotwo hiiutually, contradict dry .forms, viz., •
7 determinate (particular) arid non-determinate (universal), v y:7
,-V belonging, to' one ahd : the same entity ; so that hy one, f orin . v •
(the former), it would he reflected in the cognition of the ;';;7
aense-perbeptioh; (^sensation) and hy. the other in the re- ' v 
. productive imagination (= reason) If if. were so, then, 77i v
- indeedthe oh ject ( it-self) would have; to„ be divided^, while, ;
7v: . 7 ■ in;fact, the dislincb-ness;of a thing is nothing else but its- V.
7 :te distinct , self-character.%  ; And’. the; distinct selff j-
■ ■ •.v ; character±s npthihgyother thah tiie. di s tinc f re f 1 exi on ; . : ?v
7 (.produced/by the ; thihjg- in our mind)r.^ Otherwise>/,( if7the : v. /'
7 ’TRhalist does not ^ accept this" view (cbhatyrehlity is: only the, v;y vv-' 
particular thing that has efficiehcy to produce a .distinct 
;v :7vy Vref lexion) ,; the. whole ■ pf the Universes would, he ; ( a.pprehended as) y;.
, .. only one thing (i.e. the non-atermi h a t e Existent :Uhiversal and
: ;v ,,v 7:; everyday hehafiour would he amposbihle); ' 7 7 ■ • . -3 ; ;'
vi. Here > Ha tnaki r 11. ; i s verb ally; quo t ing; . his ! guru* ’ cp. JN., p ;
208-209. ‘ ' > ’y - : V v  . - v - V ' y/ y - v - ’V7;;yv y v-, - ■■■■;;• \ . i
2. vikalpa. , 7. ';v. ;  - '. 7-. - •
. 3. hhedaprapteh . • fvy • -7 -\ 7 y : /
- h*;, Thi su;means.No t-;Cno t-A) = A hec ause A - A y  .7 The argument ;is 
.y ,; in. support bf -..the; Buddhist; view',’that; theparticular 'positive 
■ Qualified, entity is; alone the real 11 thing-in-itself',f - (s yal- 
ak§apa); . ;.V;V 7. v';y .■.. ■ .. yyV ■'f ' . y  y,. yyv v ' '■ yv
5, Thus, since; attributes, universals, :actibhs:,: and inherence
■ , (reiatlpn) do hbtyprpduce; ariy; distinct or, separate . reflexv : \ ,
- . from the substance,; they possess' ho distihci7-bfi^ciency;by , 
themselves and there for e,.7c anno t be regarded as separate or 
V, yy distinct entities,, Of; Stcheihatsky * s tB l 7 :li,?p *26$',( 89.;8fll'^ ...
6, In factjythe1NV,v:authors dor.-admit/h•■higher::type of universality 
nwhich consists of existence alone'S bf; 'Keith*s Atomism., f
;:• :; p.193; PBh., (1895.), P . H .;y ,v ; ■ 7 7V; ;'wyiy . ;; v :;■ :v y ; v;-
(7*8-9)• If (the Realist) argues: "When two persons are
si1ting bh7theysame^ branch of a ; tree, one at, a nearer po int ,
( to usjfand the other atya; farther point>V v M V \ ( w e ‘ li ) 
determinate; and upnvdetehminate .(separate) reflexions , . . *
( = sensations) (of the two) , there is an (another) reflexion 
o f o ; c ommon -real i t y '(h r uni ve r s a 1 al so), tha t b ot h ar e s i 11 i ng 
on the same branch’1 ^ ? (7. 1 G-ll).; ; Thi s i s ■ not so.. .We ( the
.Buddhist) assert.(brumal) that the distinct momentary indefinite 
sensation :(pratibhasa^hbda|y;is determined (sniyafa), (i.e., It 
refers to) by ‘ the; hon--dichotomised; entity (abhinnavastu) • 
Moreover, it is a unique positive object (,ekavi$ayatva) 
determined by the absence (of the other things) . . Hence, (the ’ 
.experience) of a distinct entity, such as a .jar,- is. there where 
there is . the distinct -momentary indef initeVbensatioh -(pratibhascLi 
i^bheda) assisted by the distinct causal, e fficieney etc;^
.(7*12-13). In other case (the person having) only .one reflex­
ion'is illusioned, again b y y b h e o f
;1>: Lit:;> ; (;A.‘9 ) > ;y!na: s a k h i b h e d d ' i t i y  c e t  * ? t h e r e  is n o
yy d i f f e r e n c e s  o f  ( t h e i r ) ; b ^  :b r a n c h .  7,,
2;. ;Reflexioh ’is of two types:. (,l) ;of re al >ahd ’X 2) of Unreal.
Where-it is’produced by something which is an efficient point 
instant entity, I.e., the reality;;,fbrVthe 'ibuddiie^ 
y ffsuchiycase ’ thi s;i s : A ’ Contalns the negatioh o f y
all that which is not-A. But thh,;;bt.her;yt p^^  ^
produced by mental constructions in which-we failto grasp 
the difference between.two point-instant particulars and 
consgguently■ ascribing-;toythemya •-cbmmpht7bharhcteristlc, suchi.
sitting on the same branch*. This reflexion 
of an unre ai :,at tribute v is Vi heV uni vef s;a 1 re al ity f pr the Re a 1 - 
isf 5 but absbncd rot grasping the ’ difference - of; parti culars for: 
tHeBuddhist; Cp.< Stcherbatslcy,; BL. >; T I . p p . p * ^ - 1 2  n.6. 
3* Gp* above' (7*10-11).
: ; v ;;; v7;g2^spi±Lg): oheyob jeetiyeness ( of two things is, illusory)’-/ 7y ' 77V 
A7V77/7:'(i7,c.Vbeglecifng7ti%7differehce)l^ ■'■■y,.;-,7:;
V'■ ; ; corne to): another; .'argument of. Vac a sp a t i; ac c e f di hg to . which,;7 7/777 77 7
( the Realist) ;assertsy.-^sihcje the . difference of, impefcipient V 
and pei»cipient;i s/based: oh: the :dif f erexic e of (respective) y 7:7':
; causes, no 7(;df ificultiy) Vdf non^differexltiaiion.vof/ apprehens ion ; ;.
. y ; (1. e. iilusioh) ; of, .ah/ob ject -/perceived; thrqughvwords ■; and the - y ;
y V . senses will ; arise11?? . 7 . 77 Vyy/VV- 7-;• y7,77.7/7:v ' y .yy;, ■ yv^ v7yV "
/: (7.16-18). (The Buddhist),;:7 This-:y not satisfactory.? 7 V. :
7 1; : pbr. this View that an indirect cognitloii (can also be) the
7777 V- object/of -directyobjec^tive; pefeeptioni cgrihot be supported." ; "7 ;
/■y. Because ■ the ground"of vimperbeptibif liyyi^ y;7 ;
: ■. apoha). is : ( its) separate . cause- (apoha . befngya; logical /synthesis),.:
which ;is meaningful^* only because ( its) /apphehensioh . is not v 7/7'/ 
t possible by sehse-^erceptiori,^: (7.18-20.)'/. ! Hence, it is not 7,
; 7 ■ v ■ * the f liing-in-itself _!*y(;svaf ak^apa)/ whibh isy appfehehded^ in :y; 7 
' 7; v"7'') vexbal/ho^nitioh.^'*; ;v'\^VV7/'^V7\Vy-';:'^7>V7V7” -,■ '7/ '•/■/7 7vyy. ,yyy v7 / ; -v Ay 7;vV/; • 
7 Eurthermgre',; if'the thing-in-itselfV hs/;;toVbe the : 7^ ::;
7 ;7.; direct meaning of the ' word, ( then), the .thi ng should; be. known • y 
7 ( at. once) in its entire -extension' (and so) there. should be 110 / 7 ;
■7 1 , .Stcherbatsky1 a renderihgydf 7OTTT;, BL. ,11 .p.iil3 n.l: (339.v, 7:7?:
0 yy;y: 7 28-3d0.5) . 7> ;.,;:/ 'vyy' y/y77yyy:7y7./ 1 7, yy - y 7 / Vy y y. 7. 7/: '7 , /y7-
7;. 7 2. Gp. the Reali st1s view, BL. , II.p.286 (93*20). / 7V- y ;y/l/y
3* ’-nopayogi * , lit♦, 1 not useful1 . v7'v' •' / ' 7'-7.7 / V 7 7 •’•'77 ■ - /, 7
ii. kptarthati '7 y 7y ^ ^; ; ^,;7 .y,- vyyy-y 7.; ;7 . 7 ■'7 ' ' ■••7 ;v- • • - 7 7 -y
77 775 *7 Gp. BL.,' liv pp. 258-261; (88 .l-lp) -: -:r"- - 7-7,77)' -;7'7': : '77if. ■ .. •. ‘
: 6. parisphurati. 7777:,;.' --7; ,7‘> . 7 . 7^ 77. ,. .7.y-'v" '■ v.-y.yV-. , 7 ‘. y:-.. -7.7
y y':,7.V:;Sabdapra.tyaye'7; 7.7:yy;/ -;7y--.:-=7:7/77 7/;., 7:7-.: 7.yy ;;7;:7/7' - /v - y: /;• ;7-;‘7’-t 7 7
^ 3 .
(need of), affirmative and negative propositions about It 
(or reinted to1 it). , ^
(8.IV3) • . if ,if is existent, it is superfluous to say ”h  exists”, , 
(and) the. negative judgment "A does not exist” is not valid.
On the other hand, if A is not existent, the .judgment "A does ;
not exist1 is superfluous and "A exists” is not.vhLid. But •
there are such propositions! usages (concerning the same 
entity), as "A, exists** (and,does not exist), etc. n
(8..3-I4)* . Therefore, (reality) cannot he the object of ' 
reflexion- of the term (word) which is common to express both 
the existence ;$nd non-existence (i.e. relativity) of an-: ex--. p
ternal thing.
(8.5-6),. Furthermore, Vacaspati (the Realist), having explained , 
the meaning of the term findividual* as that which possesses 
a universal by itself, subsequently stated:
(8.6-12)^ "Ror is it right to maintain that if the Universal ;
were (a reality).expressed in its name, the-name could not be 
positive and .negative, (as admitting equally a connection, with ,
1. Op. BL., II.p.26U (88.25) "Thus it is that what is really 
perceived (by:the senses) is not the meaning of a name, and 
vdiat is meant by a name is not whatsis really perceived (by / 
the senses).1
2. The Buddhist contention is that if the genus Existence 
(satta) were inherent in "cow" - as the Realist believes - 
"the. judgment "the cow, is not” or "there is not cow" would be 
a contradiction". Op. BL.,II.p.Al5 n.3 and p. 14,16 n.A "Since 
in the absolute there' is no possibility of affiimaation-negat-
.xon (nopalabhyate sadliarapa-grahapam), every, thing we can 
alternately affirm- and deny is excluded from the domain of • 
real, i.e., . absolute existence.” , See also Siddheshwar ,yarma>
existence and non-existence).
(8*6-12). A Universal, indeed,; is by itself an eternal 
(-unchanging) entity, but as residing in ah infinite number of "
particulars scattered about in space and time it can be 
alternately affirmed and denied./ We can sometimes say "it. is",
and sometimes uit is.not”. Its existence is nothing but its 
actual presence in a,particular thing, its non- existence is , 1
,V(its absence, i.e.), its residence in a past or, in a future 
space-time. Thus, the proposition "whatsoever can be alter-' 
nately affirmed and denied. (is'■unreal)-” , thhs—prop0 siti on
footnote continued from -previous page:
Shastri., Analysis of Meaning in. the Indian Philosophy of Language, 
JRAS., (1925), p.30. . ,  -V
3.. The whole of the following passage of Vacaspati1 s. 3WTT., has 
been, completely translated by Stcherbat'sky in BL., II. pp., 
v lj-21-2. (3I4I •9-12)., It should"be remembered that Vacaspatim- •
isra (e.8kl A.B.) had, mainly criticised Bharmaklrti and Bhar-
mottara and Ratnakirti'following his teacher Jnanasri. (c.10^50 
A .B.) was the last. 'Buddhis t author d n . the' Histofy of Indian ‘V.
Philosophy to refute the charges of the Brahmanic schools
against Buddhism. Cf. Thakur, Int., to RN.
1. (BL., II.. p.l|21 n.5)• ”e.g., "a cow is", "a cow Is not"; we ;
cannot say "something is", "something is not", because
something is a thing and "is" .by itself....According to the
Naiyayika the genus-Existence .(satta) is inherent -in a cow, : V
it must then be inseparable, from it. . According, to the 
Buddhist Existence or !'Something" existent is the transcend­
ental substratum of a cow’s reality.
2. Gf. above p (8.3-^). . '
- '■ 1 "■ - - ■ - 
cannot be admitted as proved, since its contraposition,
.(viz., the proposition "whatsoever is real cannot be alternately
affirmed and, denied") is not proved. It is even'virrong, (since
we have given :an explanation of the fact of an alternate
affirmation and ,negation) :
(8.13-14)• (The Buddhist). This has been wrongly uttered^
(by Vacaspati). But from this too there is. no, potential - ,
opposition to the view presented ( or upheld,by the Buddhists)
Since, by stressing the universal^ (as the meaning of-the .word
'■ ,1 . ' r , . ' . ■ , . o
or name) you yourself have 3 admitted that *1110 thing-in-itself1 
(point-instant) is hot denoted by the word. ; v:' ■
■ mi t* 1 rrrwrtn—-irtwirm l i ■ m ■nm.iwifT.M.MHH i n.i 11 itrnrrOiii i n 1i* .....■ .< hi ... >■ i niniiH'M rt-iHiiiii im w iw .i < nm.n !.,■ i §m W >m  ■^rrgw n»->, m an nr- i rn.m n.i.iiWiniciij nrrrm-i"— t biti
1. anaikantikam samdigdha-vyatirekitvat - Lit., "not absolute 
because of a doubtful contraposition". BL,, II. p.422 n.l,.
2. anyathasiddham. , ; , ;
3. Cp. S.Varma, JRAS., 1929?/p.24- (l) • Vacaspatimi^ra maintained 
that a word denotes the universal including individuals.
4*. vilapitam or Lit .,, meaningless saying. J v
5. ksatib : Lit., damage,
6. prakpta. ’ • . ' . '
7* jatau bharam nyasyata. . Read Vbharam* instead of *bliaramt ,
, cf..,RN,, p.56. Lit., 'placing the -Y/eight oh the universal1..
8' sval ak$apa.
(8.15-16). Moreover, in all cases (of prepositional
■ . ■ 2 ■ •■■ . 3 ■■
functions) it is the identity of -the thing-in-itself* of
4 ' ' ■ .5 , . ' 6
Reality which is conceived as- existence etc., While
(Vacaspati * s statement) about the Universal:, "Its existence
etc. is, nothing'but its actual presence etc;., in a particular
thing"*^  - is merely (as) fooling a child.^
(8.17-18). Thus, to say that it is the individual which
possesses the universal, is neither correct; if the individual
is established by its pei^ception, (and the Realist believes
that,: the universal is also a distinct .entity, then,), the :
universal must (also) be perceived in addition^ (to its
Individual);
(9.,l). Or, for the sake of argument let us admit that the, 
universal is not perceived although it is a distinct entity
, (=ma va) even then ( the Realist) cannot be free from error 
in his view’that (only) the particular is perceived, (and not 
the universal). : (because, he lands himself in contradictions)
1. sarvatra or lit., everywhere.
2. svabhava or lit., the self-nature. ' -f
3* svalak§apa Of. BL.;, II. p.416 n.4.
4*. padartha or category. - - • ,
5• cintyate.
6. tu or lit., bu.t or on the other hand.
7. Cf . above p.214(8.6-12). "Etc." means non-existence. That is 
Vacaspati said: "Non-existence of a universal is its residence 
in a pas’Ir or in a future space-time." ■, 3
8. bala-prataraparn '
9*. dosab^or lit., error or discrepancy.
10. adhika. •
'■/^ : ; ; V 9 *2-h)> : Now,: ( ® e  ^ Bud proposes to refute) the view of ^
:-v-; y the 'followers: of"Eumaril.a1Bha.ttai^ . “Since reality consists of' . y 
l(two) aspects; (or p a r t s t h e r e  is ho discrepancy in the view 
■ that (an .universal ~ reality). is common. ( to hoth existence . . • -
; . , ’■'. and;:non"existencey.The tree-ness , is apprehended from the. .
: s '.iii :\.wordh(tfee4 w i i ^  (its) existence or :hon-existence* v:
(And) ;it :Is re 1 ated>with > e 1 ther, of the two (i*e. > existence 
or non-existence)'■ {only}; :afterjunderslanding ahother; wor / j ' r f;' 
; v^  v ;,;: ( the predicate .* isr or ’ishot ’) . • \ ■ ; •
. \--I,".'To t! 'I^ ^^ §■ariia^ ;B^ I''atia* s\Viev/ :see Sl> Vart., sections oh ■
;; ; Apohavada and Abhava. -■ . .
; C f; •'^:f2v\fsahhagatv;av^:The-postula^ ^division'of reality;;
;,*v'V-/ 'Y-.into “existence11^ (hhava')/-. and; "hon-existence" ( ahhiva) , hy 
•/’•yl : yy the Realistic^schools ^ seems to he mainly to oppose . the 
, Buddliist. theory of. Apoha in defence of the- universal as
; : r > ^ - reality^padartha) • The very fact that the Shaft as and yy
' ; tlie latpf; By.’ ufteh Udayana posits this twofbld division Vv-'V
'of, reality, iiidicates the; Buddhist: pressvire on. them. (Cf.
\ ; Kir., p. 1 •). Kurnarila Bhafta -was the foremost; opponent -  ^,
;yyy-.y. . of the Buddliists amongst theMxmainsakas and Udayana1 (nv); .,
f yy;o v y ; hndertookfi^ Of defending the Brahmanical' logical /
' . system. . In his ■ Byaya-virttika-tatparya-parisuddhi 1
;and TAtma-tattva~yiyeka! his,.main task has heen to refute
' yf and;,.yfianasri.. (Cf. RH., Int. , pp. 21-2, and .
;vh: ■ . y Int., 3HCTV5 hyAThakur)?^;: V I > yylv.'--V' -yy Y ‘ - - y-’; Vv-’"-'
vy ; 3. Gf.> S.yarmav: JRAS^^ 1929/ p.ih (l); SI. Y a r t . p . h 7 6 ;
Ah. Glmpter, verse 12, and p.§99/ Apoha ch., verses 110
h. vpk§atvam. v-; ■'
y. ,V:;.' 3 i ay agamy a t e .yOr ;; ■
' ■ .;. 6 p B L . I I  v p. 265 n.ll . - _
(9*5-6). (The Buddhist rejoins)• This, view is also incon-
1 ' - • 2 3
sistent; .since the cognition of a constant and; imperishable -
universal, (i.e. a positive existent thing), cannot coincide^
with an object of which existence and non-existence is not (yet)
determined.
(9*6-8). (The Mimajpsaka1 s argument).. It may he said that
■ ' ■ ' ■ ■ '■ fr
u The way of understanding the meaning of words is not the 
.same as: that of sense-perception. For as the perception of a
;thing, does; not depend on (the use of); predicates such- as Vis1
etc., (the meaning of a word can also he established.without 
‘'.is" etc.) For the means of valid knowledge^ (i.e. word) 
possess an unique force (to hring ahout the cognition the 
•universal entity which is not capable to he perceived hy the
•' . . • -7 i;;; . ;
simple sense-perception)." ‘
(9*9-11)* (The Buddhist). This view is also rejected hy the., 
refutation (of the realistic view) that there, is a separate 
entity to be judged (or reflected)^ (apart from the extreme
1. asaipgatam.
2. pratipatti or apprehension or perception.
3* nitya or eternal*
h. ayoga or that which cannot he yoked together.
5* artha-pratyayana-pralcar ah.
6. pram^pa. ; >
7. The contention is that the perception refers to the thing 
itself while the word (^ahdapramapa) corresponds to the 
universal and this is the unique.force of'the means.word.
8. . avabhasate.
particular,real)1, since what is grasped by the sensual and 
the verbal reflexions (in the -mind) is the one-and-the-same 
identical particular reality. . As (to the. second argument) 
viz. that of 1 the-uiaique. force of the means of hnowladge’*, . ,
(we Buddhists also honour the force of the pramaipas but. we 
say), that it, can also be meaningful^ (even if you accept the 
view that only the unitary particular reality is apprehended) 
by direct ..senserperception and by the logical synthesis (ex-v%- 
pressible by the w o r d ) .
(9.12-13). Thud, if the object of (direct) sense-perception
" - - .. ... • , ■ 
(can.also be) apprehended (or.grasped) by the verbal (re-
- .f* • ' . . Q • . - • ■ . •
flexion), : the experience should also be the same (as in the . 
sense-perception) * '; And since (that) does not happen (a term) 
cannot convey^ an object which belongs to that (direct sense-*.
1. .aindriyahajiabda-pratibhasayoh* . \ - t
• 2 . ekasvar.upa. .That is only one unitary entity: hot consisting^:
of,both;particularity and universality as the; Realists be-,
■ ‘ ’ lieve.ft . ‘ ■ '■ ' - ~
3. caritartham. \
h. sakpatlcaradhyavasayabhyam. ' The . term adhyavasaya means . ’ p.; 
! judgmental .perception1 as* opposed to, *;direct sense-perception^ 
v.'-.arLd" thus •; expressed by the.word. - t v-
3,* pratipadanam. " t t ’h
. 6* avabhasa. The contention is; that if the efficient reality 
.were utterable, our experience,at the utterence of the word 
or .the, name would be the same as that of the sense contact. ”, 
The mouth.dhould burn and cold disappear by the:pronouncement 
of ^f-i-re*. Gf. BL., II. p.26h (B8.26) and also f.n.il. >
7* abhavan. . ‘
8. khyapanam. , h-h
perception).1 . ■
(9*lU~15)« • (The Mimamska);. "Since ’by;' the term "tree" (only) , v
the tree-ness, (the universal) part of (the reality), is evoked . ’
2 • ■ ' 1 ■ ■ ’ ■ ■ 
in the raind, the use of the’ predicate is1 etc..,. (is necessary)
for . determining. (the other) part (of the reality), existence
(particular entity) etc.u? : If this he the argument (of the ;
Mimimsaka) (the Buddhist answer is as follows).
(9.16-17). "Since, the "thing-in-itself” (reality) is unitary3
and grasped in sense-perception in its entirety, there is no
(other separate part of reality), left out of the perception,
and to he. grasped by another term (or predicate "is1 and "is..:
not") nor hy another me axis of knowledge [is it possible to. ,
establish] another sb tribute which is (not already invoked by)
the affirmation or negation .(of the. thing);;3 : .
1. The Buddhist contention is that the. reality is in-it-self 
single, -an unitary pax^ticuiar. It is not a, dual entity,, co- 
inciding particular and universale ; Thus in the direct sense- 
perception only this unitary thing is pexheived which alone is 
the ..efficient real entity. . But the subject of a judgmental 
perception (adhyavasaya = .vika.lpa); is not the momentary, 
particular thing-in-itself but' its general image, a mentally^ .;- 
cohstx^ucted- non-efficient logical synthesis and this alone is 
the subject of affirmation or negation. Therefore the word’; 
denotes only, the relation between the momenatafy thing and its 
image and this (relation) is not an universal'reality but 
mex^ely a. logical synthesis. ; Cf. RN,, pp.67-8; BL.,II.ppUf2h--';
, ^25. : . . r  / " : V.f
2.: codite. ., . •• : .-
3. nirai}iAa„ Cf. ■. ‘ - .V'; f.
U,.. Lit. , 1 ko Vvakasah1 - what scope is there? PVS., p• 139,. "nir- ;
bhSgasya rastuno grahape ko'nyastada na grahitah.1' BL.,. 11.
,p.269 (9.0.2). ^
3. According^ to the Buddhist view when a thing. A is affirmed br
denied, its whole unitary self is affirmed or denied in its
entirety. . If it be. .affirmed all its attributes (perceived)
are affii*med; thereby. ‘ And if, it bb denied all its attributes
... , •; ■ , - . /over . ’ '
(9•IS). (The. Mimamsakas1 objection). "Even after a simple 
sense-perception dependence on other means'of knowledge (for, 
the judgment) is found (necessary)" ? Of
(9.19-20). (The Buddhist answers). That may be.true^ only 
with regard to a thing .whose1 form and characteristics are not , •
familiar. In that case the sense-perception is not successful 
in determining (the fact); But in the case of a mental con­
struction (i.e..the -term ~ logical synthesis) which is itself v 
a determinative, .there is no need .for another means (of judg­
ment) for its apprehension,3
(10.1). But ;to grasp the ( distinct) reality of. an object 
(we).do depend on other (different) terms and the logical marks.^
Dootnote continued from previous page:
are dehled^vCf. PyP.^ p.‘6l6 "na.ca kihcid avasitam kihcinneti f, ,
dakya samarthanam. vibhagasyasattvat." See also PV., IV. 230- .
231; PVB.-, p. 122 ",.anavakasak phamabantarasya vrttih*" '
1. As> for example, a .child for" the first time seeing a red . .f 
rose, without the. authority^Ibfgthe cori»esponding Word (£ab- ;f 
dapramapa), i.e., of an elder person or a descriptive work,
cannot have the./judgment "this is a red rose". Thus the / 
Realists maintain that to.perceive a real universal attribute,. : 
such as colour j. name. etc. of a .thing we depend on a ppamapa 
other than the simple sense-perception, vis, .the £abda; or Word 
determining the cognition of universal reality. . -
2. bhavatu.
3. The Buddhist regards- vikalpa = .adhyavasaya as.a logical syn- . 
thesis. Although ultimately based on perception it is free. - 
from the sense-object contact. RN., p.83s "pratyak$am anumanam. 
pratyak§app§thabhavi ea vikalpab" and p.12b: "agbhito*pi pra- f 
vpttivi §ayo ' dhyavaseyab" •
h. The question/is that since the. Buddhist admits only one unitary, 
reality and that is the object of sbnse-perception, why doe s- 
he, then, need to posit any other: means of judgment viz.,‘ In­
ference or word and reason = dahdalinga = apoha; .and hovvr can- 
any other means be valid without corresponding to any reality? 
see BL., II.. p.2?0: (-90*3); PV.', I.b9* f f ;  •
(10.2-h) • (The- Realist) . trSince, such properties as the . > ;
universal (particular) etc. are different (real) attributes'^ *> :
' 2 (of the same object) and are mutually harbouring each other* .
although, from the term "tree11: (he* the possessor of b r a n c h e s )  (
we know the tree as the possessor of only one attribute viz., 
its one universal character; the tree is not apprehended as V
being the possessor of another (its particular) characteristic 
(Therefore),, (10.5)• is it not (a fact that) there is a cogni­
tion^ of another characteristic viz., the.quality of•possessing.yiy 
very high branches floating in the bTue sky, etc., (and) this r - 
(other characteristic) is expressed by another name?"''*
(10.6-7)* (The Buddhist). This view is inconsistent; for , "
(we Buddhists have already stated that) it is the undivided y-
(unitary)^ reality of the 1 thing-in-itself* that is reflected 
in.the sense-perception. (.And also) because (the judgment of)
1. dharina or attribute. ■
2. dharmin (substance) locus. '
3* sakhin. ' / ■.
h* avabodhah* . ; , p
5. Op. BL., II.: p.275 (91*1)*
6.\;akhanda = "niraijisa. Gp. above AS-.*. (9*16). According to K.K.*
Raja the Buddhist theory of Apoha may be included in "the : / 
Akhapd^pakeg or the Gestalt view, of which Bhart^hari, who 
wrote the Vakyapadiya in the fourth century A.D., is the 
greatest exponent, (according to which), the; fundamental 4
linguistic fact is the sentence considered as ah integral :
language symbol. Words are mere abstractions made from the 
sentence by linguistic analysis and have only a pragmatic value* 
’Theory of Meaning.According to Buddhist Logicians1, op.cit.p*l-£
7* Gp. PVS., pp.241'“2^1-2 and Karpakagomin therein: *nahi vpk$adi$u: ■ 
dvau^pratibhasav(upalabhyete. ekaiy ^ akhadyakaro1 parasca^ak- > 
hadyakarah*1 We do not have two cognitions of one tree viz., ’. y 
one consisting of the branches and the other of .not-branches. y'
the difference: between the characteristics and the character­
ized ’perceptual thing; does not arise out of the sense- 
perceptipn. (Differentiation is logical and thus, a cog- ; 
nitive act.) , (10.8-9). Otherwise there would he the in- -
consistency of everything being present everywhere.^ This 
has been well explained in the sastra® (in this way) : (Our.,
every day) behaviour of { distinguishing, between) characteristics 
and the characterized (or -.Quality' and Substance), is, indeed, 
(not based on their real difference) but grounded in the. 
mentally .constructed: difference
(10.10). Or let us suppose that. the difference of the 
characteristic and the characterized is real. (10.11-12). . 
Nevertheless, since both are corrupted (falsely assumed to be
1. atiprasahgab.
2. If^’'Differentiation11} ■ were not cognitive but perceptual we , . 
would have perceived-at once all that what is not-A in the 
determination of A. Cp. BL., I I .  pp.267 - ff.
3. We are not sure whether Ratnaklrti hdre refers to Dharmkirti 
or dmnadrH* However, the same expressions can be found in 
the passages ascribed to Dharmakxrti. by S t c he rb at sky, cf.
. BL.., II. p.273 n,2.
h. Cp. BL., II. p.275 (90.28), t! (The Buddhist1 s view is that) 
the attributes are not something apart, from the substance 
of, the thing, but; productive imagination constructs them as 
V something different. Thus (the synthetic images) are not
due to a stimulus.;.coming from the, object, (but to imagination)*;
,5. paramarthikah.
'"jLinterdependent) by Inherence etc*; (they cannot be appre­
hended separately and) their relational knowledge2 must be 
posited pnly as qualifying3 (each o t h e r ) (10.12-16). And 
thus, just as in perception through the relational knowledge 
(or the judgmental relation) arising from the sense-contact, 
all the characteristics are apprehended when the; thing charact­
erized is apprehended,6 so should all the characteristics 
(referred to by not-A) be.apprehended, when the characterized
(A) is apprehended, by the term and the logical mark6 which
7
are invariably cbncommitant with the relation of the denoted
- C f ..
and the denotative etc; for the relational knowledge is just 
the same (in both the cases viz., the sense-contact and the 
constructive judgment or the synthetic judgment).9
1. dusitatvad. •
2. pratyasatti. Cp. below AS., (10*16).
3.. upakaralaksana.
U. Cp. BL., It.’pp.266-267 (n.3 on p.267).
5. Or: at the apprehension of the substance all its attributes, 
are apprehended through the judgmental relation (pratyasatti) 
simultaneously in the sense-perception...
6 . £abdalihga =s apoha, or discrimination.
7. pratibaddha. Cf^ BL.,_II. p;Ul6jn.2.
8. vacya-vacaka « karya-karana - jnapya- jnapakabhavah. Although 
these terns differ in their connotative usage they express the 
’cause and effect’ relation. Cp. PKM., (2nd ed.) p.Jwl; NVTT., 
(Banares ed.) p.135.
9. The contention of the passage seems to be that the relation
between A and not-A or the characterized and the characteristic
or the particular and the so called universal cannot be that
of the cause and effect and therefore we do not cognize two
separate, entities. Cf. BLi, II. p.267. However the relation
between the word and the differentiated conceptual image is 
that of the cause and effect and therefore the term denotes
discrimination or apoha.: Cp. BL., II. p.287 n.3.
(10.174*19)^ ; (The Realist * s argument) . And Vaeaspati further, 
argued: - "When a substance^ - is qualified hy one at tributes 
(and) is grasped (so), (then), this is not apprehended as .being . 
qualified by another attribute (or universal) . Indeed, the
'  h. "i ’ * " v ‘ r ' I '  . 1 , " Ot
substance of the thing (or the identity of the substance) is 
characterized by the attributes.,: (ll'.l). But neither the y
attributes nor their relation to the substance^ are identical 
with the substance itself, (All. are separate entities..)& :
(ll.l) . (The Buddhist re joins) . This view is also hot sound. ^ 
(11.2-5). (In ;t he Buddhist view) / in fact, t he ■ appre hens ion
- . / ; y
of different at tribute (s) is not implied' in the non-differentia- 
ted (cognition of the thing), since the apprehension of the 
characterized is entailed in the apprehension of the charact- 
eristic only if it is preceded by the .knowledge of the 
difference (between the two viz., the characterized and the .
1. sattva or reality or thing.'
2. txpadhi or an imposed property.
5. svabhavo hi. dravyasya. Lit., the self-nature of the substance.
U. videsyatvany.p visistatvam r sambandha .=• samavaya. >Cf. BL., II. , 
p. 288 n.5. \ ** , „
5. Stcherbatsky* s translation of the 3WTT., of Vacaspati, appar-,
■ ently of the same- passage which has been referred to here by
Ratnaklrti is as follows: "And not, if this, one is character­
ized by one characteristic, the consequence of it’s being per­
ceived as characterized by other characteristics. Indeed, -the: 
substance, of,the thing is characterized by the characteristics 
but neither, the characteristics nor the fact of being charact­
erized by them are the substance." BL.,II.p.288.n.7. Lit., ;
(95.26-28)
6. plavata eva. Or weightless or does not hold ground.
7 •; head ,asanjitam, . "mas ah jit am" is apparently a printing mis­
take .Cf. beloy/ line 12 and cp'. RH ., p.57.
8, puraskrtya. Lit., haying placed before.
characteristic). ,(11.h-5). And further* it is not correct 
to posit' the rule of natural relation between substance and 
attribute, in the same way as (it is applied to) the cause and 
. effect relation of fire and smoke, , (11*5-7). For even the . ., . 
two* (the substance and5the attribute) are hot validly estab­
lished (as two separate entities)* And it is logically correct 
that (you can) describe reality3 (only) when it. has been 
validly established.^ (11.8-9). (The Realistic view of the 
.' ^ Ryayabhu^aha") . :• And here in the Nyayabhupapa it; is said
that the apprehension: of the sun -etc.* entails the apprehension 
of the-whole of the collection^ of things that are; qualified
1. kalpanam.
.2, "The^reality of relations required as a corollary the stability 
• ‘ (s:fchayit,ya) of qn&uring; objects. The Buddhist: who denied this .
.stability:and converted the existence of every object into a . 
stream of momentary events (k^apikaiva) divided all.relations ;
; into real ..(vastava) - thabwas the relation of Causality be- , 
tween the consecutive moments and logical (kalpita) - these 
"y;K- were the relations of the thing with its attributes and motions 
. superimposed (aropita) upon it by productive.imagination (kal- 
.■ paiia* s:'vikalpa-vasana) .V (See further there) . Stcherbatsky, V.y 
. op. ci t., p . 287 n . 3. . ,
8. svabhava. ■ . y y  . y
,• U .. $The Buddhists do, not admit the transcendental reality of. the
relation betv/een substance and, quality (dharma-dhaiTfli-bhava).
, The substance alone is,reality, the qualities are construetionV 
. ' Stchefbatskyy BL., II. p>,58, ri.l. See also PV;, T.b9., "dharmi- ,
' ■ ■ y pab siddhau - siddham kirn abaft. param". ^
,5. A wbrk■ by:-theylogician Bhasarya jha,. the authbr of the Nyayas- 
ara. The text of the Nyayabhusapa "has not yet; come-t o light 
and.our source of information'about it is'restricted:to the % 
quotations' found scattered in later, works." A.Thakur,R.N. Int., 
p. 25.^See also p. 2U; Vidyabhu?apa, HIL., p. 358. Vy- .
6.. suryyadi. -y The example of the. sun . seems to. indicate the ..problea 
of the relation of the word and its meaning, i.e. to know the
. word is to know all that what it expresses. "
7. a£esavasfu~ra£i.
toy it (the. sun), (and thus with the perception of* the qualifier, 
(i.e., one universal all .individuals can toe apprehended). 
(11.9-10) .. (The Buddhist rejoins). This- (the Nyayatohusana’s 
argument) is the result of not understanding (the.Buddhist) 
intention (atohipraya) (properly). Thus, in your, view there is 
(a real) difference between the. attribute and the substance . 
and they are cognized, as related toy qualifying relation only.-**
(11.11-12). , Thus, '(in your opinion) in the cognition of the 
qualifier is entailed (asanjitam) the cognition, of only that 
qualificand which resides in the same locus (in which resides 
its qualifier) and1 which is (it-self) only a form of an attri­
bute.^ (11,13-lU). In that case, it may toe asked: How can
(your statement) toe regarded as ’consistent1 if its inconsistency 
is (so) apparent^ For (in your example) the apprehension of--, 
such a thing is involved which, although residing in a place 
or a substance-different from the sun, ,is still qualified toy it. . 
(11.15-18). Because,' (you assert that) if we investigate a
1. upakaralaksanaiva.
2. The contention seems to toe .is that since the relation between 
the attribute and the _ sub stance is posited to toe complimentary 
(upakaralak$apa pratyasatti)if A qualifies B, then, toy know­
ing A we shall as well know B only if tooth reside in the same 
locus and in some way B also is complimentary: to A, for 
according.to the Realists A, B and their R (relation) all are 
real entities. . ~ ~
3. drstavyatohicara. ■ •
1
particular thing "by means of one of its attributes, it is 
known in its entirity; (it may be., asked then) What scope is 
there for other positive or negative statements concerning it? 
However, there are (asti) (affirmative and negative propositions 
concerning, e.g., a tree); thus it is established that "it 
is not the "the thing-in-itself" which is reflected in the 
words, Judgments and logic." (For these refer only to logical 
synthesis and constructive imagination, hut not to "sensation" 
or direct perception.)^
(11.19-20). Moreoever, Universals do not form the prima facie 
(mental) contant.of words.. For instance, in the proposition 
"cows are grazing (caranti) across the river", - (12.1-5) since 
there is here ho consideration, of individuals belonging to 
the same class they appear as it were, brought together into 
one (unidentified) mass3: of dewleps, horns, and tails etc. 
by the image of the letters (aksarakara) (of the word c-o-w) .
And this (mass) is (certainly) not a universal (even in terms. r: 
of the realistic definition).
1. vastu-svabhava.
s! Cf. above (7.18- 8.1-U); BL., II. p.2Q4 (88.25); S.Varma, 
, JRAS., (1989)_, p. 30; pVS., pp,38U-385.
5. sampisditapraya|i..
(12.1*). Ah universal is, indeed, defined (by the Realists)
(as a distinct transcendental reality) to he distinguished 
from,the colour and the. shape (of the cow) (and) the liters 
(constituting the term ,fc o wu).
(12,5-7). And (thus) this is called uthe universal1* (hy the 
Realists): The mere (form of) the dewlap.and horn etc., which 
resides in all5 (the multitudes of) its individuals. -Although 
it is absolutely distinct from them, it is capable of coalescing 
with'the particular individuals.^ (But) since in an external 
(oh3ective)1 form, no such "thing** (universal) ;is perceived,
• it is indeed, a (mere) illusion,:like the appearance of (new)
1. The complete verse in DharmakTrti* s PV., III. 11+7, is as 
follows: . !
11 yadyapy-anvayi vijnanam ^ahda-vyaictypavahhasi tat.
; varnp^rt^-ak§arpikarasunyam gotvam hi varnnyate.11 Translation: 
’[Although the affirmative cognition of an universal is that 
which appears in the apprehension of the name, (or word) (cow) 
and the individual (body cow) , it is,; indeed, defined as. •.
(as above translated)11.
In this verse, according to Prof. A. Thakur in a letter to me,
11 DharmakTrti gives, the Nyaya-vaidesika view about Universals11.
2. Por the Realist view see BL., II, p.271+ n.9.
hair*’1' (12.8). Thus, let this paradox9 he (solved hy 
admitting) the (universal) as an internal mental construction 
due to our (eternal) habit® (of coalescing dissimilar 
particulars as similar in the: mind hy negating a common counter­
correlate). (12.9). Or let its form he known as merely unreal.^:
(12.IO-II) . Or let it he the erroneous appearance of the 
neglected difference of the (extreme) particulars belonging to 
the same class (i.e.., possessing, similar attributes although 
they are different), due to their being experienced at different 
moments.^ (12.11). Or we may call it a confusion of memory*^
1. ke^a. Dharamkirti in PV., III. §03-59 refuting Kumarila 
Bhaftafs view of the pratyahhijha or ,fthis is that1', says 
that although the Judgment nthis is that" arises in the per­
ception of newly grown hair, of a hall repeatedly produced hy 
a magician and of the ever new:flames of a candle, this is in . 
fact not a perception, as the Mlmaijisaka believes it is uThis
is that11 - involves the imposition of the attribute which is . * 
previously experienced and now remembered and due to this im- ; 
position there is an illusion or failure of apprehension of 
difference between the first point instant of reality and the i 
■second, the third and so forth. - See also, Rahula SahkytyayanaV]
dd., p.798, ;
2. vivartta, or confusion or illusion.
3. vasana. Cf. BL0  II, p.ij-18 n.ll; PVS., pp.3l9> 38ij., PV., I. 
207-8.
asadeva. .
5. anuhhava-vyavadhana. Cp. above f.n.l.
6. smrti-pramo§a=^ramo§a=viparyaya-Jhanam=:vivekakhyati. This, 
is Prabhakaraf.s viev/. Cf. PKM., p*5*4*: "tacca (rajatadnanam)
siuarapamapi syarupena-navabhasata iti smpti (&uktikayam) 
pramoi^bhidhlyate (prabhakarepa)And also Pt. Mahendra
." Kumar Shastri, (Hindi) Int., dbid., p.23. ■
*L p
(12.12). (Thus), in all cases fhe cognition .of the universal
' . ,• • • A •
corresponds to nothing in reality. Therefore how can we talk
about the reality of the universal?
(12.13-14)• And again, the objection (of the'Realist) that 
the Imowledge oi1 the universal^ v/ithoiit. its corresponding 
reality, would become accidental cognition, is not correct. 
(12.14-16). Because, .(the Buddhist answers) the totality of
• ' ■ R ■ . . .  •'/"' ■
the causes producing a non-distincth cognition qualified by
. ’ ' V  “ V  ■" . 7  ‘ ‘ • • . • ■
the.force of the cooperating memory of the previously per-
ceived object creates a mentally constructed universal (image)
which has no corresponding (external) object. . . ;
(12.16-18). Hence, verbal cognition does not.produce the
ftppearance of the unreal (in the mind); nor does it arise
in sense-perception, nor can if be established/(as an.entity)
1.,, sarvatha. : ■' . i • ..
2. pratyaya or understanding. - p
3* nirvi$ay$ti. Lit., having no corresponding biibject.
4. akasmika. ' ■'''7■-1 --
5* avise^aprat^aya-janika-samagri•
6. atiricyamana.
7> sahakaripa, • •" . h
8. It should bejremembered that the Realists regard the
■ univei’sal (Samanya): as a perceptual reality, perceived
through the individual; body in which it inheres. Cf. Keith1 
Atomism. , pp.75~76. . .
by Inference; since it is non-empirical, there can "be no v
perception.of the "reason" (1inga) containing the invariable, 
concomitant relation, , (12•19-)• Hor can it he established
(as a self determining entity) like the sense-organs♦
(13.I)• Since .it is an effect of the cognitive act, it is . 
established only.on something produced by sa:different cause. V : 
.(l3vl~5)» (The Realist’s1 argument) • If the absence of the 
cognition of a cow is iDointed out in (the presence of) another 
body (not-cow)^ or (when the cow is removed) by - a distance of 
time and place,w;then the:negation-is based on the absence of 
all individuals cows,, including the.spotted, (the red and 
white, ones etc.',). The Realist then asked, since negation is . . 
brought about by the .cognition of (absence of the universal) .
.cow, how.can negation (of such a characteristic) entail"*
* ■ . 6 -■ ■ ; ' ' -: •' - ■ ■ ' •' /■. - - 
another. entity? / (Moreover), A is 1 said to, be, the body of (an
1* kadacitkasya. - h
2. The contention sebms to /be that on the basis of. things v/hich 
are different ,in - their causes,:.- we mentally construct their 
different classes. , —v. " "
3. piudantare. This perhaps^refers to the situation of mutual 
. absence or the anyonyabhava, in which, for. the Realist,.
there are two separate positive universals in the two opposed ., 
entities.- - v A /. ,
4. antarale va. This, seems to_refer to prag (prior), p.radhvaijisa. 
(posterior)', and atyanthabhava (absolute absence) •
5. /ak^ipet./; /. ' . . ■ t.' \ >■ .. • A/.
6. That is - since ’not cow1 means the. absence, of cow-ness, how ; 
can the negation of cow create aii^ other universal vis., lion, 
horse etc., i.e. everything which is referred to by ’now-cow*?
/%‘According ‘to the- Realistic .view-.it is the absence of the
:universal cow that is qognized in.the cognition of things ,
which are referred,to by the term-'not-cow*. But according.
. Co. fhe Buddhist this creates a mental universal image of 
- things that are "hot-cow". ;> ■
individual) cow only because it .possesses the characteristic 
of the universal. -cow (ness). Otherwise (the. term) " the body / 
of the cow" could also refer to a horse.
(13 * 5-"7) (The Buddhist re joins). . If it is true that the
universal cow-nes's exists because of the; body coy/,, individual 
cows - as substantiated the .argument that in the‘contrary case, 
(the term) cow-ness could also refer to horse-ness,, then,
“Does it not follow that the cow-ness'is, in fact, (produced 
bj?-) the causal efficiency of the individual cow?"
(13.8-II) . (The Realist). "If the (causal) efficiency of 
pr0dueing\the‘ apprehension of the universal is not separate 
from the one body (individual), then, another. body (individual 
of the same class e.g. a r.ed cow), is not capable to be diff- 
erentiated from the other class. But if'(the efficiency of 
.producing) .is separate (from one individual body), then, that 
very (separate) thing is the universal.? (Thus), the greatest
1. s.amanya-pratyaya- jahana-s amar thy.am
2, That ,,is:- if only one. individual, a, white : cow has the potential 
efficiency- to produce the apprehension of the cow-ness, and,, 
is not separated from.it, then, another individual’ - a red; \
;■ Cow could not have the ..same efficiency and • thus not be differ-'
. entiated (on the basis of its own class)-from universals of. 
.horses., lions etc., for all individuals, even of the same 
; v class, differ in their causal/efficiency or individuality.
3* In the text (13.10). stop after "samanyam"; cf. RN., P.58.
. d  |>
controversy is only about the name (universal,, not about its 
contents)."? ' (13.11-13)• (The Buddhist). (To this view our 
answer is' as follows): That efficiency,-is, indeed, conjoined
in each thing (individual): just as one existent thing has
its natural efficiency .so the other (individual) can hlso have 
(its ov/n'natural efficiency); what discrepancy can be caused?
As in your (Realist ■ s) .view, (.13* 14-16) * although Universal 
is only one (and still) is the cause of creating various 
similar (universal) sounds (i.e. cow-ness, horse-ness etc.),
(and) other uniyersals are also 1 index>enda.nt of-different uni-, 
versals by their own self-nature; so in our (Buddhist) view 
-the individual;(momentry extreme particular) is also inde­
pendent of the universal (and), is a separate cause (of an other 
momentary particular) by its self-nature.J -
1. £ ak t a s v ahb avab.
2. avahati.
3# The contention seems to be Is that .even if we admit an uni- 
versal as the meaning of ;the term or word, we have to accept, 
it as. the particular univei’sal in it-self independent of other 
universals. Therefore, according to the Buddhist view the 
meaning of a word is differentiative or discriminative - a 
particular excluded jfom a common characteristic. Thus .posy,., 
ulation of a separate universal entity serves no purpose. Cf. 
PV.,^1.99; "vyavacchedo^sti cedasya nanvetavat prayojanam.
/■ sabdanam^ifi kirn tatra. sariianyen-apareca vab-u See also,
, Rahul a Sankptyayana, 1)70., p. 7 89.. • * /
■(13* 17-1?) * How the argument of. Trilocana^ (is as follows):
"The particular,universals , such as horse-ness, cow-ness etc* 
are ..related- to ‘ their, locus . (individuals or substances) by In­
herence universals, (Thus), the universal is the cause 
(nimittam), of names and concepts (abhidhana-pratyayor).
(13•19”)* ‘(The Buddhist). . If it wex?.e true then (in the view. /. 
of) in particulars^ also (there .is the inherence relation, and) 
we might agree that (the universal). is the cause.of names and 
concepts; but.how and. by what .error could this be applied to1 , 
the universal rtheniselves?^ (That is, are the uni versals also 
the cause- of universals, or do .universals inhere in universals 
also?). . . - - ; • ’ .
1. Amongst the Halyayika realist opponents, after Uddyotakara and 
Vacaspati, Trilocana is "the third dominant figure to receive 
special attention" of Ratnalcirti and his teacher Jhanasrimi.tra 
It is well established that Tidlocana was the guru of Vacaspat 
imisra^ Cf. HVTT.,. p.133; Stcherbatsky, op.cit., p.258 n.3« 
Thakur, The Naiyayika Trilocana as a Teacher of Vachaspati, 
Indian Culture, XIV. Ho.I. p.36 ff; Prasad, HIE*.,. p.2i+9; ; Sinha 
-Hip., -I* p.h52; Hadhakrishnan, IP.,, II.p.57. A Nyayabha$ya-.
; t>ika has^also been ascribed to him by Durvekamidra, Dharmo- 
, . ttarpradlpa, p. 173; KH. , Int., p.26 n.ij..
2. samanya-vide^apam..
3.- vyakti$u.^ .
k . s amanyasvlkar a. ' '
(l4..3~7)• Moreover* the inherence, relation cannot be estab­
lished (as an independent real entity). (Since.it is main­
tained by the realist, that) Inherence is established because' 
there is the.judgment .such as* “(this is in^) here". And - 
the.cognition "(this is in-) here" is.based on the perception 
of two . (facts)! And thus there is noYrhere dependence on that, 
object (’'inherence'1) in. order .to know for instance* that A ■ 
inheres in B). (inherence) is thersfore* merely an expediency 
(abhyupaya^)* of our conceptual construction.
(14.8-10). (The Buddhist continues). The contention posited 
by the Realist (asya) is rejected.^ (The realist asserts, 
that) there is a direct continuity^.between.the concrete 
objects (particulars) and their, corresponding concepts (= the 
universals which; inhere in the particulars). (.This view is
rejected in terms-of the following question): How is this
5 ’• f)
possible if the positive(conceptual) cognition of the
*7 8  .
distinct objects- which result from the extreme unipue
particulars^ (given in sensation).10 : •
.1. That is the perception or sensation has only a single object 
v (svalah§apa) not two on the basis of which constructive con­
cepts such as* universals^ inherence etc. are. formed or im- 
; agined.
2 . uha =^uha_or consideration* examination, inference etc.
3. pratyakhya’tiHm* . , , ' - ' .
4. anpvytti-aiiuvptta.
3. hath am bh ay i turn arha t i. •
6. pratyayabhava.
JJ. vyavpttavi^aya.
8., anupatini§u• ;
9. aty ant abhe di ni §u. . : .
10. .This means that according to the Realist the.particulars are
x b  7
.(14.11-12)., This inconsistency arises .only in .- ( the realist 
view of) universals *,(where the universals correspond to) 
the apprehension of the. positive extended object!* Thus*
(the universals), themselves become particular universals by 
mutually excluding each other. .
(14.12-14)• This again is refuted (by the Realist): "It
cannot be admitted -.that the cognition ( of universals) is 
illusory, for the concrete conceptual content of terms (or
-j " . - ‘ ' . 1 ' ' , h ■' ‘
names) is caused by a given time and place and therefore
from some other extensions (or affirmation).. And (thus) ‘
(an affirmation words .and concepts) .cannot be.( negatively) the . 
cause, of something else (i.e. .the anyapoha* the discrimination 
of the other* the not-A)11.
Footnote, continued from-previous page.
known by the real universals v( their.. class characters) and con­
versely* according to•the Buddhists* the universal are logically 
constructed on the basis of. the extreme particulars.
n —1  t n r ^ T T rm r 1 I l » i l  n n  i i »  H  mt ■  11 Ml IH H  Ml . ,   ......  I T i i i im im n iii ■ !  H H m u m M m I t if......... M nMim w ! iVi - I .I . J.- .. ..1' J i n i m  ^  i i  m u  ir i ! i r m m . l. »<rririrr i iM i.«».iiit»  1 n w m ■ ..........................in  mm  n  n  1 1111 ■ 111 ■
1. nimittavatl • • - ' .
(14*15-17)'* (The Buddhist)* This is not correct*.
Because, even without the extension (or universal • ' = • 
affirmation) (as the meaning of the term, what is apprehended.) 
as the extension of the meaning of the term (or/name), is 
the particular A ident ical'with its self ^character .(and) 
discriminated from the form of all that whieir is not-A*
(Thus, the discrimination - not the positive universal 
affirmation) must be accepted (as the meaning of the term), 
for this is established so* . . Thence, (DharmakTrti said) r 
(14*18-19)• "The same relational knowledge2 (or class . 
connection) by which the class, ~ in spite of the sameness 
of the difference - occurs^ in certain"*' (particulars) -
1* This verse, is found in PV. ,1.164 (G-.ed. 1.162) * For . .> 
translation see E. Frauwallnar, WZKM*,vol.40, p.79* 
and the text, vol.3?, p.283.
2* pratyasatti_. , Karnakagomin, PVST. ,p *320, explains the ,
/ :term by "bhava-sakti .lakgana" which in this context I 
am unable to understand.
3* prasarpati = vyapya. yartate. Cf. PVST., Karpaka•,p •320• 
4* kvacit*
and. not in other ones, may also be the cause of words and 
concepts*1
(14.20) * (The, Realist) * . Here again the Nyayabhupana
objects by saying that this (the Buddhist view) is not
. p
correct. (He argues): (15.1-3) /The relational know­
ledge by which.(only) in some.(particular instances) the 
terms stick, thread, etc. occur.: and not in other instances, 
that same relational kno?/ledge may determine the pragmatic 
use of (such terms as) "the person qualified by a stick"^
(= a staff holder) and "crystal (bead) qualified by thread"^ 
(in.a necklace) etc.^ rather than (the non-empirical usage 
of) "thread qualified by stick") etc.
1* pratyasatti =* anyapoha. The relational cognition by
which., absolutely different individuals, e.g., horses, 
lions, camels, etc., due to a common counter-correlate, .;
i.e., cow, are apprehended as. belonging to one class,
via., not-cow (x). Thus this is only the logical
mentally constructed relational knowledge (pratyasatti) 
or the exclusion of other entities (anyapoha) which brings 
about a so-called universal cognition.. Cp. Sinha, HIP.,- 
PP.331-333.
2. na hyevaiii bhavati. Lit., It does not.happen in this way. .
3. dan4i(tva)* Lit., (a person) being in possession of a 
stick. •
4. sutritva. Lit., (a crystal bead) being threaded.
5. The contention is that if there were no real relation
between a qualifier and the qualified, e.g., a person and 
the stick, how could the conceptualist (Buddhist) create 
the cognition of their relation by mere mentally constructed 
logical relational knowledge?
(15.3)♦ (The Buddhist rejoins). . The objection is 
not applicable to our (Buddhist) view. (15*4-7)• (We 
Buddhists) do not reject the stick and thread, perceived 
. in close .relation with the person and the crystal (ball),., 
as being the cause of the cognition of the; person-with-the-* . 
stick and the threaded-crystal. But an universal is not 
perceived even in a dream (and this we reject). And if 
this (universal) has to be accepted ,as an imaginative 
(entity), then, why not rather presume (or imagine) only
the relational knowledge, of a term,, which is the reason of ;
' ' ' ithe cognition of an universal.. •
(15.7). What purpose is to be served by the, unnecessary
burden of the postulation of. an extra universal entity.,
is due
(15*8). (The objection of the Nyayabhu§ana)/(only) to . 
the lack of (proper) understanding of (the Buddhist theory 
of Discrimination).
(I5.9)• (The.Realist)• Further, we assert that the univ­
ersal. ( as the meaning ofaa word) is established by Inference 
(15.10-12)• : (This inference can be explained In the
following syllogism).
1.. varam
(Major term)’: Whenever there is a cognition of. a
qualified A, it is invariably concomitant
with the perception of the attribute that
\ * < * -
qualifies it (A).
(Example): The cognition: of the person-with-stick (dan&in,),,
and (the judgmental perception) "This is a 
cow". This is (also) a qualified cognition. 
(Reason):, The Reason being the Causality of the meaning
(of the term cow).
(Conclusion): In the example, the cognition of the qualified
is, indeed, the .effect of the perception of 
the qualifier (an attribute or universal 
cowness)• This (i.e; the positive meaning 
of the term 1 cow1 is the universal cow) is 
established.
(15.13-14). (The Buddhist). (But there are two ways of
interpreting the Major term). Here is the explanation?*
2
whether the Major term is:
(a) the cognition of the qualified (A) is being produced
1. anuyogah. . ' .
2* sadhyahl
concomitantly with the perception of the qualifier (which 
is a separate entity); or whether
(b) (the cognition of the qualified A) is being produced 
concomitantly with the mere experience (i.e. imaginative 
reproduction) of the qualifier (universal)?
(15.15-19)* (The Buddhist continues). In.the former
(a) view, the perception of the major term (i.e. the 
substance or the qualified) is not possible for the 
sense-perception, when grasping (one) object (at one time, 
instant), cannot reflect the cognition of two (separate 
entities)*; And (the reason given by the Realist for 
admitting a separate universal‘entity is the cognition of 
the qualified.^* (But) this reason is not inclusive (or 
invariable)#,^ For (a qualified cognition) is seen to be
1. paksah. ^ _ _ _ ' _ •
2. pratyaksa-vadha-sadhanavadhanam avaka^ayati. I am. 
unable to give.a literal rendering of the passage.
3* The Buddhist holds that entities are unitary, i.e., they 
comprise both the characterized (dharmin) and.the 
characteristic or property (dharma). Thus according 
to him the two are perceived^simultaneously through .the 
same sense-organ. Of. Dignaga^ P.Samuccaya-vrtti.^p.SS 
"yatra vi&esya-vi£esanabhavah tatra sarnanendriya-gocarat- 
vam.": . * . .
4* Lit. , 11 Universal is the qualified cognition."
5* hetur-anaikantikah.
possible^even without perceiving a qualifier separate 
(from the qualified)/ For example: (in the propositions)
11A dar is the possessor, of its own character (or nature^"1;
Or •/ ' % ’ ' '
"The universal (of cow) is (its) cow-ness11/
(We do not apprehend a qualifier universal as separate from 
the individual).
(16.1-4). (The Buddhist continues). . And in.the latter
(b) view there is a petitio principii. ' (We say), "The . 
body (of the cow) is the possessor of the genus^ of cow 
(i.e. the cow-ness),"' “just as (we say) "the gar is the 
possessor of its own character1'. For (In all such 
propositions) the division of the qualifier and the qualif- 
icand is intended, (by the Buddhist) to be!based on: the
imaginary difference' (between the two), (and) since proposi-
' 4  '
tions such as uthis is a cow" is being based on the experience 
of the exclusion of all that is (referred to by the term) 
not-cow. (16.5)• This is indeed, not the. cognition of 
the universal.
1. dar&ana or perception. ;
2. sfddha-sa dhanam. ■:
3. .
4. bhavitva.
1(16*5-6)* And what we perceive in the clear perception
is only the particular (i.e. A and the exclusion of not-A),
2 ' ~ , 
and this factor debars the admission of the (vicious; circle
■' ' 3
of (the realistic pluralism) of such imposed realities as,
4 .
univefsals, attributes, actions etc* (16*7*) Or the theory
pr
of non-percept ion of the perceptible is well known (in sub­
stantiation of the Buddhist view of ’Discrimination1 without 
resorting to universal entities)*
1* Patupratyaksa sc patupratyaya.
According to the Ryaya-VaiSesikas cognitions reproduced 
in memory through- reminiscent impressions are three-fold;
(a) patupratyaya or ’'vivid cognition” - ”a normal type of 
c'ognition fw hieh involves the minimum degree of attention 
sufficient to ensure reproduction in memory”";
, (b) abhyasapratyaya or ”repetitional cognition” - ’'repeated­
ly revolving a certain idea in one’s mind” ;
(c)adarapratyaya or ”regardful cognition”' - in which ’’one’s 
mind;gets riveted to a wonderful or extraordinary object”*
Cf.; Kuppuswami Sastri, Primer., pp. 144*145*
2* badhakam.
3* , upadhi-c akr as ya *
4. These are three^out of the seven ultimate entities or
categories, (padartha) accepted by the Realists (W.), but 
rejected by the Buddhists who believe in momentary (ksanika) 
reality* '
5* The contention is that in the judgment ”this is a cow” , we 
exclude 1not-cow*. on the basis of non-perceptionof a 
perceptible not-cow i.e., a horse, lion, etc* Thus the 
exclusion or negation is not real but only a relative and 
logical synthesis. A lion is a positive entity but only . 
with relation to a ’cow’ it is apprehended as^’not-cow* or 
non-existent)* - (Of.PVS.,31* ’anyasattaya asatta* , and 
Karnakagomin thereon). Thus, according to the,Buddhist 
whaV is affirmed and denied is not the universal but the 
particular. The Buddhist, theory of negation is comparable 
with-that of Bradley* Of. Principles of Logic, Vol.l*, 
p. 114.
a  y r
(16. 8-1G). (The Buddhist continues). Hence, the meaning
1
of the term is (said) to be. only, a positive, (thing), i.e.,
2 ■ "  3
it is an ideal image as well as. an external objective thing.
In this context, affirmation and.negation,.are not applicable 
to the ideal image, jpfirhie.h is. a passive cognitiohj neither in. 
reality (as a thing) nor in internal-feeling.(for it is neither 
to be desired nor to be not d e s i r e d ) F o r  the self-feeling.
1. vidhireva.
2. buddhyakarah. J
3. bahyarthah.*
4. samvrtya. * sariivrtti = syasamvedana. SEE P V S T .,p.l21;
. PVP.#,p*573: samvrttisadeva dharrai-dharmalaksanam.
Stcherbatsky1s*rendering of ,fDignaga!s Aphorism, Pramana— 
samucc.aya, 1.10 and his Own Comment", BL.',II, Appendix* IV, 
PP.384 ff. and 383 n.6 f. on p. 386. - Dharmottara in
HBT.,p.ll 6 ff defines 1 sv.as arrive da na* as^  1 jnanasya anubhava 
and the term has also been explained as synonymous with 
’svasamvitti*. uThe’feeling1 of the; presence in us of 
a perception is evidently conceived as belonging to the v. 
emotional sphere and is put on the same;line as the feel­
ing of1 pleasure or ease. Jineandrabuddhi^explains it. 
also as *3es~pa~vi ni £es-pa = jhanasya jnanarn’ (cp.Mdo., 
vol*115 f* 37b.l)., with reference to Digriaga’s words that 
the. result of cognition is self-consciousness (svasamvitti) 
as a feeling of something either desirable or undesirable.11; 
The reader may, see the footnote in full for a clear ex- : 
planation of the problem of; knowledge ,wi.th regard to . these 
terms of Buddhist logic. On the authority of Stcherbatsky 
we; are inclined to understand the terms expressing a 
passive cognition as against the act of cognizing.
r
(or the internal feeling), is produced by the sense- 
perception, (l6.ll). which is non-constructive (whereas 
affirmation and negation are acts of constructive or 
judgmental active cognition). (16.11-12) Nor is the 
external object really affirmed,: or denied., for it is not
.1
reflected (i.e. it does not appear in the verbal cognition,
(16*12-13). -Hence*, o we cannot really talk about (or
2
apprehend) all the attributes, (of a substance), for there 
can be no reflexion (of their sense-contact) nor a judgmental 
apprehension (is sensation).^
(16*14-15)• Thus what is affirmed and denied is only the 
feeling^ of an external object. Otherwise no pragmatic
1. A verbal cognition, according to the Buddhist, produces
only the reflexion of an ideal image of the external
object; it does not reflect the thin-in-itself (svalak-
. sana) which is momentary. Of. BL.,11, pp.405-6, 'Names
are connotative of Mental Construction of Universals1.
2. That is everything in the universe which is referred to
by the term not-A_or anyapoha* _ >■
3. The terms. .pr at i'bhasa and adhyavasaya have been explained
, by Ratnakirti in Citr’advaita-prakasavadah, RN.,j).130 in
the following words i^dvividho hi visaya-vyavaharah, 
prajjibhsTslad adhyavajsayacca. tad-iha^pratibhas’abhave1 pi 
par'apodha-svalaksanader-adhyavas’aya-matrena visayatvam 
uktara.sarvattia nirvisayatve^pravrtti-nivrttyadi 
sakala-vyavaharoccheda-prasamgat..•I; see also pp. 124,,
" 68 , 85* #
Of. supra, p.^4* n.4*
purpose would possibly be served. Thence:
(16.16-17)• :Neither the external object (i.e. an Individual) 
nor (its) ideal image (universal) can really be designated 
as the (only) positive (meaning of the term). (The term 
refers to) an external object, indeed, only due to the ”l?eeling,r 
(of it), but their combination is not (externally referred to) 
even on the .(basis of ) the "feeling"
(16.18)* By this (above exposition) Dharmottara1s view 
(17.1-2) •: has been rejected (in which, he said): 11 Affirmation 
and negation refer to (a quasi) external thing, the external-1 
ity (or objectivity) of. which is superimposed.'1 (Ratnakirti 
criticises .his'fellow Buddhist for advancing): the. arguments
which are unrealistic, against the authority of the Buddhist
5 -■ • ■ 6
writings, and illogical.
1. Lit.,11 it ■ would, inv olve ( prasanga) infringment (hani) of
(our daily) behaviour.’1 It should be remembered that the 
Buddhist logician regards 1 efficient behaviourr as the 
ultimate authority. And since he admit s: a: momentary; ;
. reality (external) he cannot be called "Idealist” in the
. .strict sense of the, word.: '
2. Cf. Stcherbatslcy, op.cit. ,p.408: (339*6) and n.3. " *. .This
view is contrasted with the standpoint of naive realism 
according to which universals (akarafati), particulars
. , (svalaksanacvyakti) and-their combinations (samanyavad,-
bheda =akrti) are all external real, objects cognized by 
special contacts with the senses.” \
3*- See Dharmottara1s view loc.cit. ,(339.7) n.4. Dharmottara 
"has written a special work on” A po ha (Bstan-hg yur,Mdo,vo1. 
112) which is not extant in Sanskrit.Stcherbatsky,ibid.,404.
4. . aiadkika. Of. supra,, foot note .2.
§. anagamam.
6. atarkiklyam.
(17*3-4). (The Realist). “If there is no, objective 
(external) entity present (corresponding) to the judgment, 
which arises in the judgment , then, what, is that which is
intended (when we say) “A has been judged” . .(in the judgment
v  i  . . •
“this is A).?
1 .■ - *'■ ■ y 2 ' ■ ■
(17*4-5)* (The Buddhist). “The same thing which is the
.  ^ 3 ' " V
object of a:propositional attitude even when there is no
object to reflect (in the sense-perception').”^ 4
(17* 5-6). (The Realist). “How can there be a propositional
attitude of a determined subject (A) by delusion (or negation)
of (all) other objects (not-A). (so long as) (first) there
is no reflexion of a common (non-discriminated := universal)
5
reality?”
(17*7-10). (The Buddhist). We answer: just as, our propo­
sitional attitude concerning such entities as “water” etc.,' 
is, indeed, determihate, aIthough (we) have not perceived the
1.. 'arthah* here means jthing.! For ^adhyavasaya* ©f*-lnf ra;$\ 
A“PpendrX'-i$^ pratibhasa adhyavasaya y supra, p. 55"n.3 •
2. arthah. 1  ’’ ,9-*/
3* pravriti.
4. For a .propositional attitude or function, the presence or 
perception of a reflexive object is not necessary*
5* avid,esa=samanya. : That is for a . determinative cognition., 
according to the Realist, first we must have an indeter- 
. minative cognition.
6. niyata.
* 7 ?
entire Universe (in contrast to ,fwater*1 etc*), similarly the 
direct expressive, force of wor&^ is determined, by the ideal 
image (of water) which isdeterminate; (therefore) the 
judgment (a cognitive act) is being produced from the totality 
pf the determinate causes* (For example.) just as the cognition .
of an unperceived fire is produced from the perception of
■ ‘ 2  '  '  ' ' ' / :  ' - "  =:  ' ‘ 1 . ' 
smoke*
(17*11-12)• Things (extreme-point-instants) are determined 
by their causal efficienty,^  their identity (or self nature) 
is based on the valid means of knowledge.(perception) (and thus),
1* ' niyata-fiaktitvat* dakti=abhida. Of. Steherbatsky, op.cit*, 
p. 112 n. 6* . V
2. From this, example it is clear that Apoha or discrimination 
•is a logical construction (adhyavasaya) just as Inference*
.. As: in inference we need hot have perceived all the similar 
.and dissimilar (paksa-yipaksa) instances; only on the basis 
.of. the a priori (i.e. the three laws of Reason, viz:
. Negation, Identity and Causation; NB.,11.12) we arrive at
the conclusion; thus is the case with Apoha. . We need. not _yj
have perceived all the instances of not-A. in order;to 
determine A* Exclusion of not-A is determined by the . y y  
causality of A and this apprehension is a logical (or mental)
.construction. Cf. RN.jp.67^ 1agrhTte1 pi vastuni manasyadi- 
' gravrttik'arakatvam vikalpasyadhyavasayitvam* • (SBNT•,
ksanabhamga-siddhih,p*33) •
- 3 *. c£* *RN.^‘rp* 131, '■ 1 niyata-saktayo. bhava hi pramana-p ar i ni s t hi t a-> 
svabhavah. • • •1. The problem discussed on this page (A§tl7) 
has been discussed by the author again in^detail in his 
other, essay on the problem of Error * * c i t r a dv ai t a-pr alca£ ava da*1, 
RN., pp 130-131. With a slight. variance, the whole passage . 
(17•7-18) re-occurs there* . ';';y.:
1 ■ 2 they are not subject to be mixed with confusion of
3
efficiency, (17.13). Hence, that (extreme particular 
reality) is the (ultimate) object.pf. the Judgmental cog­
nition (discrimination), for (the judgment) is conjoined2*, 
with the particular .ideal image (of the point instant real)., 
(and therefore!#: it is the judgment or a mental construct) 
that directs our purpopive action.
(17.14-15)• And,further, we (Buddhists) do not assert 
that our propositional, attitude is due to the imposition, of 
similarity (of either the ideal image on the external object 
or vice versa). . And thus there is ;no scope for the 
criticism that we impose external objects on internal images
1# bhajah. ‘
2. paryyanuyogablia jah. •v
3. That is, if several particulars really belong to one 
universal, their distinct causal efficiency would not 
remain distinct. . RatnakTrti explains.this distinct­
ness of individuals by the examples of sprout from 
the seed and heat from fire. of. loc.cit; also 
supra, footnote 1.
4* yogat• • -
5* janaka.
Lit., producer or creator#
■ ; ' . 1 
on the external objects. 2
(17.16-18). On the; contrary, (we Buddhists) have indeed
3 : : .
explained (our position as follows); It (similarity)
is the cognition - arising from our illusory inveterate
habit which directs (extends) our propositional attitude
1. The contention of the Buddhist view, is that although the 
external.momentary object (svalaksana) is not present in 
the conceptual contention of the term or. word, on the basis 
of its ideal image it is determined by "the exclusion of 
others*1 in the judgmental cognition. How the question 
arises: whether, the similarity of the ideal image is 
imposed-upon the external object, or vice versa? Fox* the 
momentary thing is not present and only on the basis of its 
image' we apprehend its determination and the exclusion of 
others. (This question has been posed by^RatnakTrti ,loo.cit. 
"nanu ca^s'adriSyraropena kirn .^ sy’ak’ar a sya bahye ^v aka re va .
. b ahyas y^aro pa h1,v~^ub ha y at ha p y*a s amga 11 h. aro p ya r. o pa -v is a yayo h 
svakara-bahyayoirSgrahanrasamB'havad iti cet*").In either way^ 
imposition is noli correct, for in the judgment we do not 
apprehend two things, i.e. the image and, the eternal object 
as the objects of imposition and the thing to be imposed.
The Buddhist answers "we do not say...." (see above).
2. kintarhi. 3. viplutaiva.
$-• Gf. PV.TV.234; Stcherbatsky, op.cit. ,p.4l8 n.llf.419* "The 
Universals are not external, they are internal mental con­
structions, but their difference from the external points of 
reality i^s overlooked and we through an inveterate habit 
(anadi-vasaria) deem them to be external. The external world 
is moreover split in discrete point-instants which are "part­
iculars" ,i.e. , individually distinct, discontinuous, Purpo­
sive action'of sentient beings is directed towards some 
point when it is similar to what has been previously exper- 
. ,ienbed by them as pleasant. The Universal, the image, cannot 
attract our action because it is unreal, unefficient,neither 
can the particular do it because it’is unique and dissimilar. 
The problem is solved by assuming a "coordination" (s’arupya) 
between the point-instant of reality and the imagined Univer­
sal. But this coordination consists in a.negative similar-.
/ ity (anya-vyavrtti=apoha=sarupya). just as the Universal 
"cow", is nothing but a negation of "non-cow** , just so the 
point of efficient reality is also a negation of "non-cow*1, 
fhus the unity is difference...."
5* atanoti.
((or purposive action) concerning the external particular 
realit y , .even when (we do not) perceive the. external things
(17*18). Thus, (according to the Buddhist), an assertion
■ ■ 1 '‘1 ■ of a.positive thing (constitutes) the thing qualified hy
the negation of the other (individuals of the same class),
and discriminated from the class of dissimilar instances
(i.e. not-A) (18.1-2). : And this (qualified positive ■
thing) alone is the direct import of the term “Discrimination11,
the. meaning, of the words (or names) and the. subject of
affirmation and negation. This is -established (hy us
Buddhists). /
(18.3-B)• Here (concerning the: theox*y of Apoha), the 
syllogistic formula is as follows:
(Major premise). Whatsoever is a denotative term (implies).
the cognition of the mere positive thing 
, discriminated from not-A in.the 
judgmental construction./
1. vidhih. ■
2* The reader is reminded that the class character is
only a mental construction for the Buddhist. Cf. supra•
3* prayogali. Cf, Stcherbatslcy, ibird.p.6l n.2. 
h* vastu.
5.* Cf. NB. ,1.3; Translation BL. ,11,. p. 1-9; NBT.,p.8 19*
Example: the. statement “there is water here (in
this) well'■* (That is distinctly express­
ing the well,.discriminated from old and 
dried wells and, also waters in not-wells.) 
Reason: .Reason is Identity: “This (term 'wellf) is
said to he denotative just as the word Vcow* 
(etc. is denotative of their objects.) . 
Conclusion): (Thus it is.established that every denotative
:v term denotes the positive;thing qualified by 
the discrimination of other* in the judgmental 
construction) ■
(18.6-8). The fail acy of i nva lid re a soning^* is not appl i c - 
able here (to the Buddhi st view), for, f ollowing the _ aforesaid 
rule^, although (according to the Buddhist) there is no real
■ ' r '.I-!;;. - . '• • ;■ •' . -
constant relation - (of cause and effect) between the denoted, 
and the denotative,7 it (the relation) must be admitted 
by all pragmatists as a logical mental construction*
1. ’rupam1,. here.means 1 similar to1, or 1 of that form’.
2. Cf. Stcherbatsky, op.cit*,p.hi7 h.5: “svabhava-hetuh• The 
judgment “similarity is established by a common, contrast, 
or common.negation" is an analytical one, since similarity 
and common negation, are identical.**
3* Qf. supra, (18.1-2)..
h* asiddhah.
3* purvoktena nyayena. . Cfsupra, (18.1-2).
6. paramarthika, ( sambandha) •
7. va£ya-vacakabhava. Cf. supra, (10.12-16)
8. . vyavaharathiliL. The Buddhist .pragmatism-seems to be
. similar to that of Peirce. See Dictionary of Philosophy,. 
. : p.2k5^ ' ■
(18.8-9)...otherwise (if the relation were not admitted) - 
all pragmatic' purposes would become impossible*:
■ - '' j  ’• • • . / . ’
(18.9). Nor the fallacy ;of incompatibility (can be. raised), 
for (the relation of the denoted and the denotative) is 
found (only) in similar instances.1 (18*10).. Nor is 
(the reason) hon-conclusive^ (for the denotative term 1 cow1 
denotes only the body of the individual cow. qualified by 
not-cow and. nothing else. ).
(l,8. 10-12). . However, other philosophers,^ who do not
hold that the .object of the words is the•(qualified) 
positive thing alone discriminated from things of another 
class; in the logical mental construction, (such philosophers 
regard the relation of the word and its meaning) as eternal 
(real and concomitant), (and their argument is as follows); 
(18.13-lh) “If (the extreme particular is not really denoted) 
then, either;it is superimposed (as the meaning, of the word), 
or it is (a mere) creation of (our) mind. (Thus in both 
cases thb,thing cannot be a real entity). ;
(in fact), a superimposed (unreal property)^
1. viruddhah.
2., ana i kant i ka3j. • /, Stop here and re ad M t atha-hi... u as a 
new sentence. Of. HN., p.61.
3* paraih. It is not clear, to whom.RatnakTrti refers here: 
most, probably to some fellow Buddhist philosopherr—
h. ■ upadhih. • " ; .
is r^ated (or corresponds) to a mental construction 
(imposition)^, only (while) the thing-in-it-self (particular 
real) is the object of denotation.“
(18.15). (Reason). For there is no other than the 
concomitant relation (between the word and, its meaning).
And if (the word) has nothing as its direct meaning, then,
'• ' 3
it cannot be designated as a denotative.
(18.16-18). To this (Eatnaklrti rejoins):
(Our view that a word denotes a mentally con­
structed relation of A and not-A) is supported by the three- ' 
fold^ (reasoning):
(l) . For,, (notwithstanding the opponent’s view that the 
thihg-in-itself is to be denoted), there can be no condition­
ing^ of the beginning and end (of the thing which is momentary 
and thus constantly in Flux; for beginning and end are ex­
pressed by the words only on the basis , of our mental con­
struction) ;
1. upadhiyogalj.
2. gatih. Of. NB.,III. .28,30
3* Lit., “and if there is no object (of it), (it) cannot be 
conjoined with denotative-ness“. 
k* tritayena yuktah. . ,
5* samayah. Or determining judgment. ,
" X '(2) neither a logical (syllogistic) conclusion, (nor)
the direct expressive force of the word is, possible (if 
the momentary is to he denoted);
(3) (and if. the opponent argues that the word denotes the 
momentary thing only at) the present (joint of time), then, 
there is also the difficulty that an imposed property^' 
shall not he denoted (hy a word at all)*
(18.19)* ; Thus the direct import (of the term), is that 
there, is nothing else (hut discrimination)t 
(19* 1~3)• The invariable connexion (or concomitant 
relation), (between the term and its meaning discrimination) 
is established (as follows):®1 /
"Denotative-ness (of the term) is invariably connected^
with the essence of the external object (momentary) of the
, ■ - - 6 • 
mental operation (of discrimination),, (and being), excluded
1. phala. .. ■ _
5. sakti. May mean indirect forces of word (lak§ana and 
vyafljana) •
3* upadhih. That is it-self a mental construction. An
imposed property is "imposed" only because it is not 
present* ' : "
h* vyapti-siddhilj. EH.,p.6l*,"the text ends.here,
3* vyapyate. Or ’marked-.
6, . adhyavasita-bahya-vi§ayatvena* :
from dissimilar cases*,:.
(19*4-7)• It is, in .fact, the thing2which is p r i m a r i l y  
(or mainly) expressed by words, and discrimination is 
apprehended there as: being its attribute*
And the thing is one (point instant), (the 
essence of which) is different from a mental construction 
and sense reflexion,® , In reality there is nothing to be 
/denoted (as) constant and permanent (i.e. a positive univ­
ersal .existence)*^
(19*8)* Here ends the.work entitled "Apoha-siddhify" or 
/ "the. Establishment of Discriminationt,•
. • . .. • ■ . . ' !-V C
(1.9• 9) • This is a work of the gredt scholar, the -revered 
Ratnaklrti* ‘ ,'
(19• 10-17) • May this be Imown as a difficult work on
.1* :vip;ak§a=avi§ayavattvalak§.ana=animittavattva or absolute.
, existence, i.e., the th i ng-in~i t seIf ( svalaksana)*,
2* artha^i or the particular.
3*. gunatvena. According to the Buddhist view Reality is L 
■ - unitary. - ’>■
4* adhyasato bhasato*nyah.;
5* - sthapya, lit ., to be stable*
6. padanam. Lit., (a work) of the revered feet. Accord­
ing to an. Indian' custom, one must not pronounce the name.
. of one’s teacher, husband and parents or elders* Manu 
has also given an ordinance to this effect*.
■ ' ' i • ' ; -
Discrimination;;;; its essence1 is that v/hich is reflected 
in our mind (from, words) is not the. self-nature pf the 
positive (momentary) thing (hut discrimination - sr- 
logical relation)*
2In the world whatsoever is not-rfirm decays 
(for) not being'maintained with effoi'ts* But if firm a 
thing lasts long.^ For this very reason, (and) to benefit 
others,^* (this work) "Apoha1' of (Ratna)klrti has been written 
in leisure9 by Trailokyadatta in 6ne full night and. two 
quarters of a day* .•
(Since it is a valuable Buddhist philosophical 
woiik written virith. great effort) it must.be icept with great 
• care* ; . •
1* Or: may this be a complex (prapancalj) presentation of 
the subject of Discrimination (as the meaning of Word)*,
2. tatra lit., there.'
3* sausthyam. Or remains healthy. There is pun in'this
verse, i.e., if one keeps liis body fit and strong he
lives long: and healthily...
1*. paratMetolj...
5* SUkheria. Leisure in this context seems to have no 
significance,; and therefore, I am. inclined, to read 
"sulekhena"; meaning'1 in beautiful hand.1
6* Stcherbatsky writes' that. as. was ^written in one night 
and probably for this reason lacking clearness1', (BL*:.
vol.II, p.b-04). However, it must be pointed out that ; 
it was copied in one night - not written.
-7. ' ■* CONCLUSION*
The study of legation involves many logical, 
epistemological ;.and tietaphysical. difficulties* : But-
before we. come to discuss these difficulties, let us take 
some examples of negative statements: . , '
-I. The book is not on the .tab1e•
2 *  ■ Snow is not blacks ; • 7 .;;'
•■3• : God does, hot .exist*:7 7  .. 7777>
hv Mt. Everest is the highest mountain in the world*^
In the first statement a possible relation is ,
denied; in the 'second a quality is rejected; in the third 
existence is refuted; whereas in the fourth hegation is 
implied in the assertion of the superlative "highest"* .
It means that there is no mountaiii in the world which is. 
as high as Mt* Everest* ; .
From these '.examples it'is clear (a) that ,we have 
adequate means to distinguish between affirmative and neg- 
. ative propositions,? and (b) that thev denial may but need
not necessarily'be expressed in a negative form of statement*, 
Linguistic signs of negation,' such as the particle not <
; T; We borrow this, example from A.J.Ayer, "Negation" Philo- . 
. 7 sophical Essays * (195b) * p *36*  ^ : 7 .
2 .  ' V i c T e ^  i b i d .  ; ;  v  ' 7  7 - 7 -
(Sanskrit nan), and.. the prefix non- or un- (Sanskrit a-) 
etc* have no meaning: they correspond to nothing in reality* 
For without using' them a negative judgment can be expressed ; 
and hy repeating them we can express an affirmative judgment 
as. is -the case in a double negation* However, negative 
signs convey a sense only when they are 'used in propositions* 
According to B* Russell not is not an nobject wordt,;, it 
belongs to the class of "propositional words.";*,.
t,: 5*512 t,( "p1/ is true ;if t"p"; is false* Therefore
in the true proposition "~pH "p" is a false proposition*
How then can the stroke ,f~H bring it into agreement with 
'reality?. - V" ■ . ’
That which denies in "tp," is however;not " " but - 
that which all signs of this notation, which deny p, have 
in common. . \
Hence the common rule according to which " *p .‘V  
,..M’ **£ u ~P v :§p*V ” ~p • p etc* etc.*. ;(to infinity)
are constructed* And this which is common to them all
• ' , . - ‘z .• ' . ' • - . ■■ ' -  ■
mirrors denial."^ 1 ’
1* Cf * Ludwig Wittgenstein,. Tract atus Log! co-Fhi losophicus,
■ (Eighth, imp.I960) , . p *75 (i.j.,0621)* - r— —
2* Inquiry into Meaning; and Truth*., (fifth imp* 1956), pp*
' . 70., 77* . -
3• L&dwig Wittgeiistein, op • cit•, p . 133*
The question is where does the truth of a negative ; . 
; % • • proposiAiph^lie?y, ‘‘A I^;;an\,affirmatiye;-propositi on, for v •;-
I; ; instance,, "it is rainy"-, is true it corresponds to the
v V ;A v actual f a c t u a l B u t  a negative proposition "it ^
is not rainy" can also he true at a different time. ., And
if it is true, although we know it is: true, it does not 
• , correspond to reality in the manner the affi rmative propo-
*; ■ V sition "it is rainy*--. does. We do not find a negative fact.
■ .■ in the emp 1 rical world.’; However,:; a trtie negative propo- v
sit ion . describes a true situation and we must keep in mind • •
; , v t h a t  in the ultimate analysis truth refers to reality.
: THE REALIST APPROACH I;- .Vl-v'A'/
; .A-.- Indian realist thinkers,' just as their counterpart:
. v: i n  the West, .^ assign a place in the real world to whatever"
v: , the mind can know. According to -the -ihdian realist schools,
A namely , the Nyaya, the Vaisesika, and the . Bhat'f aMimamsa, y...
v' v , ; . reality (padartha) ..can primarily be divided into two categ­
ories: Existenc.e (bhava) and Non-existence (abhava)These.
.'y-y two parts (bhava) .of reality ..correspond; to their respective
: I; Cf. Ledger Wood, "The Paradox of Negative Judgment", :
Philosophical Review* Vol.XLII, No. 1,1933 ,p#Ul6.
2* Vide,. Lak, ^ pvl .( supra p .36 ir. 1). •
cognitions* In other words the former is cognized in 
the; affIrmat i ye,j udgment whereas the 1aftef is, referred 
to in the negative /judgment • Nor instance, t aking a 
stock example of Indian' logicians’, in the judgment "the 
jar,.is here on the floor"; (iha bhutale glia to'* st 1), it is : 
the positively -real entity which is the ob ject of the cog­
nition. While in the negatIve judgment "the jar is not 
here on the floor":/(iha bhutale ghato nasti),/ it is the 
hegativelyy real enti ty, / namelyy the non-^exlstence of the 
jar which is the ob ject of the cbgnitiohi -
The two categories existence and non-existence. ,
although exi sting- independently, .cannot be defined without : 
reference to each other. ; The former is;defined as "that 
real!ty which is frde from being the object of a negative
t ' ■ . -" ' • . . . ; • , •" ; - '• .
judgment"V And the latter is. explained, as "that entity 
/which depends ,f or i t s cogni 11 oh oh the po si five count er- ; 
entity, that is the hegatum (pratiyogin)" • The realists
believe; that realty exists independent to our; knowledge• 
Negative reality is ho exception to thi s/ rule. There . 
are negative.facts in the world just as/there are positive
IV ibid. : ■" 7 - ■ 7 ' ^  7/ :: \7’7-k ■; 7
2. /Kir., p.38h SP., pi65; Sl.Vart., Ab. verse.27 p. 182.
facts *1 Whether we can know-all of them or can hey aware , 
of all of them is a different que £tion, For thi s reason 
y- / . it isysaid that in the negative cognition v/e depend on the 
' •/ cognition (jnana) of the counter-positive (pratiyogin).
. Otherwise the/negation of. mere existence (bhava).would 
' y . mean the denial of the Whole of Existence while this is not
; intended in the usage of negat.ion/in practical everyday V :
yy; .ylife,/■■.- • ■ ■ ■ ' - / ■ ; . ;  7 ’" ' : .•
However, we must hake it clear that the Indian 
•'•//.. realists;, at least, in their early,writings were not conr 
/ : / earned with the propositional character of negation.
; Rather they Were involved in -'Its onto 1 ogical and ep i s t emo- . 
logical prphlems. The Emancipation (moksa = apavarga) 
was def ined :in terms of "the -absolute non-exi stance, of 
' ;. pain" ( duhkha t y ant a-vi mokso ap avar galj).. *?* ■ " And according 
//••/'.. y ' to their theory of causality, namely, the "not-pre-existent- . /
;; / effect". ( asatlcafya) , an effect is produced for the first ■ .
/ ; time out of the material cause hnd is’ an entity entirely ;
! different from its, cause * By the production of the effect, \
its causes /including-its * antecedent .non-existence1 (prgabhava),
1. NS., I.i.21-22; N.Sara (1922),p.98; IQr.,p.11; Essentials,
:/. y/y V • : p.102^.. ' y //  ^ ./ ,  ^; ^ :/--y • y. ' ; ‘ ’ ■' • f ; . /. y'
■ ■ ’ • ■ ’■ : X <:\ 1
• ' ", ; V - • r .' • • . ' 'r‘ ‘ ■ : • 1 ‘ : - ;,v'
are destroyed* . Thus, it is clear that apart from the ;
problem of the negative judgment, the postulation of the .
negative ideality was also necessary for their,doctrines ■
of Emancipation and Causality.
For centuries, a main concern of the Indian.real-
ists vwas the. solution of ;the .problem: How^-negative entities
n >. ‘ '  0 - ■
cognised. The early Nyaya-Vaise^ika logicians,namely, 
Gotama* Kapada and Prasastpada maintained that negative 
cognition was an inferentiaT judgment• But the later , 
Nyaya-Vaise§ikas subsequent to Uddyotakara, explained 
it as a perceptual cognition.' The Bhat’fa-MImamsakas did 
not:agree with the other realists. They maintained that .
Negat i on i t self (abha vap r araaiia) i s the indep endent me ans .
i ' - . -  • 1
of cognizing the reality of non-existence♦
THE TRUTH OF A NEGATIVE JUDGMENT - LIES . IN THE FACT 1 OF ITS ■; 
BEING A COMPLEX OF AFFIRMATIVE JUDGMENTS. . ■
-: The weakness of the realists1 argument lies in. the'
fact that the cognition of.the so-called negative entity
1. Vide supra pp. 11-12.
. 2 • NS •, 1 1 i . 2—12; VS., IX • i .1-10; PBh.,p.225*
3. Vide, NVT. ,I.i.if. (ICSS), p.315 NIC.,p. 195,* supra Chap.
IV. Section VII.
if. Si.yart.,Ab.verses l,Jf6;.; .S.pipika,pp.233“2if7; MM. ,p.132, ^
depends on the cognition of its counter-positive (pratiyogin). 
The judgment "the hook is/not on the.table" presupposes the 
knowledge of "the book"• Thus, the affirmative and negative 
judgments cannot-be. regarded as coordinate judgments*'*'
The difference between the fwo is that whereas the former 
refers to reality .directly*, the, latter refers to it only 
indirectly* Thus, 1 the -.truth of a negative judgment does not. 
lie in the so-called real ndn-ekistenee (abhayapadartha) as -, 
suggested by the realists* But it actually rests upon two., 
affirmative judgments: (l) the affirmative judgment of which 
it is the denial, and (2) the;affirmative judgment of some 
other fact on the ground of which the first judgment is 
denied* For instance, in the judgment "Snow .is.not black", 
first we have to refer to the affirmative judgment, "Snow is 
black" and then reject it; but in;order to reject it we have 
to depend on some other affirmative judgment which provides 
us with the logical basis for doing so. And this basis is 
provided.by the judgment "Snow is white"*. . In Bradley*s 
words: "The truth of the negative may be seen in .the end to 
lie in the affirmation of a positive quality." In the 
west this theory is advocated by anumber of "eminent philo-,/
1. .Cf.F.H.Bradiey, Principles of Logic (1922).p,111; Richard;
Wollheim. F .H.Bradle.v. (pelican Book A 352). p.llO.
2. op.cit., p . 11.6• - ■
sophers and- logicians, past and contemporary*",‘/among whom \
are Aristotle, ' Kant Sigwart, W.B.G*Johnson and Raphael . ,
1 1 . , '. -; 2■ " ■' *,t - . 3 , ;; -
Demos.. . , Henry Bergson and Bertrand Russell^ may also
“be included in this list.
■ In India two systems, , namely, the (logical) Buddhist '
and the Prabhakara MimaErisa Schools^ maintained this theory
of, negation* ;When-we refer to Indian philosophy^ and :logic r.;
we have to speak in terms of systems rather than of the
individual thinkers. However, if we were to name them we 'pv
would certainly say:that the Buddhist logicians Dharmakirtl,,
Kahiiakagomin,: Prajnakaragupta, Dharmottara,. JSanasrimitra,
and Ratnakirti ; as v/ell as the Mlmarpsakas Prabhakara and,
Salikanatha Mlsra advocated this theory.
. The two above, mentioned systems explained the
negative judgment in the following terms:
Therh are two conditions of a valid negative judgment;
(l) The judgment of .perceptibility of the thing to :be
denied; and Its non-perception (svabhavanupalabdhi. = ,>
dpsyanupalabdhi) /'■ ?
(2 ) The perception of the bare locus (bhutalamatra);. on
-•1. '■'■■Ofp L . Wood', ; op • c i t., pp • 120-121 • ,
2. Creative Evolution. (English transl. by Arthur Mitchell: • 
Reprint 1951) PP* 301, 306-307.
3* Russell, ■ pp> cit .,pp. 163-161, 73^71*
the basis of which the perception of the thing
' 1 ' ' . A ' •*'=.'' . '
is denied*
According to this theory, negation is an inferential . 
form of judgment. . It is explained that all objects of 
human judgments are perceptible (dr^ys). Now, then, when 
we perceive the bare locus, say, the empty table with 
reference to a book, we infer the absence of the book in the.. 
following manner:
Thesis: "the book is not .on. the table’"
. Reason: . "we perceive the bare table. Had it
been there we would have likewise perceived 
V' it."2 / ■ ' ' ■•*''
Thus in the theory of the Buddhists and the Prabhakaras 
the negative judgment is not a tautology of the.form "there 
is. no book on the table because there is none". Rather . 
it is a deduction of the form "the book is not, on the table 
because there is an empty table.
1. . Vide, supra Chap.II, pp. SJ-H It PV. ,1.31; PP.,pp.118-20.
2. Cf. PVQ.,pp.20-22 (a.ed.p,2); NB.,11.13; supra Chap. IV.,, 
sect*IV. Note: Indian logicians examp1ified. negation
by instances of a jar. (ghata), and floor (bhutala) such
as, "the jar is not on the^floor". ,
3* PVS. ,p.31 1 anyasattayasatt.a^ Th..Stcherbatsky, Buddhist 
Logic, vol.Ii,p.118 n. 1• v
" ■ THE LIMITS.: tiFTHE. NBgATIVE .TnDn-M^ iWT ABE^EMBIRICAL ONLY.
v-From - this theory of.negation, namely, that the 
; truth of a negative judgment ultimately lies in the fact of -gyy
its'.-being acomplex of •affifmatiye: judgments, a very 
. intex^esting point emerges. . , That; is :that the limits of 'y,/
f  f/negation ;.are exclusively empirical."The negative judgment 7; 
is possible - only of such things of which the presence and/, y •/."// 
/absence hav^ been experienced.; ;;Non-perceptiQn or negation 
y can only be applied/to ;a:possible/Perception, and therefore
 ^ ; ; "it; must keep, our know!edge within the borders of sensuous . .r.: -
■ experIenceM,.^ : Negation of a non-perceptible., oh super- '■,/
/// y. sensuous object (adysya .= •■depakplasvabhnvaviprakpsta) dannot y
be-: ac dep ted as ay valid negat i ve judgment. ’ In DharmakI r t i * s. :/
yj'-words: ^Negation;of, objects inaccessible (to experience) is ./ 
the.source of problematic reasoning, since; its dssence Is 
=  ^" exclusive/'ofboth direct and,^indirect"^ knowledge*1,2 ■ 7 ■
, ‘ • Letyus take the statement:. "God does not exist1",
y y v and trv to apply the above/discussed theory of negation. /• y y
If the; negative proposition is/true It means the counter . f/:////4 
affirmative must be false./ First:we have to entertain the
..^ _ “ fy^ 7-v\7Bn,/V , v -r , .- : — -— ::;y
yyy 1 .  y q f . S tche iybatsky , - i b i d , y , v o l . I , p . 382^  * .. Hy
:'2.:yyNB.II,h8,y Trto BL^II,p:il07*>
affirmative judgment "God exists,tf and reject it but in 
order to.reject it we have to depend on:some other affirmative 
judgment which; provides us with the basis for doing so* In-. , 
the proposition '• the book is not on the table**', it is the 
assertion of the empty table that provides■us with the logic- 
>■ al basis for, denying the affirmative proposition uthe book 
is on. the table1* Now,- in the. case of the denial of the 
existence of God we find no -such verifiable empirical logical 
ground on the basis of which the existence of God can be 
denied* Therefore, such statements as **God does not exist1' 
are meaningless*, Furthermore, since there is no basis for 
the denial, the statement uGpd does not exist**1, appears to he 
only a tautology of the form !,God does not exist because 
there is nonli*
Thus, we conclude that the theory of negation which 
is advocated by. the Buddhists and the Frabhakara logicians, 
and also supported by a number of eminent western thinkers
including B*Russell, helps us in solving &any;logical diff-
( » (
iculties involved in the probleln of the negative judgment* _ 
It also brings home the'point - that the existence of God cannot 
be logically denied*
i.,.' -V ' A. ■ ’'y : SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY , : y ^ ’■
y,'::'v, ‘ y — "v-':v-ry >  ^ : OF APQHA y ';'y:' yV;; ' ; V y -.'-y :.y  ;y,y
yi/y ’?■ (For ■de'tailsylpf the published works see yyyy;:
y.y\ y general bibliography) :"v-y-yy ■ "- V'— ^V
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